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It has been a decade since book-length writing about law and the Internet be-
gan in earnest. Ethan Katsh’s wonderful book Law in a Digital World (1995) is
just over a decade old, and anticipated the flood. My first book, Code and Other
Laws of Cyberspace (1999), is just under.
Most of these early books had a common character. We were all trying first to
make the obscure understandable, and second, to draw lessons from the under-
stood about how law and technology needed to interact.
As obscurity began to fade (as the network became more familiar), a differ-
ent pattern began to emerge: cheerleading. Many of us (or at least I) felt we had
seen something beautiful in the Net, felt that something needed to be pro-
tected, felt there were powerful interests that felt differently about all this, and
thus felt we needed to make clear just how important it was to protect the Net
of the present into the future.
This cheerleading tended to obscure certain increasingly obvious facts (not
features, more like bugs) of the Internet. Put most succinctly, there was a grow-
ing and increasingly dangerous lot of stuff on the Net. The first notice of this
crud pointed to pornography. In response, civil libertarians (the sort likely to
love the Net anyway) launched a vigorous campaign to defend the rights of
Foreword by Lawrence Lessig
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porn on the Net. But as the crud got deeper and more vicious, the urge to de-
fend it began to wane. Spam became an increasingly annoying burden. Viruses,
and worse, became positively harmful. Like a family on a beach holiday not
wanting to confront the fact that “yes, that is a sewage line running into the wa-
ter just upstream from the house we have rented,” many of us simply turned a
blind eye to this increasingly uncomfortable (and worse) fact: The Net was not
in Kansas anymore.
Jonathan Zittrain’s book is a much-needed antidote to this self-imposed
blindness. It changes the whole debate about law and the Internet. It radically
reorients the work of the Net’s legal scholars. Rather than trying to ignore the
uncomfortable parts of what the Net has become, Zittrain puts the crud right
in the center. And he then builds an understanding of the Net, and the com-
puters that made the Net possible, that explains how so much good and so
much awful could come through the very same wires, and, more important,
what we must do to recapture the good.
It is long past time for this understanding to become the focus, not just of le-
gal scholars, but any citizen thinking about the future of the Net and its poten-
tial for society. Indeed, it may well be too late. As Zittrain argues quite effec-
tively, the Internet is destined for an i9/11 event—by which I don’t mean an
attack by Al Qaeda, but rather a significant and fatally disruptive event that
threatens the basic reliability of the Internet. When that happens, the passion
clamoring for a fundamental reform of the Internet will be—if things stay as
they are—irresistible. That reform, if built on the understanding that is com-
monplace just now, will radically weaken what the Internet now is, or could be.
If built upon the understanding Zittrain is advancing here, it could strengthen
the very best of the Internet, and the potential that network offers.
Zittrain doesn’t have all the answers, though the proposals he offers are bril-
liant beginnings, and I think this powerfully argued book has more answers
than even he suspects. But his aim is not to end a debate; it is to begin it. After
providing an understanding of the great power this network promises, a power
grounded in the “generativity” of the network, and the civic spirit of a critical
mass of its users, he begins us on a path that might yet teach how to preserve the
best of generativity, while protecting us from the worst.
This is a debate that all of us need to engage soon. I know of no book that
more powerfully and directly speaks to the most important issues facing the fu-
ture of the Net. I can’t imagine a book that would speak to everyone more
clearly and simply. You need know nothing about computers or the Internet to
be inspired by this book. We need many more than the experts in computers
and the Internet to preserve it.
Forewordviii
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The venerable Warner Brothers antagonist Wile E. Coyote famously demon-
strates a law of cartoon physics. He runs off a cliff, unaware of its ledge, and
continues forward without falling. The Coyote defies gravity until he looks
down and sees there’s nothing under him. His mental gears turn as he contem-
plates his predicament. Then: splat.
Both the Internet and the PC are on a similar trajectory. They were designed
by people who shared the same love of amateur tinkering as the enterprising
Coyote. Both platforms were released unfinished, relying on their users to fig-
ure out what to do with them—and to deal with problems as they arose. This
kind of openness isn’t found in our cars, fridges, or TiVos. Compared to the rest
of the technologies we use each day, it’s completely anomalous, even absurd.
This openness, described and praised in this book in more detail as “genera-
tivity,” allowed the Internet and PC to emerge from the realms of researchers
and hobbyists and surprisingly win out over far more carefully planned and
funded platforms. (They were certainly more successful than any of the Coy-
ote’s many projects.)
Today the very popularity and use of the Internet and PC are sorely testing
that generativity. We wouldn’t want our cars, fridges, or TiVos to be altered by
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unknown outsiders at the touch of a button—and yet this remains the pre-
vailing way that we load new software on our PCs. More and more often that
software is rogue—harvesting computing cycles from a PC in order to attack
others, stealing personal information, or simply frying the PC. Soon, either
abruptly or in slow motion: splat.
The first reaction to abuses of openness is to try to lock things down. One
model for lockdown can be drawn from our familiar appliances, which are
sealed when they leave the factory. No one but a true geek could hack a car or a
fridge—or would want to—and we’ve seen glimpses of that model in commu-
nications platforms like iPods, most video game consoles, e-book readers like
the Amazon Kindle, and cable company set-top boxes. Such lockdown was the
direction a visionary Steve Jobs—the guy who gave us the first open PC, the
Apple II—first took with the iPhone, with which he bet the future of Apple.
Of course, the Internet or PC would have to be in bad shape for us to aban-
don them for such totally closed platforms; there are too many pluses to being
able to do things that platform manufacturers don’t want or haven’t thought of.
But there’s another model for lockdown that’s much more subtle, and that
takes, well, a book to unpack. This new model exploits near-ubiquitous net-
work connectivity to let vendors change and monitor their technologies long
after they’ve left the factory—or to let them bring us, the users, to them, as
more and more of our activities shift away from our own devices and into the
Internet’s “cloud.”
These technologies can let geeky outsiders build upon them just as they
could with PCs, but in a highly controlled and contingent way. This is iPhone
2.0: an iPod on steroids, with a thriving market for software written by out-
siders that must be approved by and funneled through Apple. It’s also Web 2.0
software-as-service ventures like the Facebook platform and Google Apps,
where an application popular one day can be banished the next.
This model is likely the future of computing and networking, and it is no
minor tweak. It’s a wholesale revision to the Internet and PC environment
we’ve experienced for the past thirty years. The serendipity of outside tinkering
that has marked that generative era gave us the Web, instant messaging, peer-
to-peer networking, Skype, Wikipedia—all ideas out of left field. Now it is dis-
appearing, leaving a handful of new gatekeepers in place, with us and them
prisoner to their limited business plans and to regulators who fear things that
are new and disruptive. We are at risk of embracing this new model, thinking it
the best of both worlds—security and whimsy—when it may be the worst.
Even fully grasping how untenable our old models have become, consolidation
and lockdown need not be the only alternative. We can stop that future.
Preface to the Paperback Editionx
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On January 9, 2007, Steve Jobs introduced the iPhone to an eager au-
dience crammed into San Francisco’s Moscone Center.1 A beautiful
and brilliantly engineered device, the iPhone blended three products
into one: an iPod, with the highest-quality screen Apple had ever pro-
duced; a phone, with cleverly integrated functionality, such as voice-
mail that came wrapped as separately accessible messages; and a device
to access the Internet, with a smart and elegant browser, and with
built-in map, weather, stock, and e-mail capabilities. It was a technical
and design triumph for Jobs, bringing the company into a market
with an extraordinary potential for growth, and pushing the industry
to a new level of competition in ways to connect us to each other and
to the Web.
This was not the ﬁrst time Steve Jobs had launched a revolution.
Thirty years earlier, at the First West Coast Computer Faire in nearly
the same spot, the twenty-one-year-old Jobs, wearing his ﬁrst suit, ex-
hibited the Apple II personal computer to great buzz amidst “10,000
walking, talking computer freaks.”2 The Apple II was a machine for
hobbyists who did not want to fuss with soldering irons: all the ingre-
dients for a functioning PC were provided in a convenient molded plastic case.
It looked clunky, yet it could be at home on someone’s desk. Instead of puzzling
over bits of hardware or typing up punch cards to feed into someone else’s main-
frame, Apple owners faced only the hurdle of a cryptic blinking cursor in the up-
per left corner of the screen: the PC awaited instructions. But the hurdle was not
high. Some owners were inspired to program the machines themselves, but true
beginners simply could load up software written and then shared or sold by their
more skilled or inspired counterparts. The Apple II was a blank slate, a bold de-
parture from previous technology that had been developed and marketed to per-
form speciﬁc tasks from the ﬁrst day of its sale to the last day of its use.
The Apple II quickly became popular. And when programmer and entrepre-
neur Dan Bricklin introduced the ﬁrst killer application for the Apple II in
1979—VisiCalc, the world’s ﬁrst spreadsheet program—sales of the ungainly
but very cool machine took oﬀ dramatically.3 An Apple running VisiCalc
helped to convince a skeptical world that there was a place for the PC at every-
one’s desk and hence a market to build many, and to build them very fast.
Though these two inventions—iPhone and Apple II—were launched by
the same man, the revolutions that they inaugurated are radically diﬀerent. For
the technology that each inaugurated is radically diﬀerent. The Apple II was
quintessentially generative technology. It was a platform. It invited people to
tinker with it. Hobbyists wrote programs. Businesses began to plan on selling
software. Jobs (and Apple) had no clue how the machine would be used. They
had their hunches, but, fortunately for them, nothing constrained the PC to
the hunches of the founders. Apple did not even know that VisiCalc was on the
market when it noticed sales of the Apple II skyrocketing. The Apple II was de-
signed for surprises—some very good (VisiCalc), and some not so good (the
inevitable and frequent computer crashes).
The iPhone is the opposite. It is sterile. Rather than a platform that invites in-
novation, the iPhone comes preprogrammed. You are not allowed to add pro-
grams to the all-in-one device that Steve Jobs sells you. Its functionality is locked
in, though Apple can change it through remote updates. Indeed, to those who
managed to tinker with the code to enable the iPhone to support more or diﬀerent
applications,4 Apple threatened (and then delivered on the threat) to transform
the iPhone into an iBrick.5 The machine was not to be generative beyond the in-
novations that Apple (and its exclusive carrier, AT&T) wanted. Whereas the world
would innovate for the Apple II, only Apple would innovate for the iPhone. (A
promised software development kit may allow others to program the iPhone with
Apple’s permission.)
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Jobs was not shy about these restrictions baked into the iPhone. As he said at
its launch: 
We deﬁne everything that is on the phone. . . . You don’t want your phone to be like
a PC. The last thing you want is to have loaded three apps on your phone and then
you go to make a call and it doesn’t work anymore. These are more like iPods than
they are like computers.6
No doubt, for a signiﬁcant number of us, Jobs was exactly right. For in the
thirty years between the ﬁrst ﬂashing cursor on the Apple II and the gorgeous
iconized touch menu of the iPhone, we have grown weary not with the unex-
pected cool stuﬀ that the generative PC had produced, but instead with the 
unexpected very uncool stuﬀ that came along with it. Viruses, spam, identity
theft, crashes: all of these were the consequences of a certain freedom built into
the generative PC. As these problems grow worse, for many the promise of se-
curity is enough reason to give up that freedom.
* * *
In the arc from the Apple II to the iPhone, we learn something important about
where the Internet has been, and something more important about where it is
going. The PC revolution was launched with PCs that invited innovation by
others. So too with the Internet. Both were generative: they were designed to
accept any contribution that followed a basic set of rules (either coded for a
particular operating system, or respecting the protocols of the Internet). Both
overwhelmed their respective proprietary, non-generative competitors, such as
the makers of stand-alone word processors and proprietary online services like
CompuServe and AOL. But the future unfolding right now is very diﬀerent
from this past. The future is not one of generative PCs attached to a generative
network. It is instead one of sterile appliances tethered to a network of control.
These appliances take the innovations already created by Internet users and
package them neatly and compellingly, which is good—but only if the Internet
and PC can remain suﬃciently central in the digital ecosystem to compete with
locked-down appliances and facilitate the next round of innovations. The bal-
ance between the two spheres is precarious, and it is slipping toward the safer
appliance. For example, Microsoft’s Xbox 360 video game console is a powerful
computer, but, unlike Microsoft’s Windows operating system for PCs, it does
not allow just anyone to write software that can run on it. Bill Gates sees the
Xbox as at the center of the future digital ecosystem, rather than at its periph-
ery: “It is a general purpose computer. . . . [W]e wouldn’t have done it if it was
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just a gaming device. We wouldn’t have gotten into the category at all. It was
about strategically being in the living room. . . . [T]his is not some big secret.
Sony says the same things.”7
It is not easy to imagine the PC going extinct, and taking with it the possi-
bility of allowing outside code to run—code that is the original source of so
much of what we ﬁnd useful about the Internet. But along with the rise of in-
formation appliances that package those useful activities without readily allow-
ing new ones, there is the increasing lockdown of the PC itself. PCs may not be
competing with information appliances so much as they are becoming them.
The trend is starting in schools, libraries, cyber cafés, and oﬃces, where the
users of PCs are not their owners. The owners’ interests in maintaining stable
computing environments are naturally aligned with technologies that tame the
wildness of the Internet and PC, at the expense of valuable activities their users
might otherwise discover.
The need for stability is growing. Today’s viruses and spyware are not merely
annoyances to be ignored as one might tune out loud conversations at nearby
tables in a restaurant. They will not be ﬁxed by some new round of patches to
bug-ﬁlled PC operating systems, or by abandoning now-ubiquitous Windows
for Mac. Rather, they pose a fundamental dilemma: as long as people control
the code that runs on their machines, they can make mistakes and be tricked
into running dangerous code. As more people use PCs and make them more
accessible to the outside world through broadband, the value of corrupting
these users’ decisions is increasing. That value is derived from stealing people’s
attention, PC processing cycles, network bandwidth, or online preferences.
And the fact that a Web page can be and often is rendered on the ﬂy by drawing
upon hundreds of diﬀerent sources scattered across the Net—a page may pull
in content from its owner, advertisements from a syndicate, and links from var-
ious other feeds—means that bad code can infect huge swaths of the Web in a
heartbeat.
If security problems worsen and fear spreads, rank-and-ﬁle users will not be
far behind in preferring some form of lockdown—and regulators will speed the
process along. In turn, that lockdown opens the door to new forms of regula-
tory surveillance and control. We have some hints of what that can look like.
Enterprising law enforcement oﬃcers have been able to eavesdrop on occu-
pants of motor vehicles equipped with the latest travel assistance systems by
producing secret warrants and ﬂicking a distant switch. They can turn a stan-
dard mobile phone into a roving microphone—whether or not it is being used
for a call. As these opportunities arise in places under the rule of law—where
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some might welcome them—they also arise within technology-embracing au-
thoritarian states, because the technology is exported.
A lockdown on PCs and a corresponding rise of tethered appliances will
eliminate what today we take for granted: a world where mainstream technol-
ogy can be inﬂuenced, even revolutionized, out of left ﬁeld. Stopping this fu-
ture depends on some wisely developed and implemented locks, along with
new technologies and a community ethos that secures the keys to those locks
among groups with shared norms and a sense of public purpose, rather than in
the hands of a single gatekeeping entity, whether public or private.
The iPhone is a product of both fashion and fear. It boasts an undeniably at-
tractive aesthetic, and it bottles some of the best innovations from the PC and
Internet in a stable, controlled form. The PC and Internet were the engines of
those innovations, and if they can be saved, they will oﬀer more. As time passes,
the brand names on each side will change. But the core battle will remain. It
will be fought through information appliances and Web 2.0 platforms like to-
day’s Facebook apps and Google Maps mash-ups. These are not just products
but also services, watched and updated according to the constant dictates of
their makers and those who can pressure them.
In this book I take up the question of what is likely to come next and what
we should do about it.
Introduction 5
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I
The Rise and Stall of the
Generative Net
Today’s Internet is not the only way to build a network. In the 1990s,
the Internet passed unnoticed in mainstream circles while networks
were deployed by competing proprietary barons such as AOL, Com-
puServe, and Prodigy. The technorati placed bets on which baron
would prevail over the others, apparently imagining that the propri-
etary networks would develop in the same way that the separate phone
networks—at one time requiring diﬀerently colored phones on each
person’s desk—had converged to just one lucky provider.1 All those
bets lost. The proprietary networks went extinct, despite having accu-
mulated millions of subscribers. They were crushed by a network built
by government researchers and computer scientists who had no CEO,
no master business plan, no paying subscribers, no investment in con-
tent, and no ﬁnancial interest in accumulating subscribers.
The framers of the Internet did not design their network with vi-
sions of mainstream dominance. Instead, the very unexpectedness of
its success was a critical ingredient. The Internet was able to develop
quietly and organically for years before it became widely known, re-
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maining outside the notice of those who would have insisted on more cautious
strictures had they only suspected how ubiquitous it would become.
This ﬁrst part of the book traces the battle between the centralized propri-
etary networks and the Internet, and a corresponding ﬁght between specialized
information appliances like smart typewriters and the general-purpose PC,
highlighting the qualities that allowed the Internet and PC to win.
Today, the same qualities that led to their successes are causing the Internet
and the PC to falter. As ubiquitous as Internet technologies are today, the pieces
are in place for a wholesale shift away from the original chaotic design that 
has given rise to the modern information revolution. This counterrevolution
would push mainstream users away from a generative Internet that fosters inno-
vation and disruption, to an appliancized network that incorporates some of
the most powerful features of today’s Internet while greatly limiting its innova-
tive capacity—and, for better or worse, heightening its regulability. A seductive
and more powerful generation of proprietary networks and information appli-
ances is waiting for round two. If the problems associated with the Internet and
PC are not addressed, a set of blunt solutions will likely be applied to solve the
problems at the expense of much of what we love about today’s information
ecosystem. Understanding its history sheds light on diﬀerent possible futures
and helps us to recognize and avoid what might otherwise be very tempting
dead ends.
One vital lesson from the past is that the endpoint matters. Too often, a dis-
cussion of the Internet and its future stops just short of its endpoints, focusing
only on the literal network itself: how many people are connected, whether and
how it is ﬁltered, and how fast it carries data.2 These are important questions,
but they risk obscuring the reality that people’s experiences with the Internet
are shaped at least as much by the devices they use to access it.
As Internet-aware devices proliferate, questions posed about network regula-
tion must also be applied to the endpoints—which, until recently, have been so
open and so nonconstricting as to be nearly unnoticeable, and therefore absent
from most debates about Internet policy. Yet increasingly the box has come to
matter.
History shows that the box had competitors—and today they are back. The
early models of commercial (as compared to academic) computing assumed
that the vendor of the machinery would provide most or all of its program-
ming. The PC of the 1980s—the parent of today’s PC—diverged from these
models, but the result was by no means a foregone conclusion. Internet users
are again embracing a range of “tethered appliances,” reﬂecting a resurgence of
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the initial model of bundled hardware and software that is created and con-
trolled by one company. This will aﬀect how readily behavior on the Internet
can be regulated, which in turn will determine the extent that regulators and
commercial incumbents can constrain amateur innovation, which has been re-
sponsible for much of what we now consider precious about the Internet.3
The Internet also had competitors—and they are back. Compared to the In-
ternet, early online information services were built around very diﬀerent tech-
nical and business models. Their designs were much easier to secure against il-
legal behavior and security threats; the cost was that innovation became much
more diﬃcult. The Internet outpaced these services by assuming that every user
was contributing a goodwill subsidy: people would not behave destructively
even when there were no easy ways to monitor or stop them.
The Internet’s tradeoﬀ of more ﬂexibility for less security worked: most
imaginable risks failed to materialize—for example, people did not routinely
spy on one another’s communications, even though it was eminently possible,
and for years there were no spam and no viruses. By observing at which point
these tradeoﬀs were made, we will see that the current portfolio of tradeoﬀs is
no longer optimal, and that some of the natural adjustments in that balance,
while predictable, are also undesirable.
The fundamental challenges for those who have built and maintained the
Internet are to acknowledge crucial deﬁciencies in a network-and-endpoint
structure that has otherwise served so well for so long, to understand our alter-
natives as the status quo evaporates, and to devise ways to push the system to-
ward a future that addresses the very real problems that are forcing change,
while preserving the elements we hold most dear.
The Rise and Stall of the Generative Net 9
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Battle of the Boxes
11
Herman Hollerith was a twenty-year-old engineer when he helped to
compile the results of the 1880 U.S. Census.1 He was sure he could
invent a way to tabulate the data automatically, and over the next sev-
eral years he spent his spare time devising a punch card system for sur-
veyors to use. The U.S. government commissioned him to tally the
1890 Census with his new system, which consisted of a set of punch
cards and associated readers that used spring-mounted needles to pass
through the holes in each card, creating an electrical loop that ad-
vanced the reader’s tally for a particular hole location.
Rather than selling the required equipment to the government,
Hollerith leased it out at a rate of one thousand dollars per year for
each of the ﬁrst ﬁfty machines. In exchange, he was wholly responsible
for making sure the machines performed their designated tasks.2
The tally was a success. It took only two and a half years to tally the
1890 Census, compared to the seven years required for the 1880 
Census. Hollerith’s eponymous Tabulating Machine Company soon
expanded to other governments’ censuses, and then to payroll, inven-
tory, and billing for large ﬁrms like railroad and insurance compa-
nies.3 Hollerith retained the idea of renting rather than selling, controlling the
ongoing computing processes of his clients in order to ensure a desirable out-
come. It worked. His clients did not want to be burdened with learning how to
operate these devices themselves. Instead, they wanted exactly one vendor to
summon if something went wrong.
By the 1960s, the company name was International Business Machines, 
and IBM dominated business computing. Its leadership retained Hollerith’s
original control paradigm: ﬁrms leased IBM’s mainframes on a monthly ba-
sis, and the lease covered everything—hardware, software, maintenance, and
training.4 Businesses developed little in-house talent for operating the ma-
chines because everything was already included as part of the deal with IBM.
Further, while IBM’s computers were general-purpose information processors,
meaning they could be repurposed with new software, no third-party software
industry existed. All software was bundled with the machine rental as part of
IBM’s business model, which was designed to oﬀer comprehensive computing
solutions for the particular problems presented by the client. This model pro-
vided a convenient one-stop-shopping approach to business computing, re-
sulting in software that was well customized to the client’s business practices.
But it also meant that any improvements to the computer’s operation had to
happen through a formal process of discussion and negotiation between IBM
and the client. Further, the arrangement made it diﬃcult for ﬁrms to switch
providers, since any new vendor would have to redo the entire project from
scratch.
IBM’s competitors were not pleased, and in 1969, under the threat of an
antitrust suit—which later materialized—IBM announced that it would un-
bundle its oﬀerings.5 It became possible to buy an IBM computer apart from
the software, beginning a slow evolution toward in-house programming talent
and third-party software makers. Nevertheless, for years after the unbundling
announcement many large ﬁrms continued to rely on custom-built, externally
maintained applications designed for speciﬁc purposes.
Before unbundling, mainstream customers encountered computing devices
in one of two ways. First, there was the large-scale Hollerith model of main-
frames managed by a single ﬁrm like IBM. These computers had general-pur-
pose processors inside, capable of a range of tasks, and IBM’s programming
team devised the software that the customer needed to fulﬁll its goals. The sec-
ond type of computing devices was information appliances: devices hardwired
for a particular purpose. These were devices like the Friden Flexowriter, a type-
writer that could store what was typed by making holes in a roll of tape.
The Rise and Stall of the Generative Net12
Rethreading the tape through the Flexowriter allowed it to retype what had
come before, much like operating a player piano. Cutting and pasting diﬀerent
pieces of Flexowriter tape together allowed the user to do mail merges about as
easily as one can do them today with Microsoft Word or its rivals.6 Information
appliances were substantially cheaper and easier to use than mainframes, thus
requiring no ongoing rental and maintenance relationship with a vendor.
However, they could do only the tasks their designers anticipated for them.
Firms could buy Flexowriters outright and entrust them to workers—but
could not reprogram them.
Today’s front-line computing devices are drawn from an entirely diﬀerent
lineage: the hobbyist’s personal computer of the late 1970s. The PC could be
owned as easily as a Flexowriter but possessed the ﬂexibility, if not the power, of
the generic mainframe.7 A typical PC vendor was the opposite of 1960s IBM:
it made available little more than a processor in a box, one ingeniously under-
accessorized to minimize its cost. An owner took the inert box and connected it
to common household appliances to make it a complete PC. For example, a
$99 Timex/Sinclair Z-1000 or a $199 Texas Instruments TI-99/4A could 
use a television set as a display, and a standard audio cassette recorder to store
and retrieve data.8 The cassette player (and, later, PC-speciﬁc diskette drives)
could also store and retrieve code that reprogrammed the way the computers
worked.9 In this way, the computers could run new software that was not nec-
essarily available at the time the computer was purchased. PC makers were sell-
ing potential functionality as much as they were selling actual uses, and many
makers considered themselves to be in the hardware business only. To them, the
PCs were solutions waiting for problems.
But these computers did not have to be built that way: there could simply be
a world of consumer information technology that comprised appliances. As
with a Flexowriter, if a designer knew enough about what the user wanted a PC
to do, it would be possible to embed the required code directly into the hard-
ware of the machine, and to make the machine’s hardware perform that speciﬁc
task. This embedding process occurs in the digital watch, the calculator, and
the ﬁrmware within Mr. Coﬀee that allows the machine to begin brewing at a
user-selected time. These devices are all hardware and no software (though
some would say that the devices’ software is inside their hardware). If the coﬀ-
eemaker, calculator, or watch should fail to perform as promised, the user
knows exactly whom to blame, since the manufacturers determine the device’s
behavior as surely as Herman Hollerith controlled the design and use of his tab-
ulators.
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The essence—and genius—of separating software creation from hardware
construction is that the decoupling enables a computer to be acquired for one
purpose and then used to perform new and diﬀerent tasks without requiring
the equivalent of a visit to the mechanic’s shop.10 Some might remember global
retailer Radio Shack’s “75-in-1 Electronic Project Kit,” which was a piece of
cardboard with lots of electronic components attached to it.11 Each compo-
nent—a transistor, resistor, capacitor, speaker, relay, or dial—was wired to
springy posts so that a budding Hollerith could quickly attach and detach wires
linking individual components to one another, reconﬁguring the board to imi-
tate any number of appliances: radio, doorbell, lie detector,12 or metronome.
The all-important instruction manual oﬀered both schematics and wiring in-
structions for various inventions—seventy-ﬁve of them—much like a book of
recipes. Kids could tinker with the results or invent entirely new appliances
from scratch as long as they had the ideas and the patience to attach lots of wires
to springy posts.
Computer software makes this sort of reconﬁgurability even easier, by sepa-
rating the act of algorithm-writing from the act of wiring and rewiring the ma-
chine. This separation saves time required for switching between discrete tasks,
and it reduces the skill set a programmer needs in order to write new soft-
ware.13 It also lays the groundwork for the easy transmission of code from an
inventor to a wider audience: instead of passing around instructions for how to
rewire the device in order to add a new feature, one can distribute software code
that feeds into the machine itself and rewires it in a heartbeat.
The manufacturers of general-purpose PCs could thus write software that
gave a PC new functionality after the computer left the factory. Some early PC
programs were distributed in printed books for buyers to retype into their ma-
chines, but increasingly aﬀordable media like cassette tapes, diskettes, and car-
tridges became a more cost-eﬀective way to install software. The consumer
merely needed to know how to load in the cassette, diskette, or cartridge con-
taining the software in order to enjoy it.
Most signiﬁcantly, PCs were designed to run software written by authors
other than the PC manufacturer or those with whom the PC manufacturer had
special arrangements.14 The resulting PC was one that its own users could pro-
gram, and many did. But PCs were still ﬁrmly grounded in the realm of hob-
byists, alongside 75-in-1 Project Kit designs. To most people such a kit was just
a big pile of wires, and in the early 1980s a PC was similarly known as more
oﬀbeat recreation—a 75-in-1 Project Kit for adults—than as the gateway to a
revolution.
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The business world took up PCs slowly—who could blame companies for
ignoring something called “personal computer”? In the early 1980s ﬁrms were
still drawing on custom-programmed mainframes or information appliances
like smart typewriters. Some businesses obtained custom-programmed mini-
computers, which the employees accessed remotely through “dumb” terminals
connected to the minicomputers via small, rudimentary in-building networks.
The minicomputers would typically run a handful of designated applications
—payroll, accounts receivable, accounts payable, and perhaps a more enter-
prise-speciﬁc program, such as a case management system for a hospital or a
course selection and assignment program for a university.
As the 1980s progressed, the PC increased in popularity. Also during this
time the variety of things a user could do with a PC increased dramatically, pos-
sibly because PCs were not initially networked. In the absence of a centrally
managed information repository, there was an incentive to make an individual
PC powerful in its own right, with the capacity to be programmed by anyone
and to function independently of other computers. Moreover, while a central
information resource has to be careful about the places to which access is
granted—too much access could endanger others’ use of the shared machine—
individual PCs in hobbyist hands had little need for such security. They were
the responsibility of their keepers, and no more.
The PC’s ability to support a variety of programs from a variety of makers
meant that it soon outpaced the functionality of appliancized machines like
dedicated word processors, which were built to function the same way over the
entire life of the machine. An IT ecosystem comprising ﬁxed hardware and
ﬂexible software soon proved its worth: PC word processing software could be
upgraded or replaced with better, competing software without having to junk
the PC itself. Word processing itself represented a signiﬁcant advance over typ-
ing, dynamically updated spreadsheets were immensely more powerful than
static tables of numbers generated through the use of calculators, and relational
databases put index cards and more sophisticated paper-based ﬁling systems 
to shame.15 Entirely new applications like video games, beginning with text-
based adventures,16 pioneered additional uses of leisure time, and existing
games—such as chess and checkers—soon featured the computer itself as a
worthy opponent.17
PCs may not have been ideal for a corporate environment—documents and
other important information were scattered on diﬀerent PCs depending on who
authored what, and enterprise-wide backup was often a real headache. But the
price was right, and diﬃdence about them soon gave way as businesses could
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rely on college graduates having skills in word processing and other basic PC
tools that would not have to be relearned on a legacy minicomputer system.
The mature applications that emerged from the PC’s uncertain beginnings
provided a reason for the white-collar worker to be assigned a PC, and for an
ever broader swath of people to want a PC at home. These machines may have
been bought for one purpose, but the ﬂexible architecture—one that made
them ready to be programmed using software from any number of sources—
meant that they could quickly be redeployed for another. Someone could buy a
PC for word processing and then discover the joys of e-mail, or gaming, or the
Web.
Bill Gates used to describe his company’s vision as “a computer on every desk
and in every home, all running Microsoft software.”18 That may appear to be a
simple desire to move units—nearly every PC sold meant more money for Mi-
crosoft—but as it came true in the developed world, the implications went be-
yond Microsoft’s proﬁtability. Signiﬁcantly, Gates sought to have computers
“all running Microsoft software” rather than computers running only Micro-
soft software. Windows PCs, like their Mac OS and Linux counterparts, do not
insist that all the software found within them come from the same vendor and
its partners. They were instead designed to welcome code from any source. De-
spite Microsoft’s well-earned reputation as a ruthless monopolist, a reputation
validated by authorities in multiple jurisdictions, a Microsoft PC on nearly
every desk can also be interpreted as an ongoing invitation to outside coders to
write new software that those PCs can run.19
An installed base of tens of millions of PCs ensured the existence of pretilled
soil in which new software from any source could take root. Someone writing a
creative new application did not need to persuade Microsoft or Apple to allow
the software onto the machine, or to persuade people to buy a new piece of
hardware to run it. He or she needed only to persuade users to buy (or simply
acquire) the software itself, and it could run without further obstacle. As PCs
were connected to the Internet, the few remaining barriers—the price of the
media and corresponding trip to the computer store—were largely eliminated.
People could simply click on the desired link, and new software would be in-
stalled.
Networked PCs may have been purchased for a variety of narrow reasons,
but collectively they represented openness to new code that could be tried and
shared at very little eﬀort and cost. Their manufacturers—both hardware and
operating system makers—found their incentives largely aligned with those of
independent software developers.20 The more outside developers there were
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writing new code, the more valuable a computer would become to more people.
To be sure, operating system makers sometimes tried to expand their oﬀerings
into the “application space”—for example, Microsoft and Apple each developed
their own versions of word processing software to compete with third-party ver-
sions, and the Microsoft antitrust cases of the 1990s arose from attempts to link
operating system dominance to application dominance—but the most suc-
cessful business model for both Microsoft and Apple has been to make their
computers’ operating systems appealing for third-party software development,
since they proﬁt handsomely from the sale of the platforms themselves.21
* * *
The Hollerith model is one of powerful, general-purpose machines maintained
continuously and exclusively by a vendor. The appliance model is one of pre-
dictable and easy-to-use specialized machines that require little or no mainte-
nance. Both have virtues. The Hollerith machine is a powerful workhorse and
can be adapted by the vendor to fulﬁll a range of purposes. The appliance is easy
to master and it can leverage the task for which it was designed, but not much
else. Neither the Hollerith machine nor the appliance can be easily repro-
grammed by their users or by third parties, and, as later chapters will explain,
“generativity” was thus not one of their features.
A third model eclipsed them: powerful desktop PCs that were adaptable to
many diﬀerent tasks and accessible to anyone who wanted to recode them, and
that had the capacity to connect to an Internet that was as good as invisible
when it was working well. Perhaps the PC model of computing would have
gathered steam even if it had not been initially groomed in hobbyist backwa-
ters. But the strength of the Hollerith model and the risk aversion of many
commercial ﬁrms to alternatives—“No one got ﬁred for choosing IBM sys-
tems”—suggest that the idea of user-maintained and user-tweaked computers
running code from many diﬀerent sources was substantially enhanced by ﬁrst
being proven in environments more amenable to experimentation and risk-
taking.22 These backwater environments cultivated forms of amateur tinkering
that became central to major software development. Both small and large
third-party applications are now commonplace, and major software eﬀorts of-
ten include plug-in architecture that allows fourth parties to write code that
builds on the third parties’ code.
The box has mattered. The complex, expensive computers of the 1960s, cen-
trally run and managed by a professional class, allowed for customization to the
user’s needs over time, but at substantial expense. The simpler, inexpensive in-
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formation appliances intended for individual use diﬀused technology beyond
large consuming ﬁrms, but they could not be repurposed or customized very
well; changes to their operation took place only as successive models of the ap-
pliance were released by the manufacturer. The PC integrated the availability of
the appliance with the modiﬁability of the large generic processor—and began
a revolution that aﬀected not only amateur tinkerers, but PC owners who had
no technical skills, since they could install the software written by others.
The story of the PC versus the information appliance is the ﬁrst in a recur-
ring pattern. The pattern begins with a generative platform that invites contri-
butions from anyone who cares to make them. The contributions start among
amateurs, who participate more for fun and whimsy than for proﬁt. Their
work, previously unnoticed in the mainstream, begins to catch on, and the
power of the market kicks in to regularize their innovations and deploy them in
markets far larger than the amateurs’ domains. Finally, the generative features
that invite contribution and that worked so well to propel the ﬁrst stage of in-
novation begin to invite trouble and reconsideration, as the power of openness
to third-party contribution destabilizes its ﬁrst set of gains. To understand the
options that follow, it helps to see the sterile, non-generative alternatives to the
generative system. The endpoint box is one place where these alternatives can
vie against each other for dominance. The network to which these boxes are
connected is another, and the next chapter explores a parallel battle for su-
premacy there.
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As the price of computer processors and peripheral components
dropped precipitously from the days of mainframes, it became easier
for computer technology to end up in people’s homes. But the crucial
element of the PC’s success is not that it has a cheap processor inside,
but that it is generative: it is open to reprogramming and thus repur-
posing by anyone. Its technical architecture, whether Windows, Mac,
or other, makes it easy for authors to write and owners to run new
code both large and small. As prices dropped, distributed ownership
of computers, rather than leasing within institutional environments,
became a practical reality, removing legal and business practice barri-
ers to generative tinkering with the machines.
If the hobbyist PC had not established the value of tinkering so that
the PC could enter the mainstream in the late 1980s,1 what cheap
processors would small ﬁrms and mainstream consumers be using 
today? One possibility is a set of information appliances. In such a
world, people would use smart typewriters for word processing from
companies like Brother: all-in-one units with integrated screens and
printers that could be used only to produce documents. For gaming,
they would use dedicated video game consoles—just as many do today. A per-
sonal checkbook might have had its own souped-up adding machine/calcula-
tor unit for balancing accounts—or it might have had no appliance at all, since
the cost of deploying specialized hardware for that purpose might have ex-
ceeded consumer demand.
There is still the question of networking. People would likely still want to ex-
change word processing and other documents with colleagues or friends. To
balance checkbooks conveniently would require communication with the
bank so that the user would not have to manually enter cleared checks and their
dates from a paper statement. Networking is not impossible in a world of
stand-alone appliances. Brother word processor users could exchange diskettes
with each other, and the bank could mail its customers cassettes, diskettes, or
CD-ROMs containing data usable only with the bank’s in-home appliance. Or
the home appliance could try to contact the bank’s computer from afar—an ac-
tivity that would require the home and the bank to be networked somehow.
This conﬁguration converges on the Hollerith model, where a central com-
puter could be loaded with the right information automatically if it were in the
custody of the bank, or if the bank had a business relationship with a third-
party manager. Then the question becomes how far away the various dumb ter-
minals could be from the central computer. The considerable expense of build-
ing networks would suggest placing the machines in clusters, letting people
come to them. Electronic balancing of one’s checkbook would take place at a
computer installed in a bank lobby or strategically located cyber café, just as 
automated teller machines (ATMs) are dispersed around cities today. People
could perform electronic document research over another kind of terminal
found at libraries and schools. Computers, then, are only one piece of a mosaic
that can be more or less generative. Another critical piece is the network, its
own generativity hinging on how much it costs to use, how its costs are mea-
sured, and the circumstances under which its users can connect to one another.
Just as information processing devices can be appliance, mainframe, PC, or
something in between, there are a variety of ways to design a network. The
choice of conﬁguration involves many trade-oﬀs. This chapter explains why
the Internet was not the only way to build a network—and that diﬀerent net-
work conﬁgurations lead not only to diﬀerent levels of generativity, but also to
diﬀerent levels of regulability and control. That we use the Internet today is not
solely a matter of some policy-maker’s choice, although certain regulatory in-
terventions and government funding were necessary to its success. It is due to
an interplay of market forces and network externalities that are based on pre-
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sumptions such as how trustworthy we can expect people to be. As those pre-
sumptions begin to change, so too will the shape of the network and the things
we connect to it.
BUILDING NETWORKS ON A NETWORK
Returning to a threshold question: if we wanted to allow people to use infor-
mation technology at home and to be able to network in ways beyond sending
ﬂoppy diskettes through the mail, how can we connect homes to the wider
world? A natural answer would be to piggyback on the telephone network,
which was already set up to convey people’s voices from one house to another,
or between houses and institutions. Cyberlaw scholar Tim Wu and others have
pointed out how diﬃcult it was at ﬁrst to put the telephone network to any new
purpose,not for technical reasons, but for ones of legal control—and thus how
important early regulatory decisions forcing an opening of the network were to
the success of digital networking.2
In early twentieth-century America, AT&T controlled not only the tele-
phone network, but also the devices attached to it. People rented their phones
from AT&T, and the company prohibited them from making any modiﬁca-
tions to the phones. To be sure, there were no AT&T phone police to see what
customers were doing, but AT&T could and did go after the sellers of acces-
sories like the Hush-A-Phone, which was invented in 1921 as a way to have a
conversation without others nearby overhearing it.3 It was a huge plastic funnel
enveloping the user’s mouth on one end and strapped to the microphone of
the handset on the other, muﬄing the conversation. Over 125,000 units were
sold.
As the monopoly utility telephone provider, AT&T faced specialized regula-
tion from the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC). In 1955, the
FCC held that AT&T could block the sale of the funnels as “unauthorized for-
eign attachments,” and terminate phone service to those who purchased them,
but the agency’s decision was reversed by an appellate court. The court drolly
noted, “[AT&T does] not challenge the subscriber’s right to seek privacy. They
say only that he should achieve it by cupping his hand between the transmitter
and his mouth and speaking in a low voice into this makeshift muﬄer.”4
Cupping a hand and placing a plastic funnel on the phone seemed the same
to the court. It found that at least in cases that were not “publicly detrimen-
tal”—in other words, where the phone system was not itself harmed—AT&T
had to allow customers to make physical additions to their handsets, and man-
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ufacturers to produce and distribute those additions. AT&T could have in-
vented the Hush-A-Phone funnel itself. It did not; it took outsiders to begin
changing the system, even in small ways.
Hush-A-Phone was followed by more sweeping outside innovations. During
the 1940s, inventor Tom Carter sold and installed two-way radios for com-
panies with workers out in the ﬁeld. As his business caught on, he realized
how much more helpful it would be to be able to hook up a base station’s ra-
dio to a telephone so that faraway executives could be patched in to the front
lines. He invented the Carterfone to do just that in 1959 and sold over 3,500
units. AT&T told its customers that they were not allowed to use Carterfones,
because these devices hooked up to the network itself, unlike the Hush-A-
Phone, which connected only to the telephone handset. Carter petitioned
against the rule and won.5 Mindful of the ideals behind the Hush-A-Phone
decision, the FCC agreed that so long as the network was not harmed, AT&T
could not block new devices, even ones that directly hooked up to the phone
network.
These decisions paved the way for advances invented and distributed by
third parties, advances that were the exceptions to the comparative innovation
desert of the telephone system. Outsiders introduced devices such as the an-
swering machine, the fax machine, and the cordless phone that were rapidly
adopted.6 The most important advance, however, was the dial-up modem, a
crucial piece of hardware bridging consumer information processors and the
world of computer networks, whether proprietary or the Internet.
With the advent of the modem, people could acquire plain terminals or PCs
and connect them to central servers over a telephone line. Users could dial up
whichever service they wanted: a call to the bank’s network for banking, fol-
lowed by a call to a more generic “information service” for interactive weather
and news.
The development of this capability illustrates the relationships among the
standard layers that can be said to exist in a network: at the bottom are the
physical wires, with services above, and then applications, and ﬁnally content
and social interaction. If AT&T had prevailed in the Carterfone proceeding, it
would have been able to insist that its customers use the phone network only
for traditional point-to-point telephone calls. The phone network would have
been repurposed for data solely at AT&T’s discretion and pace. Because AT&T
lost, others’ experiments in data transmission could move forward. The physi-
cal layer had become generative, and this generativity meant that additional
types of activity in higher layers were made possible. While AT&T continued
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collecting rents from the phone network’s use whether for voice or modem
calls, both amateurs working for fun and entrepreneurs seeking new business
opportunities got into the online services business.
THE PROPRIETARY NETWORK MODEL
The ﬁrst online services built on top of AT&T’s phone network were natural
extensions of the 1960s IBM-model minicomputer usage within businesses:
one centrally managed machine to which employees’ dumb terminals con-
nected. Networks like CompuServe, The Source, America Online, Prodigy,
GEnie, and MCI Mail gave their subscribers access to content and services de-
ployed solely by the network providers themselves.7
In 1983, a home computer user with a telephone line and a CompuServe
subscription could pursue a variety of pastimes8—reading an Associated Press
news feed, chatting in typed sentences with other CompuServe subscribers
through a “CB radio simulator,” sending private e-mail to fellow subscribers,
messaging on bulletin boards, and playing rudimentary multiplayer games.9
But if a subscriber or an outside company wanted to develop a new service that
might appeal to CompuServe subscribers, it could not automatically do so.
Even if it knew how to program on CompuServe’s mainframes, an aspiring
provider needed CompuServe’s approval. CompuServe entered into develop-
ment agreements with outside content providers10 like the Associated Press
and, in some cases, with outside programmers,11 but between 1984 and 1994,
as the service grew from one hundred thousand subscribers to almost two mil-
lion, its core functionalities remained largely unchanged.12
Innovation within services like CompuServe took place at the center of the
network rather than at its fringes. PCs were to be only the delivery vehicles for
data sent to customers, and users were not themselves expected to program or
to be able to receive services from anyone other than their central service
provider. CompuServe depended on the phone network’s physical layer gener-
ativity to get the last mile to a subscriber’s house, but CompuServe as a service
was not open to third-party tinkering.
Why would CompuServe hold to the same line that AT&T tried to draw?
After all, the economic model for almost every service was the connect charge:
a per-minute fee for access rather than advertising or transactional revenue.13
With mere connect time as the goal, one might think activity-garnering user-
contributed software running on the service would be welcome, just as user-
contributed content in the CB simulator or on a message board produced rev-
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enue if it drew other users in. Why would the proprietary services not harness
the potential generativity of their oﬀerings by making their own servers more
open to third-party coding? Some networks’ mainframes permitted an area in
which subscribers could write and execute their own software,14 but in each
case restrictions were quickly put in place to prevent other users from running
that software online. The “programming areas” became relics, and the Hol-
lerith model prevailed.
Perhaps the companies surmised that little value could come to them from
user and third-party tinkering if there were no formal relationship between
those outside programmers and the information service’s in-house developers.
Perhaps they thought it too risky: a single mainframe or set of mainframes run-
ning a variety of applications could not risk being compromised by poorly
coded or downright rogue applications.
Perhaps they simply could not grasp the potential to produce new works that
could be found among an important subset of their subscribers—all were in-
stead thought of solely as consumers. Or they may have thought that all the
important applications for online consumer services had already been in-
vented—news, weather, bulletin boards, chat, e-mail, and the rudiments of
shopping.
In the early 1990s the future seemed to be converging on a handful of cor-
porate-run networks that did not interconnect. There was competition of a sort
that recalls AT&T’s early competitors: ﬁrms with their own separate wires go-
ing to homes and businesses. Some people maintained an e-mail address on
each major online service simply so that they could interact with friends and
business contacts regardless of the service the others selected. Each information
service put together a proprietary blend of oﬀerings, mediated by software pro-
duced by the service. Each service had the power to decide who could sub-
scribe, under what terms, and what content would be allowed or disallowed, 
either generally (should there be a forum about gay rights?) or speciﬁcally
(should this particular message about gay rights be deleted?). For example,
Prodigy sought a reputation as a family-friendly service and was more aggres-
sive about deleting sensitive user-contributed content; CompuServe was more
of a free-for-all.15
But none seemed prepared to budge from the business models built around
their mainframes, and, as explained in detail in Chapter Four, works by schol-
ars such as Mary Benner and Michael Tushman shed some light on why. Ma-
ture ﬁrms can acquire “stabilizing organizational routines”: “internal biases for
certainty and predictable results [which] favor exploitative innovation at the
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expense of exploratory innovation.”16 And so far as the proprietary services
could tell, they had only one competitor other than each other: generative PCs
that used their modems to call other PCs instead of the centralized services. Ex-
actly how proprietary networks would have evolved if left only to that compe-
tition will never be known, for CompuServe and its proprietary counterparts
were soon overwhelmed by the Internet and the powerful PC browsers used to
access it.17 But it is useful to recall how those PC-to-PC networks worked, and
who built them.
A GRASSROOTS NETWORK OF PCs
Even before PC owners had an opportunity to connect to the Internet, they
had an alternative to paying for appliancized proprietary networks. Several
people wrote BBS (“bulletin board system”) software that could turn any PC
into its own information service.18 Lacking ready arrangements with institu-
tional content providers like the Associated Press, computers running BBS
software largely depended on their callers to provide information as well as to
consume it. Vibrant message boards, some with thousands of regular partici-
pants, sprang up. But they were limited by the physical properties and business
model of the phone system that carried their data. Even though the Carterfone
decision permitted the use of modems to connect users’ computers, a PC host-
ing a BBS was limited to one incoming call at a time unless its owner wanted to
pay for more phone lines and some arcane multiplexing equipment.19 With
many interested users having to share one incoming line to a BBS, it was the
opposite of the proprietary connect time model: users were asked to spend as
little time connected as possible.
PC generativity provided a way to ameliorate some of these limitations. 
A PC owner named Tom Jennings wrote FIDOnet in the spring of 1984.20
FIDOnet was BBS software that could be installed on many PCs. Each FIDO-
net BBS could call another in the FIDO network and they would exchange
their respective message stores. That way, users could post messages to a single
PC’s BBS and ﬁnd it copied automatically, relay-style, to hundreds of other
BBSs around the world, with replies slowly working their way around to all the
FIDOnet BBSs. In the fall of 1984 FIDOnet claimed 160 associated PCs; by
the early 1990s it boasted 32,000, and many other programmers had made
contributions to improve Jennings’s work.21
Of course, FIDOnet was the ultimate kludge, simultaneously a testament to
the distributed ingenuity of those who tinker with generative technologies and
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a crude workaround that was bound to collapse under its own weight. Jennings
found that his network did not scale well, especially since it was built on top of
a physical network whose primary use was to allow two people, not many com-
puters, to talk to each other. As the FIDOnet community grew bigger, it was no
longer a community—at least not a set of people who each knew one another.
Some new FIDOnet installations had the wrong dial-in numbers for their
peers, which meant that computers were calling people instead of other com-
puters, redialing every time a computer did not answer.
“To impress on you the seriousness of wrong numbers in the node list,” Jen-
nings wrote, “imagine you are a poor old lady, who every single night is getting
phone calls EVERY TWO MINUTES AT 4:00AM, no one says anything,
then hangs up. This actually happened; I would sit up and watch when there
was mail that didn’t go out for a week or two, and I’d pick up the phone after di-
aling, and was left in the embarrasing [sic ] position of having to explain bul-
letin boards to an extremely tired, extremely annoyed person.”22
In some ways, this was the fear AT&T had expressed to the FCC during the
Carterfone controversy. When AT&T was no longer allowed to perform quality
control on the devices hooking up to the network, problems could arise and
AT&T would reasonably disclaim responsibility. Jennings and others worked
to ﬁx software problems as they arose with new releases, but as FIDOnet au-
thors wrestled with the consequences of their catastrophic success, it was clear
that the proprietary services were better suited for mainstream consumers.
They were more reliable, better advertised, and easier to use. But FIDOnet
demonstrates that amateur innovation—cobbling together bits and pieces
from volunteers—can produce a surprisingly functional and eﬀective result—
one that has been rediscovered today in some severely bandwidth-constrained
areas of the world.23
Those with Jennings’s urge to code soon had an alternative outlet, one that
even the proprietary networks did not foresee as a threat until far too late: the
Internet, which appeared to combine the reliability of the pay networks with
the ethos and ﬂexibility of user-written FIDOnet.
ENTER THE INTERNET
Just as the general-purpose PC beat leased and appliancized counterparts that
could perform only their manufacturers’ applications and nothing else, the In-
ternet ﬁrst linked to and then functionally replaced a host of proprietary con-
sumer network services.24
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The Internet’s founding is pegged to a message sent on October 29, 1969. It
was transmitted from UCLA to Stanford by computers hooked up to proto-
type “Interface Message Processors” (IMPs).25 A variety of otherwise-incom-
patible computer systems existed at the time—just as they do now—and the
IMP was conceived as a way to connect them.26 (The UCLA programmers
typed “log” to begin logging in to the Stanford computer. The Stanford com-
puter crashed after the second letter, making “Lo” the ﬁrst Internet message.)
From its start, the Internet was oriented diﬀerently from the proprietary net-
works and their ethos of bundling and control. Its goals were in some ways
more modest. The point of building the network was not to oﬀer a particular
set of information or services like news or weather to customers, for which the
network was necessary but incidental. Rather, it was to connect anyone on the
network to anyone else. It was up to the people connected to ﬁgure out why
they wanted to be in touch in the ﬁrst place; the network would simply carry
data between the two points.
The Internet thus has more in common with FIDOnet than it does with
CompuServe, yet it has proven far more useful and ﬂexible than any of the pro-
prietary networks. Most of the Internet’s architects were academics, amateurs
like Tom Jennings in the sense that they undertook their work for the innate in-
terest of it, but professionals in the sense that they could devote themselves full
time to its development. They secured crucial government research funding
and other support to lease some of the original raw telecommunications facili-
ties that would form the backbone of the new network, helping to make the
protocols they developed on paper testable in a real-world environment. The
money supporting this was relatively meager—on the order of tens of millions
of dollars from 1970 to 1990, and far less than a single popular startup raised in
an initial public oﬀering once the Internet had gone mainstream. (For example,
ten-month-old, money-losing Yahoo! raised $35 million at its 1996 initial pub-
lic oﬀering.27 On the ﬁrst day it started trading, the oﬀered chunk of the com-
pany hit over $100 million in value, for a total corporate valuation of more
than $1 billion.28)
The Internet’s design reﬂects the situation and outlook of the Internet’s
framers: they were primarily academic researchers and moonlighting corporate
engineers who commanded no vast resources to implement a global network.29
The early Internet was implemented at university computer science depart-
ments, U.S. government research units,30 and select telecommunications com-
panies with an interest in cutting-edge network research.31 These users might
naturally work on advances in bandwidth management or tools for researchers
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to use for discussion with each other, including informal, non-work-related
discussions. Unlike, say, FedEx, whose wildly successful paper transport net-
work depended initially on the singularly focused application of venture capi-
tal to design and create an eﬃcient physical infrastructure for delivery, those in-
dividuals thinking about the Internet in the 1960s and ’70s planned a network
that would cobble together existing research and government networks and
then wring as much use as possible from them.32
The design of the Internet reﬂected not only the ﬁnancial constraints of its
creators, but also their motives. They had little concern for controlling the net-
work or its users’ behavior.33 The network’s design was publicly available and
freely shared from the earliest moments of its development. If designers dis-
agreed over how a particular protocol should work, they would argue until one
had persuaded most of the interested parties. The motto among them was, “We
reject: kings, presidents, and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and run-
ning code.”34 Energy spent running the network was seen as a burden rather
than a boon. Keeping options open for later network use and growth was seen
as sensible, and abuse of the network by those joining it without an explicit ap-
proval process was of little worry since the people using it were the very people
designing it—engineers bound by their desire to see the network work.35
The Internet was so diﬀerent in character and audience from the proprietary
networks that few even saw them as competing with one another. However, by
the early 1990s, the Internet had proven its use enough that some large ﬁrms
were eager to begin using it for data transfers for their enterprise applications. It
helped that the network was subsidized by the U.S. government, allowing ﬂat-
rate pricing for its users. The National Science Foundation (NSF) managed the
Internet backbone and asked that it be used only for noncommercial purposes,
but by 1991 was eager to see it privatized.36 Internet designers devised an en-
tirely new protocol so that the backbone no longer needed to be centrally man-
aged by the NSF or a single private successor, paving the way for multiple pri-
vate network providers to bid to take up chunks of the old backbone, with no
one vendor wholly controlling it.37
Consumer applications were originally nowhere to be found, but that
changed after the Internet began accepting commercial interconnections with-
out network research pretexts in 1991. The public at large was soon able to sign
up, which opened development of Internet applications and destinations to a
broad, commercially driven audience.
No major PC producer immediately moved to design Internet Protocol
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compatibility into its PC operating system. PCs could dial in to a single com-
puter like that of CompuServe or AOL and communicate with it, but the abil-
ity to run Internet-aware applications on the PC itself was limited. To attach to
the Internet, one would need a minicomputer or workstation of the sort typi-
cally found within university computer science departments—and usually
used with direct network connections rather than modems and phone lines.
A single hobbyist took advantage of PC generativity and forged the missing
technological link. Peter Tattam, an employee in the psychology department of
the University of Tasmania, wrote Trumpet Winsock, a program that allowed
owners of PCs running Microsoft Windows to forge a point-to-point Internet
connection with the dial-up servers run by nascent Internet Service Providers
(ISPs).38 With no formal marketing or packaging, Tattam distributed Winsock
as shareware. He asked people to try out the program for free and to send him
$25 if they kept using it beyond a certain tryout period.39
Winsock was a runaway success, and in the mid-1990s it was the primary
way that Windows users could access the Internet. Even before there was wide
public access to an Internet through which to distribute his software, he
claimed hundreds of thousands of registrations for it,40 and many more people
were no doubt using it and declining to register. Consumer accessibility to In-
ternet-enabled applications, coupled with the development of graphic-friendly
World Wide Web protocols and the PC browsers to support them—both ini-
tially noncommercial ventures—marked the beginning of the end of propri-
etary information services and jerry-rigged systems like FIDOnet. Consumers
began to explore the Internet, and those who wanted to reach this group, such
as commercial merchants and advertising-driven content providers, found it
easier to set up outposts there than through the negotiated gates of the propri-
etary services.
Microsoft bundled the functionality of Winsock with late versions of Win-
dows 95.41 After that, anyone buying a PC could hook up to the Internet in-
stead of only to AOL’s or CompuServe’s walled gardens. Proprietary informa-
tion services scrambled to reorient their business models away from corralled
content and to ones of accessibility to the wider Internet.42 Network providers
oﬀering a bundle of content along with access increasingly registered their ap-
peal simply as ISPs. They became mere on-ramps to the Internet, with their
users branching out to quickly thriving Internet destinations that had no re-
lationship to the ISP for their programs and services.43 For example, Com-
puServe’s “Electronic Mall,” an e-commerce service intended as the exclusive
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means by which outside vendors could sell products to CompuServe sub-
scribers,44 disappeared under the avalanche of individual Web sites selling
goods to anyone with Internet access.
The resulting Internet was a network that no one in particular owned and
that anyone could join. Of course, joining required the acquiescence of at least
one current Internet participant, but if one was turned away at one place, there
were innumerable other points of entry, and commercial ISPs emerged to pro-
vide service at commoditized rates.45
The bundled proprietary model, designed expressly for consumer uptake,
had been defeated by the Internet model, designed without consumer demands
in mind. Proprietary services tried to have everything under one roof and to vet
each of their oﬀerings, just as IBM leased its general-purpose computers to its
1960s customers and wholly managed them, tailoring them to those cus-
tomers’ perceived needs in an ordered way. The Internet had no substantive
oﬀerings at all—but also no meaningful barriers to someone else’s setting up
shop online. It was a model similar to that of the PC, a platform rather than a
fully ﬁnished ediﬁce, one open to a set of oﬀerings from anyone who wanted to
code for it.
DESIGN CHOICES AND THE INTERNET ETHOS
Recall that our endpoint devices can possess varying levels of accessibility to
outside coding. Where they are found along that spectrum creates certain basic
trade-oﬀs. A less generative device like an information appliance or a general-
purpose computer managed by a single vendor can work more smoothly be-
cause there is only one cook over the stew, and it can be optimized to a particu-
lar perceived purpose. But it cannot be easily adapted for new uses. A more
generative device like a PC makes innovation easier and produces a broader
range of applications because the audience of people who can adapt it to new
uses is much greater. Moreover, these devices can at ﬁrst be simpler because
they can be improved upon later; at the point they leave the factory they do not
have to be complete. That is why the ﬁrst hobbyist PCs could be so inexpen-
sive: they had only the basics, enough so that others could write software to
make them truly useful. But it is harder to maintain a consistent experience
with such a device because its behavior is then shaped by multiple software au-
thors not acting in concert. Shipping an incomplete device also requires a cer-
tain measure of trust: trust that at least some third-party software writers will
write good and useful code, and trust that users of the device will be able to ac-
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cess and sort out the good and useful code from the bad and even potentially
harmful code.
These same trade-oﬀs existed between proprietary services and the Internet,
and Internet design, like its generative PC counterpart, tilted toward the simple
and basic. The Internet’s framers made simplicity a core value—a risky bet with
a high payoﬀ. The bet was risky because a design whose main focus is simplic-
ity may omit elaboration that solves certain foreseeable problems. The simple
design that the Internet’s framers settled upon makes sense only with a set of
principles that go beyond mere engineering. These principles are not obvious
ones—for example, the proprietary networks were not designed with them in
mind—and their power depends on assumptions about people that, even if
true, could change. The most important are what we might label the procrasti-
nation principle and the trust-your-neighbor approach.
The procrastination principle rests on the assumption that most problems
confronting a network can be solved later or by others. It says that the network
should not be designed to do anything that can be taken care of by its users. Its
origins can be found in a 1984 paper by Internet architects David Clark, David
Reed, and Jerry Saltzer. In it they coined the notion of an “end-to-end argu-
ment” to indicate that most features in a network ought to be implemented at
its computer endpoints—and by those endpoints’ computer programmers—
rather than “in the middle,” taken care of by the network itself, and designed by
the network architects.46 The paper makes a pure engineering argument, ex-
plaining that any features not universally useful should not be implemented, in
part because not implementing these features helpfully prevents the generic
network from becoming tilted toward certain uses. Once the network was op-
timized for one use, they reasoned, it might not easily be put to other uses that
may have diﬀerent requirements.
The end-to-end argument stands for modularity in network design: it allows
the network nerds, both protocol designers and ISP implementers, to do their
work without giving a thought to network hardware or PC software. More gen-
erally, the procrastination principle is an invitation to others to overcome the
network’s shortcomings, and to continue adding to its uses.
Another fundamental assumption, reﬂected repeatedly in various Internet
design decisions that tilted toward simplicity, is about trust. The people using
this network of networks and conﬁguring its endpoints had to be trusted to be
more or less competent and pure enough at heart that they would not inten-
tionally or negligently disrupt the network. The network’s simplicity meant
that many features found in other networks to keep them secure from fools and
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knaves would be absent. Banks would be simpler and more eﬃcient if they did
not need vaults for the cash but could instead keep it in accessible bins in plain
view. Our houses would be simpler if we did not have locks on our doors, and
it would be ideal to catch a ﬂight by following an unimpeded path from the air-
port entrance to the gate—the way access to many trains and buses persists to-
day.
An almost casual trust for the users of secured institutions and systems is
rarely found: banks are designed with robbers in mind. Yet the assumption that
network participants can be trusted, and indeed that they will be participants
rather than customers, infuses the Internet’s design at nearly every level. Any-
one can become part of the network so long as any existing member of the net-
work is ready to share access. And once someone is on the network, the net-
work’s design is intended to allow all data to be treated the same way: it can be
sent from anyone to anyone, and it can be in support of any application devel-
oped by an outsider.
Two examples illustrate these principles and their trade-oﬀs: the Internet’s
lack of structure to manage personal identity, and its inability to guarantee
transmission speed between two points.
There are lots of reasons for a network to be built to identify the people us-
ing it, rather than just the machines found on it. Proprietary networks like
CompuServe and AOL were built just that way. They wanted to oﬀer diﬀerent
services to diﬀerent people, and to charge them accordingly, so they ensured
that the very ﬁrst prompt a user encountered when connecting to the network
was to type in a prearranged user ID and password. No ID, no network access.
This had the added beneﬁt of accountability: anyone engaging in bad behavior
on the network could have access terminated by whoever managed the IDs.
The Internet, however, has no such framework; connectivity is much more
readily shared. User identiﬁcation is left to individual Internet users and
servers to sort out if they wish to demand credentials of some kind from those
with whom they communicate. For example, a particular Web site might de-
mand that a user create an ID and password in order to gain access to its con-
tents.
This basic design omission has led to the well-documented headaches of
identifying wrongdoers online, from those who swap copyrighted content to
hackers who attack the network itself.47 At best, a source of bad bits might be
traced to a single Internet address. But that address might be shared by more
than one person, or it might represent a mere point of access by someone at yet
another address—a link in a chain of addresses that can recede into the dis-
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tance. Because the user does not have to log in the way he or she would to use a
proprietary service, identity is obscured. Some celebrate this feature. It can be
seen as a bulwark against oppressive governments who wish to monitor their
Internet-surﬁng populations. As many scholars have explored, whether one is
for or against anonymity online, a design decision bearing on it, made ﬁrst as
an engineering matter, can end up with major implications for social interac-
tion and regulation.48
Another example of the trade-oﬀs of procrastination and trust can be found
in the Internet’s absence of “quality of service,” a guarantee of bandwidth be-
tween one point and another. The Internet was designed as a network of net-
works—a bucket-brigade partnership in which network neighbors pass along
each other’s packets for perhaps ten, twenty, or even thirty hops between two
points.49 Internet Service Providers might be able to maximize their band-
width for one or two hops along this path, but the cobbled-together nature of a
typical Internet link from a source all the way to a destination means that there
is no easy way to guarantee speed the whole way through. Too many inter-
mediaries exist in between, and their relationship may be one of a handshake
rather than a contract: “you pass my packets and I’ll pass yours.”50 An endpoint
several hops from a critical network intermediary will have no contract or
arrangement at all with the original sender or the sender’s ISP. The person at the
endpoint must instead rely on falling dominos of trust. The Internet is thus
known as a “best eﬀorts” network, sometimes rephrased as “Send it and pray”
or “Every packet an adventure.”51
The Internet’s protocols thus assume that all packets of data are intended to
be delivered with equal urgency (or perhaps, more accurately, lack of urgency).
This assumption of equality is a ﬁction because some packets are valuable only
if they can make it to their destination in a timely way. Delay an e-mail by a
minute or two and no one may be the poorer; delay a stream of music too long
and there is an interruption in playback. The network could be built to priori-
tize a certain data stream on the basis of its sender, its recipient, or the nature of
the stream’s contents. Yet the Internet’s framers and implementers have largely
clung to simplicity, omitting an architecture that would label and then speed
along “special delivery” packets despite the uses it might have and the eﬃcien-
cies it could achieve. As the backbone grew, it did not seem to matter. Those
with lots of content to share have found ways to stage data “near” its destination
for others, and the network has proved itself remarkably eﬀective even in areas,
like video and audio transmission, in which it initially fell short.52 The future
need not resemble the past, however, and a robust debate exists today about the
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extent to which ISPs ought to be able to prioritize certain data streams over oth-
ers by favoring some destinations or particular service providers over others.53
(That debate is joined in a later chapter.)
* * *
The assumptions made by the Internet’s framers and embedded in the net-
work—that most problems could be solved later and by others, and that those
others themselves would be interested in solving rather than creating prob-
lems—arose naturally within the research environment that gave birth to the
Internet. For all the pettiness sometimes associated with academia, there was a
collaborative spirit present in computer science research labs, in part because
the project of designing and implementing a new network—connecting peo-
ple—can beneﬁt so readily from collaboration.
It is one thing for the Internet to work the way it was designed when de-
ployed among academics whose raison d’être was to build functioning net-
works. But the network managed an astonishing leap as it continued to work
when expanded into the general populace, one which did not share the world-
view that informed the engineers’ designs. Indeed, it not only continued to
work, but experienced spectacular growth in the uses to which it was put. It is
as if the bizarre social and economic conﬁguration of the quasi-anarchist Burn-
ing Man festival turned out to function in the middle of a city.54 What works
in a desert is harder to imagine in Manhattan: people crashing on each others’
couches, routinely sharing rides and food, and loosely bartering things of value.
At the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century, then, the developed world has found
itself with a wildly generative information technology environment.
Today we enjoy an abundance of PCs hosting routine, if not always-on,
broadband Internet connections.55 The generative PC has become intertwined
with the generative Internet, and the brief era during which information appli-
ances and appliancized networks ﬂourished—Brother word processors and
CompuServe—might appear to be an evolutionary dead end.
Those alternatives are not dead. They have been only sleeping. To see why,
we now turn to the next step of the pattern that emerges at each layer of gener-
ative technologies: initial success triggers expansion, which is followed by
boundary, one that grows out of the very elements that make that layer appeal-
ing. The Internet ﬂourished by beginning in a backwater with few expecta-
tions, allowing its architecture to be simple and ﬂuid. The PC had parallel 
hobbyist backwater days. Each was ﬁrst adopted in an ethos of sharing and 
tinkering, with proﬁt ancillary, and each was then embraced and greatly im-
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proved by commercial forces. But each is now facing problems that call for
some form of intervention, a tricky situation since intervention is not easy—
and, if undertaken, might ruin the very environment it is trying to save. The
next chapter explains this process at the technological layer: why the status quo
is drawing to a close, confronting us—policy-makers, entrepreneurs, technol-
ogy providers, and, most importantly, Internet and PC users—with choices we
can no longer ignore.
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In 1988 there were about sixty thousand computers connected to the
Internet. Few of them were PCs.1 Instead, the Net was the province of
mainframes, minicomputers, and professional workstations found at
government oﬃces, universities, and computer science research cen-
ters.2 These computers were designed to allow diﬀerent people to run
software on them at the same time from multiple terminals, sharing
valuable processor cycles the way adjoining neighbors might share a
driveway.3
On the evening of November 2, 1988, many of these computers
started acting strangely. Unusual documents appeared in the depths of
their ﬁle systems, and their system logs recorded activities unrelated to
anything the computers’ regular users were doing. The computers also
started to slow down. An inventory of the running code on the ma-
chines showed a number of rogue programs demanding processor
time. Concerned administrators terminated these foreign programs,
but they reappeared and then multiplied. Within minutes, some com-
puters started running so slowly that their keepers were unable to in-
vestigate further. The machines were too busy attending to the wishes
of the mysterious software.
3
Cybersecurity and the 
Generative Dilemma
System administrators discovered that renegade code was spreading through
the Internet from one machine to another. In response, some unplugged their
computers from the rest of the world, inoculating them from further attacks
but sacriﬁcing all communication. Others kept their machines plugged in and,
working in groups, ﬁgured out how to kill the invading software and protect
their machines against re-infection.
The software—now commonly thought of as the ﬁrst Internet worm—was
traced to a twenty-three-year-old Cornell University graduate student named
Robert Tappan Morris, Jr. He had launched it by infecting a machine at MIT
from his terminal in Ithaca, New York.4 The worm identiﬁed other nearby
computers on the Internet by riﬂing through various electronic address books
found on the MIT machine.5 Its purpose was simple: to transmit a copy of it-
self to the machines, where it would there run alongside existing software—
and repeat the cycle.6
An estimated ﬁve to ten percent of all Internet-connected machines had
been compromised by the worm in the span of a day. Gene Spaﬀord of Purdue
University called it an “attack from within.”7 The program had accessed the
machines by using a handful of digital parlor tricks—tricks that allowed it to
run without having an account on the machine. Sometimes it exploited a ﬂaw
in a commonly used e-mail transmission program running on the victimized
computers, rewriting the program to allow itself in. Other times it simply
guessed users’ passwords.8 For example, a user named jsmith often chose a pass-
word of . . . jsmith. And if not, the password was often obvious enough to be
found on a list of 432 common passwords that the software tested at each com-
puter.9
When asked why he unleashed the worm, Morris said he wanted to count
how many machines were connected to the Internet. (Proprietary networks
were designed to keep track of exactly how many subscribers they had; the sim-
ple Internet has no such mechanism.) Morris’s program, once analyzed, ac-
corded with this explanation, but his code turned out to be buggy. If Morris
had done it right, his program would not have slowed down its infected hosts
and thereby not drawn attention to itself. It could have remained installed for
days or months, and it could have quietly performed a wide array of activities
other than simply relaying a “present and accounted for” message to Morris’s
designated home base to assist in his digital nose count.
The university workstations of 1988 were generative: their users could write
new code for them or install code written by others. The Morris worm was the
ﬁrst large-scale demonstration of a vulnerability of generativity: even in the
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custody of trained administrators, such machines could be commandeered and
reprogrammed, and, if done skillfully, their users would probably not even no-
tice. The opportunity for such quick reprogramming vastly expanded as these
workstations were connected to the Internet and acquired the capacity to re-
ceive code from afar.
Networked computers able to retrieve and install code from anyone else on
the network are much more ﬂexible and powerful than their appliancized
counterparts would be. But this ﬂexibility and power are not without risks.
Whether through a sneaky vector like the one Morris used, or through the front
door, when a trusting user elects to install something that looks interesting but
without fully inspecting it and understanding what it does, opportunities for
accidents and mischief abound. Today’s generative PCs are in a similar but
more pronounced bind, one characterized by faster networks, more powerful
processors, and less-skilled users.
A MILD AUTOIMMUNE REACTION
The no-longer-theoretical prospect that a large swath of Internet-connected
computers could be compromised, and then contribute to the attack of others,
created a stir. But to most, the Morris attack remained more a curiosity than a
call to arms. Keith Bostic of the University of California–Berkeley computer
science department described in a retrospective news account the fun of trying
to puzzle out the problem and defeat the worm. “For us it was a challenge. . . .
It wasn’t a big deal.”10
Others perceived the worm as a big deal but did little to ﬁx the problem. The
mainstream media had an intense but brief fascination with the incident.11 A
professional organization for computer scientists, the Association for Comput-
ing Machinery, devoted an issue of its distinguished monthly journal to the
worm,12 and members of Congress requested a report from its research arm,
the U.S. General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO).13
The GAO report noted some ambiguities and diﬃculties in U.S. law that
might make prosecution of worm- and virus-makers burdensome,14 and called
for the creation of a government committee to further consider Internet secu-
rity, staﬀed by representatives of the National Science Foundation, the Depart-
ment of Defense, and other agencies that had helped fund the Internet’s devel-
opment and operation.15 At the time it was thought that the Internet would
evolve into a “National Research Network,” much larger and faster, but still
used primarily by educational and other noncommercial entities in loose coor-
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dination with their U.S. government sponsors.16 The most tangible result
from the government inquiry was a Defense Department–funded program at
Carnegie Mellon University called CERT/CC, the “Computer Emergency Re-
sponse Team Coordination Center.” It still exists today as a clearinghouse for
information about viruses and other network threats.17
Cornell impaneled a commission to analyze what had gone wrong. Its report
exonerated the university from institutional responsibility for the worm and
laid the blame solely on Morris, who had, without assistance or others’ knowl-
edge, engaged in a “juvenile act” that was “selﬁsh and inconsiderate.”18 It re-
buked elements of the media that had branded Morris a hero for exposing 
security ﬂaws in dramatic fashion, noting that it was well known that the 
computers’ Unix operating systems had many security ﬂaws, and that it was no
act of “genius” to exploit such weaknesses.19 The report called for a university-
wide committee to advise the university on technical security standards and an-
other to write a campus-wide acceptable use policy.20 It described consensus
among computer scientists that Morris’s acts warranted some form of punish-
ment, but not “so stern as to damage permanently the perpetrator’s career.”21
That is just how Morris was punished. He apologized, and criminal prosecu-
tion for the act earned him three years of probation, four hundred hours of
community service, and a $10,050 ﬁne.22 His career was not ruined. Morris
transferred from Cornell to Harvard, founded a dot-com startup with some
friends in 1995, and sold it to Yahoo! in 1998 for $49 million.23 He ﬁnished his
degree and is now a tenured professor at MIT.24
As a postmortem to the Morris worm incident, the Internet Engineering
Task Force, the far-ﬂung, unincorporated group of engineers who work on In-
ternet standards and who have deﬁned its protocols through a series of formal
“request for comments” documents, or RFCs, published informational RFC
1135, titled “The Helminthiasis of the Internet.”25 RFC 1135 was titled and
written with whimsy, echoing reminiscences of the worm as a fun challenge.
The RFC celebrated that the original “old boy” network of “UNIX system wiz-
ards” was still alive and well despite the growth of the Internet: teams at univer-
sity research centers put their heads together—on conference calls as well as
over the Internet—to solve the problem.26 After describing the technical de-
tails of the worm, the document articulated the need to instill and enforce eth-
ical standards as new people (mostly young computer scientists like Morris)
signed on to the Internet.27
These reactions to the Morris worm may appear laughably inadequate, an
unwarranted triumph of the principles of procrastination and trust described
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earlier in this book. Urging users to patch their systems and asking hackers to
behave more maturely might, in retrospect, seem naïve. To understand why
these were the only concrete steps taken to prevent another worm incident—
even a catastrophically destructive one—one must understand just how deeply
computing architectures, both then and now, are geared toward ﬂexibility
rather than security, and how truly costly it would be to retool them.
THE GENERATIVE TRADE-OFF
To understand why the Internet-connected machines infected by the Morris
worm were so vulnerable, consider the ways in which proprietary networks
were more easily secured.
The U.S. long distance telephone network of the 1970s was intended to
convey data between consumers in the form of telephone conversations. A
group of hackers discovered that a tone at a frequency of 2,600 hertz sent over
a telephone line did not reach the other side, but instead was used by the phone
company to indicate to itself that the line was idle.28 For example, the tone
could be used by a pay phone to tell network owner AT&T that it was ready for
the next call. It was not intended for customers to discover, much less use. As
fortune would have it, a children’s toy whistle packaged as a prize in boxes of
Cap’n Crunch cereal could, when one hole was covered, generate a shrill tone
at exactly that frequency.29
People in the know could then dial toll-free numbers from their home
phones, blow the whistle to clear but not disconnect the line, and then dial a
new, non-toll-free number, which would be connected without charge.30
When this vulnerability came to light, AT&T was mortiﬁed, but it was also
able to reconﬁgure the network so that the 2,600 hertz tone no longer con-
trolled it.31 Indeed, the entire protocol of in-band signaling could be and was
eliminated. Controlling the network now required more than just a sound gen-
erated at a telephone mouthpiece on one end or the other. Data to be sent be-
tween customers and instructions intended to aﬀect the network could be sep-
arated from one another, because AT&T’s centralized control structure made it
possible to separate the transfer of data (that is, conversations) between cus-
tomers from instructions that aﬀected network operations.32
The proprietary consumer networks of the 1980s used similar approaches 
to prevent network problems. No worm could spread on CompuServe in the
same manner as Morris’s, because CompuServe already followed the post–
Cap’n Crunch rule: do not let the paths that carry data also carry code. The
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consumer computers attached to the CompuServe network were conﬁgured as
mere “dumb terminals.” They exchanged data, not programs, with Compu-
Serve. Subscribers browsed weather, read the news, and posted messages to
each other. Subscribers were not positioned easily to run software encountered
through the CompuServe network, although on occasion and in very carefully
labeled circumstances they could download new code to run on their genera-
tive PCs separately from their dumb terminal software.33 The mainframe com-
puters at CompuServe with which those dumb terminals communicated ex-
isted out of view, ensuring that the separation between users and programmers
was strictly enforced.34
These proprietary networks were not user-programmable but instead relied
on centralized feature rollouts performed exclusively by their administrators.
The networks had only the features their owners believed would be economi-
cally viable. Thus, the networks evolved slowly and with few surprises either
good or bad. This made them both secure and sterile in comparison to genera-
tive machines hooked up to a generative network like the Internet.
Contrary to CompuServe’s proprietary system, the Internet of 1988 had no
control points where one could scan network traﬃc for telltale wormlike be-
haviors and then stop such traﬃc. Further, the Morris worm really was not per-
ceived as a network problem, thanks to the intentional conceptual separation of
network and endpoint. The Morris worm used the network to spread but did
not attack it beyond slowing it down as the worm multiplied and continued to
transmit itself. The worm’s targets were the network’s endpoints: the computers
attached to it. The modularity that inspired the Internet’s design meant that
computer programming enthusiasts could write software for computers with-
out having to know anything about the network that would carry the resulting
data, while network geeks could devise new protocols with a willful ignorance
of what programs would run on the devices hooked up to it, and what data
would result from them. Such ignorance may have led those overseeing net-
work protocols and operation unduly to believe that the worm was not some-
thing they could have prevented, since it was not thought to be within their de-
sign responsibility.
In the meantime, the endpoint computers could be compromised because
they were general-purpose machines, running operating systems for which out-
siders could write executable code.35 Further, the operating systems and appli-
cations running on the machines were not perfect; they contained ﬂaws that
rendered them more accessible to uninvited code than their designers in-
tended.36 Even without such ﬂaws, the machines were intentionally designed
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to be operated at a distance, and to receive and run software sent from a dis-
tance. They were powered on and attached to the network continuously, even
when not in active use by their owners. Moreover, many administrators of these
machines were lazy about installing available ﬁxes to known software vulnera-
bilities, and often utterly predictable in choosing passwords to protect entry to
their computer accounts.37 Since the endpoint computers infected by the
worm were run and managed by disparate groups who answered to no single
authority for their use, there was no way to secure them all against attack.38
A comparison with its proprietary network and information appliance
counterparts, then, reveals the central security dilemma of yesterday’s Internet
that remains with us today: the proprietary networks did not have the Cap’n
Crunch problem, and the Internet and its connected machines do. On the In-
ternet, the channels of communication are also channels of control.39 There is
no appealing ﬁx of the sort AT&T undertook for its phone network. If one ap-
plies the post–Cap’n Crunch rule and eliminates the ability to control PCs via
the Internet—or the ability of the attached computers to initiate or accept such
control—one has eliminated the network’s generative quality. Such an action
would not merely be inconvenient, it would be incapacitating. Today we need
merely to click to install new code from afar, whether to watch a video newscast
embedded within a Web page or to install whole new applications like word
processors or satellite image browsers. That quality is essential to the way in
which we use the Internet.
It is thus not surprising that there was little impetus to institute changes in
the network in response to the Morris worm scare, even though Internet-con-
nected computers suﬀered from a fundamental security vulnerability. The de-
centralized, nonproprietary ownership of the Internet and the computers it
linked made it diﬃcult to implement any structural revisions to the way it
functioned, and, more important, it was simply not clear what curative changes
could be made that did not entail drastic, wholesale, purpose-altering changes
to the very fabric of the Internet. Such changes would be so wildly out of pro-
portion with the perceived level of threat that the records of postworm discus-
sion lack any indication that they were even considered.
As the next chapter will explore, generative systems are powerful and valu-
able, not only because they foster the production of useful things like Web
browsers, auction sites, and free encyclopedias, but also because they can allow
an extraordinary number of people to express themselves in speech, art, or code
and to work with other people in ways previously not possible. These charac-
teristics can make generative systems very successful even though they lack cen-
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tral coordination and control. That success draws more participants to the gen-
erative system. Then it stalls.
Generative systems are built on the notion that they are never fully com-
plete, that they have many uses yet to be conceived of, and that the public can
be trusted to invent and share good uses. Multiplying breaches of that trust can
threaten the very foundations of the generative system. A hobbyist computer
that crashes might be a curiosity, but when a home or oﬃce PC with years’
worth of vital correspondence and papers is compromised it can be a crisis. As
such events become commonplace throughout the network, people will come
to prefer security to generativity. If we can understand how the generative In-
ternet and PC have made it as far as they have without true crisis, we can pre-
dict whether they can continue, and what would transpire following a breaking
point. There is strong evidence that the current state of aﬀairs is not sustain-
able, and what comes next may exact a steep price in generativity.
AN UNTENABLE STATUS QUO
The Internet and its generative machines have muddled along pretty well since
1988, despite the fact that today’s PCs are direct descendants of that era’s unse-
cured workstations. In fact, it is striking how few truly disruptive security inci-
dents have happened since 1988. Rather, a network designed for communica-
tion among academic and government researchers appeared to scale beautifully
as hundreds of millions of new users signed on during the 1990s, a feat all the
more impressive when one considers how demographically diﬀerent the new
users were from the 1988 crowd. However heedless the network administrators
of the late ’80s were to good security practice, the mainstream consumers of the
’90s were categorically worse. Few knew how to manage or code their genera-
tive PCs, much less how to rigorously apply patches or observe good password
security.
The threat presented by bad code has slowly but steadily increased since
1988. The slow pace, which has let it remain a back-burner issue, is the result of
several factors which are now rapidly attenuating. First, the computer scientists
of 1988 were right that the hacker ethos frowns upon destructive hacking.40
Morris’s worm did more damage than he intended, and for all the damage it did
do, the worm had no payload other than itself. Once a system was compromised
by the worm it would have been trivial for Morris to have directed the worm to,
for instance, delete as many ﬁles as possible.41 Morris did not do this, and the
overwhelming majority of viruses that followed in the 1990s reﬂected similar
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authorial forbearance. In fact, the most well-known viruses of the ’90s had
completely innocuous payloads. For example, 2004’s Mydoom spread like
wildﬁre and aﬀected connectivity for millions of computers around the world.
Though it reputedly cost billions of dollars in lost productivity, the worm did
not tamper with data, and it was programmed to stop spreading at a set time.42
The bad code of the ’90s merely performed attacks for the circular purpose
of spreading further, and its damage was measured by the eﬀort required to
eliminate it at each site of infection and by the burden placed upon network
traﬃc as it spread, rather than by the number of ﬁles it destroyed or by the
amount of sensitive information it compromised. There are only a few excep-
tions. The infamous Lovebug worm, released in May 2000, caused the largest
outages and damage to Internet-connected PCs to date.43 It aﬀected more than
just connectivity: it overwrote documents, music, and multimedia ﬁles with
copies of itself on users’ hard drives. In the panic that followed, software engi-
neers and antivirus vendors mobilized to defeat the worm, and it was ultimately
eradicated.44 Lovebug was an anomaly. The few highly malicious viruses of the
time were otherwise so poorly coded that they failed to spread very far. The
Michelangelo virus created sharp anxiety in 1992, when antivirus companies
warned that millions of hard drives could be erased by the virus’s dangerous
payload. It was designed to trigger itself on March 6, the artist’s birthday. The
number of computers actually aﬀected was only in the tens of thousands—it
spread only through the pre-Internet exchange of infected ﬂoppy diskettes—
and it was soon forgotten.45 Had Michelangelo’s birthday been a little later in
the year—giving the virus more time to spread before springing—it could
have had a much greater impact. More generally, malicious viruses can be
coded to avoid the problems of real-world viruses whose virulence helps stop
their spread. Some biological viruses that incapacitate people too quickly can
burn themselves out, destroying their hosts before their hosts can help them
spread further.46 Human-devised viruses can be intelligently designed—ﬁne-
tuned to spread before biting, or to destroy data within their hosts while still us-
ing the host to continue spreading.
Another reason for the delay of truly destructive malware is that network op-
erations centers at universities and other institutions became more profession-
alized between the time of the Morris worm and the advent of the mainstream
consumer Internet. For a while, most of the Internet’s computers were staﬀed
by professional administrators who generally heeded admonitions to patch reg-
ularly and scout for security breaches. They carried beepers and were prepared
to intervene quickly in the case of an intrusion. Less adept mainstream con-
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sumers began connecting unsecured PCs to the Internet in earnest only in the
mid-1990s. At ﬁrst their machines were hooked up only through transient dial-
up connections. This greatly limited both the amount of time per day during
which they were exposed to security threats, and the amount of time that, if
compromised and hijacked, they would themselves contribute to the prob-
lem.47
Finally, there was no business model backing bad code. Programs to trick
users into installing them, or to bypass users entirely and just sneak onto the
machine, were written only for fun or curiosity, just like the Morris worm.
There was no reason for substantial ﬁnancial resources to be invested in their
creation, or in their virulence once created. Bad code was more like graﬃti than
illegal drugs. Graﬃti is comparatively easier to combat because there are no
economic incentives for its creation.48 The demand for illegal drugs creates
markets that attract sophisticated criminal syndicates.
Today each of these factors has substantially diminished. The idea of a Net-
wide set of ethics has evaporated as the network has become so ubiquitous.
Anyone is allowed online if he or she can ﬁnd a way to a computer and a con-
nection, and mainstream users are transitioning to always-on broadband. In
July 2004 there were more U.S. consumers on broadband than on dial-up,49
and two years later, nearly twice as many U.S. adults had broadband connec-
tions in their homes than had dial-up.50 PC user awareness of security issues,
however, has not kept pace with broadband growth. A December 2005 online
safety study found 81 percent of home computers to be lacking ﬁrst-order pro-
tection measures such as current antivirus software, spyware protection, and
eﬀective ﬁrewalls.51 The Internet’s users are no longer skilled computer scien-
tists, yet the PCs they own are more powerful than the fastest machines of the
1980s. Because modern computers are so much more powerful, they can
spread malware with greater eﬃciency than ever.
Perhaps most signiﬁcantly, there is now a business model for bad code—one
that gives many viruses and worms payloads for purposes other than simple re-
production.52 What seemed truly remarkable when it was ﬁrst discovered is
now commonplace: viruses that compromise PCs to create large “botnets”
open to later instructions. Such instructions have included directing the PC to
become its own e-mail server, sending spam by the thousands or millions to 
e-mail addresses harvested from the hard disk of the machine itself or gleaned
from Internet searches, with the entire process typically unnoticeable to the
PC’s owner. At one point, a single botnet occupied 15 percent of Yahoo’s entire
search capacity, running random searches on Yahoo to ﬁnd text that could be
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inserted into spam e-mails to throw oﬀ spam ﬁlters.53 One estimate pegs the
number of PCs involved in such botnets at 100 to 150 million, or a quarter of
all the computers on the Internet as of early 2007,54 and the ﬁeld is expanding:
a study monitoring botnet activity in 2006 detected, on average, the emergence
of 1 million new bots per month.55 But as one account pulling together various
guesses explains, the science is inexact:
MessageLabs, a company that counts spam, recently stopped counting bot-infected
computers because it literally could not keep up. It says it quit when the ﬁgure passed
about 10 million a year ago. Symantec Corp. recently said it counted 6.7 million ac-
tive bots during an Internet scan. Since all bots are not active at any given time, the
number of infected computers is likely much higher. And Dave Dagon, who recently
left Georgia Tech University to start a bot-ﬁghting company named Damballa, pegs
the number at closer to 30 million. The ﬁrm uses a “capture, mark, and release,”
strategy borrowed from environmental science to study the movement of bot armies
and estimate their size.
“It’s like asking how many people are on the planet, you are wrong the second you
give the answer. . . . But the number is in the tens of millions,” Dagon said. “Had
you told me ﬁve years ago that organized crime would control 1 out of every 10
home machines on the Internet, I would have not have believed that. And yet we are
in an era where this is something that is happening.”56
In one notable experiment conducted in the fall of 2003, a researcher con-
nected a PC to the Internet that simulated running an “open proxy”—a condi-
tion in which many PC users unintentionally ﬁnd themselves.57 Within nine
hours, spammers’ worms located the computer and began attempting to 
commandeer it. Sixty-six hours later the researcher had recorded attempts to
send 229,468 distinct messages to 3,360,181 would-be recipients.58 (The re-
searcher’s computer pretended to deliver on the spam, but in fact threw it
away.) Such zombie computers were responsible for more than 80 percent of
the world’s spam in June 2006, and spam in turn accounted for an estimated 80
percent of the world’s total e-mail.59 North American PCs led the world in De-
cember 2006, producing approximately 46 percent of the world’s spam.60 That
spam produces proﬁt, as a large enough number of people actually buy the
items advertised or invest in the stocks touted.61
Botnets can also be used to launch coordinated attacks on a particular Inter-
net endpoint. For example, a criminal can attack an Internet gambling Web site
and then extort payment to make the attacks stop. The going rate for a botnet
to launch such an attack is reputed to be about $50,000 per day.62 Virus mak-
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ers compete against each other to compromise PCs exclusively, some even us-
ing their access to install hacked versions of antivirus software on victim com-
puters so that they cannot be poached away by other viruses.63 The growth of
virtual worlds and massively multiplayer online games provides another eco-
nomic incentive for virus creators. As more and more users log in, create value,
and buy and sell virtual goods, some are ﬁguring out ways to turn such virtual
goods into real-world dollars. Viruses and phishing e-mails target the acquisi-
tion of gaming passwords, leading to virtual theft measured in real money.64
The economics is implacable: viruses are now valuable properties, and that
makes for a burgeoning industry in virus making where volume matters. Well-
crafted worms and viruses routinely infect vast swaths of Internet-connected
personal computers. In 2004, for example, the Sasser worm infected more than
half a million computers in three days. The Sapphire/Slammer worm in Janu-
ary 2003 went after a particular kind of Microsoft server and infected 90 per-
cent of those servers, about 120,000 of them, within ten minutes. Its hijacked
machines together were performing ﬁfty-ﬁve million searches per second for
new targets just three minutes after the ﬁrst computer fell victim to it. The 
sobig.f virus was released in August 2003 and within two days accounted for
approximately 70 percent of all e-mail in the world, causing 23.2 million virus-
laden e-mails to arrive on AOL’s doorstep alone. Sobig was designed by its
author to expire a few weeks later.65 In May 2006 a virus exploiting a vulnera-
bility in Microsoft Word propagated through the computers of the U.S. De-
partment of State in eastern Asia, forcing the machines to be taken oﬄine
during critical weeks prior to North Korea’s missile tests.66
Antivirus companies receive about two reports a minute of possible new
viruses in the wild, and have abandoned individual review by staﬀ in favor of
automated sorting of viruses to investigate only the most pressing threats.67
Antivirus vendor Eugene Kaspersky of Kaspersky Labs told an industry confer-
ence that antivirus vendors “may not be able to withstand the onslaught.”68
Another vendor executive said more directly: “I think we’ve failed.”69
CERT/CC’s malware growth statistics conﬁrm the anecdotes. The organiza-
tion began documenting the number of attacks—called “incidents”—against
Internet-connected systems from its founding in 1988, as reproduced in Figure
3.1.
The increase in incidents since 1997 has been roughly geometric, doubling
each year through 2003. In 2004, CERT/CC announced that it would no
longer keep track of the ﬁgure, since attacks had become so commonplace and
widespread as to be indistinguishable from one another.70 IBM’s Internet Se-
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curity Systems reported a 40 percent increase in Internet vulnerabilities—situ-
ations in which a machine was compromised, allowing access or control by at-
tackers—between 2005 and 2006.71 Nearly all of those vulnerabilities could
be exploited remotely, and over half allowed attackers to gain full access to the
machine and its contents.72 Recall that at the time of the Morris worm there
were estimated to be 60,000 distinct computers on the Internet. In July 2006
the same metrics placed the count at over 439 million.73 Worldwide there were
approximately 1.1 billion e-mail users in 2006.74 By one credible estimate,
there will be over 290 million PCs in use in the United States by 2010 and 2 bil-
lion PCs in use worldwide by 2011.75 In part because the U.S. accounts for 18
percent of the world’s computer users, it leads the world in almost every type of
commonly measured security incident (Table 3.1, Figure 3.2).76
These numbers show that viruses are not simply the province of computing
backwaters, away from the major networks where there has been time to de-
velop eﬀective countermeasures and best practices. Rather, the war is being lost
across the board. Operating system developers struggle to keep up with provid-
ing patches for newly discovered computer vulnerabilities. Patch development
time increased throughout 2006 for all of the top operating system providers
(Figure 3.3).77
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Figure 3.1 Number of security incidents reported to CERT/CC, 1988–2003. Source: CERT
Coordination Center, CERT/CC Statistics 1988–2005, http://www.cert.org/stats#incidents.
Figure 3.2 Countries as a percentage of all detected malicious activity. Source: S
I S T R at 26.
Table 3.1. Rankings of malicious activity by country
Command
and
Malicious Spam Control Phishing
Country Code Hosts Services Hosts Bots Attacks
United States 1 1 1 1 2 1
China 3 2 4 8 1 2
Germany 7 3 3 2 4 3
France 9 4 14 4 3 4
United Kingdom 4 13 9 3 6 6
South Korea 12 9 2 9 11 9
Canada 5 23 5 7 10 5
Spain 13 5 15 16 5 7
Taiwan 8 11 6 6 7 11
Italy 2 8 10 14 12 10
Source: S C., S I S T R: T  J–
D , at  () [hereinafter S I S T R], http://eval
.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi
__.en-us.pdf.
Antivirus researchers and ﬁrms require extensive coordination eﬀorts just to
agree on a naming scheme for viruses as they emerge—much less a strategy for
battling them.78 Today, the idea of casually cleaning a virus oﬀ of a PC once it
has been infected has been abandoned. When computers are compromised,
users are now typically advised to completely reinstall everything on them—ei-
ther losing all their data or laboriously ﬁguring out what to save and what to ex-
orcise. For example, in 2007, some PCs at the U.S. National Defense Univer-
sity fell victim to a virus. The institution shut down its network servers for two
weeks and distributed new laptops to instructors, because “the only way to en-
sure the security of the systems was to replace them.”79
One Microsoft program manager colorfully described the situation: “When
you are dealing with rootkits and some advanced spyware programs, the only
solution is to rebuild from scratch. In some cases, there really is no way to re-
cover without nuking the systems from orbit.”80
In the absence of such drastic measures, a truly “mal” piece of malware could
be programmed to, say, erase hard drives, transpose numbers inside spread-
sheets randomly, or intersperse nonsense text at random intervals in Word doc-
uments found on infected computers—and nothing would stand in the way.
A massive number of always-on powerful PCs with high-bandwidth con-
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Figure 3.3 Patch development time by operating system. Source: S I
S T R at 39–40.
nections to the Internet and run by unskilled users is a phenomenon new to the
twenty-ﬁrst century.81 This unprecedented set of circumstances leaves the PC
and the Internet vulnerable to across-the-board compromise. If one carries for-
ward the metaphor of “virus” from its original public health context,82 today’s
viruses are highly and near-instantly communicable, capable of causing world-
wide epidemics in a matter of hours.83 The symptoms may reveal themselves to
users upon infection or they may lie in remission, at the whim of the virus au-
thor, while the virus continues to spread. Even fastidiously protected systems
can suﬀer from a widespread infection, since the spread of a virus can disrupt
network connectivity. And, as mentioned earlier, sometimes viruses are pro-
grammed to attack a particular network host by sending it a barrage of requests.
Summed across all infected machines, such a distributed denial of service at-
tack can ruin even the most well-connected and well-defended server, even if
the server itself is not infected.
The compounded threat to the system of generative PCs on a generative net-
work that arises from the system’s misuse hinges on both the ability of a few 
malicious experts to bring down the system and this presence of a large ﬁeld of
always-connected, easily exploited computers. Scholars like Paul Ohm caution
that the fear inspired by anecdotes of a small number of dangerous hackers
should not provide cause for overbroad policy, noting that security breaches
come from many sources, including laptop theft and poor business practices.84
Ohm’s concern about regulatory overreaction is not misplaced. Nonetheless,
what empirical data we have substantiate the gravity of the problem, and the
variety of ways in which modern mainstream information technology can be
subverted does not lessen the concern about any given vector of compromise.
Both the problem and the likely solutions are cause for concern.
Recognition of the basic security problem has been slowly growing in Inter-
net research communities. Nearly two-thirds of academics, social analysts, and
industry leaders surveyed by the Pew Internet & American Life Project in 2004
predicted serious attacks on network infrastructure or the power grid in the
coming decade.85 Though few appear to employ former U.S. cybersecurity
czar Richard Clarke’s evocative language of a “digital Pearl Harbor,”86 experts
are increasingly aware of the vulnerability of Internet infrastructure to attack.87
When will we know that something truly has to give? There are at least two
possible models for a fundamental shift in our tolerance of the status quo: a col-
lective watershed security moment, or a more glacial death of a thousand cuts.
Both are equally threatening to the generativity of the Internet.
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A WATERSHED SCENARIO
Suppose that a worm is released that exploits security ﬂaws both in a commonly
used Web server and in a Web browser found on both Mac and Windows plat-
forms. The worm quickly spreads through two mechanisms. First, it randomly
knocks on the doors of Internet-connected machines, immediately infecting
vulnerable Web servers that answer the knock. Unwitting consumers, using
vulnerable Internet browsers, visit the infected servers, which infect users’ com-
puters. Compromised machines become zombies, awaiting direction from the
worm’s author. The worm asks its zombies to look for other nearby machines to
infect for a day or two and then tells the machines to erase their own hard 
drives at the stroke of midnight, adjusting for time zones to make sure the col-
lective crash takes place at the same time around the globe.
This is not science ﬁction. It is merely another form of the Morris episode, a
template that has been replicated countless times since, so often that those who
run Web servers are often unconcerned about exploits that might have crept
into their sites. Google and StopBadware.org, which collaborate on tracking
and eliminating Web server exploits, report hundredfold increases in exploits
between August 2006 and March 2007. In February 2007, Google found
11,125 infected servers on a web crawl.88 A study conducted in March 2006 by
Google researchers found that out of 4.5 million URLs analyzed as potentially
hosting malicious code, 1.15 million URLs were indeed distributing mal-
ware.89 Combine one well-written worm of the sort that can penetrate ﬁrewalls
and evade antivirus software with one truly malicious worm-writer, and we
have the prospect of a panic-generating event that could spill over to the real
world: no check-in at some airline counters using Internet-connected PCs; no
overnight deliveries or other forms of package and letter distribution; no pay-
roll software producing paychecks for millions of workers; the elimination, re-
lease, or nefarious alteration of vital personal records hosted at medical oﬃces,
schools, town halls, and other data repositories that cannot aﬀord a full-time IT
staﬀ to perform backups and ward oﬀ technological demons. Writing and dis-
tributing such a worm could be a tempting act of information warfare by any of
the many enemies of modernity—asymmetric warfare at that, since the very
beliefs that place some enemies at odds with the developed world may lead
them to rely less heavily on modern IT themselves.
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A GLACIAL SHIFT
The watershed scenario is plausible, but a major malware catastrophe depends
on just the right combination of incentives, timing, and luck. Truly malicious
foes like terrorists may see Internet-distributed viruses as damaging but refrain
from pursuing them because they are not terror-inducing: such events simply
do not create fear the way that lurid physical attacks do. Hackers who hack for
fun still abide by the ethic of doing no or little harm by their exploits. And
those who hack for proﬁt gain little if their exploits are noticed and disabled,
much less if they should recklessly destroy the hosts they infect.
Hacking a machine to steal and exploit any personal data within is currently
labor-intensive; credit card numbers can be found more easily through passive
network monitoring or through the distribution of phishing e-mails designed
to lure people voluntarily to share sensitive information.90 (To be sure, as banks
and other sensitive destinations increase security on their Web sites through
such tools as two-factor authentication, hackers may be more attracted to PC
vulnerabilities as a means of compromise.91 A few notable instances of bad
code directed to this purpose could make storing data on one’s PC seem tanta-
mount to posting it on a public Web site.)
Finally, even without major security innovations, there are incremental im-
provements made to the growing arsenals of antivirus software, updated more
quickly thanks to always-on broadband and boasting ever more comprehensive
databases of viruses. Antivirus software is increasingly being bundled with new
PCs or built into their operating systems.
These factors defending us against a watershed event are less eﬀective against
the death of a thousand cuts. The watershed scenario, indeed any threat fol-
lowing the Morris worm model, is only the most dramatic rather than most
likely manifestation of the problem. Good antivirus software can still stop ob-
vious security threats, but much malware is no longer so manifestly bad. Con-
sider the realm of “badware” beyond viruses and worms. Most spyware, for 
example, purports to perform some useful function for the user, however half-
heartedly it delivers. The nefarious Jessica Simpson screensaver does in fact
show images of Jessica Simpson—and it also modiﬁes the operation of other
programs to redirect Web searches and installs spyware programs that cannot
be uninstalled.92 The popular ﬁle-sharing program KaZaA, though advertised
as “spyware-free,” contains code that users likely do not want. It adds icons to
the desktop, modiﬁes Microsoft Internet Explorer, and installs a program that
cannot be closed by clicking “Quit.” Uninstalling the program does not unin-
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stall all these extras along with it, and the average user does not have the know-
how to get rid of the code itself. FunCade, a downloadable arcade program, au-
tomatically installs spyware, adware, and remote control software designed to
turn the PC into a zombie when signaled from afar. The program is installed
while Web surﬁng. It deceives the user by opening a pop-up ad that looks like a
Windows warning notice, telling the user to beware. Click “cancel” and the
download starts.93
What makes such badware bad is often subjective rather than objective, hav-
ing to do with the level of disclosure made to a consumer before he or she in-
stalls it. That means it is harder to intercept with automatic antivirus tools. For
example, VNC is a free program designed to let people access other computers
from afar—a VNC server is placed on the target machine, and a VNC client on
the remote machine. Whether this is or is not malware depends entirely on the
knowledge and intentions of the people on each end of a VNC connection. I
have used VNC to access several of my own computers in the United States and
United Kingdom simultaneously. I could also imagine someone installing
VNC in under a minute after borrowing someone else’s computer to check 
e-mail, and then using it later to steal personal information or to take over the
machine. A ﬂaw in a recent version of VNC’s password processor allowed it
to be accessed by anyone94—as I discovered one day when my computer’s
mouse started moving itself all over the screen and rapid-ﬁre instructions ap-
peared in the computer’s command window. I fought with an unseen enemy
for control of my own mouse, ﬁnally unplugging the machine the way some
Morris worm victims had done twenty years earlier. (After disconnecting the
machine from the network, I followed best practices and reinstalled every-
thing on the machine from scratch to ensure that it was no longer compro-
mised.)
BEYOND BUGS: THE GENERATIVE DILEMMA
The burgeoning gray zone of software explains why the most common re-
sponses to the security problem cannot solve it. Many technologically savvy
people think that bad code is simply a Microsoft Windows issue. They believe
that the Windows OS and the Internet Explorer browser are particularly poorly
designed, and that “better” counterparts (Linux and Mac OS, or the Firefox
and Opera browsers) can help protect a user. This is not much added protec-
tion. Not only do these alternative OSes and browsers have their own vulnera-
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bilities, but the fundamental problem is that the point of a PC—regardless of
its OS—is that its users can easily reconﬁgure it to run new software from any-
where.
When users make poor decisions about what new software to run, the results
can be devastating to their machines and, if they are connected to the Internet,
to countless others’ machines as well. To be sure, Microsoft Windows has been
the target of malware infections for years, but this in part reﬂects Microsoft’s
dominant market share. Recall Willie Sutton’s explanation for robbing banks:
that’s where the money is.95 As more users switch to other platforms, those
platforms will become more appealing targets. And the most enduring way to
subvert them may be through the front door, asking a user’s permission to add
some new functionality that is actually a bad deal, rather than trying to steal in
through the back, silently exploiting some particular OS ﬂaw that allows new
code to run without the user or her antivirus software noticing.
The Microsoft Security Response Center oﬀers “10 Immutable Laws of Se-
curity.”96 The ﬁrst assumes that the PC is operating exactly as it is meant to,
with the user as the weak link in the chain: “If a bad guy can persuade you to
run his program on your computer, it’s not your computer anymore.”97 This
boils down to an admonition to the user to be careful, to try to apply judgment
in areas where the user is often at sea:
That’s why it’s important to never run, or even download, a program from an un-
trusted source—and by “source,” I mean the person who wrote it, not the person
who gave it to you. There’s a nice analogy between running a program and eating a
sandwich. If a stranger walked up to you and handed you a sandwich, would you eat
it? Probably not. How about if your best friend gave you a sandwich? Maybe you
would, maybe you wouldn’t—it depends on whether she made it or found it lying in
the street. Apply the same critical thought to a program that you would to a sand-
wich, and you’ll usually be safe.98
The analogy of software to sandwiches is not ideal. The ways in which we
pick up code while surﬁng the Internet is more akin to accepting a few nibbles
of food from hundreds of diﬀerent people over the course of the day, some es-
tablished vendors, some street peddlers. Further, we have certain evolutionary
gifts that allow us to directly judge whether food has spoiled by its sight and
smell. There is no parallel way for us to judge programming code which arrives
as an opaque “.exe.” A closer analogy would be if many people we encountered
over the course of a day handed us pills to swallow and often conditioned en-
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trance to certain places on our accepting them. In a world in which we rou-
tinely beneﬁt from software produced by unknown authors, it is impractical to
apply the “know your source” rule.
Worse, surﬁng the World Wide Web often entails accepting and running
new code. The Web was designed to seamlessly integrate material from dis-
parate sources: a single Web page can draw from hundreds of diﬀerent sources
on the ﬂy, not only through hyperlinks that direct users to other locations on
the Web, but through placeholders that incorporate data and code from else-
where into the original page. These Web protocols have spawned the massive
advertising industry that powers companies like Google. For example, if a user
visits the home page of the New York Times, he or she will see banner ads and
other spaces that are ﬁlled on the ﬂy from third-party advertising aggregators
like Google and DoubleClick. These ads are not hosted at nytimes.com—they
are hosted elsewhere and rushed directly to the user’s browser as the nytimes
.com page is rendered. To extend Microsoft’s sandwich metaphor: Web pages
are like fast food hamburgers, where a single patty might contain the blended
meat of hundreds of cows spanning four countries.99 In the fast food context,
one contaminated carcass is reported to be able to pollute eight tons of ground
meat.100 For the Web, a single advertisement contaminated with bad code can
instantly be circulated to those browsing tens of thousands of mainstream Web
sites operated entirely in good faith. To visit a Web site is not only to be asked
to trust the Web site operator. It is also to trust every third party—such as an ad
syndicator—whose content is automatically incorporated into the Web site
owner’s pages, and every fourth party—such as an advertiser—who in turn
provides content to that third party. Apart from advertising, generative tech-
nologies like RSS (“really simple syndication”) have facilitated the automated
repackaging of information from one Web site to another, creating tightly cou-
pled networks of data ﬂows that can pass both the latest world news and the lat-
est PC attacks in adjoining data packets.
Bad code through the back door of a bug exploit and the front door of a poor
user choice can intersect. At the Black Hat Europe hacker convention in 2006,
two computer scientists gave a presentation on Skype, the wildly popular PC
Internet telephony software created by the same duo that invented the KaZaA
ﬁle-sharing program.101 Skype is, like most proprietary software, a black box.
It is not easy to know how it works or what it does except by watching it in ac-
tion. Skype is installed on millions of computers, and so far works well if not
ﬂawlessly. It generates all sorts of network traﬃc, much of which is unidentiﬁ-
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able even to the user of the machine, and much of which happens even when
Skype is not being used to place a call. How does one know that Skype is not
doing something untoward, or that its next update might not contain a zom-
bie-creating Trojan horse, placed by either its makers or someone who compro-
mised the update server? The Black Hat presenters reverse engineered Skype
enough to ﬁnd a few ﬂaws. What would happen if they were exploited? Their
PowerPoint slide title may only slightly exaggerate: “Biggest Botnet Ever.”102
Skype is likely ﬁne. I use it myself. Of course, I use VNC, too, and look where
that ended up. The most salient feature of a PC is its openness to new func-
tionality with minimal gatekeeping. This is also its greatest danger.
PC VS. INFORMATION APPLIANCE
PC users have increasingly found themselves the victims of bad code. In addi-
tion to overtly malicious programs like viruses and worms, their PCs are
plagued with software that they have nominally asked for that creates pop-up
windows, causes crashes, and damages useful applications. With increasing
pressure from these experiences, consumers will be pushed in one of two un-
fortunate directions: toward independent information appliances that opti-
mize a particular application and that naturally reject user or third-party mod-
iﬁcations, or toward a form of PC lockdown that resembles the centralized
control that IBM exerted over its rented mainframes in the 1960s, or that
CompuServe and AOL exerted over their information services in the 1980s. In
other words, consumers ﬁnd themselves frustrated by PCs at a time when a va-
riety of information appliances are arising as substitutes for the activities they
value most. Digital video recorders, mobile phones, BlackBerries, and video
game consoles will oﬀer safer and more consistent experiences. Consumers will
increasingly abandon the PC for these alternatives, or they will demand that
the PC itself be appliancized.
That appliancization might come from the same ﬁrms that produced some
of the most popular generative platforms. Microsoft’s business model for PC
operating systems has remained unchanged from the founding days of DOS
through the Windows of today: the company sells each copy of the operating
system at a proﬁt, usually to PC makers rather than to end users. The PC mak-
ers then bundle Windows on the machine before it arrives at the customer’s
doorstep. As is typical for products that beneﬁt from network externalities,
having others write useful code associated with Windows, whether a new game,
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business application, or utility, makes Windows more valuable. Microsoft’s in-
terest in selling Windows is more or less aligned with an interest in making the
platform open to third-party development.
The business models of the new generation of Internet-enabled appliances
are diﬀerent. Microsoft’s Xbox 360 is a video game console that has as much
computing power as a PC.103 It is networked, so users can play games against
other players around the world, at least if they are using Xboxes, too. The busi-
ness model diﬀers from that of the PC: it is Gillette’s “give them the razor, sell
them the blades.” Microsoft loses money on every Xbox it sells. It makes that
money back through the sale of games and other software to run on the Xbox.
Third-party developers can write Xbox games, but they must obtain a license
from Microsoft before they can distribute them—a license that includes giving
Microsoft a share of proﬁts.104 This reﬂects the model the video game console
market has used since the 1970s. But the Xbox is not just a video game console.
It can access the Internet and perform other PC-like functions. It is occupying
many of the roles of the gamer PC without being generative. Microsoft retains
a privileged position with respect to reprogramming the machine, even after it
is in users’ hands: all changes must be certiﬁed by Microsoft. While this action
would be considered an antitrust violation if applied to a PC operating system
that enjoyed overwhelming market share,105 it is the norm when applied to
video game consoles.
To the extent that consoles like the Xbox take on some of the functions of the
PC, consumers will naturally ﬁnd themselves choosing between the two. The
PC will oﬀer a wider range of software, thanks to its generativity, but the Xbox
might look like a better deal in the absence of a solution to the problem of bad
code. It is reasonable for a consumer to factor security and stability into such a
choice, but it is a poor choice to have to make. As explained in Chapter Five,
the drawbacks of migration to non-generative alternatives go beyond the fac-
tors driving individual users’ decisions.
Next-generation video game consoles are not the only appliances vying for a
chunk of the PC’s domain. With a handful of exceptions, mobile phones are in
the same category: they are smart, and many can access the Internet, but the ac-
cess is channeled through browsers provided and controlled by the phone ser-
vice vendor. The vendor can determine what bookmarks to preinstall or up-
date, what sites to allow or disallow, and, more generally, what additional
software, if any, can run on the phone.106 Many personal digital assistants
come with software provided through special arrangements between device
and software vendors, as Sony’s Mylo does with Skype. Software makers with-
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out deals cannot have their code run on the devices, even if the user desires it.
In 2006, AMD introduced the “Telmex Internet Box,” which looks just like a
PC but cannot run any new software without AMD’s permission. It will run
any software AMD chooses to install on it, even after the unit has been pur-
chased.107 Devices like these may be safer to use, and they may seem capacious
in features so long as they oﬀer a simple Web browser, but by limiting the dam-
age that users can do through their own ignorance or carelessness, the appliance
also limits the beneﬁcial activities that users can create or receive from others—
activities they may not even realize are important to them when they are pur-
chasing the device.
Problems with generative PC platforms can thus propel people away from
PCs and toward information appliances controlled by their makers. Eliminate
the PC from many dens or living rooms, and we eliminate the test bed and dis-
tribution point of new, useful software from any corner of the globe. We also
eliminate the safety valve that keeps those information appliances honest. If
TiVo makes a digital video recorder that has too many limits on what people
can do with the video they record, people will discover DVR software like
MythTV that records and plays TV shows on their PCs.108 If mobile phones
are too expensive, people will use Skype. But people do not buy PCs as insur-
ance policies against appliances that limit their freedoms, even though PCs
serve exactly this vital function. People buy them to perform certain tasks at the
moment of acquisition. If PCs cannot reliably perform these tasks, most con-
sumers will not see their merit, and the safety valve will be lost. If the PC ceases
to be at the center of the information technology ecosystem, the most restric-
tive aspects of information appliances will come to the fore.
PC AS INFORMATION APPLIANCE
PCs need not entirely disappear as people buy information appliances in their
stead. They can themselves be made less generative. Recall the fundamental dif-
ference between a PC and an information appliance: the PC can run code from
anywhere, written by anyone, while the information appliance remains teth-
ered to its maker’s desires, oﬀering a more consistent and focused user experi-
ence at the expense of ﬂexibility and innovation. Users tired of making the
wrong choices about installing code on their PCs might choose to let someone
else decide what code should be run. Firewalls can protect against some bad
code, but they also complicate the installation of new good code.109 As anti-
virus, antispyware, and antibadware barriers proliferate, they create new chal-
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lenges to the deployment of new good code from unprivileged sources. And in
order to guarantee eﬀectiveness, these barriers are becoming increasingly pater-
nalistic, refusing to allow users easily to overrule them. Especially in environ-
ments where the user of the PC does not own it—oﬃces, schools, libraries, and
cyber cafés—barriers are being put in place to prevent the running of any code
not speciﬁcally approved by the relevant gatekeeper.
Short of completely banning unfamiliar software, code might be divided
into ﬁrst- and second-class status, with second-class, unapproved software al-
lowed to perform only certain minimal tasks on the machine, operating within
a digital sandbox. This technical solution is safer than the status quo but, in a
now-familiar tradeoﬀ, noticeably limiting. Skype works best when it can also
be used to transfer users’ ﬁles, which means it needs access to those ﬁles. Worse,
such boundaries would have to be built into the operating system—placing the
operating system developer or installer in the position of deciding what soft-
ware will and will not run. If the user is allowed to make exceptions, the user
can and will make the wrong exceptions, and the security restrictions will too
often serve only to limit the deployment of legitimate software that has not
been approved by the right gatekeepers. The PC will have become an informa-
tion appliance, not easily reconﬁgured or extended by its users.
* * *
The Internet Engineering Task Force’s RFC 1135 on the Morris worm closed
with a section titled “Security Considerations.” This section is the place in a
standards document for a digital environmental impact statement—a survey
of possible security problems that could arise from deployment of the standard.
RFC 1135’s security considerations section was one sentence: “If security con-
siderations had not been so widely ignored in the Internet, this memo would
not have been possible.”110
What does that sentence mean? One reading is straightforward: if people
had patched their systems and chosen good passwords, Morris’s worm would
not have been able to propagate, and there would have been no need to write
the memo. Another is more profound: if the Internet had been designed with
security as its centerpiece, it would never have achieved the kind of success it
was enjoying, even as early as 1988. The basic assumption of Internet protocol
design and implementation was that people would be reasonable; to assume
otherwise runs the risk of hobbling it in just the way the proprietary networks
were hobbled. The cybersecurity problem deﬁes easy solution, because any of
the most obvious solutions to it will cauterize the essence of the Internet and
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the generative PC.111 That is the generative dilemma. The next chapter ex-
plains more systematically the beneﬁts of generativity, and Chapter Five ex-
plores what the digital ecosystem will look like should our devices become
more thoroughly appliancized. The vision is not a pleasant one, even though it
may come about naturally through market demand. The key to avoiding such
a future is to give that market a reason not to abandon or lock down the PCs
that have served it so well—also giving most governments reason to refrain
from major intervention into Internet architecture. The solutions to the gener-
ative dilemma will rest on social and legal innovation as much as on technical
innovation, and the best guideposts can be found in other generative successes
in those arenas. Those successes have faced similar challenges resulting from
too much openness, and many have overcome them without abandoning gen-
erativity through solutions that inventively combine technical and social ele-
ments.
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In Part I of this book I showed how generativity—both at the PC and
network layers—was critical to the explosion of the Net, and how it
will soon be critical to the explosion of the Net in a very diﬀerent
sense. In Part II I drill down a bit more into this concept of genera-
tivity. What is it? What does it mean? Where do we see it? Why is it
good?
This part of the book oﬀers an analytic deﬁnition of generativity
and describes its beneﬁts and drawbacks. It then explores the implica-
tions of a technological ecosystem in which non-generative devices
and services—sterile “tethered appliances”—come to dominate. This
trend threatens to curtail future innovation and to facilitate invasive
forms of surveillance and control. A non-generative information
ecosystem advances the regulability of the Internet to a stage that goes
beyond addressing discrete regulatory problems, instead allowing reg-
ulators to alter basic freedoms that previously needed no theoretical or
practical defense. I then turn to ways in which some systems—such as
II
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Wikipedia—have managed to retain their essential generative character while
confronting the internal limits and external scrutiny that have arisen because of
their initial successes.
Some principles jump out:
Our information technology ecosystem functions best with generative technology
at its core. A mainstream dominated by non-generative systems will harm inno-
vation as well as some important individual freedoms and opportunities for
self-expression. However, generative and non-generative models are not mutu-
ally exclusive. They can compete and intertwine within a single system. For ex-
ample, a free operating system such as GNU/Linux can be locked within an in-
formation appliance like the TiVo, and classical, proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms like
Red Hat and IBM can ﬁnd it worthwhile to contribute to generative technolo-
gies like GNU/Linux.1 Neither model is necessarily superior to the other for all
purposes. Moreover, even if they occupy a more minor role in the mainstream,
non-generative technologies still have valuable roles to serve. But they develop
best when they can draw on the advances of generative systems.
Generativity instigates a pattern both within and beyond the technological layers
of the information technology ecosystem. This book has so far described a trajec-
tory for the generative Internet and PC, which begins in a backwater, accepts
contribution from many quarters, experiences extraordinary success and unex-
pected mainstream adoption, and then encounters new and serious problems
precisely because of that success. These problems can pose a lethal threat to
generative systems by causing people to transform them into, or abandon them
for, sterile alternatives. The forces that can stall the progress of the open Inter-
net and return us to the days of proprietary networks can aﬀect opportunities
for generative enterprises like Wikipedia; such ventures are much more diﬃcult
to start without an open PC on a neutral Net. Moreover, the generative pattern
of boom, bust, and possible renewal is not unique to technologies. It can also be
found in generative expressive and social systems built with the help of those
technologies. Recognizing the generative pattern can help us to understand
phenomena across all the Internet’s layers, and solutions at one layer—such as
those oﬀered by Wikipedians in the face of new pressures at the content layer—
can oﬀer insight into solutions at others, such as the problems of viruses and
spam at the technical layer.
Proponents of generative systems ignore the drawbacks attendant to generativity’s
success at their peril. Generative systems are threatened by their mainstream suc-
cess because new participants misunderstand or ﬂout the ethos that makes the
After the Stall64
systems function well, and those not involved with the system ﬁnd their legally
protected interests challenged by it. Generative systems are not inherently self-
sustaining when confronted with these challenges. We should draw lessons
from instances in which such systems have survived and apply these lessons to
problems arising within generative systems in other layers.
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4
The Generative Pattern
Anyone can design new applications to operate over the Internet.
Good applications can then be adopted widely while bad ones are ig-
nored. The phenomenon is part of the Internet’s “hourglass architec-
ture” (Figure 4.1).
The hourglass portrays two important design insights. First is the
notion that the network can be carved into conceptual layers. The ex-
act number of layers varies depending on who is drawing the hour-
glass and why,1 and even by chapter of this book.2 On one basic view
the network can be understood as having three layers. At the bottom
is the “physical layer,” the actual wires or airwaves over which data will
ﬂow. At the top is the “application layer,” representing the tasks peo-
ple might want to perform on the network. (Sometimes, above that,
we might think of the “content layer,” containing actual information
exchanged among the network’s users, and above that the “social
layer,” where new behaviors and interactions among people are en-
abled by the technologies underneath.) In the middle is the “protocol
layer,” which establishes consistent ways for data to ﬂow so that the
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sender, the receiver, and anyone necessary in the middle can know the basics of
who the data is from and where the data is going.
By dividing the network into layers and envisioning some boundaries
among them, the path is clear to a division of labor among people working to
improve the overall network. Tinkerers can work on one layer without having
to understand much about the others, and there need not be any coordination
or relationship between those working at one layer and those at another. For ex-
ample, someone can write a new application like an instant messenger without
having to know anything about whether its users will be connected to the net-
work by modem or broadband. And an ISP can upgrade the speed of its Inter-
net service without having to expect the authors of instant messenger programs
to rewrite them to account for the new speed: the adjustment happens natu-
rally. On the proprietary networks of the 1980s, in contrast, such divisions
among layers were not as important because the networks sought to oﬀer a one-
stop solution to their customers, at the cost of having to design everything
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Figure 4.1 Hourglass architecture of the Internet
themselves. Layers facilitate polyarchies, and the proprietary networks were
hierarchies.3
The second design insight of the hourglass is represented by its shape. The
framers of Internet Protocol did not undertake to predict what would ﬁll the
upper or lower layers of the hourglass. As a technical matter, anyone could be-
come part of the network by bringing a data-carrying wire or radio wave to the
party. One needed only to ﬁnd someone already on the network willing to
share access, and to obtain a unique IP address, an artifact not intended to be
hoarded. Thus, wireless Internet access points could be developed by outsiders
without any changes required to Internet Protocol: the Protocol embodied so
few assumptions about the nature of the medium used that going wireless did
not violate any of them. The large variety of ways of physically connecting is
represented by the broad base to the hourglass. Similarly, the framers of Inter-
net Protocol made few assumptions about the ultimate uses of the network.
They merely provided a scheme for packaging and moving data, whatever its
purpose. This scheme allowed a proliferation of applications from any inter-
ested and talented source—from the Web to e-mail to instant messenger to ﬁle
transfer to video streaming. Thus, the top of the hourglass is also broad. It is
only the middle that is narrow, containing Internet Protocol, because it is
meant to be as feature-free as possible. It simply describes how to move data,
and its basic parameters have evolved slowly over the years. Innovation and
problem-solving are pushed up or down, and to others: Chapter Two’s procras-
tination principle at work.
This same quality is found within traditional PC architecture. It greatly fa-
cilitates the way that the overall network operates, although those joining the
debate on Internet openness have largely ignored this quality. Operating sys-
tem designers like Microsoft and Apple have embraced the procrastination
principle of their counterparts in Internet network design. Their operating sys-
tems, as well as Unix and its variants, are intentionally incomplete; they were
built to allow users to install new code written by third parties. Such code could
entirely revise the way a computer operates, which gives individuals other than
the original designers the capacity to solve new problems and redirect the pur-
poses of PCs.4 We could even sketch a parallel hourglass of PC architecture
(Figure 4.2).
The PC can run code from a broad number of sources, and it can be physi-
cally placed into any number and style of physical chassis from many sources,
at least as a technical matter. (Sometimes the operating system maker may ob-
ject as a strategic and legal matter: Apple, for example, has with few exceptions
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notoriously insisted on bundling its operating system with Apple hardware,
perhaps a factor in its mere 5 percent market share for PCs.5)
I have termed this quality of the Internet and of traditional PC architecture
“generativity.” Generativity is a system’s capacity to produce unanticipated change
through unﬁltered contributions from broad and varied audiences. Terms like
“openness” and “free” and “commons” evoke elements of it, but they do not
fully capture its meaning, and they sometimes obscure it.
Generativity pairs an input consisting of unﬁltered contributions from di-
verse people and groups, who may or may not be working in concert, with the
output of unanticipated change. For the inputs, how much the system facili-
tates audience contribution is a function of both technological design and so-
cial behavior. A system’s generativity describes not only its objective character-
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Figure 4.2 Hourglass architecture of the PC
istics, but also the ways the system relates to its users and the ways users relate
to one another. In turn, these relationships reﬂect how much the users identify
as contributors or participants, rather than as mere consumers.
FEATURES OF A GENERATIVE SYSTEM
What makes something generative? There are ﬁve principal factors at work: (1)
how extensively a system or technology leverages a set of possible tasks; (2) how
well it can be adapted to a range of tasks; (3) how easily new contributors can
master it; (4) how accessible it is to those ready and able to build on it; and (5)
how transferable any changes are to others—including (and perhaps especially)
nonexperts.
Leverage: Leverage makes a diﬃcult job easier. Leverage is not exclusively a
feature of generative systems; non-generative, specialized technologies can pro-
vide leverage for their designated tasks.6 But as a baseline, the more a system
can do, the more capable it is of producing change. Examples of leverage
abound: consider a lever itself (with respect to lifting physical objects), a band
saw (cutting them), an airplane (transporting them from one place to another),
a piece of paper (hosting written language, wrapping ﬁsh), or an alphabet (con-
structing words). Our world teems with useful objects and processes, both nat-
ural and artiﬁcial, tangible and intangible. Both PCs and network technologies
have proven very leveraging. A typical PC operating system handles many of
the chores that the author of an application would otherwise have to worry
about, and properly implemented Internet Protocol sees to it that bits of data
move from one place to another without application authors having to worry
on either end. A little eﬀort can thus produce a very powerful computer pro-
gram, whether a ﬁle-sharing program or a virus comprising just a few lines of
code.
Adaptability: Adaptability refers to how easily the system can be built on or
modiﬁed to broaden its range of uses. A given instrumentality may be highly
leveraging yet suited only to a limited range of applications. For example, TiVo
is greatly leveraging—television viewers describe its impact on their lives as rev-
olutionary—but it is not very adaptable. A plowshare enables one to plant a va-
riety of seeds; however, its comparative leverage quickly vanishes when devoted
to other tasks such as holding doors open. The same goes for swords (they really
make poor plowshares), guns, chairs, band saws, and even airplanes. Adaptabil-
ity is clearly a spectrum. Airplanes can transport people and things, or they can
be conﬁgured to dust or bomb what lies below. But one can still probably count
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the kinds of uses for an airplane on two hands. A technology that aﬀords hun-
dreds of diﬀerent, additional kinds of uses beyond its essential application is
more adaptable and, all else being equal, more generative than a technology
that oﬀers fewer kinds of uses. The emphasis here is on uses not anticipated at
the time the technology was developed. A thick Swiss Army knife may have
plenty of built-in tools compared with a simple pocket knife, but many of those
are highly specialized.7
By this reckoning, electricity is an amazingly adaptable technology, as is plas-
tic (hence the historical use of “plastic” to refer to notions of sculptability).8
And so are the PC and the Internet: they can be endlessly diverted to new tasks
not counted on by their original makers.
Ease of mastery: A technology’s ease of mastery reﬂects how easy it is for broad
audiences to understand how to adopt and adapt it. The airplane is not readily
mastered, being neither easy to ﬂy nor easy to learn how to modify for new pur-
poses. The risk of physical injury if the modiﬁcations are poorly designed or ex-
ecuted is a further barrier to such tinkering. Paper, on the other hand, is readily
mastered: we teach our children how to use it, draw on it, and even fold it into
paper airplanes (which are much easier to ﬂy and modify than real ones), often
before they enter preschool. The skills required to understand many otherwise
generative technologies are often not very readily absorbed. Many technologies
require apprenticeships, formal training, or many hours of practice if one is to
become conversant in them. The small electronic components used to build ra-
dios and doorbells fall into this category—one must learn both how each piece
functions and how to solder—as do antique car engines that the enthusiast
wants to customize. Of course, the skills necessary to operate certain technolo-
gies, rather than modify them, are often more quickly acquired. For example,
many quickly understand how to drive a car, an understanding probably assisted
by user-friendly inventions such as the automatic transmission.
Ease of mastery also refers to the ease with which various types of people
might deploy and adapt a given technology, even if their skills fall short of full
mastery. A pencil is easily mastered: it takes a moment to understand and put to
many uses, even though it might require a lifetime of practice and innate artistic
talent to achieve Da Vincian levels of leverage from it. The more useful a tech-
nology is both to the neophyte and to the expert, the more generative it is. PCs
and network technologies are not easy for everyone to master, yet many people
are able to learn how to code, often (or especially) without formal training.
Accessibility: The easier it is to obtain access to a technology, along with the
tools and information necessary to achieve mastery of it, the more generative it
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is. Barriers to accessibility can include the sheer expense of producing (and
therefore consuming) the technology, taxes, regulations associated with its
adoption or use, and the secrecy its producers adopt to maintain scarcity or
control.
Measured by accessibility, paper, plowshares, and guns are highly accessible,
planes hardly at all, and cars somewhere in between. It might be easy to learn
how to drive a car, but cars are expensive, and the government can always re-
voke a user’s driving privileges, even after the privileges have been earned
through a demonstration of driving skill. Moreover, revocation is not an ab-
stract threat because eﬀective enforcement is not prohibitively expensive. Mea-
sured by the same factors, scooters and bicycles are more accessible, while
snowplows are less so. Standard PCs are very accessible; they come in a wide
range of prices, and in a few keystrokes or mouse-clicks one can be ready to
write new code for them. On the other hand, specialized PC modes—like
those found in “kiosk mode” at a store cycling through slides—cannot have
their given task interrupted or changed, and they are not accessible.
Transferability: Transferability indicates how easily changes in the technol-
ogy can be conveyed to others. With fully transferable technology, the fruits of
skilled users’ adaptations can be easily conveyed to less-skilled others. The PC
and the Internet together possess very strong transferability: a program written
in one place can be shared with, and replicated by, tens of millions of other ma-
chines in a matter of moments. By contrast, a new appliance made out of a 
75-in-1 Electronic Project Kit is not easily transferable because the modiﬁer’s
changes cannot be easily conveyed to another kit. Achieving the same result re-
quires manually wiring a new kit to look like the old one, which makes the
project kit less generative.
GENERATIVE AND NON-GENERATIVE SYSTEMS COMPARED
Generative tools are not inherently better than their non-generative (“sterile”)
counterparts. Appliances are often easier to master for particular uses, and be-
cause their design often anticipates uses and abuses, they can be safer and more
eﬀective. For example, on camping trips, Swiss Army knives are ideal. Luggage
space is often at a premium, and such a tool will be useful in a range of ex-
pected and even unexpected situations. In situations when versatility and
space constraints are less important, however, a Swiss Army knife is compara-
tively a fairly poor knife—and an equally awkward magnifying glass, saw, and
scissors.
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As the examples and terms suggest, the ﬁve qualities of leverage, adaptability,
ease of mastery, accessibility, and transferability often reinforce one another.
And the absence of one of these factors may prevent a technology from being
generative. A system that is accessible but diﬃcult to master may still be gener-
ative if a small but varied group of skilled users make their work available to
less-sophisticated users. Usually, however, a major deﬁciency in any one factor
greatly reduces overall generativity. This is the case with many tools that are
leveraging and adaptable but diﬃcult to master. For example, while some enjoy
tinkering in home workshops, making small birdhouses using wood and a saw,
most cannot build their own boats or decks, much less pass those creations on
to others. Similarly, there are plenty of examples of technology that is easy to
master and is quite adaptable, but lacks leverage. Lego building blocks are easy
to master and can produce a great range of shapes, but regardless of the skill be-
hind their arrangement they remain small piles of plastic, which largely con-
ﬁnes their uses to that of toys.
The more that the ﬁve qualities are maximized, the easier it is for a system or
platform to welcome contributions from outsiders as well as insiders. Maxi-
mizing these qualities facilitates the technology’s deployment in unanticipated
ways. Table 4.1 lists examples of generative tools. For comparison, the table also
includes some of these tools’ less generative counterparts. Views on these cate-
gories or particular examples will undoubtedly vary, but some themes emerge.
In general, generative tools are more basic and less specialized for accomplish-
ing a particular purpose; these qualities make such tools more usable for many
tasks. Generative technologies may require the user to possess some skill in or-
der for the tool to be even minimally useful—compare a piano with a music
box—but once the user has acquired some skill, the tools support a wider range
of applications.
Generative tools are individually useful. Generative systems are sets of tools
and practices that develop among large groups of people. These systems pro-
vide an environment for new and best—or at least most popular—practices to
spread and diversify further within them. Generative systems can be built on
non-generative platforms—no technical reason prevented CompuServe from
developing wiki-like features and inviting its subscribers to contribute to some-
thing resembling Wikipedia—but frequently generativity at one layer is the
best recipe for generativity at the layer above.
After the Stall74
Table 4.1. Examples of generative tools
Generative Less Generative
Tools/ Duct tapea Anchor bolts Jackhammers, while highly leveraging 
Construction Hammer Jackhammer for demolition, have few other uses. 
Hammers can be used for a greater 
variety of activities. They are more 
adaptable and accessible, and they 
are easier to master.
Square tiles Patterned tiles Square tiles of different colors can be 
laid out in a variety of different
patterns. Particularly shaped and 
colored tiles aesthetically ﬁt to-
gether in only a certain way.
Paint Decals
Games/Toys Dice, playing Board games Dice and playing cards are building 
cards blocks for any number of games. 
Board games are generally special-
ized for playing only one particu-
lar game. All, however are accessi-
ble: just as with dice and playing 
cards, one could make up entirely 
new rules for Monopoly using its 
board, game pieces, and money.
Lego bricks, Prefabricated Lego bricks can be assembled into
plastic dollhouse houses or reconﬁgured for vari-
girder and ous other uses. A dollhouse facili-
panel con- tates variety in play by its users.
struction While less reconﬁgurable than
sets, erector Legos, it can be a platform for other
sets outputs. Compared with a board
game, a dollhouse is thus a more
generative toy.
Chess, Connect Four Many variants on traditional games
checkers involve chess and checkers. The
pieces can also be generalized to
create different games.
Etch-a- Coloring book,
Sketch, paint-by-
crayons, numbers
paper
(continued )
aDuct tape has been celebrated as having thousands of uses. See, e.g., Duck Prods., Creative Uses
http://www.duckproducts.com/creative (last visited May 16, 2007). Interestingly, one of them is decid-
edly not patching ducts. See P P, S HVAC D: U A  D T
(1998), http://www.lbl.gov/Science-Articles/Archive/duct-tape-HVAC.html.
Table 4.1. Continued
Generative Less Generative
Kitchen Knife Potato peeler Peelers can be used only on particular 
Devices foods. Knives have greater versatil-
ity to tasks besides peeling, as well 
as greater adaptability for uses out-
side cooking.
Stove Slot toaster Generally, toasters are dedicated to
heating bread. An electric stove can
be adapted for that task as well as 
for many other meals.
Kettle Coffeemaker A “pod” coffee system restricts the 
user to making coffee from supplies
provided by that vendor. Even a 
traditional coffeemaker is limited 
to making coffee. A kettle, how-
ever, can be used to heat water for 
use in any number of hot drinks or 
meals, such as oatmeal or soup.
Sports Dumbbells Exercise An exercise machine’s accessibility is 
machine often limited by its cost. The possi-
ble workouts using the machine are
also limited by its conﬁguration. 
Dumbbells can be combined for a 
variety of regimens. An exercise 
machine is safer, however, and per-
haps less intimidating to new users.
Cooking/ Vodka Flavored wine
Food cooler
Rice, salt Prepared sushi Prepared sushi may be less accessible
due to its price. Rice and salt are 
staple foods that are easier to add 
and use in a variety of dishes.
Corn Microwave 
popcorn
GENERATIVITY AND ITS COUSINS
The notion of generativity is itself an adaptation. It is related to other concep-
tions of information technology and, to some degree, draws upon their mean-
ings.
The Free Software Philosophy
The normative ideals of the free software movement and the descriptive attri-
butes of generativity have much in common. According to this philosophy, any
software functionality enjoyed by one person should be understandable and
modiﬁable by everyone. The free software philosophy emphasizes the value of
sharing not only a tool’s functionality, but also knowledge about how the tool
works so as to help others become builders themselves. Put into our terms, ac-
cessibility is a core value. When the free software approach works, it helps to ex-
pand the audiences capable of building software, and it increases the range of
outputs the system generates.
While generativity has some things in common with the free software ap-
proach, it is not the same. Free software satisﬁes Richard Stallman’s benchmark
“four freedoms”: freedom to run the program, freedom to study how it works,
freedom to change it, and freedom to share the results with the public at large.9
These freedoms overlap with generativity’s four factors, but they depart in sev-
eral important respects. First, some highly generative platforms may not meet
all of free software’s four freedoms. While proprietary operating systems like
Windows may not be directly changeable—the Windows source code is not
regularly available to outside programmers—the ﬂexibility that software au-
thors have to build on top of the Windows OS allows a programmer to revise
nearly any behavior of a Windows PC to suit speciﬁc tastes. Indeed, one could
implement GNU/Linux on top of Windows, or Windows on top of GNU/
Linux.10 So, even though Windows is proprietary and does not meet the deﬁ-
nition of free software, it is generative.
Free software can also lack the accessibility associated with generativity.
Consider “trapped” PCs like the one inside the TiVo. TiVo is built on Linux,
which is licensed as free software, but, while the code is publicly published, it is
nearly impossible for the Linux PC inside a TiVo to run anything but the code
that TiVo designates for it. The method of deploying a generative technology
can have a non-generative result: the free software satisﬁes the leveraging qual-
ity of generativity, but it lacks accessibility.11
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Aﬀordance Theory
Fields such as psychology, industrial design, and human-computer interaction
use the concept of “aﬀordances.”12 Originally the term was used to refer to the
possible actions that existed in a given environment. If an action were objec-
tively possible, the environment was said to “aﬀord” that action. The concept
has since been adapted to focus on “perceived aﬀordances,” the actions or uses
that an individual is subjectively likely to make, rather than on actions or uses
that are objectively possible. As a design tool, aﬀordances can help the creator
of an environment ensure that the available options are as obvious and inviting
as possible to the intended users.
A theory of aﬀordances can also be used to predict what various people
might do when presented with an object by asking what that object invites
users to do. A ball might be thrown; a chair might be sat on. A hyperlink that is
not underlined may be “poorly aﬀorded” because it may impede users from re-
alizing that they can click on it, suggesting that a better design would visually
demarcate the link.
Generativity shares some of this outlook. If poorly aﬀorded, some forms of
technical user empowerment, such as the ability to run software written by oth-
ers, can harm users who mistakenly run code that hurts their machines. This
leads to the unfortunate result that the unqualiﬁed freedom to run any code
can result in restrictions on what code is or can be run: adverse experiences
cause less-skilled users to become distrustful of all new code, and they ask for
environments that limit the damage that they can inadvertently do.
Yet unlike generativity, aﬀordance theory does not focus much on systemic
output. Instead, it takes one object at a time and delineates its possible or likely
uses. More recent incarnations of the theory suggest that the object’s designer
ought to anticipate its uses and tailor the object’s appearance and functionality
accordingly. Such tailoring is more consistent with the development of appli-
ancized systems than with generative ones. Generativity considers how a sys-
tem might grow or change over time as the uses of a technology by one group
are shared with other individuals, thereby extending the generative platform.
Theories of the Commons
Generativity also draws from recent scholarship about the commons. Some
commentators, observing the decentralized and largely unregulated infrastruc-
ture of the Internet, have noted how these qualities have enabled the develop-
ment of an innovation commons where creativity can ﬂourish.13 Projects like
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Creative Commons have designed intellectual property licenses so that authors
can clearly declare the conditions under which they will permit their technical
or expressive work to be copied and repurposed. Such licensing occurs against
the backdrop of copyright law, which generally protects all original work upon
ﬁxation, even work for which the author has been silent as to how it may be
used. By providing a vehicle for understanding that authors are willing to share
their work, Creative Commons licenses are a boon for content-level generativ-
ity because the licenses allow users to build on their colleagues’ work.
Other scholars have undertaken an economic analysis of the commons.
They claim that the Internet’s economic value as a commons is often signiﬁ-
cantly underestimated, and that there are strong economic arguments for man-
aging and sustaining an infrastructure without gatekeepers.14 In particular,
they argue that nonmonopolized Internet access is necessary to ensure merito-
cratic competition among content providers.15
These arguments about infrastructure tend to end where the network cable
does. A network on which anyone can set up a node and exchange bits with
anyone else on the network is necessary but not suﬃcient to establish competi-
tion, to produce innovative new services, to promote the free ﬂow of informa-
tion to societies in which the local media is censored, or to make the most eﬃ-
cient use of network resources. As the next chapter explains, the endpoints have
at least as much of a role to play. Focusing on the generativity of a system with-
out conﬁning that system to a particular technical locus can help us evaluate
what values the system embodies—and what it truly aﬀords.
Values, of course, vary from one person and stakeholder to the next. Gener-
ative systems can encourage creativity and spur innovation, and they can also
make it comparatively more diﬃcult for institutions and regulators to assert
control over the systems’ uses. If we are to draw conclusions about whether
a ﬁeld balanced between generative and non-generative systems ought to be
preserved, we need to know the beneﬁts and drawbacks of each in greater 
detail.
THE STRENGTHS OF GENERATIVE SYSTEMS
Generative systems facilitate change. The ﬁrst part of this book introduced pos-
itive and negative faces of generativity: it told an optimistic tale of Internet de-
velopment, followed by pessimistic predictions of trouble due to deep-rooted
vulnerabilities in that network.
A generative system can be judged from both within the system and outside
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of it. A set of PCs being destroyed by a virus from afar is a change brought
about by a generative system that is internally bad because it harms the system’s
generativity. The development and distribution of a generic installer program
for a PC, which makes it easy for other software authors to bundle their work so
that users can easily install and use it, is an example of a generative system pro-
ducing an internally good change, because it makes the system more genera-
tive.
Generative outputs can also be judged as good or bad by reference to exter-
nal values. If people use a generative system to produce software that allows its
users to copy music and video without the publishers’ permissions, those sup-
portive of publishers will rationally see generativity’s disruptive potential as
bad. When a generative system produces the means to circumvent Internet ﬁl-
tering in authoritarian states, people in favor of citizen empowerment will ap-
prove.
Generativity’s beneﬁts can be grouped more formally as at least two distinct
goods, one deriving from unanticipated change, and the other from inclusion
of large and varied audiences. The ﬁrst good is its innovative output: new
things that improve people’s lives. The second good is its participatory input,
based on a belief that a life well lived is one in which there is opportunity to
connect to other people, to work with them, and to express one’s own individ-
uality through creative endeavors.
GENERATIVITY’S OUTPUT: INNOVATION
To those for whom innovation is important, generative systems can provide for
a kind of organic innovation that might not take place without them.
The Limits of Non-generative Innovation
Non-generative systems can grow and evolve, but their growth is channeled
through their makers: a new toaster is released by Amana and reﬂects antici-
pated customer demand or preferences, or an old proprietary network like
CompuServe adds a new form of instant messaging by programming it itself.
When users pay for products or services in one way or another, those who con-
trol the products or services amid competition are responsive to their desires
through market pressure. This is an indirect means of innovation, and there is
a growing set of literature about its limitation: a persistent bottleneck that pre-
vents certain new uses from being developed and cultivated by large incumbent
ﬁrms, despite the beneﬁts they could enjoy with a breakthrough.16
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We have already seen this phenomenon by anecdote in the ﬁrst part of this
book. Recall the monopoly telephone system in the United States, where
AT&T attempted to extend its control through the network and into the end-
point devices hooked up to the network, at ﬁrst barring the Hush-A-Phone and
the Carterfone. The telephone system was stable and predictable; its uses
evolved slowly if at all from its inception in the late nineteenth century. It was
designed to facilitate conversations between two people at a distance, and with
some important exceptions, that is all it has done. The change it has wrought
for society is, of course, enormous, but the contours of that change were known
and set once there was a critical mass of telephones distributed among the gen-
eral public. Indeed, given how revolutionary a telephone system is to a society
without one, it is striking that the underlying technology and its uses have seen
only a handful of variations since its introduction. This phenomenon is an ar-
tifact of the system’s rejection of outside contributions. In the United States, af-
ter the law compelled AT&T to permit third-party hardware to connect, we
saw a number of new endpoint devices: new telephone units in various shapes,
colors, and sizes; answering machines; and, most important, the telephone mo-
dem, which allows the non-generative network itself to be repurposed for wide-
spread data communication.
We saw a similar pattern as the Internet overtook proprietary networks that
did not even realize it was a competitor. The generative Internet is a basic, ﬂex-
ible network, which began with no innate content. The content was to appear
as people and institutions were moved to oﬀer it. By contrast, the proprietary
networks of CompuServe, AOL, Prodigy, and Minitel were out beating the
bushes for content, arranging to provide it through the straightforward eco-
nomic model of being paid by people who would spend connect time browsing
it. If anything, we would expect the proprietary networks to oﬀer more, and for
a while they did. But they also had a natural desire to act as gatekeepers—to
validate anything appearing on their network, to cut individual deals for rev-
enue sharing with their content providers, and to keep their customers from
aﬀecting the network’s technology. These tendencies meant that their rates of
growth and diﬀerentiation were slow. A few areas that these networks consigned
to individual contribution experienced strong activity and subscriber loyalty,
such as their topical bulletin boards run by hired systems operators (called
“sysops”) and boasting content provided by subscribers in public conversations
with each other. These forums were generative at the content layer because peo-
ple could post comments to each other without prescreening and could choose
to take up whatever topics they chose, irrespective of the designated labels for
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the forums themselves (“Pets” vs. “Showbiz”).17 But they were not generative at
the technical layer. The software driving these communities was stagnant: sub-
scribers who were both interested in the communities’ content and technically
minded had few outlets through which to contribute technical improvements
to the way the communities were built. Instead, any improvements were 
orchestrated centrally. As the initial oﬀerings of the proprietary networks
plateaued, the Internet saw developments in technology that in turn led to
developments in content and ultimately in social and economic interaction:
the Web and Web sites, online shopping, peer-to-peer networking, wikis, and
blogs.
The hostility of AT&T toward companies like Hush-A-Phone and of the
proprietary networks to the innovations of enterprising subscribers is not un-
usual, and it is not driven solely by their status as monopolists. Just as behav-
ioral economics shows how individuals can consistently behave irrationally un-
der particular circumstances,18 and how decision-making within groups can
fall prey to error and bias,19 so too can the incumbent ﬁrms in a given market
fail to seize opportunities that they rationally ought to exploit. Much of the
academic work in this area draws from further case studies and interviews with
decision-makers at signiﬁcant ﬁrms. It describes circumstances that echo the
reluctance of CompuServe, AOL, and other proprietary online services to al-
low third-party innovation—or to innovate much themselves.
For example, Tim Wu has shown that when wireless telephone carriers exer-
cise control over the endpoint mobile phones that their subscribers may use,
those phones will have undesirable features—and they are not easy for third
parties to improve.20 In design terms, there is no hourglass. Carriers have
forced telephone providers to limit the mobile phones’ Web browsers to certain
carrier-approved sites. They have eliminated call timers on the phones, even
though they would be trivial to implement—and are in much demand by
users, who would like to monitor whether their use of a phone has gone beyond
allotted minutes for a monthly plan.21 Phones’ ability to transfer photos and
recorded sounds is often limited to using the carriers’ preferred channels and
fees. For those who wish to code new applications to run on the increasingly
powerful computers embedded within the phones, the barriers to contribution
are high. The phones’ application programming interfaces are poorly disclosed,
or are at best selectively disclosed, making the programming platform diﬃcult
to master. Often, the coding must be written for a “virtual machine” that bars
access to many of the phone’s features, reducing accessibility. And the virtual
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machines run slowly, eliminating leverage. These factors persist despite compe-
tition among several carriers.
Oxford’s Andrew Currah has noted a similar reluctance to extend business
models beyond the tried-and-true in a completely diﬀerent setting. He has stud-
ied innovation within the publishing industries, and has found cultural barriers
to it across studios and record companies. As one studio president summarized:
The ﬁscal expectations are enormous. We have to act in a rational and cautious fash-
ion, no matter how much potential new markets like the Internet have. Our core
mission is to protect the library of ﬁlms, and earn as much as possible from that li-
brary over time. . . . So that means focusing our eﬀorts on what’s proven—i.e. the
DVD—and only dipping our toes into new consumer technologies. We simply
aren’t programmed to move quickly.22
And the studio’s vice-chairman said:
You have to understand [studio] strategy in relation to the lifestyle here. . . . Once
you reach the top of the hierarchy, you acquire status and beneﬁts that can soon be
lost—the nice cars, the home in Brentwood, the private schools. . . . It doesn’t make
sense to jeopardize any of that by adopting a reckless attitude towards new technolo-
gies, new markets. Moving slow, and making clear, safe progress is the mantra.23
The puzzle of why big ﬁrms exhibit such innovative inertia was placed into a
theoretical framework by Clayton Christensen in his pioneering book The In-
novator’s Dilemma.24 Christensen found the hard disk drive industry represen-
tative. In it, market leaders tended to be very good at quickly and successfully
adopting some technological advancements, yet were entirely left behind by
upstarts. To explain the discrepancy, he created a taxonomy of “sustaining” and
“disruptive” innovations. When technological innovations are consistent with
the performance trajectory of established market leaders—that is, when they
are a more eﬃcient way of doing what they already do—alert leaders will be
quick to develop and utilize such “sustaining” innovations.
It is with disruptive innovations that the market leaders will lag behind.
These innovations are not in the path of what the company is already doing
well. Indeed, Christensen found that the innovations which market leaders
were the worst at exploiting were “technologically straightforward, consisting
of oﬀ-the-shelf components put together in a product architecture that was of-
ten simpler than prior approaches. They oﬀered less of what customers in es-
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tablished markets wanted and so could rarely be initially employed there. They
oﬀered a diﬀerent package of attributes valued only in emerging markets re-
mote from, and unimportant to, the mainstream.”25
It is not the case, Christensen argues, that these large companies lack the
technological competence to deploy a new technology, but rather that their
managements choose to focus on their largest and most proﬁtable customers,
resulting in an unwillingness to show “downward vision and mobility.”26
Subsequent authors have built on this theory, arguing that a failure to inno-
vate disruptively is not simply an issue of management, but the organizational
inability of large ﬁrms to respond to changes in consumer preferences caused
by such disruptive innovations. Established ﬁrms are structurally reluctant to
investigate whether an innovative product would be marketable to a sector out-
side what they perceive to be their traditional market.27 They want to ride a
wave, and they fail to establish alternatives or plumb new markets even as com-
petitors begin to do so.
This observation has led others to conclude that in order for large organiza-
tions to become more innovative, they must adopt a more “ambidextrous orga-
nizational form” to provide a buﬀer between exploitation and exploration.28
This advice might be reﬂected in choices made by companies like Google,
whose engineers are encouraged to spend one day a week on a project of their
own choosing—with Google able to exploit whatever they come up with.29
But large ﬁrms struggling to learn lessons from academics about becoming
more creative need not be the only sources of innovation. In fact, the competi-
tive market that appears to be the way to spur innovation—a market in which
barriers to entry are low enough for smaller ﬁrms to innovate disruptively
where larger ﬁrms are reluctant to tread—can be made much more competi-
tive, since generative systems reduce barriers to entry and allow contributions
from those who do not even intend to compete.
THE GENERATIVE DIFFERENCE
Generative systems allow users at large to try their hands at implementing and
distributing new uses, and to ﬁll a crucial gap that is created when innovation is
undertaken only in a proﬁt-making model, much less one in which large ﬁrms
dominate. Generatively-enabled activity by amateurs can lead to results that
would not have been produced in a ﬁrm-mediated market model.
The brief history of the Internet and PC illustrates how often the large and
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even small ﬁrm market model of innovation missed the boat on a swath of sig-
niﬁcant advances in information technology while non-market-motivated and
amateur actors led the charge. Recall that Tasmanian amateur coder Peter Tat-
tam saw the value of integrating Internet support into Windows before Mi-
crosoft did, and that the low cost of replicating his work meant that millions of
users could adopt it even if they did not know how to program computers
themselves.30 Hundreds of millions of dollars were invested in proprietary in-
formation services that failed, while Internet domain names representing ﬁrms’
identities were not even reserved by those ﬁrms.31 (McDonald’s might be for-
given for allowing someone else to register mcdonalds.com before it occurred
to the company to do so; even telecommunications giant MCI failed to notice
the burgeoning consumer Internet before Sprint, which was the ﬁrst to register
mci.com—at a time when such registrations were given away ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-
served, to anyone who ﬁlled out the electronic paperwork.)32
The communally minded ethos of the Internet was an umbrella for more ac-
tivity, creativity, and economic value than the capitalistic ethos of the propri-
etary networks, and the openness of the consumer PC to outside code resulted
in a vibrant, expanding set of tools that ensured the end of the information ap-
pliances and proprietary services of the 1980s.
Consider new forms of commercial and social interaction made possible by
new software that in turn could easily run on PCs or be oﬀered over the Inter-
net. Online auctions might have been ripe for the plucking by Christie’s or
Sotheby’s, but upstart eBay got there ﬁrst and stayed. Craigslist, initiated as a
“.org” by a single person, dominates the market for classiﬁed advertising on-
line.33 Ideas like free Web-based e-mail, hosting services for personal Web
pages, instant messenger software, social networking sites, and well-designed
search engines emerged more from individuals or small groups of people want-
ing to solve their own problems or try something neat than from ﬁrms realizing
there were proﬁts to be gleaned. This is a sampling of major Internet applica-
tions founded and groomed by outsiders; start sliding down whatWired editor
Chris Anderson calls the Long Tail—niche applications for obscure interests—
and we see a dominance of user-written software.34 Venture capital money and
the other artifacts of the ﬁrm-based industrial information economy can kick
in after an idea has been proven, and user innovation plays a crucial role as an
initial spark.
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GENERATIVITY AND A BLENDING OF MODELS FOR INNOVATION
Eric von Hippel has written extensively about how rarely ﬁrms welcome im-
provements to their products by outsiders, including their customers, even
when they could stand to beneﬁt from them.35 His work tries to persuade oth-
erwise rational ﬁrms that the users of their products often can and do create
new adaptations and uses for them—and that these users are commonly de-
lighted to see their improvements shared. Echoing Christensen and others, he
points out that ﬁrms too often think that their own internal marketing and
R&D departments know best, and that users cannot easily improve on what
they manufacture.
Von Hippel then goes further, oﬀering a model that integrates user innova-
tion with manufacturer innovation (Figure 4.3).
Von Hippel’s analysis says that users can play a critical role in adapting tech-
nologies to entirely new purposes—a source of disruptive innovation. They
come up with ideas before there is widespread demand, and they vindicate their
ideas suﬃciently to get others interested. When interest gets big enough, com-
panies can then step in to smooth out the rough edges and fully commercialize
the innovation.
Von Hippel has compiled an extensive catalog of user innovation. He points
to examples like farmers who roped a bicycle-like contraption to some PVC
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Figure 4.3 Eric von Hippel’s zones of innovation
pipes to create a portable center-pivot irrigation system, which, now perfected
by professional manufacturers, is a leading way to water crops.36 Or a para-
medic who placed IV bags ﬁlled with water into his knapsack and ran the out-
let tubes from behind so he could drink from them while bicycling, akin to the
way some fans at football games drink beer out of baseball caps that have cup
holders that hang on either side of the head. The IV bag system has since been
adopted by large manufacturers and is now produced for hikers and soldiers.37
Von Hippel’s studies show that 20 percent of mountain bikers modify their
bikes in some way, and an equal number of surgeons tinker with their surgical
implements. Lego introduced a set of programmable blocks for kids—tradi-
tional Lego toys with little engines inside—and the toys became a runaway hit
with adults, who accounted for 70 percent of the market. The adults quickly
hacked the Lego engines and made them better. Silicon Valley ﬁrms then
banned Legos as a drain on employee productivity. Lego was stumped for over
a year about how to react—this market was not part of the original business
plan—before concluding that it was good.
The building blocks for most of von Hippel’s examples are not even particu-
larly generative ones. They represent tinkering done by that one person in a
hundred or a thousand who is so immersed in an activity or pursuit that im-
proving it would make a big diﬀerence—a person who is prepared to experi-
ment with a level of persistence that calls to mind the Roadrunner’s nemesis,
Wile E. Coyote. Generative systems and technologies are more inviting to dis-
ruptive innovation thanks to their leverage, adaptability, ease of mastery, and
accessibility, and they make it easier for their fruits to spread.
Most ﬁrms cannot sift through the thousands of helpful and not-so-helpful
suggestions sent in by their customers, and they might not even dare look at
them institutionally, lest a sender claim later on that his or her idea was stolen.
Oﬀers of partnership or aﬃliation from small businesses may not fare much
better, just as deals between proprietary networks and individual technology
and content providers numbered only in the tens rather than in the thousands.
Yet when people and institutions other than the incumbents have an opportu-
nity to create and distribute new uses as is possible in a generative system, the
results can outclass what is produced through traditional channels.
If one values innovation, it might be useful to try to ﬁgure out how much
disruptive innovation remains in a particular ﬁeld or technology. For mature
technologies, perhaps generativity is not as important: the remaining leaps,
such as that which allows transistors to be placed closer and closer together on
a chip over time without fundamentally changing the things the chip can do,
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will come from exploitative innovation or will necessitate well-funded research
through institutional channels.
For the Internet, then, some might think that outside innovation is a transi-
tory phenomenon, one that was at its apogee when the ﬁeld of opportunity was
new and still unnoticed by more traditional ﬁrms, and when hardware pro-
gramming capacity was small, as in the early days of the PC.38 If so, the recent
melding of the PC and the Internet has largely reset the innovative clock. Many
of the online tools that have taken oﬀ in recent years, such as wikis and blogs,
are quite rudimentary both in their features and in the sophistication of their
underlying code. The power of wikis and blogs comes from the fact that noth-
ing quite like them existed before, and that they are so readily adopted by In-
ternet users intrigued by their use. The genius behind such innovations is truly
inspiration rather than perspiration, a bit of tinkering with a crazy idea rather
than a carefully planned and executed invention responding to clear market de-
mand.
Due to the limitations of the unconnected PC, one could credibly claim that
its uses were more or less known by 1990: word processing, spreadsheets, data-
bases, games. The rest was merely reﬁnement. The reinvigorated PC/Internet
grid makes such applications seem like a small corner of the landscape, even as
those applications remain important to the people who continue to use them.
We have thus settled into a landscape in which both amateurs and profes-
sionals as well as small- and large-scale ventures contribute to major innova-
tions. Much like the way that millions of dollars can go into production and
marketing for a new musical recording39 while a gifted unknown musician
hums an original tune in the shower that proves the basis for a hit album, the
Internet and PC today run a fascinating juxtaposition of sweepingly ambitious
software designed and built like a modern aircraft carrier by a large contractor,
alongside “killer applets” that can ﬁt on a single ﬂoppy diskette.40 OS/2, an op-
erating system created as a joint venture between IBM and Microsoft,41 ab-
sorbed billions of dollars of research and development investment before its
plug was pulled,42 while Mosaic, the ﬁrst graphical PC Internet browser, was
written by a pair of students in three months.43
A look at sites that aggregate various software projects and their executable re-
sults reveals thousands of projects under way.44 Such projects might be tempt-
ing to write oﬀ as the indulgences of hobbyists, if not for the roll call of pivotal
software that has emerged from such environments:45 software to enable en-
cryption of data, both stored on a hard drive and transmitted across a net-
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work,46 peer-to-peer ﬁle-sharing software,47 e-mail clients,48 Web browsers,49
and sound and image editors.50 Indeed, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd software not initi-
ated by amateurs, even as later versions are produced through more formal cor-
porate means to be more robust, to include consumer help ﬁles and otherwise
attempt to improve upon others’ versions or provide additional services for
which users are willing to pay a premium.51 Many companies are now releasing
their software under a free or open source license to enable users to tinker with
the code, identify bugs, and develop improvements.52
It may well be that, in the absence of broad-based technological accessibility,
there would eventually have been the level of invention currently witnessed in
the PC and on the Internet. Maybe AT&T would have invented the answering
machine on its own, and maybe AOL or CompuServe would have agreed to
hyperlink to one another’s walled gardens. But the hints we have suggest other-
wise: less-generative counterparts to the PC and the Internet—such as stand-
alone word processors and proprietary information services—had far fewer
technological oﬀerings, and they stagnated and then failed as generative coun-
terparts emerged. Those proprietary information services that remain, such as
Lexis/Nexis and Westlaw, sustain themselves because they are the only way to
access useful proprietary content, such as archived news and some scholarly
journal articles.53
Of course, there need not be a zero-sum game in models of software cre-
ation, and generative growth can blend well with traditional market models.
Consumers can become enraptured by an expensive, sophisticated shooting
game designed by a large ﬁrm in one moment and by a simple animation fea-
turing a dancing hamster in the next.54 Big ﬁrms can produce software when
market structure and demand call for such enterprise; smaller ﬁrms can ﬁll
niches; and amateurs, working alone and in groups, can design both inspira-
tional “applets” and more labor-intensive software that increase the volume and
diversity of the technological ecosystem.55 Once an eccentric and unlikely in-
vention from outsiders has gained notoriety, traditional means of raising and
spending capital to improve a technology can shore it up and ensure its expo-
sure to as wide an audience as possible. An information technology ecosystem
comprising only the products of the free software movement would be much
less usable by the public at large than one in which big ﬁrms help sand oﬀ rough
edges.56 GNU/Linux has become user-friendly thanks to ﬁrms that package
and sell copies, even if they cannot claim proprietary ownership in the software
itself, and tedious tasks that improve ease of mastery for the uninitiated might
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best be done through corporate models: creating smooth installation engines,
extensive help guides, and other handholding for what otherwise might be an
oﬀ-putting technical piece of PC software or Web service.57
As the Internet and the PC merge into a grid, people can increasingly lend or
barter computing cycles or bandwidth for causes they care about by simply in-
stalling a small piece of software.58 This could be something like SETI@home,
through which astronomers can distribute voluminous data from radio tele-
scopes to individual PCs,59 which then look for patterns that might indicate
the presence of intelligent life, or it could be a simple sharing of bandwidth
through mechanisms such as amateur-coded (and conceived, and designed)
BitTorrent,60 by which large ﬁles are shared among individuals as they down-
load them, making it possible for users to achieve very rapid downloads by 
accumulating bits of ﬁles from multiple sources, all while serving as sources
themselves. Generativity, then, is a parent of invention, and an open network
connecting generative devices makes the fruits of invention easy to share if the
inventor is so inclined.
GENERATIVITY’S INPUT: PARTICIPATION
A second good of generativity is its invitation to outside contribution on its
own terms. This invitation occurs at two levels: the individual act of contribu-
tion itself, and the ways in which that contribution becomes part of a self-rein-
forcing community. On the ﬁrst level, there is a unique joy to be had in build-
ing something, even if one is not the best craftsperson. This is a value best
appreciated by experiencing it; those who demand proof may not be easy to
persuade. Fortunately, there are many ways in which people have a chance to
build and contribute. Many jobs demand intellectual engagement, which can
be fun for its own sake. People take joy in rearing children: teaching, interact-
ing, guiding. They can also immerse themselves in artistic invention or soft-
ware coding.
Famed utilitarian John Stuart Mill may have believed in the greatest happi-
ness for the greatest number, but he was also a champion of the individual and
a hater of custom. He ﬁrst linked idiosyncrasy to innovation when he argued
that society should “give the freest scope possible to uncustomary things, in or-
der that it may in time appear which of these are ﬁt to be converted into cus-
toms.”61 He then noted the innate value of being able to express oneself idio-
syncratically:
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But independence of action, and disregard of custom, are not solely deserving of en-
couragement for the chance they aﬀord that better modes of action, and customs
more worthy of general adoption, may be struck out; nor is it only persons of de-
cided mental superiority who have a just claim to carry on their lives in their own
way. . . . The same things which are helps to one person towards the cultivation of
his higher nature are hindrances to another. The same mode of life is a healthy ex-
citement to one, keeping all his faculties of action and enjoyment in their best order,
while to another it is a distracting burthen, which suspends or crushes all internal
life.62
The generative Internet and PC allow more than technical innovation and
participation as new services and software are designed and deployed. In addi-
tion, much of that software is geared toward making political and artistic ex-
pression easier. Yochai Benkler has examined the opportunities for the democ-
ratization of cultural participation oﬀered by the Internet through the lens of
liberal political theory:
The networked information economy makes it possible to reshape both the “who”
and the “how” of cultural production relative to cultural production in the twentieth
century. It adds to the centralized, market-oriented production system a new frame-
work of radically decentralized individual and cooperative nonmarket production. It
thereby aﬀects the ability of individuals and groups to participate in the production
of the cultural tools and frameworks of human understanding and discourse. It
aﬀects the way we, as individuals and members of social and political clusters, inter-
act with culture, and through it with each other. It makes culture more transparent
to its inhabitants. It makes the process of cultural production more participatory, in
the sense that more of those who live within a culture can actively participate in its
creation. We are seeing the possibility of an emergence of a new popular culture, pro-
duced on the folk-culture model and inhabited actively, rather than passively con-
sumed by the masses. Through these twin characteristics—transparency and partic-
ipation—the networked information economy also creates greater space for critical
evaluation of cultural materials and tools. The practice of producing culture makes
us all more sophisticated readers, viewers, and listeners, as well as more engaged
makers.63
Benkler sees market-based models of cultural production as at odds with the
folk-culture model, and he much prefers the latter: from “the perspective of lib-
eral political theory, the kind of open, participatory, transparent folk culture
that is emerging in the networked environment is normatively more attractive
than was the industrial cultural production system typiﬁed by Hollywood and
the recording industry.”64 Here, the lines between entertainment and more
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profound civic communication are understood to be thin, if they exist at all. An
ability to participate in the making of culture is seen to be as paramount to full
citizenship as the traditionally narrower activities of engaging in direct political
debate or discussion of pressing policy issues.
Benkler points out the merits of systems that do what he calls “sharing
nicely,” systems in which people help each other without demanding the for-
malities and corresponding frictions of economic exchange.65 He argues that
much wealth has been created by an economy parallel to the corporate one, an
economy of people helping out others without direct expectation of recom-
pense, and that the network revolution makes it easier for that informal engine
to generate much more—more participation, and more innovation.
The joy of being able to be helpful to someone—to answer a question sim-
ply because it is asked and one knows a useful answer, to be part of a team driv-
ing toward a worthwhile goal—is one of the best aspects of being human, and
our information technology architecture has stumbled into a zone where those
qualities can be elicited and aﬃrmed for tens of millions of people.66 It is cap-
tured ﬂeetingly when strangers are thrown together in adverse situations and
unite to overcome them—an elevator that breaks down, or a blizzard or black-
out that temporarily paralyzes the normal cadences of life in a city but that
leads to wonder and camaraderie along with some fear. Part of the Net of the
early twenty-ﬁrst century has distilled some of these values, promoting them
without the kind of adversity or physical danger that could make a blizzard fun
for the ﬁrst day but divisive and lawless after the ﬁrst week without structured
relief.
William Fisher has noted a similar potential in his discussion of semiotic
democracy, a media studies concept drawn from the work of John Fiske.67
Fisher argues that “[i]n an attractive society all persons would be able to partic-
ipate in the process of making cultural meaning. Instead of being merely pas-
sive consumers of images and artifacts produced by others, they would help
shape the world of ideas and symbols in which they live.”68
Technology is not inherently helpful in achieving these ends. At its core, it is
a way of taking useful practices and automating them—oﬀering at least greater
leverage. Laundry that took a day to do can now be done in an hour or two. But
leverage alone, if packaged in a way that does not allow adaptation, is not gen-
erative. It threatens conformity. The more there are prescribed ways to do
something, the more readily people fall into identical patterns. Such prescrip-
tions can come about through rules (as in the fractally thorough guidebooks on
how to operate a McDonald’s franchise) or technology (as in the linearity of a
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PowerPoint slide show and the straitjacket of some of its most favored tem-
plates).69 These rules might ensure a certain minimum competence in the
preparation of a hamburger or of a business presentation precisely because they
discourage what might be unhelpful or unskilled freelancing by the people im-
plementing them. However, the regularity needed to produce consistent sand-
wiches and talks can actively discourage or prevent creativity. That drives critics
of technology like Neil Postman, author of such evocatively titled books as
Building a Bridge to the 18th Century70 and Technopoly: The Surrender of Cul-
ture to Technology,71 to argue that the ascendance of engineering and informa-
tion technology is making sheep of us.
However, this understanding of technology stops at those systems that are
built once, originating elsewhere, and then imposed (or even eagerly snapped
up) by everyone else, who then cannot change them and thus become prisoners
to them. It need not be that way. Technologies that are adaptable and accessi-
ble—not just leveraging—allow people to go a step further once they have
mastered the basics. The Lego company oﬀers suggestions of what to build on
the boxes containing Lego blocks, and they even parcel out a certain number of
each type of block in a package so the user can easily produce exactly those sug-
gestions. But they are combinable into any number of new forms as soon as the
user feels ready to do more than what the box instructs. The PC and the Inter-
net have been just the same in that way. The divide is not between technology
and nontechnology, but between hierarchy and polyarchy.72 In hierarchies,
gatekeepers control the allocation of attention and resources to an idea. In
polyarchies, many ideas can be pursued independently. Hierarchical systems
appear better at nipping dead-end ideas in the bud, but they do so at the ex-
pense of crazy ideas that just might work. Polyarchies can result in wasted en-
ergy and eﬀort, but they are better at ferreting out and developing obscure,
transformative ideas. More importantly, they allow many more people to have
a hand at contributing to the system, regardless of the quality of the contribu-
tion.
Is this only a beneﬁt for those among us who are technically inclined? Most
of Mill’s passion for individuality was channeled into a spirited defense of free
speech and free thinking, not free building—and certainly not free program-
ming.
However, as Benkler’s linkage of the Internet to cultural expression suggests,
the current incarnation of cyberspace oﬀers a generative path that is not simply
an avenue of self-expression for individual nerds. Generativity at the technical
layer can lead to new forms of expression for other layers to which nonpro-
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grammers contribute—culture, political, social, economic, and literary. We
can call this recursive generativity, repeated up through the layers of the hour-
glass. Generativity at the technical layer can also enable new forms of group in-
teraction, refuting Mill’s dichotomy of the mediocre masses versus the lone ec-
centric.
GROUPS AND GENERATIVITY: FROM GENERATIVE TOOLS TO
GENERATIVE SYSTEMS
Creative talent diﬀers greatly from one person to the next, not only in degree
but in preferred outlet. Mozart might have turned to painting if there were no
musical instruments for which to compose, but there is no particular reason to
believe that his paintings would be as good among the work of painters as his
music is judged to be among that of musicians. Generativity solicits invention,
which in turn can be an important expression of the inventor—a fulﬁllment of
a human urge that is thought to represent some of the highest endeavor and
purpose of which we are capable. New technologies welcome new groups of
people who may excel at manipulating them.
People can work alone or in groups. Working in groups has practical limita-
tions. It is typically not easy to collaborate from far away. The combination of
networks and PCs, however, has made it particularly easy to arrange such col-
laborations. Open source projects too ambitious for a single programmer or 
localized group of programmers to achieve alone have been made possible by
cheap networking,73 and the free software movement has developed tools that
greatly ease collaboration over a distance, such as CVS, the “concurrent ver-
sions system.”74 CVS automates many of the diﬃcult tasks inherent in having
many people work on the same body of code at the same time. Itself an open
source project, CVS permits users to establish a virtual library of the code they
are working on, checking out various pieces to work on and then checking
them back in for others to use.75 Successive versions are maintained so that
changes by one person that are regretted by another can be readily unmade.
People with complementary talents who otherwise would not have known or
met each other, much less found a way to collaborate without much logistical
friction, can be brought together to work on a project. Creativity, then, is en-
hanced not only for individuals, but also for groups as distinct entities, thanks
to the linkage of the PC and the Internet.
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RECURSION FROM TECHNOLOGY TO CONTENT TO SOCIETY
The emergence of a vibrant public Internet and a powerful PC affects many
traditional forms of creative and artistic expression because the accessibility of
the PC and the Internet to coding by a variety of technically capable groups has
translated to a number of platforms for use by artistically capable groups.
For example, thanks to the hypertext standards ﬁrst developed by researcher
Tim Berners-Lee,76 the Web came into existence, and because Berners-Lee’s
html hypertext markup language was easy to master, people without much
technical know-how could build Web sites showcasing their creative work,77 or
Web sites that were themselves creative works. Once html took oﬀ, others
wrote html processors and converters so that one did not even have to know the
basics of html to produce and edit Web pages.78
Similarly, simple but powerful software written by amateurs and running on
Internet servers has enabled amateur journalists and writers to prepare and cus-
tomize chronological accounts of their work—“blogs”79—and the pervasive-
ness of online search software has made these blogs accessible to millions of
people who do not seek them out by name but rather by a topical search of 
a subject covered by a blog entry.80 The blog’s underlying software may be
changeable itself, as Wordpress is, for example, and therefore generative at the
technical layer. But even if it were not so readily reprogrammed, as Microsoft’s
proprietary MSN Spaces is not, the opportunity to conﬁgure a blog for nearly
any purpose—group commentary, seeking help ﬁnding a lost camera,81 ex-
pressing and then sorting and highlighting various political opinions—makes
it generative at the content layer.
A signal example of both recursive and group generativity can be found in
the wiki. Software consultant Ward Cunningham was intrigued by the ways in
which strangers might collaborate online.82 He wrote some basic tools that
would allow people to create Web pages even if they didn’t know anything
about Web page creation, and that would allow others to modify those pages,
keeping track of revisions along the way—a sort of CVS for nonprogramming
content.83 He opened a Web site using these tools in 1995 to host an ongoing
conversation about computer programming, and called it a “wiki” after a trip to
Hawaii had exposed him to airport shuttle buses called “wiki-wikis” (wiki is the
Hawaiian word for “quick”).84
Cunningham’s own wiki was successful among a group of several hundred
people—to be sure, he did not appear to be aiming for mass adoption—and it
inspired the founding of Wikipedia in 2001.85 Wikipedia built on Cunning-
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ham’s concepts with the ambition to create an online encyclopedia written and
edited by the world at large. With few exceptions anyone can edit a Wikipedia
entry at any time. As discussed at length later in this book, the possibility for in-
accuracy or outright falsehood is thus legion, and Wikipedia’s users have both
created new technology and solicited commitments from people who share
Wikipedia’s ethos to maintain its accuracy without signiﬁcantly denting its
generativity. Wikipedia stands at the apex of amateur endeavor: an undertaking
done out of sheer interest in or love of a topic, built on collaborative software
that enables a breathtakingly comprehensive result that is the sum of individual
contributions, and one that is extraordinarily trusting of them.86 Wikipedia’s
character will no doubt evolve as, say, companies discover its existence and 
begin editing (and policing) entries that mention or describe them,87 just as
ownership of domain names evolved from an informal and free ﬁrst-come,
ﬁrst-served system to a hotly contested battleﬁeld once their true value was rec-
ognized.88 Today, Wikipedia’s success showcases the interactions that can take
place among the layers of a technical system, with the Internet’s absence of gate-
keepers allowing wiki software to be developed, shared, and then taken up for
educational and social purposes with contributions from people who have little
to no technical expertise.
The ubiquity of PCs and networks—and the integration of the two—have
thus bridged the interests of technical audiences and artistic and expressive
ones, making the grid’s generativity relevant not only to creativity in code-writ-
ing as an end, but to creativity in other artistic ventures as well, including those
that beneﬁt from the ability of near-strangers to encounter each other on the
basis of mutual interest, form groups, and then collaborate smoothly enough
that actual works can be generated. If one measures the value of generativity
through the amount of creativity it unleashes,89 then the generativity of the PC
and Internet grid should be measured not solely by the creativity it enables
among coders, but also by the creativity it enables among artists—and among
groups of each.90
THE GENERATIVE PATTERN
Generative technologies need not produce forward progress, if by progress one
means something like increasing social welfare. Rather, they foment change.
They solicit the distributed intellectual power of humanity to harness the lever-
aging power of the product or system for new applications, and, if they are
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adaptable enough, such applications may be quite unexpected. To use an evo-
lutionary metaphor, they encourage mutations, branchings away from the sta-
tus quo—some that are curious dead ends, others that spread like wildﬁre.
They invite disruption—along with the good things and bad things that can
come with such disruption.
The harm from disruption might diﬀer by ﬁeld. Consider a hypothetical
highly generative children’s chemistry set, adaptable and exceptionally leverag-
ing. It would contain chemicals that could accomplish a variety of tasks, with
small quantities adding up to big results if the user so desired. It would also be
easy to master: children would be able to learn how to use it. But such genera-
tivity would have a manifest downside risk: a chemical accident could be dan-
gerous to the child or even to the entire neighborhood.91 A malicious child—
or adult, for that matter—could wreak greater havoc as the set’s generativity
grew. The same principle applies to gene splicing kits, atom smashers, and
many of the power tools at a local hardware store. The more experimentation
allowed, the more harm the tool invites. One might want to allow more room
for experimentation in information technology than for physics because the
risks of harm—particularly physical harm—are likely to be lower as a struc-
tural matter from misuse or abuse of information technology. The law of negli-
gence echoes this divide: it is ready to intervene in cases of physical harm but
usually refuses to do so when someone’s misdeed results in “only” economic
harm.92
Nonetheless, economic harm is real, whether caused to the Internet itself or
to interests external to it. Disruption beneﬁts some while others lose, and the
power of the generative Internet, available to anyone with a modicum of
knowledge and a broadband connection, can be turned to network-destroying
ends. As the previous chapter illustrated, the Internet’s very generativity—
combined with that of the PCs attached—sows the seeds for a “digital Pearl
Harbor.”93 If we do not address this problem, the most likely ﬁrst-order solu-
tions in reaction to the problem will be at least as bad as the problem itself, be-
cause they will increase security by reducing generativity.
The Internet security problem is only one item within a basket of conﬂicts
whose balance is greatly aﬀected by the rise of the generative Internet. Some en-
trepreneurs who have beneﬁted from the disruption of the late 1990s naturally
wish to close the door behind them—enjoying the fruits of the generative grid
while denying them to the next round of innovators. First among the injured
are the publishing industries whose intellectual property’s value is premised on
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maintaining scarcity, if not ﬁne-grained control, over the creative works in
which they have been granted some exclusive rights.
Von Hippel’s work emphasizes the ways in which established ﬁrms and non-
market-acting individuals can innovate in their respective spheres and beneﬁt
from one another’s activities. Benkler, on the other hand, sees war between the
amateur authors empowered by generative systems and the industries whose
work they will aﬀect:
If the transformation I describe as possible occurs, it will lead to substantial redistri-
bution of power and money from the twentieth-century industrial producers of in-
formation, culture, and communications—like Hollywood, the recording industry,
and perhaps the broadcasters and some of the telecommunications services giants—
to a combination of widely diﬀuse populations around the globe, and the market ac-
tors that will build the tools that make this population better able to produce its own
information environment rather than buying it ready-made. None of the industrial
giants of yore are taking this reallocation lying down. The technology will not over-
come their resistance through an insurmountable progressive impulse.94
For others, the impact of a generative system may be not just a ﬁght between
upstarts and incumbents, but a struggle between control and anarchy. Mill in
part reconciled his embrace of individual rights with his utilitarian recognition
of the need for limits to freedom by conceding that there are times where regu-
lation is called for. However, he saw his own era as one that was too regulated:
Whoever thinks that individuality of desires and impulses should not be encouraged
to unfold itself, must maintain that society has no need of strong natures—is not the
better for containing many persons who have much character—and that a high gen-
eral average of energy is not desirable.
In some early states of society, these forces might be, and were, too much ahead of
the power which society then possessed of disciplining and controlling them. There
has been a time when the element of spontaneity and individuality was in excess, and
the social principle had a hard struggle with it. The diﬃculty then was, to induce
men of strong bodies or minds to pay obedience to any rules which required them to
control their impulses. To overcome this diﬃculty, law and discipline, like the Popes
struggling against the Emperors, asserted a power over the whole man, claiming to
control all his life in order to control his character—which society had not found
any other suﬃcient means of binding. But society has now fairly got the better of in-
dividuality; and the danger which threatens human nature is not the excess, but the
deﬁciency, of personal impulses and preferences. Things are vastly changed, since the
passions of those who were strong by station or by personal endowment were in a
state of habitual rebellion against laws and ordinances, and required to be rigorously
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chained up to enable the persons within their reach to enjoy any particle of security.
In our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest every one lives as
under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship.95
A necessary reaction to the lawlessness of early societies had become an over-
reaction and, worse, self-perpetuating regulation. The generative Internet and
PC were at ﬁrst perhaps more akin to new societies; as people were connected,
they may not have had ﬁrm expectations about the basics of the interaction.
Who pays for what? Who shares what? The time during which the Internet re-
mained an academic backwater, and the PC was a hobbyist’s tool, helped situ-
ate each within the norms of Benkler’s parallel economy of sharing nicely, of
greater control in the hands of users and commensurate trust that they would
not abuse it. Some might see this conﬁguration as spontaneity and individual-
ity in excess. One  holder of a mobile phone camera can irrevocably compro-
mise someone else’s privacy;96 one bootleg of a concert can make the rounds of
the whole world. And one well-crafted virus can take down millions of ma-
chines.
This is the generative pattern, and we can ﬁnd examples of it at every layer of
the network hourglass:
1. An idea originates in a backwater.
2. It is ambitious but incomplete. It is partially implemented and released any-
way, embracing the ethos of the procrastination principle.
3. Contribution is welcomed from all corners, resulting in an inﬂux of usage.
4. Success is achieved beyond any expectation, and a higher proﬁle draws even
more usage.
5. Success is cut short: “There goes the neighborhood” as newer users are not
conversant with the idea of experimentation and contribution, and other
users are prepared to exploit the openness of the system to undesirable ends.
6. There is movement toward enclosure to prevent the problems that arise from
the system’s very popularity.
The paradox of generativity is that with an openness to unanticipated
change, we can end up in bad—and non-generative—waters. Perhaps the
forces of spam and malware, of phishing and fraud and exploitation of others,
are indeed “too much ahead of the power which society then possessed of disci-
plining and controlling them.”97 For too long the framers of the Internet have
ﬁgured that ISPs can simply add bandwidth to solve the spam problem; if so,
who cares that 90 percent of e-mail is spam?98 Or vendors can add PC com-
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puting cycles to solve the malware problem, at least from the PC owner’s point
of view—a PC can function just ﬁne while it is infected because, with the latest
processor, it can spew spam while still giving its user plenty of attention for
game playing or word processing or Web surﬁng.
This complacency is not sustainable in the long term because it ignores the
harm that accrues to those who cannot defend themselves against network mis-
chief the way that technologically sophisticated users can. It fails to appreciate
that the success of the Internet and PC has created a set of valid interests be-
yond that of experimentation. In the next chapter, we will see how the most
natural reactions to the generative problem of excess spontaneity and individu-
ality will be overreactions, threatening the entire generative basis of the Net and
laying the groundwork for the hostile and dreaded censorship that Mill de-
cried. In particular, a failure to solve generative problems at the technical layer
will result in outcomes that allow for unwanted control at the content and so-
cial layers.
Then we will turn to solutions: ways in which, as the vibrant information so-
ciety matures, we can keep problems in check while retaining the vital spark
that drives it, and us, to new heights.
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Tethered Appliances, Software as
Service, and Perfect Enforcement
101
As Part I of this book explained, the generative nature of the PC and
Internet—a certain incompleteness in design, and corresponding
openness to outside innovation—is both the cause of their success
and the instrument of their forthcoming failure.
The most likely reactions to PC and Internet failures brought on by
the proliferation of bad code, if they are not forestalled, will be at least
as unfortunate as the problems themselves. People now have the op-
portunity to respond to these problems by moving away from the PC
and toward more centrally controlled—“tethered”—information 
appliances like mobile phones, video game consoles, TiVos, iPods,
iPhones, and BlackBerries. The ongoing communication between
this new generation of devices and their vendors assures users that
functionality and security improvements can be made as new prob-
lems are found. To further facilitate glitch-free operation, devices are
built to allow no one but the vendor to change them. Users are also
now able to ask for the appliancization of their own PCs, in the
process forfeiting the ability to easily install new code themselves. In a
development reminiscent of the old days of AOL and CompuServe, it
is increasingly possible to use a PC as a mere dumb terminal to access Web sites
with interactivity but with little room for tinkering. (“Web 2.0” is a new buzz-
word that celebrates this migration of applications traditionally found on the
PC onto the Internet. Confusingly, the term also refers to the separate phenom-
enon of increased user-generated content and indices on the Web—such as re-
lying on user-provided tags to label photographs.) New information appliances
that are tethered to their makers, including PCs and Web sites refashioned in
this mold, are tempting solutions for frustrated consumers and businesses.
None of these solutions, standing alone, is bad, but the aggregate loss will be
enormous if their emergence represents a wholesale shift of our information
ecosystem away from generativity. Some are skeptical that a shift so large can
take place.1 But conﬁdence in the generative Internet’s inertia is misplaced. It
discounts the power of fear should the existing system falter under the force of
particularly well-written malware. People might argue about the merits of one
platform compared to another (“Linux never needs to be rebooted”),2 but the
fact is that no operating system is perfect, and, more importantly, any PC open
to running third-party code at the user’s behest can fail when poor code is
adopted. The fundamental problem arises from too much functionality in the
hands of users who may not exercise it wisely: even the safest Volvo can be 
driven into a wall.
People are frustrated by PC kinks and the erratic behavior they produce.
Such unexpected variations in performance have long been smoothed out in 
refrigerators, televisions, mobile phones, and automobiles. As for PCs, telling
users that their own surﬁng or program installation choices are to blame un-
derstandably makes them no less frustrated, even if they realize that a more re-
liable system would inevitably be less functional—a trade-oﬀ seemingly not re-
quired by refrigerator improvements. Worse, the increasing reliance on the PC
and Internet that suggests momentum in their use means that more is at risk
when something goes wrong. Skype users who have abandoned their old-fash-
ioned telephone lines may regret their decision if an emergency arises and they
need to dial an emergency number like 911, only to ﬁnd that they cannot get
through, let alone be located automatically.3 When one’s ﬁnances, contacts,
and appointments are managed using a PC, it is no longer merely frustrating if
the computer comes down with a virus. It is enough to search for alternative ar-
chitectures.
A shift to tethered appliances and locked-down PCs will have a ripple eﬀect
on long-standing cyberlaw problems, many of which are tugs-of-war between
individuals with a real or perceived injury from online activity and those who
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wish to operate as freely as possible in cyberspace. The capacity for the types of
disruptive innovation discussed in the previous chapter will not be the only ca-
sualty. A shift to tethered appliances also entails a sea change in the regulability
of the Internet. With tethered appliances, the dangers of excess come not from
rogue third-party code, but from the much more predictable interventions by
regulators into the devices themselves, and in turn into the ways that people
can use the appliances.
The most obvious evolution of the computer and network—toward teth-
ered appliancization—is on balance a bad one. It invites regulatory interven-
tion that disrupts a wise equilibrium that depends upon regulators acting with
a light touch, as they traditionally have done within liberal societies.
THE LONG ARM OF MARSHALL, TEXAS
TiVo introduced the ﬁrst digital video recorder (DVR) in 1998.4 It allowed
consumers to record and time-shift TV shows. After withstanding several
claims that the TiVo DVR infringed other companies’ patents because it
oﬀered its users on-screen programming guides,5 the hunted became the
hunter. In 2004, TiVo sued satellite TV distributor EchoStar for infringing
TiVo’s own patents6 by building DVR functionality into some of EchoStar’s
dish systems.7
A Texas jury found for TiVo. TiVo was awarded $90 million in damages and
interest. In briefs ﬁled under seal, TiVo apparently asked for more. In August
2006, the court issued the following ruling:
Defendants are hereby . . .  to, within thirty (30) days of the issuance of
this order, disable the DVR functionality (i.e., disable all storage to and playback
from a hard disk drive of television data) in all but 192,708 units of the Infringing
Products that have been placed with an end user or subscriber.8
That is, the court ordered EchoStar to kill the DVR functionality in products
already owned by “end users”: millions of boxes which were already sitting in
living rooms around the world9 with owners who might be using them at that
very instant.10 Imagine sitting down to watch television on an EchoStar box,
and instead ﬁnding that all your recorded shows had been zapped, along with
the DVR functionality itself—killed by remote signal traceable to the stroke of
a judge’s quill in Marshall, Texas.
The judicial logic for such an order is drawn from fundamental contraband
rules: under certain circumstances, if an article infringes on intellectual prop-
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erty rights, it can be impounded and destroyed.11 Impoundment remedies are
usually encountered only in the form of Prohibition-era-style raids on ware-
houses and distribution centers, which seize large amounts of contraband be-
fore it is sold to consumers.12 There are no house-to-house raids to, say, seize
bootleg concert recordings or reclaim knockoﬀ Rolexes and Louis Vuitton
handbags from the people who purchased the goods.
TiVo saw a new opportunity in its patent case, recognizing that EchoStar’s
dish system is one of an increasing number of modern tethered appliances. The
system periodically phones home to EchoStar, asking for updated program-
ming for its internal software.13 This tethered functionality also means Echo-
Star can remotely destroy the units. To do so requires EchoStar only to load its
central server with an update that kills EchoStar DVRs when they check in for
new features.
As of this writing, TiVo v. EchoStar is pending appeal on other grounds.14
The order has been stayed, and no DVRs have yet been remotely destroyed.15
But such remote remedies are not wholly unprecedented. In 2001, a U.S. fed-
eral court heard a claim from a company called PlayMedia that AOL had in-
cluded PlayMedia’s AMP MP3 playback software in version 6.0 of AOL’s soft-
ware in violation of a settlement agreement between PlayMedia and a company
that AOL had acquired. The court agreed with PlayMedia and ordered AOL to
prevent “any user of the AOL service from completing an online ‘session’ . . .
without AMP being removed from the user’s copy of AOL 6.0 by means of an
AOL online ‘live update.’”16
TiVo v. EchoStar and PlayMedia v. AOL broach the strange and troubling is-
sues that arise from the curious technological hybrids that increasingly popu-
late the digital world. These hybrids mate the simplicity and reliability of tele-
vision-like appliances with the privileged power of the vendor to reprogram
those appliances over a network.
REGULABILITY AND THE TETHERED APPLIANCE
As legal systems experienced the ﬁrst wave of suits arising from use of the Inter-
net, scholars such as Lawrence Lessig and Joel Reidenberg emphasized that
code could be law.17 In this view, the software we use shapes and channels our
online behavior as surely as—or even more surely and subtly than—law itself.
Restrictions can be enforced by the way a piece of software operates. Our ways
of thinking about such “west coast code”18 are still maturing, and our instincts
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for when we object to such code are not well formed. Just as technology’s func-
tionality deﬁnes the universe in which people can operate, it also deﬁnes the
range of regulatory options reasonably available to a sovereign. A change in
technology can change the power dynamic between those who promulgate the
law and those who are subject to it.19
If regulators can induce certain alterations in the nature of Internet tech-
nologies that others could not undo or widely circumvent, then many of the
regulatory limitations occasioned by the Internet would evaporate. Lessig and
others have worried greatly about such potential changes, fearing that blunder-
buss technology regulation by overeager regulators will intrude on the creative
freedom of technology makers and the civic freedoms of those who use the
technology.20
So far Lessig’s worries have not come to pass. A system’s level of generativity
can change the direction of the power ﬂow between sovereign and subject in fa-
vor of the subject, and generative Internet technology has not been easy to alter.
There have been private attempts to use code to build so-called trusted systems,
software that outsiders can trust to limit users’ behavior—for example, by al-
lowing a song to be played only three times before it “expires,” or by preventing
an e-book from being printed.21 (Code-based enforcement mechanisms are
also variously called digital rights management systems or technological pro-
tection measures.)22 Most trusted systems have failed, often because either
savvy users have cracked them early on or the market has simply rejected them.
The few that have achieved some measure of adoption—like Apple iTunes’s
FairPlay, which allows purchased songs to exist on only ﬁve registered devices at
once23—are either readily circumvented, or tailored so they do not prevent
most users’ desired behavior.
Even the governments most determined to regulate certain ﬂows of infor-
mation—such as China—have found it diﬃcult to suppress the ﬂow of data
on the Internet.24 To be sure, with enough eﬀort, censorship can have some
eﬀect, especially because most citizens prefer to slow down for speed bumps
rather than invent ways around them.25 When a Web site fails to load, for ex-
ample, users generally visit a substitute site rather than wait. Taking advantage
of this reality, Chinese regulators have used their extensive control over ISPs’
routing of data packets to steer users away from undesirable Web sites by sim-
ply causing the Web pages to fail to load in the course of normal surﬁng.
But so long as the endpoints remain generative and any sort of basic Internet
access remains available, subversively minded techies can make applications
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that oﬀer a way around network blocks.26 Such applications can be distributed
through the network, and unsavvy users can then partake simply by double-
clicking on an icon. Comprehensive regulatory crackdowns require a non-gen-
erative endpoint or inﬂuence over the individual using it to ensure that the end-
point is not repurposed.
For example, non-generative endpoints like radios and telephones can be
constrained by ﬁltering the networks they use. Even if someone is unafraid to
turn a radio tuning knob or dial a telephone number to the outside world, ra-
dio broadcasts can be jammed, and phone connections can be disabled or mon-
itored. Because radios and telephones are not generative, such jamming cannot
be circumvented. North Korea has gone even further with endpoint lockdown.
There, by law, the radios themselves are built so that they cannot be tuned to
frequencies other than those with oﬃcial broadcasts.27
With generative devices like PCs, the regulator must settle for either much
leakier enforcement or much more resource-intensive measures that target the
individual—such as compelling citizens to perform their Internet surﬁng in
cyber cafés or public libraries, where they might limit their activities for fear
that others are watching.
The shift toward non-generative endpoint technology driven by consumer se-
curity worries of the sort described in this book changes the equation.28 The tra-
ditional appliance, or nearly any object, for that matter, once placed with an in-
dividual, belongs to that person. Tethered appliances belong to a new class of
technology. They are appliances in that they are easy to use, while not easy to tin-
ker with. They are tethered because it is easy for their vendors to change them
from afar, long after the devices have left warehouses and showrooms. Consider
how useful it was in 2003 that Apple could introduce the iTunes Store directly
into iTunes software found on PCs running Mac OS.29 Similarly, consumers can
turn on a TiVo—or EchoStar—box to ﬁnd that, thanks to a remote update, it
can do new things, such as share programs with other televisions in the house.30
These tethered appliances receive remote updates from the manufacturer,
but they generally are not conﬁgured to allow anyone else to tinker with
them—to invent new features and distribute them to other owners who would
not know how to program the boxes themselves. Updates come from only one
source, with a model of product development limited to non-user innovation.
Indeed, recall that some recent devices, like the iPhone, are updated in ways
that actively seek out and erase any user modiﬁcations. These boxes thus re-
semble the early proprietary information services like CompuServe and AOL,
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for which only the service providers could add new features. Any user inven-
tiveness was cabined by delays in chartering and understanding consumer fo-
cus groups, the hassles of forging deals with partners to invent and implement
suggested features, and the burdens of performing technical R&D.
Yet tethered appliances are much more powerful than traditional appliances.
Under the old regime, a toaster, once purchased, remains a toaster. An up-
graded model might oﬀer a third slot, but no manufacturer’s representative vis-
its consumers and retroﬁts old toasters. Buy a record and it can be played as
many times as the owner wants. If the original musician wishes to rerecord a
certain track, she will have to feature it in a successive release—the older work
has been released to the four winds and cannot be recalled.31 A shift to smarter
appliances, ones that can be updated by—and only by—their makers, is fun-
damentally changing the way in which we experience our technologies. Appli-
ances become contingent: rented instead of owned, even if one pays up front for
them, since they are subject to instantaneous revision.
A continuing connection to a producer paves the way for easier postacquisi-
tion improvements: the modern equivalent of third slots for old toasters. That
sounds good: more features, instantly distributed. So what is the drawback?
Those who believe that markets reﬂect demand will rightly ask why a producer
would make post hoc changes to technology that customers may not want.
One answer is that they may be compelled to do so. Consider EchoStar’s los-
ing verdict in Marshall, Texas. If producers can alter their products long after
the products have been bought and installed in homes and oﬃces, it occasions
a sea change in the regulability of those products and their users. With products
tethered to the network, regulators—perhaps on their own initiative to ad-
vance broadly deﬁned public policy, or perhaps acting on behalf of parties like
TiVo claiming private harms—ﬁnally have a toolkit for exercising meaningful
control over the famously anarchic Internet.
TYPES OF PERFECT ENFORCEMENT
The law as we have known it has had ﬂexible borders. This ﬂexibility derives
from prosecutorial and police discretion and from the artiﬁce of the outlaw.
When code is law, however, execution is exquisite, and law can be self-enforc-
ing. The ﬂexibility recedes. Those who control the tethered appliance can con-
trol the behavior undertaken with the device in a number of ways: preemption,
speciﬁc injunction, and surveillance.
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Preemption
Preemption entails anticipating and designing against undesirable conduct 
before it happens. Many of the examples of code as law (or, more generally, ar-
chitecture as law) ﬁt into this category. Lessig points out that speeding can be
regulated quite eﬀectively through the previously mentioned use of speed
bumps.32 Put a speed bump in the road and people slow down rather than risk
damaging their cars. Likewise, most DVD players have Macrovision copy pro-
tection that causes a signal to be embedded in the playback of DVDs, sty-
mieing most attempts to record DVDs onto a VCR.33 Owners of Microsoft’s
Zune music player can beam music to other Zune owners, but music so trans-
ferred can be played only three times or within three days of the transfer.34 This
kind of limitation arguably preempts much of the damage that might other-
wise be thought to arise if music subject to copyright could be shared freely.
With TiVo, a broadcaster can ﬂag a program as “premium” and assign it an ex-
piration date.35 A little red ﬂag then appears next to it in the viewer’s list of
recorded programs, and the TiVo will refuse to play the program after its expi-
ration date. The box’s makers (or regulators of the makers) could further decide
to automatically reprogram the TiVo to limit its fast-forwarding functionality
or to restrict its hours of operability. (In China, makers of multiplayer games
have been compelled to limit the number of hours a day that subscribers can
play in an eﬀort to curb gaming addiction.)36 Preemption does not require
constant updates so long as the device cannot easily be modiﬁed once it is in the
user’s possession; the idea is to design the product with broadly deﬁned limits
that do not require further intervention to serve the regulator’s or designer’s
purposes.
Speciﬁc Injunction
Speciﬁc injunction takes advantage of the communication that routinely oc-
curs between a particular tethered appliance and its manufacturer, after it is in
consumer hands, to reﬂect changed circumstances. The TiVo v. EchoStar rem-
edy belongs in this category, as it mandates modiﬁcation of the EchoStar units
after they have already been designed and distributed. This remote remedy was
practicable because the tethering allowed the devices to be completely repro-
grammed, even though the initial design of the EchoStar device had not antic-
ipated a patent infringement judgment.
Speciﬁc injunction also allows for much more tailored remedies, like the
PlayMedia-speciﬁc court order discussed earlier. Such tailoring can be content-
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speciﬁc, user-speciﬁc, or even time-speciﬁc. These remedies can apply to some
units and not others, allowing regulators to winnow out bad uses from good
ones on the basis of individual adjudication, rather than rely on the generalities
of ex ante legislative-style drafting. For example, suppose a particular television
broadcast were found to infringe a copyright or to damage someone’s reputa-
tion. In a world of old-fashioned televisions and VCRs, or PCs and peer-to-
peer networks, the broadcaster or creator could be sued, but anyone who
recorded the broadcast could, as a practical matter, retain a copy. Today, it is
possible to require DVR makers to delete the oﬀending broadcast from any
DVRs that have recorded it or, perhaps acting with more precision, to retroac-
tively edit out the slice of defamatory content from the recorded program. This
control extends beyond any particular content medium: as e-book devices be-
come popular, the same excisions could be performed for print materials. Tai-
loring also could be user-speciﬁc, requiring, say, the prevention or elimination
of prurient material from the devices of registered sex oﬀenders but not from
others’ devices.
Surveillance
Tethered appliances have the capacity to relay information about their uses
back to the manufacturer. We have become accustomed to the idea that Web
sites track our behavior when we access them—an online bookseller, for exam-
ple, knows what books we have browsed and bought at its site. Tethered appli-
ances take this knowledge a step further, recording what we do with the appli-
ances even in transactions that have nothing to do with the vendor. A TiVo
knows whether its owner watches FOX News or PBS. It knows when someone
replays some scenes and skips others. This information is routinely sent to the
TiVo mothership;37 for example, in the case of Janet Jackson’s “wardrobe mal-
function” during the 2004 Super Bowl halftime show, TiVo was able to calcu-
late that this moment was replayed three times more frequently than any other
during the broadcast.38
TiVo promises not to release such surveillance information in personally
identiﬁable form, but the company tempers the promise with an industry-stan-
dard exception for regulators who request it through legal process.39 Automak-
ers General Motors and BMW oﬀer similar privacy policies for the computer
systems, such as OnStar, built into their automobiles. OnStar’s uses range from
providing turn-by-turn driving directions with the aid of Global Positioning
System (GPS) satellites, to monitoring tire pressure, providing emergency as-
sistance, and facilitating hands-free calling with embedded microphones and
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speakers. The FBI realized that it could eavesdrop on conversations occurring
inside an OnStar-equipped vehicle by remotely reprogramming the system to
activate its microphones for use as a “roving bug,” and it has secretly ordered an
anonymous carmaker to do just that on at least one occasion.40
A similar dynamic is possible with nearly all mobile phones. Mobile phones
can be reprogrammed at a distance, allowing their microphones to be secretly
turned on even when the phone is powered down. All ambient noise and con-
versation can then be continuously picked up and relayed back to law enforce-
ment authorities, regardless of whether the phone is being used for a call.41 On
modern PCs equipped with an automatic update feature, there is no technical
barrier that prevents the implementation of any similar form of surveillance on
the machine, whether it involves turning on the PC’s microphone and video
camera, or searching and sharing any documents stored on the machine. Such
surveillance could be introduced through a targeted update from the OS maker
or from any other provider of software running on the machine.
Surveillance need not be limited to targeted eavesdropping that is part of a
criminal or civil investigation. It can also be eﬀected more generally. In 1996,
law student Michael Adler oﬀered the hypothetical of an Internet-wide search
for contraband.42 He pointed out that some digital items might be illegal to
possess or be indicative of other illegal activity—for example, child pornogra-
phy, leaked classiﬁed documents, or stores of material copied without permis-
sion of the copyright holder. A Net-wide search could be instigated that would
inventory connected machines and report back when smoking guns were
found.
Tethering makes these approaches practicable and inexpensive for regula-
tors. A government need only regulate certain critical private intermediaries—
those who control the tethered appliances—to change the way individuals 
experience the world. When a doctrine’s scope has been limited by prudential
enforcement costs, its reach can be increased as the costs diminish.
EVALUATING PERFECT ENFORCEMENT
The prospect of more thorough or “perfect” law enforcement may seem ap-
pealing. If one could wave a wand and make it impossible for people to kill each
other, there might seem little reason to hesitate. Although the common law has
only rarely sought to outright prohibit the continued distribution of defama-
tory materials by booksellers and newsstands, much less continued possession
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by purchasers, ease of enforcement through tethered appliances could make it
so that all such material—wherever it might be found—could vanish into the
memory hole. Even when it comes to waving the regulator’s wand for the pur-
pose of eradicating online evils like harassment, invasion of privacy, and copy-
right infringement, there are important reasons to hesitate.43
Objections to the Underlying Substantive Law
Some people are consistently diﬃdent about the presence of law in the online
space. Those with undiluted libertarian values might oppose easier enforce-
ment of laws as a general matter, because they believe that self-defense is the
best solution to harm by others, especially within a medium that carries bits,
not bullets.44 By these lights, the most common online harms simply are not 
as harmful as those in the physical world, and therefore they call for lesser in-
trusions. For example, defamatory speech might be met not by a lawsuit for
money damages or an injunction requiring deletion of the lies, but rather by
more speech that corrects the record. A well-conﬁgured e-mail client can ade-
quately block spam, making it unnecessary to resort to intervention by a public
authority. Material harmful to minors can be defanged by using parental ﬁlters,
or by providing better education to children about what to expect when they go
online and how to deal with images of violence and hate.
Such “just deal with it” arguments are deployed less often against the online
circulation of images of child abuse. The creation and distribution of child
pornography is nearly universally understood as a signiﬁcant harm. In this con-
text, those arguing in favor of an anarchic environment shift to claims that the
activity is not very common or that existing tools and remedies are suﬃciently
eﬀective—or they rely on some of the other objections described below.
One can also argue against stronger enforcement regimes by objecting to the
laws that will be enforced. For example, many of those who argue against 
increased copyright enforcement—undertaken through laws that broaden 
infringement penalties45 or through trusted systems that preempt infringe-
ment46—argue that copyright law itself is too expansive.47 For those who be-
lieve that intellectual property rights have gone too far, it is natural to argue
against regimes that make such rights easier to enforce, independent of seeking
to reform the copyright law itself. Similarly, those who believe in lower taxes
might object to a plan that makes it easier for intermediaries to collect and re-
mit use and sales taxes for online transactions.48 Likewise, the large contingent
of people who routinely engage in illegal online ﬁle sharing may naturally dis-
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favor anything that interferes with these activities.49To be sure, some of those peo-
ple may download even though they believe it to be wrong—in which case they
might welcome a system that better prevents them from yielding to temptation.
Law professor William Stuntz notes the use of legal procedure—evolving
doctrines of Fourth and Fifth Amendment protection—as a way of limiting
the substantive application of unpopular laws in eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century America such as those involving ﬁrst heresy and sedition, and later rail-
road and antitrust regulation.50 In that context, he argues, judges interpreted
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in ways designed to increase the costs to law
enforcement of collecting evidence from private parties. When the judiciary
began deﬁning and enforcing a right to privacy that limited the sorts of searches
police could undertake, it became more diﬃcult to successfully prosecute ob-
jectionable crimes like heresy, sedition, or trade oﬀenses: “It is as if privacy pro-
tection were a proxy for something else, a tool with which courts or juries could
limit the government’s substantive power.”51 Challenging the rise of tethered
appliances helps maintain certain costs on the exercise of government power—
costs that reduce the enforcement of objectionable laws.
The drawback to arguing generally against perfect enforcement because one
objects to the laws likely to be enforced is that it preaches to the choir. Cer-
tainly, those who oppose copyright laws will also oppose changes to code that
facilitate the law’s online enforcement. To persuade those who are more favor-
ably disposed to enforcement of substantive laws using tethered appliances, we
must look to other objections.
Portability and Enforceability Without the Rule of Law
While it might be understandable that those opposed to a substantive law
would also favor continued barriers to its enforcement, others might say that
the price of living under the rule of law is that law ought to be respected, even
if one disagrees with it. In this view, the way to protest an undesirable law is to
pursue its modiﬁcation or repeal, rather than to celebrate the diﬃculty of its en-
forcement.52 The rise of procedural privacy limits described by Stuntz was itself
an artifact of the law—the decisions of judges with license to interpret the
Constitution. This legally sanctioned mandate is distinct from one allowing in-
dividuals to ﬂout the law when they feel like it, simply because they cannot be
easily prevented from engaging in the illicit act or caught.
But not every society operates according to a framework of laws that are 
democratically promulgated and then enforced by an independent judiciary.
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Governments like those of China or Saudi Arabia might particularly beneﬁt
from technological conﬁgurations that allow for inexpensive surveillance or the
removal of material authored by political dissidents. In a world where tethered
appliances dominate, the cat-and-mouse game tilts toward the cat. Recall that
the FBI can secretly eavesdrop on any automobile with an OnStar navigation
system by obtaining a judge’s order and ensuring that the surveillance does not
otherwise disrupt the system’s functioning. In a place without the rule of law,
the prospect of cars rolling oﬀ the assembly line surveillance-ready is particu-
larly unsettling. China’s government has already begun experimenting with
these sorts of approaches. For example, the PC telephone program Skype is not
amenable to third-party changes and is tethered to Skype for its updates.
Skype’s distribution partner in China has agreed to censor words like “Falun
Gong” and “Dalai Lama” in its text messaging for the Chinese version of the
program.53 Other services that are not generative at the technical layer have
been similarly modiﬁed: Google.cn is censored by Google at the behest of the
Chinese government, and Microsoft’s MSN Spaces Chinese blog service auto-
matically ﬁlters out sensitive words from blog titles.54
There is an ongoing debate about the degree to which ﬁrms chartered in
freer societies should assist in censorship or surveillance taking place in less free
societies.55 The argument considered here is one layer deeper than that debate:
if the information ecosystem at the cutting edge evolves into one that is not
generative at its core, then authoritarian governments will naturally inherit an
ability to enforce their wills more easily, without needing to change technolo-
gies and services or to curtail the breadth of their inﬂuence. Because it is often
less obvious to users and the wider world, the ability to enforce quietly using
qualities of the technology itself is worrisome. Technologies that lend them-
selves to an easy and tightly coupled expression of governmental power simply
will be portable from one society to the next. It will make irrelevant the ques-
tion about how ﬁrms like Google and Skype should operate outside their home
countries.
This conclusion suggests that although some social gain may result from bet-
ter enforcement of existing laws in free societies, the gain might be more than
oﬀset by better enforcement in societies that are less free—under repressive
governments today, or anywhere in the future. If the gains and losses remain
coupled, it might make sense to favor retention of generative technologies to
put what law professor James Boyle has called the “Libertarian gotcha” to au-
thoritarian regimes: if one wants technological progress and the associated eco-
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nomic beneﬁts, one must be prepared to accept some measure of social liberal-
ization made possible with that technology.56 Like many regimes that want to
harness the beneﬁts of the market while forgoing political liberalization, China
is wrestling with this tension today.57 In an attempt to save money and estab-
lish independence from an overseas software vendor like Microsoft, China has
encouraged the adoption of GNU/Linux,58 an operating system least amen-
able in its current form to appliancization because anyone can modify it and 
install it on a non-locked-down endpoint PC. China’s attempt, therefore, rep-
resents either a misunderstanding of the key role that endpoints can play in reg-
ulation or a calculated judgment that the beneﬁts of international technologi-
cal independence outweigh the costs of less regulability.
If one objects to censorship in societies that have not developed the rule of
law, one can support the maintenance of a generative core in information tech-
nology, minimizing the opportunities for some societies that wish to exploit the
information revolution to discover new tools for control.
Ampliﬁcation and the Lock-in of Mistakes
When a regulator makes mistakes in the way it construes or applies a law, a
stronger ability to compel compliance implies a stronger ability to compel
compliance with all mandates, even those that are the results of mistaken inter-
pretations. Gaps in translation may also arise between a legal mandate and its
technological manifestation. This is especially true when technological design
is used as a preemptive measure. Under U.S. First Amendment doctrine, prior
restraints on speech—preventing speech from occurring in the ﬁrst place,
rather than punishing it after the fact if indeed it is unlawful—are greatly dis-
favored.59 Design features mandated to prevent speech-related behaviors, on
the premise that such behaviors might turn out to be unlawful, could be
thought to belong in just that category.60 Consider the Australian Web hosting
company that automatically deletes all of its clients’ multimedia ﬁles every
night unless it receives speciﬁc assurances up front that the ﬁles in a given di-
rectory are placed with the permission of the copyright owner or are uncopy-
righted.61
Preemptive design may have a hard time tailoring the technical algorithms to
the legal rules. Even with some ongoing human oversight, the blacklists of ob-
jectionable Web sites maintained by commercial ﬁltering programs are consis-
tently overbroad, erroneously placing Web sites into categories to which they
do not belong.62 For example, when the U.S. government sponsored a service
to assist Iranians in overcoming Internet ﬁltering imposed by the Iranian gov-
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ernment, the U.S.-sponsored service in turn sought to ﬁlter out pornographic
sites so that Iranians would not use the circumvention service to obtain
pornography. The service ﬁltered any site with “ass” in its domain name—in-
cluding usembassy.state.gov, the U.S. Department of State’s online portal for
its own overseas missions.63
In the realm of copyright, whether a particular kind of copying qualiﬁes for
a fair use defense is in many instances notoriously diﬃcult to determine ahead
of time.64 Some argue that broad attempts to embed copyright protections in
technology fall short because the technology cannot easily take into account
possible fair use defenses.65 The law prohibiting the circumvention of trusted
systems disregards possibilities for fair use—which might make sense, since
such an exception could swallow the rule.66 Such judgments appear to rely on
the fact that the materials within a trusted system can still be found and copied
in non-trusted analog formats, thus digital prohibitions are never complete.67
The worry that a particular speech-related activity will be precluded by design
is blunted when the technology merely makes the activity less convenient
rather than preventing it altogether. However, if we migrate to an information
ecosystem in which tethered appliances predominate, that analog safety valve
will wane.
For speciﬁc injunctions, the worries about mistakes may appear weaker. A
speciﬁc injunction to halt an activity or destroy its fruits issues only after an ad-
judication. If we move to a regime in which individuals, and not just distribu-
tors, are susceptible to impoundment remedies for digital contraband, these
remedies might be applied only after the status of the contraband has been oﬃ-
cially determined.68 Indeed, one might think that an ability to easily recall in-
fringing materials after the fact might make it possible to be more generous
about allowing distribution in the ﬁrst place—cases could proceed to ﬁnal
judgments rather than being functionally decided in earlier stages on the claim
that continued distribution of the objectionable material would cause irrepara-
ble harm. If cats can easily be put back into bags, there can be less worry about
letting them out to begin with.
However, the ability to perfectly (in the sense of thoroughly) scrub every-
one’s digital repositories of unlawful content may compromise the values that
belie fear of prior restraints, even though the scrub would not be “prior” in fact.
Preventing the copying of a work of copyrighted music stops a behavior with-
out removing the work from the public sphere, since presumably the work is
still available through authorized channels. It is a diﬀerent matter to eliminate
entirely a piece of digital contraband. Such elimination can make it diﬃcult to
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understand, reevaluate, or even discuss what happened and why. In ruling
against a gag order at a trial, the U.S. Supreme Court worried that the order 
was an “immediate and irreversible sanction.”69 “If it can be said that a threat
of criminal or civil sanctions after publication ‘chills’ speech, prior restraint
‘freezes’ it at least for the time.”70 Post hoc scrubs are not immediate, but they
have the prospect of being permanent and irreversible—a freezing of speech
that takes place after it has been uttered, and no longer just “for the time.” That
the speech had an initial opportunity to be broadcast may make a scrub less
worrisome than if it were blocked from the start, but removing this informa-
tion from the public discourse means that those who come after us will have to
rely on secondary sources to make sense of its removal.
To be sure, we can think of cases where complete elimination would be ideal.
These are cases in which the public interest is not implicated, and for which
continued harm is thought to accrue so long as the material circulates: leaked
medical records, child abuse images, and nuclear weapon designs.71 But the
number of instances in which legal judgments eﬀecting censorship are over-
turned or revised—years later—counsels that an ability to thoroughly enforce
bans on content makes the law too powerful and its judgments too permanent,
since the material covered by the judgment would be permanently blocked
from the public view. Imagine a world in which all copies of once-censored
books like Candide, The Call of the Wild, and Ulysses had been permanently de-
stroyed at the time of the censoring and could not be studied or enjoyed after
subsequent decision-makers lifted the ban.72 In a world of tethered appliances,
the primary backstop against perfectly enforced mistakes would have to come
from the fact that there would be diﬀerent views about what to ban found
among multiple sovereigns—so a particular piece of samizdat might live on in
one jurisdiction even as it was made diﬃcult to ﬁnd in another.
The use of tethered appliances for surveillance may be least susceptible to an
objection of mistake, since surveillance can be used to start a case rather than
close it. For example, the use of cameras at traﬃc lights has met with some ob-
jection because of the level of thoroughness they provide—a sense of snooping
simply not possible with police alone doing the watching.73 And there are in-
stances where the cameras report false positives.74 However, those accused can
have their day in court to explain or deny the charges inspired by the cameras’
initial reviews. Moreover, since running a red light might cause an accident and
result in physical harm, the cameras seem well-tailored to dealing with a true
hazard, and thus less objectionable. And the mechanization of identifying vio-
lators might even make the system more fair, because the occupant of the vehi-
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cle cannot earn special treatment based on individual characteristics like race,
wealth, or gender. The prospects for abuse are greater when the cameras in mo-
bile phones or the microphones of OnStar can be serendipitously repurposed
for surveillance. These sensors are much more invasive and general purpose.
Bulwarks Against Government
There has been a simmering debate about the meaning of the Second Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution, which concerns “the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms.”75 It is not clear whether the constitutional language refers to a
collective right that has to do with militias, or an individual one that could
more readily be interpreted to preclude gun control legislation. At present,
most reported decisions and scholarly authority favor the former interpreta-
tion, but the momentum may be shifting.76 For our purposes, we can extract
one strand from this debate without having to join it: one reason to prohibit
the government’s dispossession of individual ﬁrearms is to maintain the pros-
pect that individuals could revolt against a tyrannical regime, or provide a 
disincentive to a regime considering going down such a path.77 These check-
on-government notions are echoed by some members of technical communi-
ties, such as those who place more faith in their own encryption to prevent 
secrets from being compromised than in any government guarantees of self-
restraint. Such a description may unnecessarily demean the techies’ worries as a
form of paranoia. Translated into a more formal and precise claim, one might
worry that the boundless but unnoticeable searches permitted by digital ad-
vances can be as disruptive to the equilibrium between citizen and law enforce-
ment as any enforcement-thwarting tools such as encryption.
The equilibrium between citizens and law enforcement has crucially relied
on some measure of citizen cooperation. Abuse of surveillance has traditionally
been limited not simply by the conscience of those searching or by procedural
rules prohibiting the introduction of illegally obtained evidence, but also by
the public’s own objections. If occasioned through tethered appliances, such
surveillance can be undertaken almost entirely in secret, both as a general mat-
ter and for any speciﬁc search. Stuntz has explained the value of a renewed fo-
cus on physical “data mining” via group sweeps—for example, the searching of
all cars near the site of a terrorist threat—and pointed out that such searches are
naturally (and healthily) limited because large swaths of the public are notice-
ably burdened by them.78 The public, in turn, can eﬀectively check such gov-
ernment action by objecting through judicial or political processes, should the
sweeps become too onerous. No such check is present in the controlled digital
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environment; extensive searching can be done with no noticeable burden—in-
deed, without notice of any kind—on the parties searched. For example, the
previously mentioned FBI use of an OnStar-like system to listen in on the oc-
cupants of a car is public knowledge only because the manufacturer chose to
formally object.79
The rise of tethered appliances signiﬁcantly reduces the number and variety
of people and institutions required to apply the state’s power on a mass scale. It
removes a practical check on the use of that power. It diminishes a rule’s ability
to attain legitimacy as people choose to participate in its enforcement, or at
least not stand in its way.
A government able to pressure the provider of BlackBerries could insist on
surveillance of e-mails sent to and from each device.80 And such surveillance
would require few people doing the enforcement work. Traditionally, ongoing
mass surveillance or control would require a large investment of resources and,
in particular, people. Eavesdropping has required police willing to plant and
monitor bugs; seizure of contraband has required agents willing to perform
raids. Further, a great deal of routine law enforcement activity has required the
cooperation of private parties, such as landlords, banks, and employers. The
potential for abuse of governmental power is limited not only by whatever pro-
cedural protections are aﬀorded in a jurisdiction that recognizes the rule of law,
but also more implicitly by the decisions made by parties asked to assist. Some-
times the police refuse to ﬁre on a crowd even if a dictator orders it, and, less
dramatically, whistleblowers among a group of participating enforcers can slow
down, disrupt, leak, or report on anything they perceive as abusive in a law en-
forcement action.81
Compare a citywide smoking ban that enters into eﬀect as each proprietor
acts to enforce it—under penalty for failing to do so, to be sure—with an al-
ternative ordinance implemented by installing highly sensitive smoke detectors
in every public place, wired directly to a central enforcement oﬃce. Some in fa-
vor of the ordinance may still wish to see it implemented by people rather than
mechanical ﬁat. The latter encourages the proliferation of simple punishment-
avoiding behavior that is anathema to open, participatory societies. As law pro-
fessor Lior Strahilevitz points out, most laws are not self-enforcing, and a mea-
sure of the law’s value and importance may be found in just how much those
aﬀected by it (including as victims) urge law enforcement to take a stand, or in-
voke what private rights of action they may have.82 Strahilevitz points to laws
against vice and gambling, but the idea can apply to the problems arising from
technology as well. Law ought to be understood not simply by its meaning as a
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text, but by the ways in which it is or is not internalized by the people it af-
fects—whether as targets of the law, victims to be helped by it, or those charged
with enforcing it.83
The Beneﬁts of Tolerated Uses
A particular activity might be illegal, but in some cases those with standing to
complain about it sometimes hold back on trying to stop it while they deter-
mine whether they really object. If they decide they do object, they can sue.
Tim Wu calls this phenomenon “tolerated uses,”84 and copyright infringement
shows how it can work.
When Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
(DMCA),85 it sought to enlist certain online service providers to help stop the
unauthorized spread of copyrighted material. ISPs that just routed packets for
others were declared not responsible for copyright infringement taking place
over their communication channels.86 Intermediaries that hosted content—
such as the CompuServe and Prodigy forums, or Internet hosting sites such as
Geocities.com—had more responsibility. They would be unambiguously clear
of liability for copyright infringement only if they acted expeditiously to take
down infringing material once they were speciﬁcally notiﬁed of that infringe-
ment.87
Although many scholars have pointed out deﬁciencies and opportunities for
abuse in this notice-and-takedown regime,88 the scheme reﬂects a balance. Un-
der the DMCA safe harbors, intermediaries have been able to provide ﬂexible
platforms that allow for a broad variety of amateur expression. For example,
Geocities and others have been able to host personal home pages, precursors to
the blogs of today, without fear of copyright liability should any of the home
page owners post infringing material—at least so long as they act after speciﬁc
notiﬁcation of an infringement. Had these intermediaries stopped oﬀering
these services for fear of crushing liability under a diﬀerent legal conﬁguration,
people would have had far fewer options to broadcast online: they could have
either hosted content through their own personal PCs, with several incumbent
shortcomings,89 or forgone broadcasting altogether. Thanks to the incentives
of notice-and-takedown, copyright holders gained a ready means of redress for
the most egregious instances of copyright infringement, without chilling indi-
vidual expression across the board in the process.
The DMCA legal regime supports the procrastination principle, allowing
for experimentation of all sorts and later reining in excesses and abuses as they
happen, rather than preventing them from the outset. Compelling copyright
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holders to speciﬁcally demand takedown may seem like an unnecessary bur-
den, but it may be helpful to them because it allows them to tolerate some fa-
cially infringing uses without forcing copyright holders to make a blanket
choice between enforcement and no enforcement. Several media companies
and publishers simply have not ﬁgured out whether YouTube’s and others’ ex-
cerpts of their material are friend or foe. Companies are not monolithic, and
there can be dissenting views within a company on the matter. A company with
such diverse internal voices cannot come right out and give an even temporary
blessing to apparent copyright infringement. Such a blessing would cure the
material in question of its unlawful character, because the infringement would
then be authorized. Yet at the same time, a copyright holder may be loath to is-
sue DMCA notices to try to get material removed each time it appears, because
clips can serve a valuable promotional function.
The DMCA regime maintains a loose coupling between the law’s violation
and its remedy, asking publishers to step forward and aﬃrmatively declare that
they want speciﬁc material wiped out as it arises and giving publishers the lux-
ury to accede to some uses without forcing intermediaries to assume that the
copyright holder would have wanted the material to be taken down. People
might make videos that include copyrighted background music or television
show clips and upload them to centralized video sharing services like YouTube.
But YouTube does not have to seek these clips out and take them down unless
it receives a speciﬁc complaint from the copyright holder.
While requiring unprompted attempts at copyright enforcement by a ﬁrm
like YouTube may not end up being unduly burdensome to the intermediary—
it all depends on how its business model and technology are structured—re-
quiring unprompted enforcement may end up precluding uses of copyrighted
material to which the author or publisher actually does not object, or on which
it has not yet come to a ﬁnal view.90
Thus there may be some cases when preemptive regimes can be undesirable
to the entities they are designed to help. A preemptive intervention to preclude
some particular behavior actually disempowers the people who might com-
plain about it to decide that they are willing, after all, to tolerate it. Few would
choose to tolerate a murder, making it a good candidate for preemption through
design, were that possible,91 but the intricacies of the markets and business
models involved in the distribution of intellectual works means that reasonable
copyright holders could disagree on whether it would be a good thing to pre-
vent certain unauthorized distributions of their works.
The generative history of the Internet shows that allowing openness to third-
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party innovation from multiple corners and through multiple business models
(or no business model at all) ends up producing widely adopted, socially useful
applications not readily anticipated or initiated through the standard corporate
production cycle.92
For example, in retrospect, permitting the manufacture of VCRs was a great
boon to the publishers who were initially opposed to it. The entire video rental
industry was not anticipated by publishers, yet it became a substantial source of
revenue for them.93 Had the Hush-A-Phones, Carterfones, and modems of
Chapter Two required preapproval, or been erasable at the touch of a button
the way that an EchoStar DVR of today can be killed, the decisions to permit
them might have gone the other way, and AT&T would not have beneﬁted as
people found new and varied uses for their phone lines.
Some in the music, television, and movie industries are embracing cheap
networks and the free ﬂow of bits, experimenting with advertising models sim-
ilar to those pioneered for free television, in which the more people who watch,
the more money the publishers can make. For instance, the BBC has made a
deal with the technology ﬁrm Azureus, makers of a peer-to-peer BitTorrent
client that has been viewed as contraband on many university campuses and
corporate networks.94 Users of Azureus’s software will now be able to download
BBC television programs for free, and with authorization, reﬂecting both a
shift in business model for the BBC and a conversion of Azureus from devil’s
tool to helpful distribution vehicle. BitTorrent software ensures that people up-
load to others as they download, which means that the BBC will be able to re-
lease its programs online without incurring the costs of a big bandwidth bill be-
cause many viewers will be downloading from fellow viewers rather than from
the BBC. EMI is releasing music on iTunes without digital rights manage-
ment—initially charging more for such unfettered versions.95
The tools that we now take as so central to the modern Internet, including
the Web browser, also began and often remain on uncertain legal ground. As
one surfs the Internet, it is easy to peek behind the curtain of most Web sites by
asking the browser to “view source,” thereby uncovering the code that gener-
ates the viewed pages. Users can click on nearly any text or graphic they see and
promptly copy it to their own Web sites or save it permanently on their own
PCs. The legal theories that make these activities possible are tenuous. Is it an
implied license from the Web site owner? Perhaps, but what if the Web site
owner has introductory text that demands that no copies like that be made?96
Is it fair use? Perhaps. In the United States, fair use is determined by a fuzzy
four-factor test that in practice rests in part on habit and custom, on people’s
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expectations.97 When a technology is deployed early, those expectations are
unsettled, or perhaps settled in the wrong direction, especially among judges
who might be called upon to apply the law without themselves having fully ex-
perienced the technologies in question. A gap between deployment and regula-
tory reaction gives the economic and legal systems time to adapt, helping to en-
sure that doctrines like fair use are applied appropriately.
The Undesirable Collapse of Conduct and Decision Rules
Law professor Meir Dan-Cohen describes law as separately telling people how
to behave and telling judges what penalties to impose should people break the
law. In more general terms, he has observed that law comprises both conduct
rules and decision rules.98 There is some disconnect between the two: people
may know what the law requires without fully understanding the ramiﬁcations
for breaking it.99 This division—what he calls an “acoustic separation”—can
be helpful: a law can threaten a tough penalty in order to ensure that people
obey it, but then later show unadvertised mercy to those who break it.100 If the
mercy is not telegraphed ahead of time, people will be more likely to follow the
law, while still beneﬁting from a lesser penalty if they break it and have an ex-
cuse to oﬀer, such as duress.
Perfect enforcement collapses the public understanding of the law with its
application, eliminating a useful interface between the law’s terms and its ap-
plication. Part of what makes us human are the choices that we make every day
about what counts as right and wrong, and whether to give in to temptations
that we believe to be wrong. In a completely monitored and controlled envi-
ronment, those choices vanish. One cannot tell whether one’s behavior is an ex-
pression of character or is merely compelled by immediate circumstance.
Of course, it may be diﬃcult to embrace one’s right to ﬂout the law if the
ﬂouting entails a gross violation of the rights of another. Few would uphold the
freedom of someone to murder as “part of what makes us human.” So we might
try to categorize the most common lawbreaking behaviors online and see how
often they relate to “merely” speech-related wrongs rather than worse transgres-
sions. This is just the sort of calculus by which prior restraints are disfavored es-
pecially when they attach to speech, rather than when they are used to prevent
lawbreaking behaviors such as those that lead to physical harm. If most of the
abuses sought to be prevented are well addressed through post hoc remedies,
and if they might be adequately discovered through existing law enforcement
mechanisms, one should disfavor perfect enforcement to preempt them. At the
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very least, the prospect of abuse of powerful, asymmetric law enforcement tools
reminds us that there is a balance to be struck rather than an unmitigated good
in perfect enforcement.
WEB 2.0 AND THE END OF GENERATIVITY
The situation for online copyright illustrates that for perfect enforcement to
work, generative alternatives must not be widely available.101 In 2007, the
movie industry and technology makers unveiled a copy protection scheme for
new high-deﬁnition DVDs to correct the ﬂaws in the technical protection
measures applied to regular DVDs over a decade earlier. The new system was
compromised just as quickly; instructions quickly circulated describing how
PC users could disable the copy protection on HD-DVDs.102 So long as the
generative PC remains at the center of the modern information ecosystem, the
ability to deploy trusted systems with restrictions that interfere with user ex-
pectations is severely limited: tighten a screw too much, and it will become
stripped.
So could the generative PC ever really disappear? As David Post wrote in re-
sponse to a law review article that was a precursor to this book, “a grid of 400
million open PCs is not less generative than a grid of 400 million open PCs and
500 million locked-down TiVos.”103 Users might shift some of their activities
to tethered appliances in response to the security threats described in Chapter
Three, and they might even ﬁnd themselves using locked-down PCs at work or
in libraries and Internet cafés. But why would they abandon the generative PC
at home? The prospect may be found in “Web 2.0.” As mentioned earlier, in
part this label refers to generativity at the content layer, on sites like Wikipedia
and Flickr, where content is driven by users.104 But it also refers to something
far more technical—a way of building Web sites so that users feel less like they
are looking at Web pages and more like they are using applications on their very
own PCs.105 New online map services let users click to grasp a map section and
move it around; new Internet mail services let users treat their online e-mail
repositories as if they were located on their PCs. Many of these technologies
might be thought of as technologically generative because they provide hooks
for developers from one Web site to draw upon the content and functionality of
another—at least if the one lending the material consents.106
Yet the features that make tethered appliances worrisome—that they are less
generative and that they can be so quickly and eﬀectively regulated—apply
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with equal force to the software that migrates to become a service oﬀered over
the Internet. Consider Google’s popular map service. It is not only highly use-
ful to end users; it also has an open API (application programming interface) to
its map data,107 which means that a third-party Web site creator can start with
a mere list of street addresses and immediately produce on her site a Google
Map with a digital push-pin at each address.108 This allows any number of
“mash-ups” to be made, combining Google Maps with third-party geographic
datasets. Internet developers are using the Google Maps API to create Web sites
that ﬁnd and map the nearest Starbucks, create and measure running routes,
pinpoint the locations of traﬃc light cameras, and collate candidates on dating
sites to produce instant displays of where one’s best matches can be found.109
Because it allows coders access to its map data and functionality, Google’s
mapping service is generative. But it is also contingent: Google assigns each
Web developer a key and reserves the right to revoke that key at any time, for
any reason—or to terminate the whole Google Maps service.110 It is certainly
understandable that Google, in choosing to make a generative service out of
something in which it has invested heavily, would want to control it. But this
puts within the control of Google, and anyone who can regulate Google, all
downstream uses of Google Maps—and maps in general, to the extent that
Google Maps’ popularity means other mapping services will fail or never be
built.
Software built on open APIs that can be withdrawn is much more precarious
than software built under the old PC model, where users with Windows could
be expected to have Windows for months or years at a time, whether or not Mi-
crosoft wanted them to keep it. To the extent that we ﬁnd ourselves primarily
using a particular online service, whether to store our documents, photos, or
buddy lists, we may ﬁnd switching to a new service more diﬃcult, as the data is
no longer on our PCs in a format that other software can read. This disconnect
can make it more diﬃcult for third parties to write software that interacts with
other software, such as desktop search engines that can currently paw through
everything on a PC in order to give us a uniﬁed search across a hard drive. Sites
may also limit functionality that the user expects or assumes will be available.
In 2007, for example, MySpace asked one of its most popular users to remove
from her page a piece of music promotion software that was developed by an
outside company. She was using it instead of MySpace’s own code.111 Google
unexpectedly closed its unsuccessful Google Video purchasing service and re-
motely disabled users’ access to content they had purchased; after an outcry,
Google oﬀered limited refunds instead of restoring access to the videos.112
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Continuous Internet access thus is not only facilitating the rise of appliances
and PCs that can phone home and be reconﬁgured by their vendors at any mo-
ment. It is also allowing a wholesale shift in code and activities from endpoint
PCs to the Web. There are many functional advantages to this, at least so long
as one’s Internet connection does not fail. When users can read and compose 
e-mail online, their inboxes and outboxes await no matter whose machines
they borrow—or what operating system the machines have—so long as they
have a standard browser. It is just a matter of getting to the right Web site and
logging in. We are beginning to be able to use the Web to do word processing,
spreadsheet analyses, indeed, nearly anything we might want to do.
Once the endpoint is consigned to hosting only a browser, with new features
limited to those added on the other end of the browser’s window, consumer de-
mand for generative PCs can yield to demand for boxes that look like PCs but
instead oﬀer only that browser. Then, as with tethered appliances, when Web
2.0 services change their oﬀerings, the user may have no ability to keep using an
older version, as one might do with software that stops being actively made
available.
This is an unfortunate transformation. It is a mistake to think of the Web
browser as the apex of the PC’s evolution, especially as new peer-to-peer appli-
cations show that PCs can be used to ease network traﬃc congestion and to al-
low people directly to interact in new ways.113 Just as those applications are 
beginning to show promise—whether as ad hoc networks that PCs can create
among each other in the absence of connectivity to an ISP, or as distributed
processing and storage devices that could apply wasted computing cycles to far-
away computational problems114—there is less reason for those shopping for a
PC to factor generative capacity into a short-term purchasing decision. As a
2007 Wall Street Journal headline put it: “‘Dumb terminals can be a smart
move’: Computing devices lack extras but oﬀer security, cost savings.”115
* * *
Generative networks like the Internet can be partially controlled, and there is
important work to be done to enumerate the ways in which governments try to
censor the Net.116 But the key move to watch is a sea change in control over the
endpoint: lock down the device, and network censorship and control can be ex-
traordinarily reinforced. The prospect of tethered appliances and software as
service permits major regulatory intrusions to be implemented as minor tech-
nical adjustments to code or requests to service providers. Generative tech-
nologies ought to be given wide latitude to ﬁnd a variety of uses—including
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ones that encroach upon other interests. These encroachments may be undesir-
able, but they may also create opportunities to reconceptualize the rights un-
derlying the threatened traditional markets and business models. An informa-
tion technology environment capable of recursive innovation117 in the realms
of business, art, and culture will best thrive with continued regulatory forbear-
ance, recognizing that the disruption occasioned by generative information
technology often amounts to a long-term gain even as it causes a short-term
threat to some powerful and legitimate interests.
The generative spirit allows for all sorts of software to be built, and all sorts
of content to be exchanged, without anticipating what markets want—or what
level of harm can arise. The development of much software today, and thus of
the generative services facilitated at the content layer of the Internet, is under-
taken by disparate groups, often not acting in concert, whose work can become
greater than the sum of its parts because it is not funneled through a single ven-
dor’s development cycle.118
The keys to maintaining a generative system are to ensure its internal secu-
rity without resorting to lockdown, and to ﬁnd ways to enable enough enforce-
ment against its undesirable uses without requiring a system of perfect enforce-
ment. The next chapters explore how some enterprises that are generative at the
content level have managed to remain productive without requiring extensive
lockdown or external regulation, and apply those lessons to the future of the 
Internet.
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The Dutch city of Drachten has undertaken an unusual experiment
in traﬃc management. The roads serving forty-ﬁve thousand people
are “verkeersbordvrij”: free of nearly all road signs. Drachten is one of
several European test sites for a traﬃc planning approach called “un-
safe is safe.”1 The city has removed its traﬃc signs, parking meters,
and even parking spaces. The only rules are that drivers should yield to
those on their right at an intersection, and that parked cars blocking
others will be towed.
The result so far is counterintuitive: a dramatic improvement in ve-
hicular safety. Without signs to obey mechanically (or, as studies have
shown, disobey seventy percent of the time2), people are forced to
drive more mindfully—operating their cars with more care and atten-
tion to the surrounding circumstances. They communicate more with
pedestrians, bicyclists, and other drivers using hand signals and eye
contact. They see other drivers rather than other cars. In an article de-
scribing the expansion of the experiment to a number of other Euro-
pean cities, including London’s Kensington neighborhood, traﬃc ex-
pert Hans Monderman told Germany’s Der Spiegel, “The many rules
strip us of the most important thing: the ability to be considerate. We’re losing
our capacity for socially responsible behavior. The greater the number of pre-
scriptions, the more people’s sense of personal responsibility dwindles.”3
Law has long recognized the diﬀerence between rules and standards—be-
tween very precise boundaries like a speed limit and the much vaguer admon-
ishment characteristic of negligence law that warns individuals simply to “act
reasonably.” There are well-known tradeoﬀs between these approaches.4 Rules
are less subject to ambiguity and, if crafted well, inform people exactly what
they can do, even if individual situations may render the rule impractical or,
worse, dangerous. Standards allow people to tailor their actions to a particular
situation. Yet they also rely on the good judgment of often self-interested ac-
tors—or on little-constrained second-guessing of a jury or judge that later de-
crees whether someone’s actions were unreasonable.
A small lesson of the verkeersbordvrij experiment is that standards can work
better than rules in unexpected contexts. A larger lesson has to do with the
traﬃc expert’s claim about law and human behavior: the more we are regulated,
the more we may choose to hew only and exactly to the regulation or, more pre-
cisely, to what we can get away with when the regulation is not perfectly en-
forced. When we face heavy regulation, we see and shape our behavior more in
relation to reward and punishment by an arbitrary external authority, than be-
cause of a commitment to the kind of world our actions can help bring about.5
This observation is less about the diﬀerence between rules and standards than
it is about the source of mandates: some may come from a process that a person
views as alien, while others arise from a process in which the person takes an ac-
tive part.
When the certainty of authority-sourced reward and punishment is less-
ened, we might predict two opposing results. The ﬁrst is chaos: remove security
guards and stores will be looted. The second is basic order maintained, as peo-
ple choose to respect particular limits in the absence of enforcement. Such act-
ing to reinforce a social fabric may still be due to a form of self-interest—game
and norm theorists oﬀer reasons why people help one another in terms that
draw on longer-term mutual self-interest6—but it may also be because people
have genuinely decided to treat others’ interests as their own.7 This might be
because people feel a part of the process that brought about a shared man-
date—even if compliance is not rigorously monitored. Honor codes, or stu-
dents’ pledges not to engage in academically dishonest behavior, can apparently
result in lower rates of self-reported cheating.8 Thus, without the traﬃc sign
equivalent of pages of rules and regulations, students who apprentice to gener-
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alized codes of honor may be prone to higher levels of honesty in academic
work—and beneﬁt from a greater sense of camaraderie grounded in shared val-
ues.
More generally, order may remain when people see themselves as a part of a
social system, a group of people—more than utter strangers but less than
friends—with some overlap in outlook and goals. Whatever counts as a satisfy-
ing explanation, we see that sometimes the absence of law has not resulted in
the absence of order.9 Under the right circumstances, people will behave chari-
tably toward one another in the comparative absence or enforcement of rules
that would otherwise compel that charity.
In modern cyberspace, an absence of rules (or at least enforcement) has led
both to a generative blossoming and to a new round of challenges at multiple
layers. If the Internet and its users experience a crisis of abuse—behaviors that
artfully exploit the twin premises of trust and procrastination—it will be
tempting to approach such challenges as ones of law and jurisdiction. This rule-
and-sanction approach frames the project of cyberlaw by asking how public au-
thorities can ﬁnd and restrain those it deems to be bad actors online. Answers
then look to entry points within networks and endpoints that can facilitate
control. As the previous chapter explained, those points will be tethered appli-
ances and software-as-service—functional, fashionable, but non-generative or
only contingently generative.10
The “unsafe is safe” experiment highlights a diﬀerent approach, one poten-
tially as powerful as traditional rule and sanction, without the sacriﬁce of gen-
erativity entailed by the usual means of regulation eﬀected through points of
control, such as the appliancization described earlier in this book. When peo-
ple can come to take the welfare of one another seriously and possess the tools
to readily assist and limit each other, even the most precise and well-enforced
rule from a traditional public source may be less eﬀective than that uncom-
pelled goodwill. Such an approach reframes the project of cyberlaw to ask:
What are the technical tools and social structures that inspire people to act hu-
manely online? How might they be available to help restrain the damage that
malevolent outliers can wreak? How can we arrive at credible judgments about
what counts as humane and what counts as malevolent? These questions may
be particularly helpful to answer while cyberspace is still in its social infancy, its
tools for group cohesion immature, and the attitudes of many of its users still in
an early phase which treats Internet usage as either a tool to augment existing
relationships or as a gateway to an undiﬀerentiated library of information from
indiﬀerent sources. Such an atomistic conception of cyberspace naturally pro-
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duces an environment without the social signaling, cues, and relationships that
tend toward moderation in the absence of law.11 This is an outcome at odds
with the original architecture of the Internet described in this book, an archi-
tecture built on neighborliness and cooperation among strangers occupying
disparate network nodes.
The problem raised in the ﬁrst part of this book underscores this dissonance
between origins and current reality at the technical layer: PCs running wild, in-
fected by and contributing to spyware, spam, and viruses because their users ei-
ther do not know or do not care what they should be installing on their com-
puters. The ubiquity of the PC among mainstream Internet users, and its
ﬂexibility that allows it to be reprogrammed at any instant, are both signal ben-
eﬁts and major ﬂaws, just as the genius of the Web—allowing the on-the-ﬂy
composition of coherent pages of information from a staggering variety of un-
vetted sources—is also proving a serious vulnerability. In looking for ways to
mitigate these ﬂaws while preserving the beneﬁts of such an open system, we
can look to the other layers of the generative Internet which have been plagued
with comparable problems, and the progress of their solutions. Some of these
resemble verkeersbordvrij: curious experiments with unexpected success that
suggest a set of solutions well suited to generative environments, so long as the
people otherwise subject to more centralized regulation are willing to help con-
tribute to order without it.
Recall that the Internet exists in layers—physical, protocol, application,
content, social. Thanks to the modularity of the Internet’s design, network and
software developers can become experts in one layer without having to know
much about the others. Some legal academics have even proposed that regula-
tion might be most eﬃciently tailored to respect the borders of these layers.12
For our purposes, we can examine the layers and analyze the solutions from
one layer to provide insight into the problems of another. The pattern of gener-
ative success and vulnerability present in the PC and Internet at the technical
layer is also visible in one of the more recent and high proﬁle content-layer en-
deavors on the Internet: Wikipedia, the free online encyclopedia that anyone
can edit. It is currently among the top ten most popular Web sites in the
world,13 and the story of Wikipedia’s success and subsequent problems—and
evolving answers to them—provide clues to solutions for other layers. We need
some new approaches. Without them, we face a Hobson’s choice between fear
and lockdown.
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THE RISE OF WIKIPEDIA
Evangelists of proprietary networks and the Internet alike have touted access to
knowledge and ideas. People have anticipated digital “libraries of Alexandria,”
providing the world’s information within a few clicks.14 Because the Internet
began with no particular content, this was at ﬁrst an empty promise. Most
knowledge was understood to reside in forms that were packaged and distrib-
uted piece by piece, proﬁtable because of a scarcity made possible by physical
limitations and the restrictions of copyright. Producers of educational materi-
als, including dictionaries and encyclopedias, were slow to put their wares into
digital form. They worried about cannibalizing their existing paper sales—for
Encyclopaedia Britannica, $650 million in 1990.15 There was no good way of
charging for the small transactions that a lookup of a single word or encyclo-
pedia entry would require, and there were few ways to avoid users’ copying,
pasting, and sharing what they found. Eventually Microsoft released the En-
carta encyclopedia on CD-ROM in 1993 for just under $1,000, pressuring
Britannica to experiment both with a CD-ROM and a subscription-only Web
site in 1994.16
As the Internet exploded, the slow-to-change walled garden content of for-
mal encyclopedias was bypassed by a generative proliferation of topical Web
pages, and search engines that could pinpoint them. There was no gestalt,
though: the top ten results for “Hitler” on Google could include a biography
written by amateur historian Philip Gavin as part of his History Place Web
site,17 a variety of texts from Holocaust remembrance organizations, and a site
about “kitlers,” cats bearing uncanny resemblances to the tyrant.18 This sce-
nario exhibits generativity along the classic Libertarian model: allow individu-
als the freedom to express themselves and they will as they choose. We are then
free to read the results. The spirit of blogging also falls within this model. If any
of the posted material is objectionable or inaccurate, people can either ignore
it, request for it to be taken down, or ﬁnd a theory on which to sue over it, per-
haps imploring gatekeepers like site hosting companies to remove material that
individual authors refuse to revise.
More self-consciously encyclopedic models emerged nearly simultaneously
from two rather diﬀerent sources—one the founder of the dot-org Free Soft-
ware Foundation, and the other an entrepreneur who had achieved dot-com
success in part from the operation of a search engine focused on salacious im-
ages.19
Richard Stallman is the ﬁrst. He believes in a world where software is shared,
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with its beneﬁts freely available to all, where those who understand the code
can modify and adapt it to new purposes, and then share it further. This was the
natural environment for Stallman in the 1980s as he worked among graduate
students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and it parallels the envi-
ronment in which the Internet and Web were invented. Stallman holds the
same views on sharing other forms of intellectual expression, applying his phi-
losophy across all of the Internet’s layers, and in 1999 he ﬂoated the idea of a
free encyclopedia drawing from anyone who wanted to submit content, one ar-
ticle at a time. By 2001, some people were ready to give it a shot. Just as Stall-
man had sought to replace the proprietary Unix operating system with a simi-
larly functioning but free alternative called GNU (“GNU’s Not Unix”), the
project was ﬁrst named “GNUpedia,” then GNE (“GNE’s Not an Encyclope-
dia”). There would be few restrictions on what those submissions would look
like, lest bias be introduced:
Articles are submitted on the following provisions:
• The article contains no previously copyrighted material (and if an article is conse-
quently found to have oﬀending material, it will then be removed).
• The article contains no code that will damage the GNE systems or the systems
from which users view GNE.
• The article is not an advert, and has some informative content (persoengl [sic ] in-
formation pages are not informative!).
• The article is comprehensible (can be read and understood).20
These provisions made GNE little more than a collective blog sans com-
ments: people would submit articles, and that would be that. Any attempt to
enforce quality standards—beyond a skim to see if the article was “informa-
tive”—was eschewed. The GNE FAQ explained:
Why don’t you have editors?
There should be no level of “acceptable thought”. This means you have to tolerate
being confronted by ideas and opinions diﬀerent to your own, and for this we oﬀer
no apologies. GNE is a resource for spe [sic ] speech, and we will strive to keep it that
way. Unless some insane country with crazy libel laws tries to stop something, we will
always try and ﬁght for your spe [sic] speech, even if we perhaps don’t agree with your
article. As such we will not allow any individuals to “edit” articles, thus opening
GNE to the possibility of bias.21
As one might predict from its philosophy, at best GNE would be an accu-
mulation of views rather than an encyclopedia—perhaps accounting for the
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“not” part of “GNE’s Not an Encyclopedia.” Today the GNE Web site is a dig-
ital ghost town. GNE was a generative experiment that failed, a place free of all
digital traﬃc signs that never attracted any cars. It was eclipsed by another proj-
ect that unequivocally aimed to be an encyclopedia, emanating from an un-
usual source.
Jimbo Wales founded the Bomis search engine and Web site at the onset of
the dot-com boom in 1996.22 Bomis helped people ﬁnd “erotic photogra-
phy,”23 and earned money through advertising as well as subscription fees for
premium content. In 2000, Wales took some of the money from Bomis to sup-
port a new idea: a quality encyclopedia free for everyone to access, copy, and al-
ter for other purposes. He called it Nupedia, and it was to be built like other 
encyclopedias: through the commissioning of articles by experts. Wales hired
philosopher Larry Sanger as editor in chief, and about twenty-ﬁve articles were
completed over the course of three years.24
As the dot-com bubble burst and Bomis’s revenues dropped, Wales sought a
way to produce the encyclopedia that involved neither paying people nor en-
during a lengthy review process before articles were released to the public. He
and his team had been intrigued at the prospect of involving the public at large,
at ﬁrst to draft some articles which could then be subject to Nupedia’s formal
editing process, and then to oﬀer “open review” comments to parallel a more
elite peer review.25 Recollections are conﬂicted, but at some point software
consultant Ward Cunningham’s wiki software was introduced to create a sim-
ple platform for contributing and making edits to others’ contributions. In Jan-
uary 2001, Wikipedia was announced to run alongside Nupedia and perhaps
feed articles into it after review. Yet Nupedia was quickly eclipsed by its easily
modiﬁable counterpart. Fragments of Nupedia exist online as of this writing, a
fascinating time capsule.26 Wikipedia became an entity unto itself.27
Wikipedia began with three key attributes. The ﬁrst was verkeersbordvrij.
Not only were there few rules at ﬁrst—the earliest ones merely emphasized the
idea of maintaining a “neutral point of view” in Wikipedia’s contents, along
with a commitment to eliminate materials that infringe copyright and an in-
junction to ignore any rules if they got in the way of building a great encyclo-
pedia—but there were also no gatekeepers. The way the wiki software worked,
anyone, registered or unregistered, could author or edit a page at any time, and
those edits appeared instantaneously. This of course means that disaster could
strike at any moment—someone could mistakenly or maliciously edit a page to
say something wrong, oﬀensive, or nonsensical. However, the wiki software
made the price of a mistake low, because it automatically kept track of every
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single edit made to a page in sequence, and one could look back at the page in
time-lapse to see how it appeared before each successive edit. If someone should
take a carefully crafted article about Hitler and replace it with “Kilroy was
here,” anyone else could come along later and revert the page with a few clicks
to the way it was before the vandalism, reinstating the previous version. This is
a far cry from the elements of perfect enforcement: there are few lines between
enforcers and citizens; reaction to abuse is not instantaneous; and missteps gen-
erally remain recorded in a page history for later visitors to see if they are curi-
ous.
The second distinguishing attribute of Wikipedia was the provision of a dis-
cussion page alongside every main page. This allowed people to explain and
justify their changes, and anyone disagreeing and changing something back
could explain as well. Controversial changes made without any corresponding
explanation on the discussion page could be reverted by others without having
to rely on a judgment on the merits—instead, the absence of explanation for
something non-self-explanatory could be reason enough to be skeptical of it.
Debate was sure to arise on a system that accumulated everyone’s ideas on a
subject in one article (rather than, say, having multiple articles written on the
same subject, each from a diﬀerent point of view, as GNE would have done).
The discussion page provided a channel for such debate and helped new users
of Wikipedia make a transition from simply reading its entries to making
changes and to understanding that there was a group of people interested in the
page on which changes were made and whom could be engaged in conversation
before, during, and after editing the page.
The third crucial attribute of Wikipedia was a core of initial editors, many
drawn from Nupedia, who shared a common ethos and some substantive ex-
pertise. In these early days, Wikipedia was a backwater; few knew of it, and
rarely would a Wikipedia entry be among the top hits of a Google search.
Like the development of the Internet’s architecture, then, Wikipedia’s origi-
nal design was simultaneously ambitious in scope but modest in execution, de-
voted to making something work without worrying about every problem that
could come up if its extraordinary ﬂexibility were abused. It embodied princi-
ples of trust-your-neighbor and procrastination, as well as “Postel’s Law,” a rule
of thumb written by one of the Internet’s founders to describe a philosophy of
Internet protocol development: “[B]e conservative in what you do; be liberal in
what you accept from others.”28
Wikipedia’s initial developers shared the same goals and attitudes about the
project, and they focused on getting articles written and developed instead of
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deciding who was or was not qualiﬁed or authorized to build on the wiki. These
norms of behavior were learned by new users from the old ones through infor-
mal apprenticeships as they edited articles together.
The absence of rules was not nonnegotiable; this was not GNE. The pro-
crastination principle suggests waiting for problems to arise before solving
them. It does not eschew solutions entirely. There would be maximum open-
ness until there was a problem, and then the problem would be tackled.
Wikipedia’s rules would be developed on the wiki like a student-written and
student-edited honor code. They were made publicly accessible and editable, in
a separate area from that of the substantive encyclopedia.29 Try suddenly to edit
an existing rule or add a new one and it will be reverted to its original state un-
less enough people are convinced that a change is called for. Most of the rules
are substance-independent: they can be appealed to and argued about wholly
apart from whatever argument might be going on about, say, how to character-
ize Hitler’s childhood in his biographical article.
From these beginnings there have been some tweaks to the wiki software be-
hind Wikipedia, and a number of new rules as the enterprise has expanded and
problems have arisen in part because of Wikipedia’s notoriety. For example, as
Wikipedia grew it began to attract editors who had never crossed paths before,
and who disagreed on the articles that they were simultaneously editing. One
person would say that Scientology was a “cult,” the other would change that to
“religion,” and the ﬁrst would revert it back again. Should such an “edit war” be
settled by whoever has the stamina to make the last edit? Wikipedia’s culture
says no, and its users have developed the “three-revert rule.”30 An editor should
not undo someone else’s edits to an article more than three times in one day.
Disagreements can then be put to informal or formal mediation, where another
Wikipedian, or other editors working on that particular article, can oﬀer their
views as to which version is more accurate—or whether the article, in the in-
terest of maintaining a neutral point of view, should acknowledge that there is
controversy about the issue.
For articles prone to vandalism—the entry for President George W. Bush,
for example, or the front page of Wikipedia—administrators can create locks
to ensure that unregistered or recently registered users may not make changes.
Such locks are seen as necessary and temporary evils, and any administrator can
choose to lift a lock at his or her discretion.31
How does an editor become an administrator with such powers? By making
lots of edits and then applying for an administratorship. Wikipedians called
“bureaucrats” have authority to promote editors to administrator status—or
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demote them. And to whom do the bureaucrats answer? Ultimately, to an
elected arbitration committee, the board of Wikipedia’s parent Wikimedia
Foundation, or to Jimbo Wales himself. (There are currently only a handful of
bureaucrats, and they are appointed by other bureaucrats.)
Administrators can also prevent particular users from editing Wikipedia.
Such blocks are rare and usually temporary. Persistent vandals usually get four
warnings before any action is taken. The warnings are couched in a way that
presumes—often against the weight of the evidence—that the vandals are act-
ing in good faith, experimenting with editing capabilities on live pages when
they should be practicing on test articles created for that purpose. Other trans-
gressions include deleting others’ comments on the discussion page—since the
discussion page is a wiki page, it can be edited in free form, making it possible
to eliminate rather than answer someone else’s argument. Threatening legal ac-
tion against a fellow Wikipedian is also grounds for a block.32
Blocks can be placed against individual user accounts, if people have regis-
tered, or against a particular IP address, for those who have not registered. IP
addresses associated with anonymizing networks such as Tor are not allowed to
edit Wikipedia at all.33
Along with sticks there are carrots, oﬀered bottom-up rather than top-down.
Each registered Wikipedia user is automatically granted a space for an individ-
ual user page, and a corresponding page for discussion with other Wikipedians,
a free form drop box for comments or questions. If a user is deemed helpful, a
practice has evolved of awarding “barnstars”—literally an image of a star. To
award a barnstar, named after the metal stars used to decorate German barns,34
is simply to edit that user’s page to include a picture of the star and a note of
thanks.35 Could a user simply award herself a pile of barnstars the way a mega-
lomaniacal dictator can adorn himself with military ribbons? Yes, but that would
defeat the point—and would require a bit of prohibited “sock puppetry,” as the
user would need to create alter identities so the page’s edit history would show
that the stars came from someone appearing to be other than the user herself.
* * *
Wikipedia has charted a path from crazy idea to stunning worldwide success.
There are versions of Wikipedia in every major language—including one in
simpliﬁed English for those who do not speak English ﬂuently—and Wiki-
pedia articles are now often among the top search engine hits for the topics they
cover. The English language version surpassed one million articles in March of
2006, and it reached the 2 million mark the following September.36
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Quality varies greatly. Articles on familiar topics can be highly informative,
while more obscure ones are often uneven. Controversial topics like abortion
and the Arab-Israeli conﬂict often boast thorough and highly developed arti-
cles. Perhaps this reﬂects Eric Raymond’s observation about the collaborative
development of free software: “[g]iven enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.”37
To be sure, Raymond himself does not claim that the maxim he coined works
beyond software, where code either objectively runs or it doesn’t. He has said
that he thinks Wikipedia is “infested with moonbats”: “The more you look at
what some of the Wikipedia contributors have done, the better Britannica
looks.”38 Still, a controversial study by Nature in 2005 systematically compared
a set of scientiﬁc entries from Wikipedia and Britannica (including some from
the Britannica Web edition), and found a similar rate of error between them.39
For timeliness, Wikipedia wins hands-down: articles near-instantly appear
about breaking events of note. For any given error that is pointed out, it can be
corrected on Wikipedia in a heartbeat. Indeed, Wikipedia’s toughest critics can
become Wikipedians simply by correcting errors as they ﬁnd them, at least if
they maintain the belief, not yet proven unreasonable, that successive changes
to an article tend to improve it, so ﬁxing an error will not be futile as others edit
it later.
THE PRICE OF SUCCESS
As we have seen, when the Internet and PC moved from backwater to main-
stream, their success set the stage for a new round of problems. E-mail is no
longer a curiosity but a necessity for most,40 and the prospect of cheaply reach-
ing so many recipients has led to the scourge of spam, now said to account for
over 90 percent of all e-mail.41 The value of the idle processing power of mil-
lions of Internet-connected PCs makes it worthwhile to hijack them, providing
a new, powerful rationale for the creation of viruses and worms.42
Wikipedia’s generativity at the content level—soliciting uncoordinated con-
tribution from tens of thousands of people—provides the basis for similar vul-
nerabilities now that it is so successful. It has weathered the most obvious perils
well. Vandals might be annoying, but they are kept in check with a critical mass
of Wikipedians who keep an eye on articles and quickly revert those that are
mangled. Some Wikipedians even appear to enjoy this duty, declaring mem-
bership in the informal Counter-Vandalism Unit and, if dealing with vandal-
ism tied to fraud, perhaps earning the Defender of the Wiki Barnstar.43 Still
others have written scripts that detect the most obvious cases of vandalism and
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automatically ﬁx them.44 And there remains the option of locking those pages
that consistently attract trouble from edits by new or anonymous users.
But just as there is a clearer means of dealing with the threat of outright ma-
licious viruses to PCs than there is to more gray-zone “badware,” vandals are
the easy case for Wikipedia. The well-known controversy surrounding John
Seigenthaler, Sr., a retired newspaper publisher and aide to Robert F. Kennedy,
scratches the surface of the problem. There, a prankster had made an edit to the
Wikipedia article about Seigenthaler suggesting that it had once been thought
that he had been involved in the assassinations of John F. Kennedy and RFK.45
The statement was false but not manifestly obvious vandalism. The article sat
unchanged for four months until a friend alerted Seigenthaler to it, replacing
the entry with his oﬃcial biography, which was then replaced with a short para-
phrase as part of a policy to avoid copyright infringement claims.46 When
Seigenthaler contacted Jimbo Wales about the issue, Wales ordered an admin-
istrator to delete Wikipedia’s record of the original edit.47 Seigenthaler then
wrote an op-ed in USA Today decrying the libelous nature of the previous ver-
sion of his Wikipedia article and the idea that the law would not require
Wikipedia to take responsibility for what an anonymous editor wrote.48
Wikipedians have since agreed that biographies of living persons are espe-
cially sensitive, and they are encouraged to highlight unsourced or potentially
libelous statements for quick review by other Wikipedians. Jimbo and a hand-
ful of other Wikipedia oﬃcials reserve the right not only to have an article
edited—something anyone can do—but to change its edit history so the fact
that it ever said a particular thing about someone will no longer be known to
the general public, as was done with the libelous portion of the Seigenthaler ar-
ticle. Such practice is carried out not under legal requirements—in the United
States, federal law protects information aggregators from liability for defama-
tory statements made by independent information providers from which they
draw49—but as an ethical commitment.
Still, the reason that Seigenthaler’s entry went uncorrected for so long is
likely that few people took notice of it. Until his op-ed appeared, he was not a
national public ﬁgure, and Jimbo himself attributed the oversight to an in-
creasing pace of article creation and edits—overwhelming the Wikipedians
who have made a habit of keeping an eye on changes to articles. In response to
the Seigenthaler incident, Wikipedia has altered its wiki software so that un-
registered users cannot create new articles, but can only edit existing ones.50
(Of course, anyone can still register.)
This change takes care of casual or heat-of-the-moment vandalism, but it
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does little to address a new category of Wikipedian somewhere between com-
mitted community member and momentarily vandalizing teenager, one that
creates tougher problems. This Wikipedian is someone who cares little about
the social act of working with others to create an encyclopedia, but instead cares
about the content of a particular Wikipedia entry. Now that a signiﬁcant num-
ber of people consult Wikipedia as a resource, many of whom come to the site
from search engine queries, Wikipedia’s contents have eﬀects far beyond the
site’s own community of user-editors.
One of Wikipedia’s community-developed standards is that individuals
should not create or edit articles about themselves, nor prompt friends to do so.
Instead they are to lobby on the article’s discussion page for other editors to
make corrections or ampliﬁcations. ( Jimbo himself has expressed regret for
editing his own entry in Wikipedia in violation of this policy.)51 What about
companies, or political aides? When a number of edits were made to politicians’
Wikipedia entries by Internet Protocol addresses traceable to Capitol Hill,
Wikipedians publicized the incidents and tried to shame the politicians in
question into denouncing the grooming of their entries.52 In some cases it has
worked. After Congressman Marty Meehan’s chief of staﬀ edited his entry to
omit mention of a broken campaign promise to serve a limited number of
terms, and subsequently replaced the text of the entire article with his oﬃcial
biography, Meehan repudiated the changes. He published a statement saying
that it was a waste of time and energy for his staﬀ to have made the edits
(“[t]hough the actual time spent on this issue amounted to 11 minutes”) be-
cause “part of being an elected oﬃcial is to be regularly commented on, praised,
and criticized on the Web.”53 Meehan’s response sidestepped the issue of
whether and how politicians ought to respond to material about them that they
believe to be false or misleading. Surely, if the New York Times published a story
that he thought was damaging, he would want to write a letter to the editor to
set the record straight.
If the Wikipedia entry on Wal-Mart is one of the ﬁrst hits in a search for the
store, it will be important to Wal-Mart to make sure the entry is fair—or even
more than fair, omitting true and relevant facts that nonetheless reﬂect poorly
on the company. What can a group of volunteers do if a company or politician
is implacably committed to editing an entry? The answer so far has been to
muddle along, assuming the best intentions of all editors and hoping that there
is epistemic strength in numbers.54 If disinterested but competent editors out-
number shills, the shills will ﬁnd their edits reverted or honed, and if the shills
persist, they can be halted by the three-revert rule.
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In August 2006, a company called MyWikiBiz was launched to help people
and companies promote themselves and shape their reputations on Wikipedia.
“If your company or organization already has a well-designed, accurately-writ-
ten article on Wikipedia, then congratulations—our services are not for you.
However, if your business is lacking a well-written article on Wikipedia, read
on—we’re here to help you!”55 MyWikiBiz oﬀers to create a basic Wikipedia
stub of three to ﬁve sentences about a company, with some links, for $49. A
“standard article” fetches $79, with a premium service ($99) that includes
checking the client’s Wikipedia article after a year to see “if further changes are
needed.”56
Wikipedia’s reaction to MyWikiBiz was swift. Jimbo himself blocked the
ﬁrm’s Wikipedia account on the basis of “paid editing on behalf of cus-
tomers.”57 The indeﬁnite block was one of only a handful recorded by Jimbo in
Wikipedia’s history. Wales talked to the ﬁrm on the phone the same day and re-
ported that they had come to an accommodation. Identifying the problem as a
conﬂict of interest and appearance of impropriety arising from editors being
paid to write by the subjects of the articles, Wales said that MyWikiBiz had
agreed to post well-sourced “neutral point of view” articles about its clients on
its own Web site, which regular Wikipedians could then choose to incorporate
or not as they pleased into Wikipedia.58 Other Wikipedians disagreed with
such a conservative outcome, believing that good content was good content,
regardless of source, and that it should be judged on its merits, without a per se
rule prohibiting direct entry by a for-proﬁt ﬁrm like MyWikiBiz.
The accommodation was short-lived. Articles submitted or sourced by My-
WikiBiz were nominated for deletion—itself a process that entails a discussion
among any interested Wikipedians and then a judgment by any administrator
about whether that discussion reached consensus on a deletion. MyWikiBiz
participated wholeheartedly in those discussions and appealed to the earlier
“Jimbo Concordat,” persuading some Wikipedians to remove their per se ob-
jections to an article because of its source. Wales himself participated in one of
the discussions, saying that his prior agreement had been misrepresented and,
after telling MyWikiBiz that it was on thin ice, once again banned it for what
he viewed as spamming Wikipedia with corporate advertisements rather than
“neutral point of view” articles.
As a result, MyWikiBiz has gone into “hibernation,” according to its
founder, who maintains that all sources, even commercial ones, should be able
to play a role in contributing to Wikipedia, especially since the sources for most
articles and edits are not personally identiﬁable, even if they are submitted un-
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der the persistent pseudonyms that are Wikipedia user identities. Rules have
evolved concerning those identities, too. In 2007, Wikipedia user Essjay, the ad-
ministrator who cleaned Seigenthaler’s defamatory edit logs, was found to have
misrepresented his credentials. Essjay had claimed to hold various graduate de-
grees along with a professorship in theology, and had contributed to many
Wikipedia articles on the subject. When Jimbo Wales contacted him to discuss
a job opportunity at Wales’s for-proﬁt company Wikia, Essjay’s real identity
was revealed. In fact, he was a twenty-four-year-old editor with no graduate de-
grees. His previous edits—and corresponding discussions in which he invoked
his credentials—were called into question. In response to the controversy, and
after a request for comments from the Wikipedia community,59 Jimbo pro-
posed a rule whereby the credentials of those Wikipedia administrators who
chose to assert them would be veriﬁed.60 Essjay retired from Wikipedia.61
* * *
A constitutional lawyer might review these tales of Wikipedia and see a mess of
process that leads to a mess of substance: anonymous and ever-shifting users; a
God-king who may or may not be able to act unilaterally;62 a set of rules now
large enough to be confusing and ambiguous but small enough to fail to reach
most challenges. And Wikipedia is decidedly not a democracy: consensus is fa-
vored over voting and its head counts. Much the same could be said about the
development process for the Internet’s fundamental technical protocols, which
is equally porous.63 The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has no “mem-
bers”; anyone can participate. But it also has had a proliferation of standards
and norms designed to channel arguments to productive resolution, along with
venerated people in unelected positions of respect and authority who could,
within broad boundaries, aﬀect the path of Internet standards.64 As the Inter-
net succeeded, the IETF’s standards and norms were tested by outsiders who
did not share them. Corporate interests became keenly interested in protocol
development, and they generally respond to their own particular pecuniary in-
centives rather than to arguments based on engineering efﬁciency. The IETF
avoided the brunt of these problems because its standards are not self-enforc-
ing; ﬁrms that build network hardware, or for-proﬁt Internet Service Providers,
ultimately decide how to make their routers behave. IETF endorsement of one
standard or another, while helpful, is no longer crucial. With Wikipedia, deci-
sions made by editors and administrators can aﬀect real-world reputations
since the articles are live and highly visible via search engines; ﬁrms do not in-
dividually choose to “adopt” Wikipedia the way they adopt Internet standards.
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Yet Wikipedia’s awkward and clumsy growth in articles, and the rules gov-
erning their creation and editing, is so far a success story. It is in its essence a
work in progress, one whose success is deﬁned by the survival—even growth—
of a core of editors who subscribe to and enforce its ethos, amid an inﬂux of
users who know nothing of that ethos. Wikipedia’s success, such as it is, is at-
tributable to a messy combination of constantly updated technical tools and
social conventions that elicit and reﬂect personal commitments from a critical
mass of editors to engage in argument and debate about topics they care about.
Together these tools and conventions facilitate a notion of “netizenship”: be-
longing to an Internet project that includes other people, rather than relating to
the Internet as a deterministic information location and transmission tool or as
a cash-and-carry service oﬀered by a separate vendor responsible for its content.
THE VALUE OF NETIZENSHIP
We live under the rule of law when people are treated equally, without regard to
their power or station; when the rules that apply to them arise legitimately from
the consent of the governed; when those rules are clearly stated; and when there
is a source of dispassionate, independent application of those rules.65
Despite the apparent mess of process and users, by these standards Wiki-
pedia has charted a remarkable course. Although diﬀerent users have diﬀerent
levels of capabilities, anyone can register, and anyone, if dedicated enough, can
rise to the status of administrator. And while Jimbo Wales may have extraordi-
nary inﬂuence, his power on Wikipedia depends in large measure on the con-
sent of the governed—on the individual decisions of hundreds of administra-
tors, any of whom can gainsay each other or him, but who tend to work
together because of a shared vision for Wikipedia. The eﬀective implementa-
tion of policy in turn rests on the thousands of active editors who may exert
power in the shape of the tens of thousands of decisions they make as
Wikipedia’s articles are edited and reedited. Behaviors that rise to the level of
consistent practice are ultimately described and codiﬁed as potential policies,
and some are then aﬃrmed as operative ones, in a process that is itself con-
stantly subject to revision.
In one extraordinary chat room conversation of Wikipedians recorded on-
line, Wales himself laments that Larry Sanger is billed in several Wikipedia ar-
ticles about Wikipedia as a “co-founder” of the encyclopedia. But apart from a
few instances that he has since publicly regretted, Wales has not edited the arti-
cles himself, nor does he directly instruct others to change them with speciﬁc
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text, since that would violate the rule against editing articles about oneself. In-
stead, he makes a case that an unremarked use of the co-founder label is inac-
curate, and implores people to consider how to improve it.66 At times—they
are constantly in ﬂux—Wikipedia’s articles about Wikipedia note that there is
controversy over the “co-founder” label for Sanger. In another example of the
limits of direct power, then-Wikimedia Foundation board member Angela
Beesley fought to have the Wikipedia entry about her deleted. She was re-
buﬀed, with administrators concluding that she was newsworthy enough to
warrant one.67 (She tried again after resigning from the Foundation board, to
no avail.)68
* * *
Wikipedia—with the cooperation of many Wikipedians—has developed a
system of self-governance that has many indicia of the rule of law without
heavy reliance on outside authority or boundary. To be sure, while outside reg-
ulation is not courted, Wikipedia’s policy on copyright infringement exhibits a
desire to integrate with the law rather than reject it. Indeed, its copyright policy
is much stricter than the laws of major jurisdictions require. In the United
States, Wikipedia could wait for formal notiﬁcations of speciﬁc infringement
before taking action to remove copyrighted material.69 And despite the fact
that Wales himself is a fan of Ayn Rand70—whose philosophy of “objectivism”
closely aligns with libertarian ideals, a triumph of the individual over the
group—Wikipedia is a consummately communitarian enterprise.71 The ac-
tivity of building and editing the encyclopedia is done in groups, though the
structure of the wiki allows for large groups to naturally break up into manage-
able units most of the time: a nano-community coalesces around each article,
often from ﬁve to twenty people at a time, augmented by non-subject-speciﬁc
roving editors who enjoy generic tasks like line editing or categorizing articles.
(Sometimes articles on roughly the same subject can develop independently, at
which point there is a negotiation between the two sets of editors on whether
and how to merge them.)
This structure is a natural form of what constitutionalists would call sub-
sidiarity: centralized, “higher” forms of dispute resolution are reserved for spe-
cial cases, while day-to-day work and decisions are undertaken in small, “local”
groups.72 Decisions are made by those closest to the issues, preventing the
lengthy, top-down processes of hierarchical systems. This subsidiarity is also 
expressed through the major groupings drawn according to language. Each
diﬀerent language version of Wikipedia forms its own policies, enforcement
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schemes, and norms. Sometimes these can track national or cultural stan-
dards—as a matter of course people from Poland primarily edit the Polish ver-
sion of Wikipedia—but at other times they cross such boundaries. The Chi-
nese language Wikipedia serves mainland China (when it is not being blocked
by the government, which it frequently is),73 Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the
many Chinese speakers scattered around the world.74
When disputes come up, consensus is sought before formality, and the lines
between subject and regulator are thin. While not everyone has the powers of
an administrator, the use of those special powers is reserved for persistent abuse
rather than daily enforcement. It is the editors—that is, those who choose to
participate—whose decisions and work collectively add up to an encyclo-
pedia—or not. And most—at least prior to an invasion of political aides, PR
ﬁrms, and other true cultural foreigners—subscribe to the notion that there is
a divide between substance and process, and that there can be an appeal to con-
tent-independent rules on which meta-agreement can be reached, even as edi-
tors continue to dispute a fact or portrayal in a given article.
This is the essence of law: something larger than an arbitrary exercise of
force, and something with meaning apart from a pretext for that force, one
couched in neutral terms only for the purpose of social acceptability. It has been
rediscovered among people who often profess little respect for their own sover-
eigns’ “real” law, following it not out of civic agreement or pride but because of
a cynical balance of the penalties for being caught against the beneﬁts of break-
ing it. Indeed, the idea that a “neutral point of view” even exists, and that it can
be determined among people who disagree, is an amazingly quaint, perhaps
even naïve, notion. Yet it is invoked earnestly and often productively on Wiki-
pedia. Recall the traﬃc engineer’s observation about road signs and human be-
havior: “The greater the number of prescriptions, the more people’s sense of
personal responsibility dwindles.”75 Wikipedia shows, if perhaps only for a
ﬂeeting moment under particularly fortuitous circumstances, that the inverse
is also true: the fewer the number of prescriptions, the more people’s sense of
personal responsibility escalates.
Wikipedia shows us that the naïveté of the Internet’s engineers in building
generative network technology can be justiﬁed not just at the technical layer of
the Internet, but at the content layer as well. The idiosyncratic system that has
produced running code among talented (and some not-so-talented) engineers
has been replicated among writers and artists.
There is a ﬁnal safety valve to Wikipedia that encourages good-faith contri-
bution and serves as a check on abuses of power that accretes among adminis-
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trators and bureaucrats there: Wikipedia’s content is licensed so that anyone
may copy and edit it, so long as attribution of its source is given and it is further
shared under the same terms.76 This permits Wikipedia’s content to be sold or
used in a commercial manner, so long as it is not proprietized—those who
make use of Wikipedia’s content cannot claim copyright over works that follow
from it. Thus dot-com Web sites like Answers.com mirror all of Wikipedia’s
content and also display banner ads to make money, something Jimbo Wales
has vowed never to do with Wikipedia.77 (A list maintained on Wikipedia
shows dozens of such mirrors.)78 Mirrors can lead to problems for people like
John Seigenthaler, who not only have to strive to correct misrepresentations in
the original article on Wikipedia, but in any mirrors as well. But Wikipedia’s
free content license has the beneﬁt of allowing members of the Wikipedia com-
munity an option to exit—and to take a copy of the encyclopedia with them. It
also allows for generative experimentation and growth. For example, third par-
ties can come up with ways of identifying accurate articles on Wikipedia and
then compile them as a more authoritative or vetted subset of the constant
work-in-progress that the site represents.
Larry Sanger, the original editor of Nupedia and organizer (and, according
to some, co-founder) of Wikipedia, has done just that. He has started “Citi-
zendium,” an attempt to combine some of Nupedia’s original use of experts
with Wikipedia’s appeal to the public at large. Citizendium seeks to fork
Wikipedia, and solicit volunteers who agree not to be anonymous, so that their
edits may be credited more readily, and their behavior made more accountable.
If Citizendium draws enough people and content, links to it from other Web
sites will follow, and, given enough links, its entries could appear as highly
ranked search results. Wikipedia’s dominance has a certain measure of inertia to
it, but the generative possibilities of its content, guaranteed by its choice of a
permissive license, allow a further check on its prominence.
Wikipedia shows us a model for interpersonal interaction that goes beyond
the scripts of customer and business. The discussions that take place adjunct to
editing can be brusque, but the behavior that earns the most barnstars is direct-
ness, intelligence, and good faith. An owner of a company can be completely
bemused that, in order to correct (and have stay corrected) what he sees as in-
accuracies in an article about his ﬁrm, he will have to discuss the issues with
random members of the public. Steve Scherf, co-founder of dot-com Grace-
note, ended up engaged in an earnest, lengthy exchange with someone known
as “Fatandhappy” about the way his company’s history was portrayed.79 The
exchange was heated and clearly frustrating for Scherf, but after another
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Wikipedian intervened to make edits, Scherf pronounced himself happy if not
thrilled with the revised text. These conversations are possible, and they are still
the norm at Wikipedia.
The elements of Wikipedia that have led to its success can help us come to
solutions for problems besetting generative successes at other layers of the In-
ternet. They are verkeersbordvrij, a light regulatory touch coupled with an
openness to ﬂexible public involvement, including a way for members of the
public to make changes, good or bad, with immediate eﬀect; a focus on earnest
discussion, including reference to neutral dispute resolution policies, as a
means of being strengthened rather than driven by disagreements; and a core of
people prepared to model an ethos that others can follow. With any of these
pieces missing Wikipedia would likely not have worked. Dot-coms that have
rushed in to adopt wikis as the latest cool technology have found mixed results.
Microsoft’s Encarta Web site, in a naked concession to the popularity of Wiki-
pedia, now has an empty box at the bottom of each article where users are asked
to enter comments or corrections, which will be forwarded to the Encarta staﬀ
for review. Users receive no further feedback.
Makers of cars and soap have run contests80 for the public to make adver-
tisements based on stock footage found in their respective commercials, com-
plete with online editing tools so that amateurs can easily put their commercials
together. Dove ran the winner of its contest during the Super Bowl.81 Many
commercial Web sites like Amazon solicit customer reviews of products as a
way to earn credibility with other customers—and some, like epinions.com,
have business models premised entirely on the reviews themselves. Yelp.com
asks for such ratings while also organizing its users into geographically based
groups and giving them the basic tools of social networking: an ability to praise
each other for good reviews, to name fellow reviewers as friends, and to discuss
and comment on each others’ views. As one Yelp participant put it in reviewing
the very Yelp “elite status” that she had just earned for contributing so many
well-regarded reviews, “[It m]akes you feel special for about two weeks. Then
you either realize you’re working for someone else without getting paid, you to-
tally lose interest, or you get really into it.”82
Such “user-generated content,” whether cultivated through fully grassroots-
motivated dot-org enterprises or well-constructed dot-com ones, forms part of
a new hybrid economy now studied by Lessig, Benkler, von Hippel, and others.
These public solicitations to manipulate corporate and cultural symbols,
pitched at varying levels of expertise, may prove to be further building blocks of
After the Stall146
“semiotic democracy,” where we can participate in the making and remaking of
cultural meanings instead of having them foisted upon us.83
But Wikipedia stands for more than the ability of people to craft their own
knowledge and culture. It stands for the idea that people of diverse back-
grounds can work together on a common project with, whatever its other
weaknesses, a noble aim—bringing such knowledge to the world. Jimbo Wales
has said that the open development model of Wikipedia is only a means to that
end—recall that he started with the far more restrictive Nupedia development
model. And we see that Wikipedia rejects straightforward democracy, favoring
discussion and consensus over outright voting, thereby sidestepping the kinds
of ballot-stuﬃng that can take place in a digital environment, whether because
one person adopts multiple identities or because a person can simply ask
friends to stack a sparsely attended vote.
Instead, Wikipedia has since come to stand for the idea that involvement of
people in the information they read—whether to ﬁx a typographical error or to
join a debate over its veracity or completeness—is an important end itself, one
made possible by the recursive generativity of a network that welcomes new
outposts without gatekeepers; of software that can be created and deployed at
those outposts; and of an ethos that welcomes new ideas without gatekeepers,
one that asks the people bearing those ideas to argue for and substantiate them
to those who question.
There are plenty of online services whose choices can aﬀect our lives. For ex-
ample, Google’s choices about how to rank and calculate its search results can
determine which ideas have prominence and which do not. That is one reason
why Google’s agreement to censor its own search results for the Chinese version
of Google has attracted so much disapprobation.84 But even those who are
most critical of Google’s actions appear to wish to pressure the company
through standard channels: moral suasion, shareholder resolutions, govern-
ment regulation compelling noncensorship, or a boycott to inﬂict ﬁnancial
pressure. Unlike Wikipedia, no one thinks that Google ought to be “governed”
by its users in some democratic or communitarian way, even as it draws upon
the wisdom of the crowds in deciding upon its rankings,85 basing them in part
on the ways in which millions of individual Web sites have decided about to
whom to link. Amazon and Yelp welcome user reviews (and reviews of those re-
views), but the public at large does not “govern” these institutions.
People instinctively expect more of Wikipedia. They see it as a shared re-
source and a public one, even though it is not an arm of any territorial sover-
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eign. The same could be said of the Internet Engineering Task Force and the In-
ternet itself, but Wikipedia appears to have further found a way to involve non-
technical people in its governance. Every time someone reads a Wikipedia arti-
cle and knowingly chooses not to vandalize it, he or she has an opportunity to
identify with and reinforce its ethos. Wales is setting his sights next on a search
engine built and governed on this model, “free and transparent” about its rank-
ings, with a “huge degree of human community oversight.”86 The next chap-
ters explore how that ethos may be replicable: vertically to solve generative
problems found at other layers of the Internet, and horizontally to other appli-
cations within the content and social layers.
If Wikipedia did not exist there would still be reason to cheer the generative
possibilities of the Internet, its capacity to bring people together in meaningful
conversations, commerce, or action. There are leading examples of each—the
community of commentary and critique that has evolved around blogging, the
user-driven reputation system within eBay, the “civil society” type of gatherings
fostered by Meetup, or the social pressure–induced promises via Pledgebank,
each drawing on the power of individuals contributing to community-driven
goals. But Wikipedia is the canonical bee that ﬂies despite scientists’ skepticism
that the aerodynamics add up.87 These examples will grow, transform, or fade
over time, and their futures may depend not just on the public’s appetites and
attention, but on the technical substrate that holds them all: the powerful but
delicate generative Internet and PC, themselves vaulted unexpectedly into the
mainstream because of amateur contribution and cooperation. We now ex-
plore how the lessons of Wikipedia, both its successes and shortcomings, shed
light on how to maintain our technologies’ generativity in the face of the prob-
lems arising from their widespread adoption.
After the Stall148
III
Solutions
This book has explained how the Internet’s generative characteristics
primed it for extraordinary success—and now position it for failure.
The response to the failure will most likely be sterile tethered appli-
ances and Web services that are contingently generative, if generative
at all. The trajectory is part of a larger pattern. If we can understand
the pattern and what drives it, we can try to avoid an end that elimi-
nates most disruptive innovation while facilitating invasive and all-
too-inexpensive control by regulators.
The pattern begins with a technology groomed in a backwater, as
much for fun as for proﬁt. The technology is incomplete even as it is
shared. It is designed to welcome contribution and improvement
from many corners. New adopters reﬁne it as it spreads, and it spreads
more as it improves, a virtuous circle that vaults the technology into
the mainstream, where commercial ﬁrms help to package and reﬁne it
for even more people. This is the story of the PC against information
appliances, and it is the story of the Internet against the proprietary
networks.
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Developments then take a turn for the worse: mainstream success brings in
people with no particular talent or tolerance for the nuts and bolts of the tech-
nology, and no connection with the open ethos that facilitates the sharing of
improvements. It also attracts those who gain by abusing or subverting the
technology and the people who use it. Users ﬁnd themselves confused and hurt
by the abuse, and they look for alternatives.
The most obvious solution to abuse of an open system is to tighten or alto-
gether close it. A bank robbery calls for more guards; a plane hijacking suggests
narrowing the list of those permitted to ﬂy and what they are permitted to take
with them. For the Internet and PC, it seems natural that a system beset by
viruses ought not to propagate and run new code so easily. The same goes for
that which is built on top of the Internet: when Wikipedia is plagued by van-
dals the obvious response is to disallow editing by anonymous users. Such solu-
tions carry their own steep price within information technology: a reduction in
the generativity of the system, clamping its innovative capacity while enhanc-
ing the prospects of control by the parties left in charge, such as in the likely
shift by users away from generative PCs toward tethered appliances and Web
services. What works in the short or medium term for banks and airlines has
crucial drawbacks for consumer information technology, even as consumers
themselves might bring such solutions about precisely where regulators would
have had diﬃculty intervening, consigning generative technologies to the
backwaters from which they came.
So what to do to stop this future? We need a strategy that blunts the worst as-
pects of today’s popular generative Internet and PC without killing these plat-
forms’ openness to innovation. Give users a reason to stick with the technology
and the applications that have worked so surprisingly well—or at least reduce
the pressures to abandon it—and we may halt the movement toward a non-
generative digital world. This is easier said than done, because our familiar
toolkits for handling problems are not particularly attuned to maintaining gen-
erativity. Solely regulatory interventions—such as banning the creation or dis-
tribution of deceptive or harmful code—are both under- and overinclusive.
They are underinclusive for the usual reasons that regulation is diﬃcult on to-
day’s Net, and that it is hard to track the identities of sophisticated wrongdoers.
Even if found, many wrongdoers may not be in cooperative jurisdictions. They
are overinclusive because so much of the good code we have seen has come
from unaccredited people sharing what they have made for fun, collaborating
in ways that would make businesslike regulation of their activities burdensome
for them—quite possibly convincing them not to share to begin with. If we
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make it more diﬃcult for new software to spread, good software from obscure
sources can be fenced out along with the bad.
The key to threading the needle between needed change and undue closure
can be forged from understanding the portability of both problems and solu-
tions among the Internet’s layers. We have seen that generativity from one layer
can recur to the next. The open architecture of the Internet and Web allowed
Ward Cunningham to invent the wiki, generic software that oﬀers a way of
editing or organizing information within an article, and spreading this infor-
mation to other articles. Wikis were then used by unrelated nontechies to form
a Web site at the content layer like Wikipedia. Wikipedia is in turn generative
because people are free to take all of its contents and experiment with diﬀerent
ways of presenting or changing the material, perhaps by placing the informa-
tion on otherwise unrelated Web sites in diﬀerent formats.1
If generativity and its problems ﬂow from one layer to another, so too can its
solutions. There are useful guidelines to be drawn from the success stories of
generative models at each layer, transcending the layer where they originate, re-
vealing solutions for other layers. For example, when the Morris worm abused
the openness of the 1987 Internet, the ﬁrst line of defense was the community
of computer scientists who populated the Internet at that time: they cooper-
ated on diagnosing the problem and ﬁnding a solution. Recall that the Internet
Engineering Task Force’s (IETF’s) report acknowledged the incident’s serious-
ness and sought to forestall future viruses not through better engineering but
by recommending better community ethics and policing.2 This is exactly
Wikipedia’s trump card. When abuses of openness beset Wikipedia, it turned
to its community—aided by some important technical tools—as the primary
line of defense. Most recently, this eﬀort has been aided by the introduction of
Virgil Griﬃth’s Wikiscanner, a simple tool that uses Wikipedia’s page histories
to expose past instances of article whitewashing by organizations.3 So what 
distinguishes the IETF recommendation, which seems like a naïve way to 
approach Internet and PC-based problems, from the Wikipedian response,
which so far appears to have held many of Wikipedia’s problems at bay?
The answer lies in two crucial diﬀerences between generative solutions at the
content layer and those at the technical layer. The ﬁrst is that much content-
layer participation—editing Wikipedia, blogging, or even engaging in transac-
tions on eBay and Amazon that ask for reviews and ratings to establish reputa-
tions—is understood to be an innately social activity.4 These services solicit
and depend upon participation from the public at large, and their participation
mechanisms are easy for the public to master. But when the same generative op-
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portunity exists at the technical layer, mainstream users balk—they are eager to
have someone else solve the underlying problem, which they perceive as tech-
nical rather than social.
The second diﬀerence is that many content-layer enterprises have developed
technical tools to support collective participation, augmenting an individualis-
tic ethos with community mechanisms.5 In the Internet and PC security space,
on the other hand, there have been few tools available to tap the power of
groups to, say, distinguish good code from bad. Instead, dealing with bad code
has been left either to individual users who are ill-positioned to, say, decipher
whether a Web site’s digital certiﬁcate is properly signed and validated, or to
Internet security ﬁrms that try to sort out good code from bad according to a
one-size-ﬁts-all standard. Such a defense still cannot easily sift bad gray-zone
software that is not a virus but still causes user regret—spyware, for instance—
from unusual but beneﬁcial code. As with the most direct forms of regulation,
this solution is both under- and overinclusive.
These two diﬀerences point to two approaches that might save the genera-
tive spirit of the Net, or at least keep it alive for another interval. The ﬁrst is to
reconﬁgure and strengthen the Net’s experimentalist architecture to make it ﬁt
better with its now-mainstream home. The second is to create and demonstrate
the tools and practices by which relevant people and institutions can help se-
cure the Net themselves instead of waiting for someone else to do it.
Beﬁtting the conception of generative systems as works in progress that
muddle through on the procrastination principle, the concrete ideas spawned
by these solutions are a bit of a grab bag. They are evocative suggestions that
show the kinds of processes that can work rather than a simple, elegant patch.
Silver bullets belong to the realm of the appliance. Yet as with many of the In-
ternet’s advances, some of these hodge-podge solutions can be developed and
deployed to make a diﬀerence without major investment—and with luck, they
will be. The most signiﬁcant barriers to adoption are, ﬁrst, a wide failure to re-
alize the extent of the problem and the costs of inaction; second, a collective ac-
tion problem, exacerbated by the Internet’s modular design, thanks to which
no single existing group of actors who appreciates the problem sees it as its own
responsibility; and third, a too-easily cultivated sense among Internet users that
the system is supposed to work like any other consumer device.
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There is a phrase from the days when television was central: “Not
ready for prime time.” Prime time refers to the precious time between
dinner and bedtime when families would gather around the TV set
looking to be informed or entertained. Viewership would be at its
apex, both in numbers and in quality of viewers, deﬁned as how much
money they had and how ready they were to spend it on the things ad-
vertised during commercial breaks. During prime time, the average
viewer was, comparatively speaking, a rich drunken sailor. Prime time
programming saw the most expensive and elaborate shows, made with
the highest production values.
Shows on channels other than those part of networks with big au-
diences, or at times of the day when most people were not watching
TV, had less investment and lower production values. Their actors or
presenters were not A-list. Flaws in the shows would prove them not
ready for prime time—now a metaphor to mean anything that has
not been buﬀed and polished to a ﬁne, predictable shine. “Not ready”
has the virtue of suggesting that someday a B-list program could be
ready, vaulting from the backwaters to the center stage. And prime
time concedes that there are other times beside it: there are backwaters that are
accessible to masses of people so long as they are willing to surf to an unfamil-
iar channel or stay up a little later than usual.
To be sure, while the barriers to getting a show on an obscure network were
less than those to landing a show on a major one, they were still high. And with
only a handful of networks that people watched in prime time, the deﬁnitions
of what was worthy of prime time ended up a devastatingly rough aggregation
of preferences. There was not much room for programs ﬁnely honed to niche
markets. TV’s metaphor is powerful in the Internet space. As we have seen, the
generative Internet allows experimentation from all corners, and it used to be
all backwater and no prime time.
Now that the generative PC is so ubiquitous and its functions so central to
both leisure and commerce, much of what it oﬀers happens in prime time: a set
of core applications and services that people are anxious to maintain. Links be-
tween backwater and prime time are legion; today’s obscure but useful back-
water application can ﬁnd itself wildly popular and relied upon overnight. No
intervention is needed from network executives running some prime time 
portion of the Internet, and realizing that there is something good going on
among the farm teams that deserves promotion to the major league. The Net
was built without programming executives, and its users have wide latitude to
decide for themselves where they would like to go that day.
The ﬁrst major challenge in preserving the generative Net, then, is to recon-
cile its role as a boisterous laboratory with its role as a purveyor of prime time,
ensuring that inventions can continue to move easily from one to the other. To-
day our prime time applications and data share space with new, probationary
ones, and they do not always sit well together. There are some technical inspi-
rations we can take from successes like Wikipedia that, with enough alert users,
can help.
THE RED AND THE GREEN
Wikis are designed so that anyone can edit them. This entails a risk that people
will make bad edits, through either incompetence or malice. The damage that
can be done, however, is minimized by the wiki technology, because it allows
bad changes to be quickly reverted. All previous versions of a page are kept, and
a few clicks by another user can restore a page to the way it was before later
changes were made. Our PCs can be similarly equipped. For years Windows
XP (and now Vista) has had a system restore feature, where snapshots are taken
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of the machine at a moment in time, allowing later bad changes to be rolled
back. The process of restoring is tedious, restoration choices can be frustrat-
ingly all-or-nothing, and the system restore ﬁles themselves can become cor-
rupted, but it represents progress. Even better would be the introduction of fea-
tures that are commonplace on wikis: a quick chart of the history of each
document, with an ability to see date-stamped sets of changes going back to its
creation. Because our standard PC applications assume a safer environment
than really exists, these features have never been demanded or implemented.
Because wikis are deployed in environments prone to vandalism, their contents
are designed to be easily recovered after a problem.
The next stage of this technology lies in new virtual machines, which would
obviate the need for cyber cafés and corporate IT departments to lock down
their PCs. Without virtual machine technology, many corporate IT depart-
ments relegate most employees to the status of guests on their own PCs, unable
to install any new software, lest it turn out to be bad. Such lockdown reduces
the number of calls to the helpdesk, as well as the risk that a user might corrupt
or compromise a ﬁrm’s data. (Perhaps more precisely, calls for help become calls
for permission.) Similarly, cyber cafés and libraries want to prevent one user’s
ill-advised actions from cascading to future users. But lockdown eliminates the
good aspects of the generative environment.
In an eﬀort to satisfy the desire for safety without full lockdown, PCs could
be designed to pretend to be more than one machine, capable of cycling from
one split personality to the next. In its simplest implementation, we could di-
vide a PC into two virtual machines: “Red” and “Green.”1 The Green PC would
house reliable software and important data—a stable, mature OS platform and
tax returns, term papers, and business documents. The Red PC would have
everything else. In this setup, nothing that happens on one PC could easily
aﬀect the other, and the Red PC could have a simple reset button that sends it
back to a predetermined safe state. Someone could conﬁdently store important
data on the Green PC and still use the Red PC for experimentation. Knowing
which virtual PC to use would be akin to knowing when a sport utility vehicle
should be placed into four-wheel drive mode instead of two-wheel drive, a deci-
sion that mainstream users could learn to make responsibly and knowledgeably.
A technology that splits the diﬀerence between lockdown and openness
means that intermediaries could aﬀord to give their end users more ﬂexi-
bility—which is to say, more opportunity to run others’ code. Indeed, the
miniaturization of storage means that users could bring their own system on a
keychain (or download it from a remote site) to plug into a library or café’s pro-
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cessing unit, screen, and network connection—a rediscovery of the hobbyist
PC and its own modularization that made it better and cheaper than its appli-
ancized counterparts.
There could be a spectrum of virtual PCs on one unit, one for each member
of the family. Already, most consumer operating systems enable separate login
names with customized desktop wallpaper and e-mail accounts for each user.2
If the divide were developed further, a parent could conﬁdently give her twelve-
year-old access to the machine under her own account and know that nothing
that the child could do—short of hurling the machine out the window—
would hurt the data found within the other virtual PCs.3 (To be sure, this does
not solve problems at the social layer—of what activities children may under-
take to their detriment once online.)
Easy reversion, coupled with virtual PCs, seeks to balance the experimental-
ist spirit of the early Internet with the fact that there are now important uses for
those PCs that we do not want to disrupt. Still, this is not a complete solution.
The Red PC, despite its experimental purpose, might end up accumulating
data that the user wants to keep, occasioning the need for what Internet archi-
tect David Clark calls a “checkpoint Charlie” to move sensitive data from Red
to Green without also carrying a virus or anything else undesirable that could
hurt the Green PC.4 There is also the question of what software can be deemed
safe for Green—which is just another version of the question of what software
to run on today’s single-identity PCs. If users could competently decide what
should go on Red and what on Green, then they could competently decide
what to run on today’s simpler machines, partially obviating the need for the
virtual PC solution in the ﬁrst place.
Worse, an infected Red PC still might be capable of hurting other PCs across
the network, by sending spam or viruses, or by becoming a zombie PC con-
trolled from afar for any number of other bad purposes. Virtualization tech-
nology eases some of the sting to users of an experimental platform whose
experiments sometimes go awry, but it does not do much to reduce the bur-
dens—negative externalities—that such failures can place on everyone else.
Most fundamentally, many of the beneﬁts of generativity come precisely
thanks to an absence of walls. We want our e-mail programs to have access to
any document on our hard drive, so that we can attach it to an e-mail and send
it to a friend. We want to edit music downloaded from a Web site with an au-
dio mixing program and then incorporate it into a presentation. We want to ex-
port data from one desktop calendar application to a new one that we might
like better. The list goes on, and each of these operations requires the ability to
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cross the boundaries from one application to another, or one virtual PC to an-
other. For similar reasons, we may be hesitant to adopt complex access control
and privilege lists to designate what software can and cannot do.5
It is not easy to anticipate what combinations of applications and data we
will want in one place, and the beneﬁts of using virtual machines will not al-
ways outweigh the confusion and limitations of having them. It is worth trying
them out to buy us some more time—but they will not be panaceas. A guiding
principle emerges from the Net’s history at the technical layer and Wikipedia’s
history at the content layer: an experimentalist spirit is best maintained when
failures can be contained as learning experiences rather than catastrophes.
BETTER INFORMED EXPERIMENTS
The Internet’s original design relied on few mechanisms of central control.
This lack of control has the added generative beneﬁt of allowing new services to
be introduced, and new destinations to come online, without any up-front vet-
ting or blocking, by either private incumbents or public authorities.
With this absence of central control comes an absence of measurement.
CompuServe or Prodigy could have reported exactly how many members they
had at any moment, because they were centralized. Wikipedia can report the
number of registered editors it has, because it is a centralized service run at
wikipedia.org. But the Internet itself cannot say how many users it has, because
it does not maintain user information. There is no “it” to query. Counting the
number of IP addresses delegated is of little help, because many addresses are al-
located but not used, while other addresses are shared. For example, QTel is the
only ISP in Qatar, and it routes all users’ traﬃc through a handful of IP ad-
dresses. Not only does this make it diﬃcult to know the number of users hail-
ing from Qatar, but it also means that when a site like Wikipedia has banned
access from the IP address of a single misbehaving user from Qatar, it inadver-
tently has banned nearly every other Internet user in Qatar.6
Such absence of measurement extends to a lack of awareness at the network
level of how much bandwidth is being used by whom. This has been beneﬁcial
for the adoption of new material on the Web by keeping the Internet in an “all
you can eat” mode of data transmission, which happens when large ISPs peer-
ing with one another decide to simply swap data rather than trying to ﬁgure out
how to charge one another per unit of information exchanged. This absence of
measurement is good from a generative point of view because it allows initially
whimsical but data-intensive uses of the network to thrive—and perhaps to
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turn out to be vital. For example, the ﬁrst online webcams were set up within
oﬃce cubicles and were about as interesting as watching paint dry. But people
could tinker with them because they (and their employers, who might be pay-
ing for the network connection) did not have to be mindful of their data con-
sumption. From an economic point of view this might appear wasteful, since
non-value-producing but high-bandwidth activities—goldﬁsh bowl cams—
will not be constrained. But the economic point of view is at its strongest when
there is scarcity, and from nearly the beginning of the Internet’s history there
has been an abundance of bandwidth on the network backbones. It is the ﬁnal
link to a particular PC or cluster of PCs—still usually a jury-rigged link on
twisted copper wires or coaxial cable originally intended for other purposes like
telephone and cable television—that can become congested. And in places
where ISPs enjoy little competition, they can further choose to segment their
services with monthly caps—a particular price plan might allow only two giga-
bytes of data transfer per month, with users then compelled to carefully moni-
tor their Internet usage, avoiding the fanciful surﬁng that could later prove cen-
tral. In either case, the owner of the PC can choose what to do with that last
slice of bandwidth, realizing that watching full screen video might, say, slow
down a ﬁle transfer in the background. (To be sure, on many broadband net-
works this ﬁnal link is shared among several unrelated subscribers, causing
miniature tragedies of the commons as a ﬁle-sharing neighbor slows down the
Internet performance for someone nearby trying to watch on-demand video.)
The ability to tinker and experiment without watching a meter provides an
important impetus to innovate; yesterday’s playful webcams on aquariums and
cubicles have given rise to Internet-facilitated warehouse monitoring, citizen-
journalist reporting from remote locations, and, as explained later in this book,
even controversial experiments in a distributed neighborhood watch system
where anyone can watch video streamed from a national border and report peo-
ple who look like they are trying to cross it illegally.7
However, an absence of measurement is starting to have generative draw-
backs. Because we cannot easily measure the network and the character of the
activity on it, we are left incapable of easily assessing and dealing with threats
from bad code without laborious and imperfect cooperation among a limited
group of security software vendors. It is like a community in which only highly
specialized private mercenaries can identify crimes in progress and the people
who commit them, with the nearby public at large ignorant of the transgres-
sions until they themselves are targeted.
Creating a system where the public can help requires work from technolo-
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gists who have more than a set of paying customers in mind. It is a call to the
academic environment that gave birth to the Net, and to the public authorities
who funded it as an investment ﬁrst in knowledge and later in general infra-
structure. Experiments need measurement, and the future of the generative
Net depends on a wider circle of users able to grasp the basics of what is going
on within their machines and between their machines and the network.
What might this system look like? Roughly, it would take the form of tool-
kits to overcome the digital solipsism that each of our PCs experiences when it
attaches to the Internet at large, unaware of the size and dimension of the net-
work to which it connects. These toolkits would have the same building blocks
as spyware, but with the opposite ethos: they would run unobtrusively on the
PCs of participating users, reporting back—to a central source, or perhaps only
to each other—information about the vital signs and running code of that PC
that could help other PCs ﬁgure out the level of risk posed by new code. Unlike
spyware, the code’s purpose would be to use other PCs’ anonymized experi-
ences to empower the PC’s user. At the moment someone is deciding whether
to run some new software, the toolkit’s connections to other machines could
say how many other machines on the Internet were running the code, what
proportion of machines of self-described experts were running it, whether
those experts had vouched for it, and how long the code had been in the wild.
It could also signal the amount of unattended network traﬃc, pop-up ads, or
crashes the code appeared to generate. This sort of data could become part of a
simple dashboard that lets the users of PCs make quick judgments about the
nature and quality of the code they are about to run in light of their own risk
preferences, just as motor vehicle drivers use their dashboards to view displays
of their vehicle’s speed and health and to tune their radios to get traﬃc updates.
Harvard University’s Berkman Center and the Oxford Internet Institute—
multidisciplinary academic enterprises dedicated to charting the future of the
Net and improving it—have begun a project called StopBadware, designed to
assist rank-and-ﬁle Internet users in identifying and avoiding bad code.8 The
idea is not to replicate the work of security vendors like Symantec and McAfee,
which seek to bail new viruses out of our PCs faster than they pour in. Rather,
it is to provide a common technical and institutional framework for users to de-
vote some bandwidth and processing power for better measurement: to let us
know what new code is having what eﬀect amid the many machines taking it
up. Not every PC owner is an expert, but each PC is a precious guinea pig—
one that currently is experimented upon with no record of what works and
what does not, or with the records hoarded by a single vendor. The ﬁrst step in
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the toolkit is now available freely for download: “Herdict.” Herdict is a small
piece of software that assembles the vital signs described above, and places them
in a dashboard usable by mainstream PC owners. These eﬀorts will test the hy-
pothesis that solutions to generative problems at the social layer might be ap-
plicable to the technical layer—where help is desperately needed. Herdict is an
experiment to test the durability of experiments.9 And it is not alone. For ex-
ample, Internet researchers Jean Camp and Allan Friedman have developed the
“good neighbors” system to allow people to volunteer their PCs to detect and
patch vulnerabilities among their designated friends’ PCs.10
The value of aggregating data from individual sources is well known. Yochai
Benkler approvingly cites Google Pagerank algorithms over search engines
whose results are auctioned, because Google draws on the individual linking
decisions of millions of Web sites to calculate how to rank its search results.11 If
more people are linking to a Web site criticizing Barbie dolls than to one selling
them, the critical site will, all else equal, appear higher in the rankings when a
user searches for “Barbie.” This concept is in its infancy at the application layer
on the PC. When software crashes on many PC platforms, a box appears asking
the user whether to send an error report to the operating system maker. If the
user assents, and enough other users reported a similar problem, sometimes a
solution to the problem is reported back from the vendor. But these imple-
mentations are only halfway there from a generative standpoint. The big insti-
tutions doing the gathering—Google because it has the machines to scrape the
entire Web; Microsoft and Apple because they can embed error reporting in
their OSes—make use of the data (if not the wisdom) of the crowds, but the
data is not further shared, and others are therefore unable to make their own in-
terpretations of it or build their own tools with it. It is analogous to Encarta
partially adopting the spirit of Wikipedia, soliciting suggestions from readers
for changes to its articles, but not giving any sense of where those suggestions
go, how they are used, or how many other suggestions have been received, what
they say, or why they say it.
A full adoption of the lessons of Wikipedia would be to give PC users the op-
portunity to have some ownership, some shared stake, in the process of evalu-
ating code, especially because they have a stake in getting it right for their own
machines. Sharing useful data from their PCs is one step, but this may work
best when the data is going to an entity committed to the public interest of
solving PC security problems, and willing to share that data with others who
want to take a stab at solving them. The notion of a civic institution here does
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not necessarily mean cumbersome governance structures and formal lines of
authority so much as it means a sense of shared responsibility and participa-
tion.12 It is the opposite of the client service model in which one calls a helpline
and for a fee expects to be helped—and those who do not pay receive no help.
Instead, it is the volunteer ﬁre department or neighborhood watch where,
while not everyone is able to ﬁght ﬁres or is interested in watching, a critical
mass of people are prepared to contribute, and such contributions are known to
the community more broadly.13 A necessary if not suﬃcient condition to ﬁght-
ing the propagation of bad code as a social problem is to allow people to enter
into a social conﬁguration in order to attack it.
These sorts of solutions are not as easily tried for tethered appliances, where
people make a decision only about whether to acquire them, and the devices are
otherwise controlled from afar. Of course, they may not be as necessary, since
the appliances are not, by deﬁnition, as vulnerable to exploits performed by un-
approved code. But tethered appliances raise the concern of perfect enforce-
ment described earlier in this book: they can too readily, almost casually, be
used to monitor and control the behavior of their users. When tools drawing
on group generativity are deployed, the opposite is true. Their success is depen-
dent on participation, and this helps establish the legitimacy of the project both
to those participating and those not. It also means that the generative uses to
which the tools are put may aﬀect the number of people willing to assist. If it
turned out that the data generated and shared from a PC vital signs tool went
to help design viruses, word of this could induce people to abandon their com-
mitment to help. Powerful norms that focus collaborators toward rather than
against a commitment to the community are necessary. This is an emerging
form of netizenship, where tools that embed particular norms grow more pow-
erful with the public’s belief in the norms’ legitimacy.
It is easy for Internet users to see themselves only as consumers whose partic-
ipation is limited to purchasing decisions that together add up to a market force
pushing one way or another. But with the right tools, users can also see them-
selves as participants in the shaping of generative space—as netizens. This is a
crucial reconception of what it means to go online. The currency of cyberspace
is, after all, ideas, and we shortchange ourselves if we think of ideas to be, in the
words of Electronic Frontier Foundation co-founder John Perry Barlow, merely
“another industrial product, no more noble than pig iron,”14 broadcast to us
for our consumption but not capable of also being shaped by us. If we insist on
treating the Net as an invisible conduit, capable of greater or lesser bandwidth
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but otherwise meant to be invisible, we naturally turn to service providers with
demands to keep it working, even when the problems arising are social in na-
ture.
RECRUITING HELP AT THE BARRICADES: THE GENERATIVITY
PRINCIPLE AND THE LIMITS OF END-TO-END NEUTRALITY
Some commentators believe that software authors and operating system mak-
ers have it easy.15 They produce buggy code open to viruses and malware, but
they are not held accountable the way that a carmaker would be for a car
whose wheels fell oﬀ, or a toaster maker would be if its toasters set bread on
ﬁre.16 Why should there be a diﬀerence? The security threats described in this
book might be thought so pervasive and harmful that even if they do not
physically hurt anyone, software makers ought to pay for the harm their bugs
cause.
This is already somewhat true of information appliances. If a TiVo unit did
not operate as promised—suppose it simply crashed and failed to record any
television programs—the law of warranty would quickly come into play. If the
TiVo unit were new enough, the company would make good on a repair or re-
placement.17 Yet this simple exchange rarely takes place after the purchase of a
standard generative PC. Suppose a new PC stops functioning: after a week of
using it to surf the Internet and send e-mail, the consumer turns it on and sees
only a blue error screen.18 Unless smoke pours out of the PC to indicate a gen-
uine hardware problem, the hardware manufacturer is likely to diagnose the
problem as software-related. The operating system maker is not likely to be
helpful. Because the user no doubt installed software after purchasing the ma-
chine, pinpointing the problem is not easy. In particularly diﬃcult cases, the
OS maker will simply suggest a laborious and complete reinstallation of the
OS, wiping clean all the changes that the consumer has made. Finally, appeal-
ing to individual software makers results in the same problem: a software maker
will blame the OS maker or a producer of other software found on the ma-
chine.
So why not place legal blame on each product maker and let them sort it out?
If the consumer is not skilled enough to solve PC security problems or wealthy
enough to pay for someone else to ﬁgure it out, a shifting of legal responsibility
to others could cause them to create and maintain more secure software and
hardware. Unfortunately, such liability would serve only to propel PC lock-
down, reducing generativity. The more complex that software is, the more
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diﬃcult it is to secure it, and allowing third parties to build upon it increases
the complexity of the overall system even if the foundation is a simple one. If
operating system makers were liable for downstream accidents, they would
start screening who can run what on their platforms, resulting in exactly the
non-generative state of aﬀairs we want to avoid. Maintainers of technology
platforms like traditional OS makers and Web services providers should be en-
couraged to keep their platforms open and generative, rather than closed to
eliminate outside sources of malware or to facilitate regulatory control, just as
platforms for content built on open technologies are wisely not asked to take
responsibility for everything that third parties might put there.19
Hardware and OS makers are right that the mishmash of software found on
even a two-week-old Internet-exposed PC precludes easily identifying the
source of many problems. However, the less generative the platform already is,
the less there is to lose by imposing legal responsibility on the technology
provider to guarantee a functioning system. To the extent that PC OSes do
control what programs can run on them, the law should hold OS developers re-
sponsible for problems that arise, just as TiVo and mobile phone manufactur-
ers take responsibility for issues that arise with their controlled technologies.
If the OS remains open to new applications created by third parties, the
maker’s responsibility should be duly lessened. It might be limited to providing
basic tools of transparency that empower users to understand exactly what their
machines are doing. These need not be as sophisticated as Herdict aims to be.
Rather, they could be such basic instrumentation as what sort of data is going
in and out of the box and to whom. A machine turned into a zombie will be
communicating with unexpected sources that a free machine will not, and in-
sisting on better information to users could be as important as providing a
speedometer on an automobile—even if users do not think they need one.
Such a regime permits technology vendors to produce closed platforms but
encourages them to produce generative platforms by scaling liabilities accord-
ingly. Generative platform makers would then be asked only to take certain 
basic steps to make their products less autistic: more aware of their digital 
surroundings and able to report what they see to their users. This tracks the 
intuition behind secondary theories of liability: technology makers may shape
their technologies largely as they please, but the conﬁgurations they choose
then inform their duties and liabilities.20
Apart from hardware and software makers, there is another set of technology
providers that reasonably could be asked or required to help: Internet Service
Providers. So far, like PC, OS, and software makers, ISPs have been on the 
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sidelines regarding network security. The justiﬁcation for this—apart from the
mere explanation that ISPs are predictably and rationally lazy—is that the In-
ternet was rightly designed to be a dumb network, with most of its features and
complications pushed to the endpoints. The Internet’s engineers embraced the
simplicity of the end-to-end principle (and its companion, the procrastination
principle) for good reasons. It makes the network more ﬂexible, and it puts de-
signers in a mindset of making the system work rather than anticipating every
possible thing that could go wrong and trying to design around or for those
things from the outset.21 Since this early architectural decision, “keep the In-
ternet free” advocates have advanced the notion of end-to-end neutrality as an
ethical ideal, one that leaves the Internet without ﬁltering by any of its inter-
mediaries. This use of end-to-end says that packets should be routed between
the sender and the recipient without anyone stopping them on the way to ask
what they contain.22 Cyberlaw scholars have taken up end-to-end as a battle
cry for Internet freedom,23 invoking it to buttress arguments about the ideo-
logical impropriety of ﬁltering Internet traﬃc or favoring some types or sources
of traﬃc over others.
These arguments are powerful, and end-to-end neutrality in both its tech-
nical and political incarnations has been a crucial touchstone for Internet de-
velopment. But it has its limits. End-to-end does not fully capture the overall
project of maintaining openness to contribution from unexpected and unac-
credited sources. Generativity more fundamentally expresses the values that at-
tracted cyberlaw scholars to end-to-end in the ﬁrst place.
According to end-to-end theory, placing control and intelligence at the
edges of a network maximizes not just network ﬂexibility, but also user
choice.24 The political implication of this view—that end-to-end design pre-
serves users’ freedom, because the users can conﬁgure their own machines how-
ever they like—depends on an increasingly unreliable assumption: whoever
runs a machine at a given network endpoint can readily choose how the ma-
chine will work. To see this presumption in action, consider that in response to
a network teeming with viruses and spam, network engineers recommend
more bandwidth (so the transmission of “deadweights” like viruses and spam
does not slow down the much smaller proportion of legitimate mail being car-
ried by the network) and better protection at user endpoints, rather than inter-
ventions by ISPs closer to the middle of the network.25 But users are not well
positioned to painstakingly maintain their machines against attack, leading
them to prefer locked-down PCs, which carry far worse, if diﬀerent, problems.
Those who favor end-to-end principles because an open network enables gen-
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erativity should realize that intentional inaction at the network level may be
self-defeating, because consumers may demand locked-down endpoint envi-
ronments that promise security and stability with minimum user upkeep. This
is a problem for the power user and consumer alike.
The answer of end-to-end theory to threats to our endpoints is to have them
be more discerning, transforming them into digital gated communities that
must frisk traﬃc arriving from the outside. The frisking is accomplished either
by letting next to nothing through—as is the case with highly controlled infor-
mation appliances—or by having third-party antivirus ﬁrms perform monitor-
ing, as is done with increasingly locked-down PCs. Gated communities oﬀer a
modicum of safety and stability to residents as well as a manager to complain to
when something goes wrong. But from a generative standpoint, these moated
paradises can become prisons. Their conﬁnement is less than obvious, because
what they block is not escape but generative possibility: the ability of outsiders
to oﬀer code and services to users, and the corresponding opportunity of users
and producers to inﬂuence the future without a regulator’s permission. When
endpoints are locked down, and producers are unable to deliver innovative
products directly to users, openness in the middle of the network becomes
meaningless. Open highways do not mean freedom when they are so dangerous
that one never ventures from the house.
Some may cling to a categorical end-to-end approach; doubtlessly, even in a
world of locked-down PCs there will remain old-fashioned generative PCs for
professional technical audiences to use. But this view is too narrow. We ought
to see the possibilities and beneﬁts of PC generativity made available to every-
one, including the millions of people who give no thought to future uses when
they obtain PCs, and end up delighted at the new uses to which they can put
their machines. And without this ready market, those professional developers
would have far more obstacles to reaching critical mass with their creations.
Strict loyalty to end-to-end neutrality should give way to a new generativity
principle, a rule that asks that any modiﬁcations to the Internet’s design or to
the behavior of ISPs be made where they will do the least harm to generative
possibilities. Under such a principle, for example, it may be preferable in the
medium term to screen out viruses through ISP-operated network gateways
rather than through constantly updated PCs.26 Although such network screen-
ing theoretically opens the door to additional ﬁltering that may be undesirable,
this speculative risk should be balanced against the very real threats to genera-
tivity inherent in PCs operated as services rather than products. Moreover, if
the endpoints remain free as the network becomes slightly more ordered, they
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remain as safety valves should network ﬁltering begin to block more than bad
code.
In the meantime, ISPs are in a good position to help in a way that falls short
of undesirable perfect enforcement, and that provides a stopgap while we de-
velop the kinds of community-based tools that can facilitate salutary endpoint
screening. There are said to be tens of thousands of PCs converted to zombies
daily,27 and an ISP can sometimes readily detect the digital behavior of a zom-
bie when it starts sending thousands of spam messages or rapidly probes a se-
quence of Internet addresses looking for yet more vulnerable PCs. Yet ISPs cur-
rently have little incentive to deal with this problem. To do so creates a two-
stage customer service nightmare. If the ISP quarantines an infected machine
until it has been recovered from zombie-hood—cutting it oﬀ from the network
in the process—the user might claim that she is not getting the network access
she paid for. And quarantined users will have to be instructed how to clean their
machines, which is a complicated business.28 This explains why ISPs generally
do not care to act when they learn that they host badware-infected Web sites or
consumer PCs that are part of a botnet.29
Whether through new industry best practices or through a rearrangement of
liability motivating ISPs to take action in particularly ﬂagrant and egregious
zombie situations, we can buy another measure of time in the continuing secu-
rity game of cat and mouse. Security in a generative system is something never
fully put to rest—it is not as if the “right” design will forestall security problems
forevermore. The only way for such a design to be foolproof is for it to be non-
generative, locking down a computer the same way that a bank would fully se-
cure a vault by neither letting any customers in nor letting any money out. Se-
curity of a generative system requires the continuing ingenuity of a few experts
who want it to work well, and the broader participation of others with the
goodwill to outweigh the actions of a minority determined to abuse it.
A generativity principle suggests additional ways in which we might redraw
the map of cyberspace. First, we must bridge the divide between those con-
cerned with network connectivity and protocols and those concerned with PC
design—a divide that end-to-end neutrality unfortunately encourages. Such
modularity in stakeholder competence and purview was originally a useful and
natural extension of the Internet’s architecture. It meant that network experts
did not have to be PC experts, and vice versa. But this division of responsibili-
ties, which works so well for technical design, is crippling our ability to think
through the trajectory of applied information technology. Now that the PC
and the Internet are so inextricably intertwined, it is not enough for network
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engineers to worry only about network openness and assume that the end-
points can take care of themselves. It is abundantly clear that many endpoints
cannot. The procrastination principle has its limits: once a problem has mate-
rialized, the question is how best to deal with it, with options ranging from fur-
ther procrastination to eﬀecting changes in the way the network or the end-
points behave. Changes to the network should not be categorically oﬀ the
table.
Second, we need to rethink our vision of the network itself. “Middle” and
“endpoint” are no longer subtle enough to capture the important emerging fea-
tures of the Internet/PC landscape. It remains correct that, from a network
standpoint, protocol designs and the ISPs that implement them are the “mid-
dle” of the network, as distinct from PCs that are “endpoints.” But the true im-
port of this vernacular of “middle” and “endpoint” for policy purposes has lost
its usefulness in a climate in which computing environments are becoming ser-
vices, either because individuals no longer have the power to exercise meaning-
ful control over their PC endpoints, or because their computing activities are
hosted elsewhere on the network, thanks to “Web services.” By ceding deci-
sion-making control to government, to a Web 2.0 service, to a corporate au-
thority such as an OS maker, or to a handful of security vendors, individuals
permit their PCs to be driven by an entity in the middle of the network, caus-
ing their identities as endpoints to diminish. The resulting picture is one in
which there is no longer such a clean separation between “middle” and “end-
point.” In some places, the labels have begun to reverse.
Abandoning the end-to-end debate’s divide between “middle” and “end-
point” will enable us to better identify and respond to threats to the Internet’s
generativity. In the ﬁrst instance, this might mean asking that ISPs play a real
role in halting the spread of viruses and the remote use of hijacked machines.
This reformulation of our vision of the network can help with other prob-
lems as well. For instance, even today consumers might not want or have the
ability to ﬁne-tune their PCs. We might say that such ﬁne-tuning is not possi-
ble because PCs, though leveraged and adaptable, are not easy for a mass audi-
ence to master. Taking the generativity-informed view of what constitutes a
network, though, we can conceptualize a variety of methods by which PCs
might compensate for this diﬃculty of mastery, only some of which require
centralized control and education. For example, users might be able to choose
from an array of proxies—not just Microsoft, but also Ralph Nader, or a pub-
lic interest organization, or a group of computer scientists, or StopBadware—
for guidance on how best to conﬁgure their PCs. For the Herdict program de-
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scribed earlier, the ambition is for third parties to contribute their own dash-
board gauges—allowing users of Herdict to draw from a market of advisers,
each of whom can draw from some combination of the herd’s data and their
own expertise to give users advice. The idea is that by reformulating our vision
of the network to extend beyond mere “endpoints” and “middles,” we can keep
our eyes on the real value at stake: individual freedom to experiment with new
code and anything made possible by it, the touchstone of a generative system.
EXTRA-LEGAL INCENTIVES TO SOLVE THE GENERATIVE PROBLEM:
FROM WIKIPEDIA TO MAPS AND STOPBADWARE
Some of the suggested solutions here include legal intervention, such as liabil-
ity for technology producers in certain circumstances. Legal interventions face
certain hurdles in the Internet space. One sovereign cannot reach every poten-
tially responsible entity on a global network, and while commercial forces can
respond well to legal incentives,30 the amateur technology producers that are so
important to a generative system are less likely to shape their behavior to con-
form to subtle legal standards.
The ongoing success of enterprises like Wikipedia suggests that social prob-
lems can be met ﬁrst with social solutions—aided by powerful technical
tools—rather than by resorting to law. As we have seen, vandalism, copyright
infringement, and lies on Wikipedia are typically solved not by declaring that
vandals are breaking laws against “exceeding authorized access” to Wikipedia or
by suits for infringement or defamation, but rather through a community
process that, astoundingly, has impact.
In the absence of consistent interventions by law, we also have seen some
peer-produced-and-implemented responses to perceived security problems at
the Internet’s technical layer, and they demonstrate both the value and draw-
backs of a grassroots system designed to facilitate choice by endpoints about
with whom to communicate or what software to run.
One example is the early implementation of the Mail Abuse Prevention Sys-
tem (MAPS) as a way of dealing with spam. In the summer of 1997, Internet
pioneer Paul Vixie decided he had had enough of spam. He started keeping a
list of those IP addresses that he believed were involved in originating spam,
discovered through either his own sleuthing or that of others whom he trusted.
The ﬁrst thing he did with the list was make sure the entities on it could not
send him e-mail. Next he made his list instantly available over the network so
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anyone could free-ride oﬀ of his eﬀort to distinguish between spammers and
nonspammers. In 1999, leading Web-based e-mail provider Hotmail decided
to do just that on behalf of its customers.31 Thus if Paul Vixie believed a partic-
ular mail server to be accommodating a spammer, no one using that server
could send e-mail to anyone with an account at hotmail.com. MAPS was also
known as the “Realtime Blackhole List,” referring to the black hole that one’s 
e-mail would enter if one’s outgoing e-mail provider were listed. The service
was viewed as a deterrent as much as an incapacitation: it was designed to get
people who e-mail (or who run e-mail servers) to behave in a certain way.32
Vixie was not the only social entrepreneur in this space. Others also oﬀered
tools for deciding what was spam and who was sending it, with varying toler-
ance for appeals from those incorrectly ﬂagged. The Open Relay Behavior-
modiﬁcation System (ORBS) sent automated test e-mails through others’ e-mail
servers to ﬁgure out who maintained so-called open relays. If ORBS was able to
send itself e-mail through another’s server successfully, it concluded that the
server could be used to send spam and would add it to its own blacklist. Vixie
concluded that the operator of ORBS was therefore also a spammer—for
sending the test e-mails. He blackholed them on MAPS, and they blackholed
him on ORBS, spurring a brief digital war between these private security
forces.33
Vixie’s eﬀorts were undertaken with what appear to be the best of intentions,
and a sense of humility. Vixie expressed reservations about his system even as he
continued to develop it. He worried about the heavy responsibilities attendant
on private parties who amass the power to aﬀect others’ lives to exercise the
power fairly.34 The judgments of one private party about another—perhaps in
turn informed by other private parties—can become as life-aﬀecting as the
judgments of public authorities, yet without the elements of due process that
cabin the actions of public authorities in societies that recognize the rule of law.
At the time, being listed on MAPS or other powerful real time blackhole lists
could be tantamount to having one’s Internet connection turned oﬀ.35
MAPS was made possible by the generative creation and spread of tools that
would help interested network administrators combat spam without reliance
on legal intervention against spammers. It was a predictable response by a sys-
tem of users in which strong norms against spamming had lost eﬀectiveness as
the Internet became more impersonal and the proﬁts to be gleaned from send-
ing spam increased.36 In the absence of legal solutions or changes at the center
of the network, barriers like MAPS could be put in place closer to the end-
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points, as end-to-end theory would counsel. But MAPS as a generative solution
has drawbacks. The ﬁrst is that people sending e-mail through blackholed
servers could not easily ﬁgure out why their messages were not being received,
and there were no easy avenues for appeal if a perceived spammer wanted to
explain or reform. Further, the use of MAPS and other lists was most straight-
forward when the IP addresses sending spam were either those of avowed spam-
mers or those of network operators with willful ignorance of the spammers’ ac-
tivities, in a position to stop them if only the operators would act. When
spammers adjusted tactics in this game of cat and mouse and moved their
spamming servers to fresh IP addresses, the old IP addresses would be reas-
signed to new, innocent parties—but they would remain blackholed without
easy appeal. Some IP addresses could thus become sullied, with people signing
on to the Internet having no knowledge that the theoretically interchangeable
IP address that they were given had been deemed unwelcome by a range of
loosely coordinated entities across the Net.37 Finally, as spammers worked with
virus makers to involuntarily and stealthily transform regular Internet users’
machines into ad hoc mail servers spewing spam, users could ﬁnd themselves
blocked without realizing what was going on.
MAPS is just one example of individual decisions being aggregated, or single
decisions sent back out to individuals or their proxies for implementation. In
2006, in cooperation with the Harvard and Oxford StopBadware initiative,
Google began automatically identifying Web sites that had malicious code hid-
den in them, ready to infect users’ browsers as soon as they visited the site.38
Some of these sites were set up expressly for the purpose of spreading viruses,
but many more were otherwise-legitimate Web sites that had been hacked. For
example, the puzzlingly named chuckroast.com sells ﬂeece jackets and other
clothing just as thousands of other e-commerce sites do. Visitors can browse
chuckroast’s oﬀerings and place and pay for orders. However, hackers had sub-
tly changed the code in the chuckroast site, either by guessing the site owner’s
password or by exploiting an unpatched vulnerability in the site’s Web server.
The hackers left the site’s basic functionalities untouched while injecting the
smallest amount of code on the home page to spread an infection to visitors.
Thanks to the generative design of Web protocols, allowing a Web page to
direct users’ browsers seamlessly to pull together data and software from any
number of Internet sites to compose a single Web page, the infecting code
needed to be only one line long, directing a browser to visit the hacker’s site qui-
etly and deposit and run a virus on the user’s machine.39 Once Google found
the waiting exploit on chuckroast’s site, it tagged it every time it came up as a
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Google search result: “Warning: This site may harm your computer.”40 Those
who clicked on the link anyway would, instead of being taken to chuckroast
.com, get an additional page from Google with a much larger warning and a
suggestion to visit StopBadware or pick another page instead of chuckroast’s.
Chuckroast’s visits plummeted after the warning was given, and the site
owner was understandably anxious to ﬁgure out what was wrong and how to
get rid of the warning. But cleaning the site requires leaving the realm of the
amateur Web designer and entering the zone of the specialist who knows how
to diagnose and clean a virus. Requests for review—which included pleas for
help in understanding the problem to begin with—inundated StopBadware
researchers, who found themselves overwhelmed in a matter of days by appeals
from thousands of Web sites listed.41 Until StopBadware could check each site
and verify it had been cleaned of bad code, the warning page stayed up. Diﬃ-
cult questions were pressed by site owners and users: does Google owe notice to
webmasters before—or even after—it lists their sites as being infected and
warns Google users away from them? Such notice is not easy to eﬀect, because
there is no centralized index of Web site owners, nor a standardized way to
reach them. (Sometimes domain name records have a space for such data,42 but
the information domain name owners place there is often false to throw oﬀ
spammers, and when true it often reaches the ISP hosting the Web site rather
than the Web site owner. When the ISP is alerted, it either ignores the request
or immediately pulls the plug on the site—a remedy more drastic than simply
warning Google users away from it.) Ideally, such notice would be given after a
potentially labor-intensive search for the Web owner, and the site owner would
be helped in ﬁguring out how to ﬁnd and remove the oﬀending code—and 
secure the site against future hacking. (Chuckroast eliminated the malicious
code, and, not long afterward, Google removed the warning about the site.)
Prior to the Google/StopBadware project, no one took responsibility for this
kind of security. Ad hoc alerts to webmasters—those running the hacked
sites—and their ISPs garnered little reaction. The sites were working ﬁne for
their intended purposes even as they were spreading viruses, and site customers
would likely not be able to trace infections back to (and thereby blame) the
merchant. As one Web site owner said after conceding that his site was unin-
tentionally distributing malware, “Someone had hacked us and then installed
something that ran an ‘Active X’ something or rather [sic ]. It would be caught
with any standard security software like McAfee.”43 In other words, the site
owner ﬁgured that security against malware was the primary responsibility of
his visitors—if they were better defended, they would not have to worry about
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the exploit that was on his site. (He also said that the exploit was located in a
little-used area of his site, and noted that he had not been given notice before a
Google warning was placed on links to his page.) With the Google/StopBad-
ware project in full swing, Web site owners have experienced a major shift in in-
centives, such that the exploit is their problem if they want Google traﬃc back.
That is perhaps more powerful than a law directly regulating them could man-
age—and it could in turn generate a market for ﬁrms that help validate, clean,
and secure Web sites.
Still, the justice of Google/StopBadware and similar eﬀorts remains rough,
and market forces alone might not make for a desirable level of attention to be
given to those wrongly labeled as people or Web sites to be avoided, or properly
labeled but unsure where to turn for help to clean themselves up. Google/Stop-
Badware and MAPS are not the only mainstream examples of this kind of
eﬀort. Windows Vista’s anti-spyware program displays a welcome screen dur-
ing installation inviting you to “meet your computer’s new bodyguards.”44
These bodyguards advise you what you can and cannot run on your PC if you
want to be safe, as far as Microsoft is concerned.
These private programs are serving important functions that might other-
wise be undertaken by public authorities—and their very eﬃciency is what
might make them less than fair. Microsoft’s bodyguard metaphor is apt, and
most of us rely on the police rather than mercenaries for analogous protec-
tion.45 The responsibilities when the private becomes the public were ad-
dressed in the United States in the 1940s, when the town of Chickasaw, 
Alabama, was owned lock, stock, and barrel by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corpo-
ration. A Jehovah’s Witness was prosecuted for trespass for distributing litera-
ture on the town’s streets because they were private property. In a regular town,
the First Amendment would have protected those activities. The Supreme
Court of the United States took up the situation in Marsh v. Alabama, and held
that the private property was to be treated as public property, and the convic-
tion was reversed.46 Others have speculated that Marsh oﬀers some wisdom for
cyberspace, where certain chokepoints can arise from private parties.47 Marsh
advises that sometimes the government can defend the individual against a
disproportionately powerful private party. This view can put public govern-
ments in a position of encouraging and defending the free ﬂow of bits and
bytes, rather than seeking to constrain them for particular regulatory purposes.
It would be a complex theoretical leap to apply the Marsh substitution of pub-
lic for private for Paul Vixie’s anti-spam service or Microsoft’s bodyguards—
asking each to give certain minimum due process to those they deem bad or
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malicious, and to be transparent about the judgments they make. It is even
harder to apply to a collective power from something like Herdict, where there
is not a Paul Vixie or Microsoft channeling it but, rather, a collective peer-to-
peer consciousness generating judgments and the data on which they are based.
How does one tell a decentralized network that it needs to be mindful of due
process?
The ﬁrst answer ought to be: through suasion. Particularly in eﬀorts like the
partnership between Google and StopBadware, public interest entities are in-
volved with a mandate to try to do the right thing. They may not have enough
money or people to handle what due process might be thought to require, and
they might come to decisions about fairness where people disagree, but the ﬁrst
way to make peace in cyberspace is through genuine discussion and shaping of
practices that can then catch on and end up generally regarded as fair. Failing
that, law might intrude to regulate not the wrongdoers but those private parties
who have stepped up ﬁrst to help stop the wrongdoers. This is because accu-
mulation of power in third parties to stop the problems arising from the gener-
ative pattern may be seen as both necessary and worrisome—it takes a network
endpoint famously conﬁgurable by its owner and transforms it into a network
middle point subject to only nominal control by its owner. The touchstone for
judging such eﬀorts should be according to the generative principle: do the so-
lutions encourage a system of experimentation? Are the users of the system
able, so far as they are interested, to ﬁnd out how the resources they control—
such as a PC—are participating in the environment? Done well, these inter-
ventions can lower the ease of mastery of the technology, encouraging even ca-
sual users to have some part in directing it, while reducing the accessibility of
those users’ machines to outsiders who have not been given explicit and in-
formed permission by the users to make use of them. It is automatic accessibil-
ity by outsiders—whether by vendors, malware authors, or governments—
that can end up depriving a system of its generative character as its own users
are proportionately limited in their own control.
* * *
We need a latter-day Manhattan project, not to build a bomb but to design the
tools and conventions by which to continually defuse one. We need a series of
conversations, arguments, and experiments whose participants span the spec-
trum between network engineers and PC software designers, between expert
users with time to spend tinkering and those who simply want the system to
work—but who appreciate the dangers of lockdown. And we need constitu-
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tionalists: lawyers who can help translate the principles of fairness and due
process that have been the subject of analysis for liberal democracies into a new
space where private parties and groups come together with varying degrees of
hierarchy to try to solve the problems they ﬁnd in the digital space. Projects like
the National Science Foundation’s FIND initiative have tried to take on some
of this work, fostering an interdisciplinary group of researchers to envision the
future shape of the Internet.48
CompuServe and AOL, along with the IBM System 360 and the Friden
Flexowriter, showed us the kind of technological ecosystem the market alone
was ready to yield. It was one in which substantial investment and partnership
with gatekeepers would be needed to expose large numbers of people to new
code—and ultimately to new content. The generative Internet was crucially
funded and cultivated by people and institutions acting outside traditional
markets, and then carried to ubiquity by commercial forces. Its success requires
an ongoing blend of expertise and contribution from multiple models and mo-
tivations—and ultimately, perhaps, a move by the law to allocate responsibility
to commercial technology players in a position to help but without economic
incentive to do so, and to those among us, commercial or not, who step for-
ward to solve the pressing problems that elude simpler solutions.
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Even if the generative Internet is preserved, those who stand to lose
from the behaviors taking place over it will maintain pressure for
change. Threats to the technical stability of the newly expanded net-
work are not the only factors at work shaping the digital future. At the
time of the founding of the Internet and the release of the PC, little at-
tention was given to whether a system that allows bits to move freely
would be an instrument of contributory copyright infringement, or
whether it was necessary to build in mechanisms of government sur-
veillance for the new medium. Now that the PC and Internet are in
the mainstream, having trumped proprietary systems that would have
been much tamer, there remain strong regulatory pressures. This
chapter considers how the law ought to be shaped if one wants to rec-
oncile generative experimentation with other policy goals beyond
continued technical stability. For those who think that good code and
content can come from amateur sources, there are some important
ways for the law to help facilitate generativity—or at least not hurt it.
And for those whose legitimate interests have been threatened or
harmed by applications of the generative Internet, we can look for ways to give
them some redress without eliminating that generative character.
The ideas here fall into several broad categories. First, we ought to take steps
to make the tethered appliances and software-as-service described in Chapter
Five more palatable, since they are here to stay, even if the PC and Internet are
saved. Second, we can help ensure a balance between generative and non-gen-
erative segments of the IT ecosystem. Third, we can make generative systems
less threatening to legally protected interests.
PROTECTIONS FOR A WORLD OF TETHERED APPLIANCES 
AND WEB 2.0
Maintaining Data Portability
A move to tethered appliances and Web services means that more and more of
our experiences in the information space will be contingent. A service or prod-
uct we use at one moment could act completely diﬀerently the next, since it can
be so quickly reprogrammed without our assent. Each time we power up a mo-
bile phone, video game console, or BlackBerry, it might have gained some fea-
tures and lost others. Each time we visit a Web site oﬀering an ongoing service
like e-mail access or photo storage, the same is true. People are notoriously poor
at planning ahead, and their decisions about whether to start hosting all the
family’s photos on one site or another may not take into account the prospect
that the function and format of the site can change at any time.
Older models of software production are less problematic. Because tradi-
tional software has clearly demarcated updates, users can stick with an older
version if they do not like the tradeoﬀs of a newer one. These applications usu-
ally feature ﬁle formats that are readable by other applications, so that data
from one program can be used in another: WordPerfect users, for example, can
switch to Microsoft Word and back again. The pull of interoperability com-
pelled most software developers to allow data to be exportable in common 
formats, and if one particular piece of software were to reach market domi-
nance—and thereby no longer need to be as interoperable—existing versions
of that software would not retroactively lose that capability.
If the security issues on generative platforms are mitigated, it is likely that
technology vendors can ﬁnd value with both generative and non-generative
business models. For example, it may be beneﬁcial for a technology maker to
sell below-cost hardware and to make up much of the loss by collecting licens-
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ing fees from any third-party contributions that build on that hardware. This is
the business model for many video game console makers.1 This business model
oﬀers cheap hardware to consumers while creating less generative systems. So
long as generative consoles can compete with non-generative ones, it would
seem that the market can sort out this tradeoﬀ—at least if people can easily
switch from one platform to another. Maintaining the prospect that users can
switch ensures that changes to wildly popular platforms and services are made
according to the interests of their users. There has been ongoing debate about
just how much of a problem lock-in can be with a technology.2 The tradeoﬀ of,
say, a long-term mobile phone contract in exchange for a heavy discount on a
new handset is one that the consumer at least knows up front. Much less un-
derstood are the limits on extracting the information consumers deposit into a
non-generative platform. Competition can be stymied when people ﬁnd them-
selves compelled to retain one platform only because their data is trapped there.
As various services and applications become more self-contained within par-
ticular devices, there is a minor intervention the law could make to avoid un-
due lock-in. Online consumer protection law has included attention to privacy
policies. A Web site without a privacy policy, or one that does not live up to
whatever policy it posts, is open to charges of unfair or deceptive trade prac-
tices.3 Makers of tethered appliances and Web sites keeping customer data sim-
ilarly ought to be asked to oﬀer portability policies. These policies would de-
clare whether they will allow users to extract their own data should they wish to
move their activities from one appliance or Web site to another.
In some cases, the law could create a right of data portability, in addition to
merely insisting on a clear statement of a site’s policies. Traditional software as
product nearly always keeps its data ﬁles stored on the user’s PC in formats that
third parties can access.4 Software as product therefore allows for the routine
portability of data, including data that could be precious: one’s trove of e-mail,
or the only copy of family photos from a cherished vacation. Imagine cameras
that eﬀectively made those photos property of Kodak, usable only in certain
ways that the company dictated from one moment to the next. These cameras
likely would not sell so long as there were free alternatives and people knew the
limitations up front. Yet as with those hypothetical cameras, when one uses
tethered appliances the limitations are neither advertised nor known, and they
may not at ﬁrst even be on the minds of the service providers themselves. They
are latent in the design of the service, able to be activated at any moment ac-
cording to the shifting winds of a dot-com’s business model and strategy. The
law should provide some generous but ﬁrm borders.5 The binding promise that
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Wikipedia’s content can be copied, modiﬁed, and put up elsewhere by anyone
else at any time—expressly permitted by Wikipedia’s content license6—is a
backstop against any abuse that might arise from Wikipedia’s operators, miti-
gating the dangers that Wikipedia is a service rather than a product and that the
plug at wikipedia.org can be pulled or the editors shut out at any time.
As we enter an era in which a photograph moves ephemerally from a camera’s
shutter click straight to the photographer’s account at a proprietary storage
Web site with no stop in between, it will be helpful to ensure that the photos
taken can be returned fully to the custody of the photographer. Portability of
data is a generative insurance policy to apply to individual data wherever it
might be stored. A requirement to ensure portability need not be onerous. It
could apply only to uniquely provided personal data such as photos and docu-
ments, and mandate only that such data ought to readily be extractable by the
user in some standardized form. Maintaining data portability will help people
pass back and forth between the generative and the non-generative, and, by
permitting third-party backup, it will also help prevent a situation in which a
non-generative service suddenly goes oﬄine, with no recourse for those who
have used the service to store their data.7
Network Neutrality and Generativity
Those who provide content and services over the Internet have generally lined
up in favor of “network neutrality,” by which faraway ISPs would not be per-
mitted to come between external content or service providers and their cus-
tomers. The debate is nuanced and far ranging.8 Proponents of various forms
of network neutrality invoke the Internet’s tradition of openness as prescrip-
tive: they point out that ISPs usually route packets without regard for what they
contain or where they are from, and they say that this should continue in order
to allow maximum access by outsiders to an ISP’s customers and vice versa. Re-
liable data is surprisingly sparse, but advocates make a good case that the level
of competition for broadband provision is low: there are few alternatives for
high-speed broadband at many locations at the moment, and they often entail
long-term consumer contracts. Such conditions make it diﬃcult for market
competition to prevent undesirable behavior such as ISPs’ favoring access to
their own content or services, and even some measure of competition in the
broadband market does not remove a provider’s incentives to discriminate.9
For example, an ISP might block Skype in order to compel the ISP’s users to
subscribe to its own Internet telephony oﬀering.10 Likewise, some argue that
independent application and content providers might innovate less out of fear
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of discriminatory behavior. While proponents of net neutrality are primarily
concerned about restrictions on application and content, their arguments also
suggest that general restrictions on technical ways of using the network should
be disfavored.
Skeptics maintain that competition has taken root for broadband, and they
claim that any form of regulatory constraint on ISPs—including enforcing
some concept of neutrality—risks limiting the ways in which the Internet can
continue to evolve.11 For example, market conditions might bring about a sit-
uation in which an ISP could charge Google for access to that ISP’s customers:
without payment from Google, those customers would not be allowed to get to
Google. If Google elected to pay—a big “if,” of course—then some of Google’s
proﬁts would go to subsidizing Internet access. Indeed, one could imagine ISPs
then oﬀering free Internet access to their customers, with that access paid for by
content providers like Google that want to reach those customers. Of course,
there is no guarantee that extra proﬁts from such an arrangement would be
passed along to the subscribers, but, in the standard model of competition, that
is exactly what would happen: surplus goes to the consumer. Even if this regime
hampered some innovation by increasing costs for application providers, this
eﬀect might—and this is speculative—be outweighed by increased innovation
resulting from increased broadband penetration.
Similarly, a situation whereby consumers share their Internet connections
with their neighbors may be salutary for digital access goals. When wireless ac-
cess points ﬁrst came to market, which allowed people to share a single physical
Internet point throughout their houses the way that cordless telephones could
be added to their telephone jacks, most ISPs’ contracts forbade them.12 Some
vendors marketed products for ISPs to ferret out such access points when they
were in use.13 However, the ISPs ended up taking a wait-and-see approach at
variance with the unambiguous limits of their contracts, and wi-ﬁ access points
became tolerated uses of the sort described in Chapter Five. Eventually the ﬂag-
stones were laid for paths where people were walking rather than the other way
around, and nearly every ISP now permits sharing within a household.
However, most access points are also automatically built to share the Inter-
net connection with anyone in range,14 friend or stranger, primarily to reduce
the complexity of installation and corresponding calls to the access point mak-
ers’ customer service and return lines. This laziness by access point makers has
made it a commonplace for users to be able to ﬁnd “free” wi-ﬁ to glom onto in
densely populated areas, often without the knowledge of the subscribers who
installed the wireless access points. Again ISPs have dithered about how to re-
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spond. Services like FON now provide a simple box that people can hook up to
their broadband Internet connection, allowing other FON users to share the
connection for free when within range, and nonmembers to pay for access to
the FON network.15 Those acquiring FON boxes can in turn use others’ FON
connections when they are on the road. Alternatively, FON users can elect to
have their FON box request a small payment from strangers who want to share
the connection, and the payment is split between FON and the box owner.
Most ISPs have not decided whether such uses are a threat and therefore have
not taken action against them, even as the ISPs still have contractual terms that
forbid such unauthorized use,16 and some have lobbied for theft-of-service
laws that would appear to criminalize both sharing Internet connections and
accepting invitations to share.17 For ISPs, customers’ ability to share their ser-
vice could increase the demand for it since customers could themselves proﬁt
from use by strangers. But this would also increase the amount of bandwidth
used on the ill-measured “all you can eat” access plans that currently depend on
far less than constant usage to break even.18 Some advocates have tried to steer
a middle course by advocating a “truth in advertising” approach to network
neutrality: broadband providers can shape their services however they want, so
long as they do not call it “Internet” if it does not meet some deﬁnition of neu-
trality.19 This seems a toothless remedy if one believes there is a problem, for
network providers inclined to shape their services could simply call it “broad-
band” instead.
The procrastination principle has left these issues open, and so far generativ-
ity is alive and well at the network level. So what can generativity contribute to
this debate? One lesson is that the endpoints matter at least as much as the net-
work. If network providers try to be more constraining about what traﬃc they
allow on their networks, software can and will be written to evade such restric-
tions—so long as generative PCs remain common on which to install that soft-
ware. We see exactly this trend in network environments whose users are not
the network’s paying customers. When employers, libraries, or schools provide
network access and attempt to limit its uses, clever PC software can generally
get around the limitations so long as general Web surﬁng is permitted, using
exactly the tools available to someone in China or Saudi Arabia who wants to
circumvent national ﬁltering.20 Even in some of the worst cases of network
traﬃc shaping by ISPs, the generative PC provides a workaround. Just as Skype
is designed to get around the unintended blockages put in place by some home
network routers,21 it would not be a far leap for Linksys or FON to produce
home boxes designed expressly to get around unwanted violations of network
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neutrality. (Of course, such workarounds would be less eﬀective if the network
provider merely slowed down all traﬃc that was not expressly favored or au-
thorized.) The harshest response by ISPs to this—to ban such boxes and then
to try to ﬁnd and punish those disobeying the ban—represents expensive
and therefore undesirable territory for them. One answer, then, to the ques-
tion of network neutrality is that wide-open competition is good and can
help address the primary worries of network neutrality proponents. In the
absence of broad competition some intervention could be helpful, but in a
world of open PCs some users can more or less help themselves, routing around
some blockages that seek to prevent them from doing what they want to do
online.
From Network Neutrality to API Neutrality
The debate on network neutrality, when viewed through a generative overlay,
suggests a parallel debate that is not taking place at all. That debate centers on
the lack of pretense of neutrality to begin with for tethered appliances and the
services oﬀered through them. Reasonable people disagree on the value of
deﬁning and mandating network neutrality. If there is a present worldwide
threat to neutrality in the movement of bits, it comes not from restrictions on
traditional Internet access that can be evaded using generative PCs, but from
enhancements to traditional and emerging appliancized services that are not
open to third-party tinkering. For example, those with cable or satellite televi-
sion have their TV experiences mediated through a set-top box provided or
speciﬁed by the cable or satellite company. The box referees what standard and
premium channels have been paid for, what pay-per-view content should be
shown, and what other features are oﬀered through the service.
The cable television experience is a walled garden. Should a cable or satellite
company choose to oﬀer a new feature in the lineup called the “Internet chan-
nel,” it could decide which Web sites to allow and which to prohibit. It could
oﬀer a channel that remains permanently tuned to one Web site, or a channel
that could be steered among a preselected set of sites, or a channel that can be
tuned to any Internet destination the subscriber enters so long as it is not on a
blacklist maintained by the cable or satellite provider. Indeed, some video game
consoles are conﬁgured for broader Internet access in this manner.22 Puz-
zlingly, parties to the network neutrality debate have yet to weigh in on this
phenomenon.
The closest we have seen to mandated network neutrality in the appliancized
space is in pre-Internet cable television and post-Internet mobile telephony.
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Long before the mainstreaming of the Internet, the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 allowed local broadcast television sta-
tions to demand that cable TV companies carry their signal, and established a
limited regime of open-access cable channels.23 This was understandably far
from a free-for-all of actual “signal neutrality” because the number of channels
a cable service could transmit was understood to be limited.24 The must-carry
policies—born out of political pressure by broadcasters and justiﬁed as a way of
eliminating some bottleneck control by cable operators—have had little dis-
cernable eﬀect on the future of cable television, except perhaps to a handful of
home shopping and religious broadcasting stations that possess broadcast li-
censes but are of little interest to large television viewerships.25 Because cable
systems of 1992 had comparatively little bandwidth, and because the systems
were designed almost solely to transmit television and nothing else, the Act had
little impact on the parched generative landscape for cable.
Mobile telephony, often featuring a tight relationship between service pro-
viders and endpoint devices used by their subscribers, has also drawn calls for
mandated neutrality. Recall the Carterfone case from Chapter Two, which com-
pelled AT&T to open the endpoints of its monopoly telephone network—that
is, mobile phones—to third-party hardware providers.26 Tim Wu has called for
a Carterfone rule for mobile phone service providers, allowing consumers to se-
lect whatever handset they want to work on the network, and Skype has peti-
tioned the FCC for such a rule—at just the time that, like the old AT&T, Steve
Jobs insists that the iPhone must be tethered to Apple and forced to use AT&T
as its network provider “to protect carrier networks and to make sure the phone
was not damaged.”27 The analogy between AT&T and telephones on the one
hand and mobile phone providers and handsets on the other is strong, and it
works because there is already an understood divide between network and de-
vice in both cases. But because a cable or satellite TV company’s regular service
is intertwined with a content oﬀering—the channels—and a specialized appli-
ance to recognize proprietary transmission encryption schemes—the set-top
box—it has been signiﬁcantly harder to implement the spirit of Carterfone for
cable television.28 A model that begins as sterile is much harder to open
meaningfully to third-party contribution than one that is generative from the
start.
We see a parallel discrepancy of attitudes between PCs and their counter-
part information appliances. Microsoft was found to possess a monopoly in 
the market for PC operating systems.29 Indeed, it was found to be abusing 
that monopoly to favor its own applications—such as its Internet Explorer
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browser—over third-party software, against the wishes of PC makers who
wanted to sell their hardware with Windows preinstalled but adjusted to suit
the makers’ tastes.30 By allowing third-party contribution from the start—an
ability to run outside software—after achieving market dominance, Microsoft
was forced to meet ongoing requirements to maintain a level playing ﬁeld for
third-party software and its own.31
Yet we have not seen the same requirements arising for appliances that do
not allow, or that strictly control, the ability of third parties to contribute from
the start. So long as the market favorite video game console maker never opens
the door to generative third-party code, it is hard to see how the ﬁrm could be
found to be violating the law. A manufacturer is entitled to make an appliance,
and to try to bolt down its inner workings so that they cannot be modiﬁed by
others.32
So when should we consider network neutrality-style mandates for applian-
cized systems? The answer lies in that subset of appliancized systems that seeks
to gain the beneﬁts of third-party contribution while reserving the right to ex-
clude it later. Those in favor of network neutrality suggest, often implicitly,
how foundational the Internet is for the services oﬀered over it.33 If down-
stream services cannot rely on the networks they use to provide roughly equal
treatment of their bits, the playing ﬁeld for Internet activities can shift drasti-
cally. If the AT&T telephone network had been permitted to treat data calls
diﬀerently from voice calls—and to change originally generous policies in a
heartbeat—the foundation to link consumer telecommunications with the ex-
isting Internet might have collapsed, or at least have been greatly constrained
only to business models provable from the start and thus ripe for partnerships
with AT&T. Network neutrality advocates might explain their lack of concern
for nonneutral treatment of bits over cable television by pointing out that cable
television never purported to oﬀer a platform for downstream third-party de-
velopment—and indeed has never served that purpose. It is bait and switch
that ought to be regulated.
The common law recognizes vested expectations in other areas. For example,
the law of adverse possession dictates that people who openly occupy another’s
private property without the owner’s explicit objection (or, for that matter, per-
mission) can, after a lengthy period of time, come to legitimately acquire it.34
More commonly, property law can ﬁnd prescriptive easements—rights-of-way
across territory that develop by force of habit—if the owner of the territory fails
to object in a timely fashion as people go back and forth across it.35 The law of
promissory estoppel identiﬁes times when one person’s behavior can give rise to
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an obligation to another without a contract or other agreement between them;
acting in a way that might cause someone else to reasonably rely on those ac-
tions can create a “quasi-contract.”36 These doctrines point to a deeply held
norm that certain consistent behaviors can give rise to obligations, sometimes
despite ﬁne print that tries to prevent those obligations from coming about.37
Recall Bill Gates’s insistence that the Xbox video game console is not just for
games: “It is a general purpose computer. . . . [W]e wouldn’t have done it if it
was just a gaming device. We wouldn’t have gotten into the category at all. It
was about strategically being in the living room.”38 Network neutrality’s spirit
applied to the box would say: if Microsoft wants to make the Xbox a general-
purpose device but still not open to third-party improvement, no regulation
should prevent it. But if Microsoft does so by welcoming third-party contri-
bution, it should not later be able to impose barriers to outside software con-
tinuing to work. Such behavior is a bait and switch that is not easy for the
market to anticipate and that stands to allow a platform maker to harness gen-
erativity to reach a certain plateau, dominate the market, and then make the re-
sult proprietary—exactly what the Microsoft antitrust case rightly was brought
to prevent.
The principles and factual assumptions that animate network neutrality—
that the network has been operated in a particular socially beneﬁcial way and
that, especially in the absence of eﬀective competition, it should stay that
way—can also apply to Internet services that solicit mash-ups from third-party
programmers described in Chapter Five, like Google Maps or Facebook, while
makers of pure tethered appliances such as TiVo may do as they please. Those
who oﬀer open APIs on the Net in an attempt to harness the generative cycle
ought to remain application-neutral after their eﬀorts have succeeded, so all
those who have built on top of their interfaces can continue to do so on equal
terms. If Microsoft retroactively changed Windows to prevent WordPerfect or
Firefox from running, it would answer under the antitrust laws and perhaps
also in tort for intentional interference with the relationship between the inde-
pendent software makers and their consumers.39 Similarly, providers of open
APIs to their services can be required to commit to neutral oﬀerings of them, at
least when they have reached a position of market dominance for that particu-
lar service. Skeptics may object that these relations can be governed by market
forces, and if an open API is advertised as contingent, then those who build on
it are on notice and can choose to ignore the invitation if they do not like the
prospect that it can be withdrawn at any moment. The claim and counterclaim
follow the essential pattern of the network neutrality debate. Just as our notions
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of network security ought to include the endpoints as well as the middle of the
network—with a generative principle to determine whether and when it
makes sense to violate the end-to-end principle—our far-ranging debates on
network neutrality ought to be applied to the new platforms of Web services
that in turn depend on Internet connectivity to function. At least Internet con-
nectivity is roughly commoditized; one can move from one provider to another
so long as there is suﬃcient competition, or—in an extreme case—one can
even move to a new physical location to have better options for Internet access.
With open APIs for Web services there is much less portability; services built
for one input stream—such as for Google Maps—cannot easily be repurposed
to another, and it may ultimately make sense to have only a handful of fre-
quently updated mapping data providers for the world, at least as much as it
can make sense only to invest in a handful of expensive physical network con-
duits to a particular geographic location.
Maintaining Privacy as Software Becomes Service
As Chapter Five explained, the use of our PCs is shrinking to that of mere
workstations, with private data stored remotely in the hands of third parties.
This section elaborates on that idea, showing that there is little reason to think
that people have—or ought to have—any less of a reasonable expectation of
privacy for e-mail stored on their behalf by Google and Microsoft than they
would have if it were stored locally in PCs after being downloaded and deleted
from their e-mail service providers.
The latest version of Google Desktop is a PC application that oﬀers a “search
across computers” feature. It is advertised as allowing users with multiple com-
puters to use one computer to ﬁnd documents that are stored on another.40
The application accomplishes this by sending an index of the contents of users’
documents to Google itself.41 While networking one’s own private computers
would not appear to functionally change expectations of privacy in their con-
tents, the placement or storage of the data in others’ hands does not hew well to
the doctrinal boundaries of privacy protection by the U.S. Constitution. These
boundaries treat the things one has held onto more gingerly than things en-
trusted to others. For example, in SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc.,42 the Supreme
Court explained: “It is established that, when a person communicates informa-
tion to a third party even on the understanding that the communication is 
conﬁdential, he cannot object if the third party conveys that information or
records thereof to law enforcement authorities. . . . These rulings disable re-
spondents from arguing that notice of subpoenas issued to third parties is nec-
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essary to allow a target to prevent an unconstitutional search or seizure of his
papers.”43
The movement of data from the PC means that warrants served upon per-
sonal computers and their hard drives will yield less and less information as the
data migrates onto the Web, driving law enforcement to the networked third
parties now hosting that information. When our diaries, e-mail, and docu-
ments are no longer stored at home but instead are business records held by a
dot-com, nearly all formerly transient communication ends up permanently
and accessibly stored in the hands of third parties, and subject to comparatively
weak statutory and constitutional protections against surveillance.44 A warrant
is generally required for the government to access data on one’s own PC, and
warrants require law enforcement to show probable cause that evidence of a
crime will be yielded by the search.45 In other words, the government must 
surmount a higher hurdle to search one’s PC than to eavesdrop on one’s data
communications, and it has the fewest barriers when obtaining data stored else-
where.46 Entrusting information to third parties changes the ease of surveil-
lance because those third parties are often willing to give it up, and typically the
ﬁrst party is not even aware the transfer has occurred. Online data repositories
of all stripes typically state in their terms of use that they may disclose any in-
formation upon the request of the government—at least after receiving assur-
ances by the requesting party that the information is sought to enhance the
public safety.47 In the United States, should a custodian deny a mere request for
cooperation, the records might further be sought under the Stored Communi-
cations Act, which does not erect substantial barriers to government access.48
The holders of private records also may be compelled to release them
through any of a series of expanded information-gathering tools enacted by
Congress in the wake of September 11. For example, a third party that stores
networked, sensitive personal data could be sent a secretly obtained PATRIOT
Act section 215 order, directing the production of “any tangible things (in-
cluding books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investiga-
tion . . . to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities.”49 The party upon whom a section 215 order is served can neither
disclose nor appeal the order.50 Moreover, since the party searched—whether a
library, accountant, or ISP—is not itself the target of interest, the targeted in-
dividual will not readily know that the search is occurring. Probable cause is not
required for the search to be ordered, and indeed the target of interest may be
presumed innocent but still monitored so long as the target is still generating
records of interest to the government in an international terrorism or counter-
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intelligence investigation. Roughly 1,700 applications to the secret Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court were lodged in each of 2003 and 2004
seeking records of some kind. Only four were rejected each year. In 2005,
2,074 applications were made, with 2 rejections, and in 2006, 2,181 were
made, with 5 rejections.51
Any custodians might also be served a national security letter concerning the
production of so-called envelope information. These letters are written and ex-
ecuted without judicial oversight, and those who receive such letters can be
prohibited by law from telling anyone that they received them.52 National se-
curity letters may be used to solicit information held by particular kinds of pri-
vate parties, including the records of telephone companies, ﬁnancial institu-
tions (now including such entities as pawnshops and travel agencies), as well as
ISPs.53 For ISPs, the sorts of information that can be sought this way are “sub-
scriber information and toll billing records information, or electronic commu-
nication transactional records.”54 This envelope information is not thought to
extend to the contents of e-mail but includes such things as the “to” and “from”
ﬁelds of e-mail—or perhaps even the search engine queries made by a sub-
scriber, since such queries are usually embedded in the URLs visited by that
subscriber.
If the government has questions about the identity of a user of a particular
Internet Protocol address, a national security letter could be used to match that
address to a subscriber name. Under section 505 of the PATRIOT Act, na-
tional security letters do not need to meet the probable cause standard asso-
ciated with a traditional warrant: the FBI merely needs to assert to the private
recipients of such letters that the records are sought in connection with an 
investigation into international terrorism.55 Government oﬃcials have indi-
cated that more than thirty thousand national security letters are issued per
year.56 A recent internal FBI audit of 10 percent of the national security letters
obtained since 2002 discovered more than a thousand potential violations of
surveillance laws and agency rules.57
Recipients of FISA orders or national security letters may press challenges to
be permitted to disclose to the public that they have received such mandates—
just as an anonymous car manufacturer sued to prevent its onboard navigation
system from being used to eavesdrop on the car’s occupants58—but there is no
assurance that they will do so. Indeed, many may choose to remain silent about
cooperating with the government under these circumstances, thereby keeping
each of these searches secret from the target.
As we move our most comprehensive and intimate details online—yet in-
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tend them to be there only for our own use—it is important to export the val-
ues of privacy against government intrusion along with them. For remotely
stored data, this suggests limiting the holdings like that of SEC v. Jerry T.
O’Brien, Inc. to ﬁnancial records held by brokers similar to the ones in that case,
rather than extending the relaxation of Fourth Amendment protections to all
cases of third-party custody of personal information. The balance of accessibil-
ity for ﬁnancial transactions need not be the same as that for our most personal
communications and data. This is a reasonable limit to draw when the physical
borders of one’s home no longer correlate well with the digital borders of one’s 
private life. Indeed, it is simply extending the protections we already enjoy to 
ﬁt a new technological conﬁguration. That is the spirit of Chapman v. United
States,59 in which a police search of a rented house for a whiskey still was found
to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of the tenant, despite the fact
that the landlord had consented to the search.60 The Court properly refused to
ﬁnd that the right against intrusion was held only by the absentee owner of the
place intruded—rather, it was held by the person who actually lived and kept
his eﬀects there. Similarly, the data we store for ourselves in servers that others
own ought to be thought of as our own papers and eﬀects in which we have a
right to be secure.
There is some suggestion that the courts may be starting to move in this di-
rection. In the 2007 case Warshak v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that the government’s warrantless attempt to seize 
e-mail records through an ISP without notice to the account holder violated
Fourth Amendment privacy rights.61 At the time of writing, the ruling stands,
though it faces further review.62
The ability to store nearly all one’s data remotely is an important and helpful
technological advance, all the more so because it can still be made to appear to
the user as if the data were sitting on his or her own personal computer. But this
suggests that the happenstance of where data are actually stored should not
alone control the constitutional assessment of which standard the government
must meet.
BALANCING GENERATIVE AND NON-GENERATIVE SYSTEMS
Code thickets
A number of scholars have written about the drawbacks to proprietary rights
thickets: overlapping claims to intellectual property can make it diﬃcult for
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those creating new but not completely original creative works to avoid infring-
ing others’ rights. This is a particular problem for code developed with the tools
of group generativity. For the past twenty years, the modern landscape of in-
formation technology has accommodated competing spheres of software pro-
duction. These spheres can be grouped roughly around two poles warring for
dominance in the ﬁeld. On one side is proprietary software, which typically
provides cash-and-carry functionality for the user. Its source code “recipe” is
nearly always hidden from view as a technical matter, and as a legal matter it
cannot be used by independent programmers to develop new software without
the rarely given permission of its unitary rights holder. On the other side is free
software, referring not to the price paid for a copy, but to the fact that the
source code of the software is open to public view and modiﬁcation.
It is not easy for the law to maintain neutrality in the conﬂict between the
two spheres, evenhandedly encouraging development in both models. For ex-
ample, the free software movement has produced some great works, but under
prevailing copyright law even a slight bit of poison, in the form of code from a
proprietary source, could amount to legal liability for anyone who copies or po-
tentially even uses the software. (Running software entails making at least a
temporary copy of it.)
The collaborative nature of free software development makes it harder to de-
termine where various contributions are coming from and whether contribu-
tions belong to those who purport to donate them. Indeed, in the case of an
employee of a software company charitably moonlighting for a free software
project, the employee’s work may not even be the employee’s to give. A barely
remembered but still enforceable employment agreement may commit all soft-
ware written by the employee to the employer’s possession, which would set the
stage for an infringement claim against those within the free software project
for making use of the employee’s contributions.
Major free software projects try to avoid these problems by soliciting decla-
rations from participants that they are only contributing code that they wrote
or to which they have free license. The Free Software Foundation even suggests
that employees obtain a disclaimer from their employers of all interest in em-
ployee contributions.63 But the danger of poisoned code remains, just as it is
possible for someone to contribute copyrighted material to Wikipedia or a
Geocities home page at any moment. The kind of law that shields Wikipedia
and Geocities from liability for material contributed by outsiders, as long as the
organization acts expeditiously to remove infringing material once it is noti-
ﬁed, ought to be extended to the production of code itself.64 Code that incor-
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porates infringing material is not given a free pass, but those who have promul-
gated it without knowledge of the infringement would have a chance to repair
the code or cease copying it before becoming liable.
The patent thicket is also worrisome. There is a large and growing literature
devoted to ﬁguring out whether and under what circumstances software
patents contribute to innovation, since they can promise returns to those who
innovate. Scholars James Bessen and Robert Hunt have observed that the num-
ber of software patents has grown substantially since the early 1980s, from one
thousand per year to over twenty thousand per year.65 These patents are ob-
tained, on average, by larger ﬁrms than those acquiring patents in other ﬁelds,
and non-software ﬁrms acquire over 90 percent of software patents.66 Bessen
and Hunt suggest that these patterns are consistent with a patent thicket—
large ﬁrms obtaining patents to extract royalties from rivals and to defend
themselves from their rivals’ patents.67
While large ﬁrms can reach patent détente with each other through cross-
licensing,68 smaller ﬁrms and individuals may be left out. There are thousands
of software patents, and patent infringement, unlike copyright, does not re-
quire a copying of the original material: so long as someone else already came
up with the idea, the new work is infringing. With copyright, if someone
miraculously managed independently to come up with the tune to a Beatles
song, that tune would not be infringing the Beatles’ copyright, since it did not
copy the song—it was independently invented. It is this virtue of copyright law
that allowed Richard Stallman to begin the free software movement’s eﬀort to
reproduce Unix’s functionality without infringing its copyright by simply cre-
ating new code from scratch that acts the same way that Unix’s code does.
Not only does patent not have such a limitation, but it also applies to the ab-
stract concepts expressed in code, rather than to a speciﬁc set of code.69 Thus,
someone can sit down to write some software in an empty room and, by that
act, infringe multiple patents. Patent infringement can be asserted without
having to claim appropriation of any code. For example, Microsoft has said
that it believes that pieces of GNU/Linux infringe its patents, though it has not
sued anyone over it.70 Microsoft may well be right, given the number and
breadth of patents it possesses. So far the best protection against copyright or
patent infringement for a contributor to a free software project is that he or she
is not worth suing; litigation can be expensive for the plaintiﬀ, and any victory
hollow if the defendant cannot pay. The principle of tolerated uses comes back
into play, not necessarily because patent holders are uncertain whether others’
uses are good or bad for them, but because the others are simply not worth 
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suing. Certainly many amateur programmers seem undeterred by the prospect
of patent infringement, and there is evidence that young commercial software
ﬁrms plunge blithely ahead with innovations without being concerned about
the risks of patent infringement.71
This is not an ideal state of aﬀairs for anyone. If those who see value in soft-
ware patents are correct, infringement is rampant. And to those who think
patents are chilling innovation, the present regime needs reform. To be sure,
amateurs who do not have houses to lose to litigation can still contribute to free
software projects. Others can contribute anonymously, evading any claims of
patent infringement since they simply cannot be found. But this turns coding
into a gray market activity, eliminating what otherwise could be a thriving mid-
dle class of contributing ﬁrms should patent warfare ratchet into high gear.
There may only be a working class of individual coders not worth suing and an
upper class of IBMs—companies powerful enough to ﬁght patent infringe-
ment cases without blinking.
The law can help level the playing ﬁeld without major changes to the scopes
of copyright or patent. Statutes of limitations deﬁne how quickly someone
must come forward to claim that the law has been broken. For patent infringe-
ment in the United States, the limit is six years; for civil copyright infringement
it is three.72 Unfortunately, this limit has little meaning for computer code be-
cause the statute of limitations starts from the time of the last infringement.
Every time someone copies (or perhaps even runs) the code, the clock starts
ticking again on a claim of infringement. This should be changed. The statute
of limitations could be clariﬁed for software, requiring that anyone who sus-
pects or should suspect his or her work is being infringed sue within, for in-
stance, one year of becoming aware of the suspect code. For example, the acts of
those who contribute to free software projects—namely, releasing their code
into a publicly accessible database like SourceForge—could be found to be
enough to start the clock ticking on that statute of limitations.73 The some-
what obscure common-law defense of laches is available when plaintiﬀs sleep
on their rights—sandbagging in order to let damages rack up—and it also
might be adapted to this purpose.74
In the absence of such a rule, companies who think their proprietary inter-
ests have been compromised can wait to sue until a given piece of code has 
become wildly popular—essentially sandbagging the process. This proposed
modiﬁcation to the statute of limitations will still allow the vindication of pro-
prietary rights, but users and developers of a particular version of code will
know that lawsuits will be precluded after a speciﬁc interval of time. A system
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that requires those holding proprietary interests to advance them promptly will
remove a signiﬁcant source of instability and uncertainty from the freewheeling
development processes that have given us—truly given, because no remunera-
tion has been sought—everything from GNU/Linux to the Apache Web
server to wikis. This approach would also create extra incentives for those hold-
ing proprietary code to release the source code so that the clock could start
counting down on any infringement claims against it.75
The legal uncertainties in the process of writing and distributing new code
currently express themselves most in the seams stitching together the worlds of
amateur and commercial software production and use. With no change to
copyright or patent, the amateur production of free software will likely con-
tinue; it is the adoption and reﬁnement of the fruits of that production by com-
mercial ﬁrms that is most vulnerable to claims of proprietary infringement.
The uptake of generative outputs by commercial ﬁrms has been an important
part of the generative cycle from backwater to mainstream. Interventions in the
legal regimes to facilitate it—while oﬀering redress for those whose proprietary
rights have been infringed, so long as claims are made promptly—would help
negotiate a better interface between generative and non-generative.
Content Thickets
Thickets similar to those found at the code layer also exist at the content layer.
While patent does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect content, legal scholars Lawrence
Lessig and Yochai Benkler, as well as others, have underscored that even the
most rudimentary mixing of cultural icons and elements, including snippets of
songs and video, can potentially result in thousands of dollars in legal liability
for copyright infringement without causing any harm to the market for the
original proprietary goods.76 Benkler believes that the explosion of amateur
creativity online has occurred despite the legal system, not thanks to it.77 The
high costs of copyright enforcement and the widespread availability of tools to
produce and disseminate what he calls “creative cultural bricolage”78—some-
thing far more subtle and transformative than merely ripping a CD and send-
ing its contents to a friend—currently allow for a variety of voices to be heard
even when what they are saying is theoretically sanctionable by ﬁnes between
$750 and $30,000 per copy made, $150,000 if the infringement contained
within their expression is done “willfully.”79 As with code, this situation shoe-
horns otherwise laudable activity into a sub-rosa gray zone. The frequent un-
lawfulness of amateur creativity may be appealing to those who see it as a coun-
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tercultural movement, like that of graﬃti—part of the point of doing it is that
it is edgy or illegal. It may even make the products of amateur cultural innova-
tion less co-optable by the mainstream industrial information economy, since
it is hard to clear rights for an anonymous ﬁlm packing in images and sounds
from hundreds of diﬀerent sources, some proprietary.
But if prevention of commercial exploitation is the goal of some authors, it is
best to let them simply structure their licenses to preclude it. Authors can opt to
share their work under Creative Commons licenses that restrict commercial
reuse of the work, while permitting limitless noncommercial use and modiﬁca-
tion by others.80
Finding ways through content thickets as Benkler and his cohort suggest is
especially important if tethered appliances begin to take up more of the infor-
mation space, making information that much more regulable. In a more regu-
lable space the gap between prohibited uses and tolerated uses shrinks, creating
the prospect that content produced by citizens who cannot easily clear permis-
sions for all its ingredients will be squeezed out.
MAINTAINING REGULATORS’ TOLERANCE OF GENERATIVE 
SYSTEMS
Individual Liability Instead of Technology Mandates
As the capacity to inﬂict damage on “real world” interests increases with the In-
ternet’s reach and with the number of valuable activities reliant upon it, the im-
peratives to take action will also increase. As both generative and non-genera-
tive devices maintain constant contact with various vendors and software
providers, regulators may seek to require those manufacturers to shape the ser-
vices they oﬀer more precisely, causing a now-familiar wound to generativity.
One way to reduce pressure on institutional and technological gatekeepers is
to ensure that individual wrongdoers can be held directly responsible. Some
piecemeal solutions to problems such as spam take this approach. ISPs are
working with makers of major PC e-mail applications to provide for forms of
sender authentication.81 A given domain can, using public key encryption
tools, authenticate that it is indeed the source of e-mail it sends. With Sender
ID, e-mail purporting—but not proved—to be from a user at yahoo.com can
be so trivially ﬁltered as spam that it will no longer be worthwhile to send. This
regime will hold ISPs more accountable for the e-mail that originates on their
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networks because they will ﬁnd themselves shunned by other ISPs if they per-
mit excessive anonymous spam—a system similar to the MAPS and Google/
StopBadware regimes discussed in the previous chapter. This opportunity for
greater direct liability reduces the pressure on those processing incoming 
e-mail—both the designated recipients and their ISPs—to resort to spam ﬁl-
tration heuristics that may unintentionally block legitimate e-mail.82
The same principle can apply to individuals’ uses of the Internet that are said
to harm legally protected interests. Music industry lawsuits against individual
ﬁle sharers may be bad policy if the underlying substantive law demarcating the
protected interest is itself ill-advised—and there are many reasons to think that
it is—but from the point of view of generativity, such lawsuits inﬂict little
damage on the network and PCs themselves. The Internet’s future may be
brighter if technology permits easier identiﬁcation of Internet users combined
with legal processes, and perhaps technical limitations, to ensure that such
identiﬁcation occurs only when good cause exists. The mechanisms to make it
less than impossible to ﬁnd copyright infringers and defamers ought not to
make it trivial for authoritarian states to single out subversives.
As the discussion of FON explained, a growing number of Internet users are
acquiring wireless routers that default to sharing their connection with anyone
nearby who has a PC conﬁgured with a wireless antenna. Consumers may not
intend to open their networks, but doing so creates generative beneﬁts for those
nearby without their own Internet access.83 Usage by others does not typically
impede the original consumer’s enjoyment of broadband, but should outsiders
use that connection, say, to send viruses or to pirate copyrighted ﬁles, the orig-
inal consumer could be blamed when the Internet connection is traced.84 Cur-
rent legal doctrine typically precludes such blame—nearly all secondary lia-
bility schemes require some form of knowledge or beneﬁt before imposing
responsibilities85—but a sea change in the ability of lawbreakers to act un-
traceably by using others’ wi-ﬁ could plausibly result in an adjustment to doc-
trine.
As such examples arise and become well known, consumers will seek to cut
oﬀ others’ access to their surplus network resources, and the manufacturers of
wireless routers might change the default to closed. If, however, genuine indi-
vidual identity can be aﬃrmed in appropriate circumstances, wi-ﬁ sharing need
not be impeded: each user will be held responsible for his or her own actions
and no more. Indeed, the FON system of sharing wireless access among mem-
bers of the “FON club” maintains users’ accounts for the purpose of identity
tracing in limited circumstances—and to prevent additional pressure on regu-
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lators to ban FON itself. Such identiﬁcation schemes need not be instant or per-
fect. Today’s status quo requires a series of subpoenas to online service providers
and ISPs to discern the identity of a wrongdoer. This provides balance between
cat and mouse, a space for tolerated uses described in Chapter Five, that pre-
cludes both easy government abuse of personal privacy and outright anarchy.
Beyond the Law
Regimes of legal liability can be helpful when there is a problem and no one has
taken ownership of it. When a manufacturing plant pollutes a stream, it ought
to pay—to internalize the negative externality it is inﬂicting on others by pol-
luting. No one fully owns today’s problems of copyright infringement and
defamation online, just as no one fully owns security problems on the Net. But
the solution is not to conscript intermediaries to become the Net police. Under
prevailing law Wikipedia could get away with much less stringent monitoring
of its articles for plagiarized work, and it could leave plainly defamatory mate-
rial in an article but be shielded in the United States by the Communications
Decency Act provision exempting those hosting material from responsibility
for what others have provided.86
Yet Wikipedia polices itself according to an ethical code—a set of commu-
nity standards that encourages contributors to do the right thing rather than
the required thing or the proﬁtable thing. To harness Wikipedia’s ethical in-
stinct across the layers of the generative Internet, we must ﬁgure out how to in-
spire people to act humanely in digital environments that today do not facili-
tate the appreciative smiles and “thank yous” present in the physical world.
This can be accomplished with tools—such those discussed in the previous
chapter and those yet to be invented—to foster digital environments that in-
spire people to act humanely. For the generative Internet fully to come into its
own, it must allow us to harness the connections we have with each other, to co-
ordinate when we have the time, talent, and energy, and to beneﬁt from others’
coordination when we do not. Such tools allow us to express and live our civic
instincts online, trusting that the expression of our collective character will be
one at least as good as that imposed by outside sovereigns—sovereigns who, af-
ter all, are only people themselves.
To be sure, this expression of collective character will not always be just, even
if participants seek to act in good faith. Some users have begun to deploy tools
like Blossom, whereby individual PC users can agree to let their Internet con-
nections be used so that others can see the Internet from their point of view.87
As states increasingly lean on their domestic ISPs and overseas online service
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providers to ﬁlter particular content, a tool like Blossom can allow someone in
China to see the Internet as if he or she were a New Yorker, and vice versa. But
such a tool undermines individual state sovereignty worldwide, just as a tool to
facilitate ﬁltering can be deployed to encroach on fundamental freedoms when
ported to regimes that do not observe the rule of law. A tool like Blossom not
only makes it hard for China to ﬁlter politically sensitive content, but it prevents
Germany and France from ﬁltering images of Nazi swastikas, and it gets in the
way of attempts by copyright holders to carve the world into geographic zones as
they seek to release online content in one place but not another: the New York
Times could not as easily provide an article with an update about a British crim-
inal investigation everywhere but within Britain, as it recently did to respect
what it took to be the law of the United Kingdom on pretrial publicity.88
Tools like Blossom, which succeed only as much as netizens are impelled to
want to adopt them, ask the distributed users of the Internet to decide, one by
one, how much they are willing to create a network to subvert the enforcement
of central authorities around the world.89 Each person can frame a view bal-
ancing the risks of misuse of a network against the risks of abuse of a sovereign’s
power to patrol it, and devote his or her processor cycles and network band-
width accordingly. Lessig is chary of such power, thinking of these tools as
“technological tricks” that short-circuit the process of making the case in the
political arena for the substantive values they enable.90 But this disregards a
kind of acoustic separation found in a society that is not a police state, by which
most laws, especially those pertaining to personal behavior, must not only be
entered on to the books, but also reinforced by all sorts of people, public and
private, in order to have eﬀect.91 Perhaps it is best to say that neither the gover-
nor nor the governed should be able to monopolize technological tricks. We are
better oﬀ without ﬂat-out trumps that make the world the way either regulator
or target wants it to be without the need for the expenditure of some eﬀort and
cooperation from others to make it so. The danger of a trump is greater for a
sterile system, where a user must accept the system as it is if he or she is to use it
at all, than for the tools developed for a generative one, where there is a con-
stant—perhaps healthy—back-and-forth between tools to circumvent regula-
tion and tools to eﬀect the regulation anyway.92 The generative Internet up-
holds a precious if hidden dynamic where a regulator must be in a relationship
with both those regulated and those who are needed to make the regulation
eﬀective. This dynamic is not found solely within the political maneuvers that
transpire in a liberal democracy to put a law in place at the outset.
Today our conception of the Internet is still largely as a tool whose regulabil-
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ity is a function of its initial design, modiﬁed by the sum of vectors to rework it
for control: as Lessig has put it, code is law, and commerce and government can
work together to change the code. There is a hierarchy of dogs, cats, and mice:
Governments might ask ISPs to retain more data or less about their users; indi-
vidual users might go to greater or lesser lengths to cloak their online activities
from observation by their ISPs.93 Tethered appliances change the equation’s re-
sults by making life far easier for the dogs and cats. Tools for group generativity
can change the equation itself, but in unpredictable directions. They allow the
level of regulability to be aﬀected by conscious decisions by the mice about the
kind of online world they want, not only for themselves but for others. If there
is apathy about being able to experience the Internet as others do elsewhere,
tools like Blossom will not be able to sustain much traﬃc, and the current level
of regulability of the Internet will remain unchanged. If there is a wellspring of
interest on this front, it can become easy to evade geographic restrictions.
One objection to the unfettered development of generative tools that can
defy centralized authority in proportion to the number and passion of those
willing to use them is that there are large groups of people who would be em-
powered to do ill with them. Criminal law typically penalizes conspiracy as a
separate crime because it recognizes that the whole can be bigger than the sum
of the parts—people working in concert can create more trouble than when
they each act alone. Continued pressure on public ﬁle-sharing networks has led
to fully realized “darknets,” semi-private systems whose sole purpose is to en-
able the convenient sharing of music and other content irrespective of copy-
right.94 For example, a network called Oink incorporates many of the commu-
nity features of Wikipedia without being open to the public.95 People may join
only on invitation from an existing member. Oink imposes strict rules on the
sharing of ﬁles to ensure maximum availability: users must maintain a certain
ratio of uploaded-to-downloaded material. Those who fall short risk being cut
oﬀ from the service—and the penalty may also be applied to the members who
sponsored them. The Oink service has none of the diﬃculties of the public net-
works, where ﬁles are nominated for takedown as they are discovered by pub-
lishers’ automated tools, and where publishers have inserted decoy ﬁles that do
not contain what they promise.96 Oink is easier and faster to use than the
iTunes store. And, of course, it is cheaper because it is free. If there are enough
people to see to the creation and maintenance of such a community—still one
primarily of strangers—is it a testament to the dangers of group generativity or
to the fact that the current application of copyright law ﬁnds very little legiti-
macy?
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One’s answer may diﬀer to the extent that similar communities exist for peo-
ple to share stolen credit card numbers or images of child abuse. If such com-
munities do not exist it suggests that a change to copyright’s policy and business
model could eliminate the most substantial disjunct between laws common to
free societies and the online behavior of their citizens.97 Here there is no good
empirical data to guide us. But the fact remains that so long as these communi-
ties are as semi-open as they must be in order to achieve a threatening scale—
ready to accept new members who are not personally known to existing ones—
they are in a position to be inﬁltrated by law enforcement. Private Yahoo!
groups whose members trade in images of child abuse—a far less sophisticated
counterpart to Oink’s community of copyright infringers—are readily moni-
tored.98 This monitoring could take place by Yahoo! itself, or in a decentralized
model, by even one or two members who have second thoughts—practically
anyone is in a position to compromise the network. As theories multiply about
the use of the Internet as a terrorist recruiting tool,99 we can see the downside
to criminals as well: open networks cannot keep secrets very well. (The use of
the Internet for more specialized conspiracies that do not depend on semi-pub-
lic participation for their success is likely here to stay; sophisticated criminals
can see to it that they retain generative devices even if the mainstream public
abandons them.)
Wikipedia, as a tool of group generativity, reﬂects the character of thousands
of people. Benkler compares Wikipedia’s entry on Barbie dolls to that of other
encyclopedias developed in more traditional ways, and ﬁnds that most of the
others fail to make mention of any of the controversies surrounding Barbie as a
cultural icon.100 Wikipedia has extensive discussion on the topic, and Britan-
nica has a share, too. Benkler freely concedes that a tool of group generativity
like Wikipedia is not the only way to include important points of view that
might not accord with the more monolithic views of what he calls the “indus-
trial information economy.” More traditional institutions, such as universities,
have established a measure of independence, too. And he also acknowledges
that tools of group generativity can be abused by a group; there can be power-
ful norms that a majority enforces upon a minority to squelch some views. But
he rightly suggests that the world is improved by a variety of models of produc-
tion of culture, models that draw on diﬀerent incentives, with diﬀerent biases,
allowing people to be exposed to a multiplicity of viewpoints, precluding a mo-
nopoly on truth. The same can be true of our technology, here the technology
that undergirds our access to those viewpoints, and our ability to oﬀer our own.
Can groups be trusted to behave well in the absence of formal government to
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rein in their excesses?101 The story of the American Revolution is sometimes
romantically told as one in which small communities of virtue united against a
common foe, and then lost their way after the revolution succeeded. Virtue
gave way to narrow self-interest and corruption. The mechanisms of due
process and separation of powers adapted by Madison to help substitute the
rule of law for plain virtue will have to be translated into those online commu-
nities empowered with generative tools to govern themselves and to aﬀect the
larger oﬄine world. Using the case of privacy, the next chapter seeks to sketch
out some of the puzzles raised by the use of the powerful tools that this book has
advocated to bring the generative Net fully into its own. Privacy problems that
have been stable for the past thirty-ﬁve years are being revolutionized by the
generative Internet, and how they are handled will tell us much about the fu-
ture of the Net and our freedoms within and from it.
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So far this book has explored generative successes and the problems
they cause at the technical and content layers of the Internet. This
chapter takes up a case study of a problem at the social layer: privacy.
Privacy showcases issues that can worry individuals who are not con-
cerned about some of the other problems discussed in this book, like
copyright infringement, and it demonstrates how generativity puts
old problems into new and perhaps unexpected conﬁgurations, call-
ing for creative solutions. Once again, we test the notion that solu-
tions that might solve the generative problems at one layer—solu-
tions that go light on law, and instead depend on the cooperative use
of code to cultivate and express norms—might also work at another.
The heart of the next-generation privacy problem arises from the
similar but uncoordinated actions of individuals that can be com-
bined in new ways thanks to the generative Net. Indeed, the Net 
enables individuals in many cases to compromise privacy more thor-
oughly than the government and commercial institutions tradition-
ally targeted for scrutiny and regulation. The standard approaches
that have been developed to analyze and limit institutional actors do
9
Meeting the Risks of Generativity:
Privacy 2.0
not work well for this new breed of problem, which goes far beyond the com-
promise of sensitive information.
PRIVACY 1.0
In 1973, a blue-ribbon panel reported to the U.S. Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare (HEW) on computers and privacy. The report could have
been written today:
It is no wonder that people have come to distrust computer-based record-keeping
operations. Even in non-governmental settings, an individual’s control over the per-
sonal information that he gives to an organization, or that an organization obtains
about him, is lessening as the relationship between the giver and receiver of personal
data grows more attenuated, impersonal, and diﬀused. There was a time when infor-
mation about an individual tended to be elicited in face-to-face contacts involving
personal trust and a certain symmetry, or balance, between giver and receiver. Nowa-
days an individual must increasingly give information about himself to large and rel-
atively faceless institutions, for handling and use by strangers—unknown, unseen
and, all too frequently, unresponsive. Sometimes the individual does not even know
that an organization maintains a record about him. Often he may not see it, much
less contest its accuracy, control its dissemination, or challenge its use by others.1
The report pinpointed troubles arising not simply from powerful computing
technology that could be used both for good and ill, but also from its imper-
sonal quality: the sterile computer processed one’s warm, three-dimensional life
into data handled and maintained by faraway faceless institutions, viewed at
will by strangers. The worries of that era are not obsolete. We are still concerned
about databases with too much information that are too readily accessed; data-
bases with inaccurate information; and having the data from databases built for
reasonable purposes diverted to less noble if not outright immoral uses.2
Government databases remain of particular concern, because of the unique
strength and power of the state to amass information and use it for life-altering
purposes. The day-to-day workings of the government rely on numerous data-
bases, including those used for the calculation and provision of government
beneﬁts, decisions about law enforcement, and inclusion in various licensing
regimes.3 Private institutional databases also continue to raise privacy issues,
particularly in the realms of consumer credit reporting, health records, and ﬁ-
nancial data.
Due to political momentum generated by the HEW report and the growing
controversy over President Richard Nixon’s use of government power to inves-
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tigate political enemies, the U.S. Congress enacted comprehensive privacy leg-
islation shortly after the report’s release. The Privacy Act of 1974 mandated a
set of fair information practices, including disclosure of private information
only with an individual’s consent (with exceptions for law enforcement, archiv-
ing, and routine uses), and established the right of the subject to know what
was recorded about her and to oﬀer corrections. While it was originally in-
tended to apply to a broad range of public and private databases to parallel the
HEW report, the Act was amended before passage to apply only to government
agencies’ records.4 Congress never enacted a comparable comprehensive regu-
latory scheme for private databases. Instead, private databases are regulated
only in narrow areas of sensitivity such as credit reports (addressed by a com-
plex scheme passed in 1970 aﬀecting the handful of credit reporting agencies)5
and video rental data,6 which has been protected since Supreme Court nomi-
nee Robert Bork’s video rental history was leaked to a newspaper during his
conﬁrmation process in 1987.7
The HEW report expresses a basic template for dealing with the informa-
tional privacy problem: ﬁrst, a sensitivity is identiﬁed at some stage of the 
information production process—the gathering, storage, or dissemination of
one’s private information—and then a legal regime is proposed to restrict these
activities to legitimate ends. This template has informed analysis for the past
thirty years, guiding battles over privacy both between individuals and govern-
ment and between individuals and “large and faceless” corporations. Of course,
a functional theory does not necessarily translate into successful practice. Pres-
sures to gather and use personal data in commerce and law enforcement 
have increased, and technological tools to facilitate such data processing have
matured without correspondingly aggressive privacy protections.8 (Consider
Chapter Five’s description of the novel uses of tethered appliances to conduct
surveillance.) In 1999, Scott McNealey, CEO of Sun Microsystems, was asked
whether a new Sun technology to link consumer devices had any built-in pri-
vacy protection. “You have zero privacy anyway,” he replied. “Get over it.”9
McNealey’s words raised some ire at the time; one privacy advocate called
them “a declaration of war.”10 McNealey has since indicated that he believes his
answer was misunderstood.11 But the plain meaning of “getting over it” seems
to have been heeded: while poll after poll indicates that the public is concerned
about privacy,12 the public’s actions frequently belie these claims. Apart from
momentary spikes in privacy concerns that typically arise in the wake of high-
proﬁle scandals—such as Watergate or the disclosure of Judge Bork’s video
rentals—we routinely part with personal information and at least passively
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consent to its use, whether by surﬁng the Internet, entering sweepstakes, or us-
ing a supermarket discount card.
Current scholarly work on privacy tries to reconcile people’s nonchalant be-
havior with their seemingly heartfelt concerns about privacy. It sometimes calls
for industry self-regulation rather than direct governmental regulation as a way
to vindicate privacy interests, perhaps because such regulation is seen as more
eﬃcient or just, or because direct governmental intervention is understood to
be politically diﬃcult to achieve. Privacy scholarship also looks to the latest ad-
vances in speciﬁc technologies that could further weaken day-to-day informa-
tional privacy.13 One example is the increasing use of radio frequency identi-
ﬁers (RFIDs) in consumer items, allowing goods to be scanned and tracked at
a short distance. One promise of RFID is that a shopper could wheel her shop-
ping cart under an arch at a grocery store and obtain an immediate tally of the
price of its contents; one peril is that a stranger could drive by a house with an
RFID scanner and instantly inventory its contents, from diapers to bacon to
ﬂat-screen TVs, immediately discerning the sort of people who live within.
This work on privacy generally hews to the original analytic template of
1973: both the analysis and suggested solutions talk in terms of institutions
gathering data, and of developing ways to pressure institutions to better respect
their customers’ and clients’ privacy. This approach is evident in discussions
about electronic commerce on the Internet. Privacy advocates and scholars
have sought ways to ensure that Web sites disclose to people what they are
learning about consumers as they browse and buy. The notion of “privacy poli-
cies” has arisen from this debate. Through a combination of regulatory suasion
and industry best practices, such policies are now found on many Web sites,
comprising little-read boilerplate answering questions about what information
a Web site gathers about a user and what it does with the information. Fre-
quently the answers are, respectively, “as much as it can” and “whatever it
wants”—but, to some, this is progress. It allows scholars and companies alike
to say that the user has been put on notice of privacy practices.
Personal information security is another area of inquiry, and there have been
some valuable policy innovations in this sphere. For example, a 2003 Califor-
nia law requires ﬁrms that unintentionally expose their customers’ private data
to others to alert the customers to the security breach.14 This has led to a rash
of well-known banks sending bashful letters to millions of their customers,
gently telling them that, say, a package containing tapes with their credit card
and social security numbers has been lost en route from one processing center
to another.15 Bank of America lost such a backup tape with 1.2 million cus-
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tomer records in 2005.16 That same year, a MasterCard International security
breach exposed information of more than 40 million credit card holders.17
Boston College lost 120,000 alumni records to hackers as a result of a breach.18
The number of incidents shows little sign of decreasing,19 despite the incen-
tives provided by the embarrassment of disclosure and the existence of obvious
ways to improve security practices. For minimal cost, ﬁrms could minimize
some types of privacy risks to consumers—for example, by encrypting their
backup tapes before shipping them anywhere, making them worthless to any-
one without a closely held digital key.
Addressing Web site privacy and security has led to elaborations on the tra-
ditional informational privacy framework. Some particularly fascinating issues
in this framework are still unfolding: is it fair, for example, for an online retailer
like Amazon to record the average number of nanoseconds each user spends
contemplating an item before clicking to buy it? Such data could be used by
Amazon to charge impulse buyers more, capitalizing on the likelihood that this
group of consumers does not pause long enough to absorb the listed price of the
item they just bought. A brief experiment by Amazon in diﬀerential pricing re-
sulted in bad publicity and a hasty retreat as some buyers noticed that they
could save as much as $10 on a DVD by deleting browser cookies that indi-
cated to Amazon that they had visited the site before.20 As this example sug-
gests, forthrightly charging one price to one person and another price to some-
one else can generate resistance. Oﬀering individualized discounts, however,
can amount to the same thing for the vendor while appearing much more
palatable to the buyer. Who would complain about receiving a coupon for 
$10 oﬀ the listed price of an item, even if the coupon were not transferable to 
any other Amazon user? (The answer may be “someone who did not get the
coupon,” but to most people the second scenario is less troubling than the one
in which diﬀerent prices were charged from the start.)21
If data mining could facilitate price discrimination for Amazon or other on-
line retailers, it could operate in the tangible world as well. As a shopper uses a
loyal-customer card, certain discounts are oﬀered at the register personalized to
that customer. Soon, the price of a loaf of bread at the store becomes indeter-
minate: there is a sticker price, but when the shopper takes the bread up front,
the store can announce a special individualized discount based on her relation-
ship with the store. The sticker price then becomes only that, providing little
indication of the price that shoppers are actually paying. Merchants can also
vary service. Customer cards augmented with RFID tags can serve to identify
those undesirable customers who visit a home improvement store, monopolize
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the attention of the attendants, and exit without having bought so much as a
single nail. With these kinds of cards, the store would be able to discern the
“good” (proﬁtable) customers from the “bad” (not proﬁtable) ones and appro-
priately alert the staﬀ to ﬂee from bad customers and approach good ones.
PRIVACY 2.0
While privacy issues associated with government and corporate databases re-
main important, they are increasingly dwarfed by threats to privacy that do not
ﬁt the standard analytical template for addressing privacy threats. These new
threats ﬁt the generative pattern also found in the technical layers for Internet
and PC security, and in the content layer for ventures such as Wikipedia. The
emerging threats to privacy serve as an example of generativity’s downsides on
the social layer, where contributions from remote amateurs can enable vulner-
ability and abuse that calls for intervention. Ideally such intervention would
not unduly dampen the underlying generativity. Eﬀective solutions for the
problems of Privacy 2.0 may have more in common with solutions to other
generative problems than with the remedies associated with the decades-old
analytic template for Privacy 1.0.
The Era of Cheap Sensors
We can identify three successive shifts in technology from the early 1970s:
cheap processors, cheap networks, and cheap sensors.22 The third shift has,
with the help of the ﬁrst two, opened the doors to new and formidable privacy
invasions.
The ﬁrst shift was cheap processors. Moore’s Law tells us that processing
power doubles every eighteen months or so.23 A corollary is that existing pro-
cessing power gets cheaper. The cheap processors available since the 1970s have
allowed Bill Gates’s vision of a “computer on every desk” to move forward.
Cheap processors also underlie information appliances: thanks to Moore’s Law,
there is now sophisticated microprocessor circuitry in cars, coﬀeemakers, and
singing greeting cards.
Cheap networks soon followed. The pay-per-minute proprietary dial-up
networks gave way to an Internet of increasing bandwidth and dropping price.
The all-you-can-eat models of measurement meant that, once established, idle
network connections were no cheaper than well-used ones, and a Web page in
New York cost no more to access from London than one in Paris. Lacking gate-
keepers, these inexpensive processors and networks have been fertile soil for
Meeting the Risks of Generativity: Privacy 2.0 205
whimsical invention to take place and become mainstream. This generativity
has occurred in part because the ancillary costs to experiment—both for soft-
ware authors and software users—have been so low.
The most recent technological shift has been the availability of cheap sen-
sors. Sensors that are small, accurate, and inexpensive are now found in cam-
eras, microphones, scanners, and global positioning systems. These character-
istics have made sensors much easier to deploy—and then network—in places
where previously it would have been impractical to have them.
The proliferation of cheap surveillance cameras has empowered the central
authorities found within the traditional privacy equation. A 2002 working pa-
per estimated that the British government had spent several hundred million
dollars on closed-circuit television systems, with many networked to central
law enforcement stations for monitoring.24 Such advances, and the analysis
that follows them, ﬁt the template of Privacy 1.0: governments have access to
more information thanks to more widely deployed monitoring technologies,
and rules and practices are suggested to prevent whatever our notions might be
of abuse.25 To see how cheap processors, networks, and sensors create an en-
tirely new form of the problem, we must look to the excitement surrounding the
participatory technologies suggested by one meaning of “Web 2.0.” In aca-
demic circles, this meaning of Web 2.0 has become known as “peer production.”
The Dynamics of Peer Production
The aggregation of small contributions of individual work can make once-
diﬃcult tasks seem easy. For example, Yochai Benkler has approvingly de-
scribed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) use of
public volunteers, or “clickworkers.”26 NASA had a tedious job involving pic-
tures of craters from the moon and Mars. These were standard bitmap images,
and they wanted the craters to be vectorized: in other words, they wanted peo-
ple to draw circles around the circles they saw in the photos. Writing some cus-
tom software and deploying it online, NASA asked Internet users at large to
undertake the task. Much to NASA’s pleasant surprise, the clickworkers ac-
complished in a week what a single graduate student would have needed a year
to complete.27 Cheap networks and PCs, coupled with the generative ability to
costlessly oﬀer new code for others to run, meant that those who wanted to
pitch in to help NASA could do so.
The near-costless aggregation of far-ﬂung work can be applied in contexts
other than the drawing of circles around craters—or the production of a free
encyclopedia like Wikipedia. Computer scientist Luis von Ahn, after noting
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that over nine billion person-hours were spent playing Windows Solitaire in a
single year, devised the online “ESP” game, in which two remote players are
randomly paired and shown an image. They are asked to guess the word that
best describes the image, and when they each guess the same word they win
points.28 Their actions also provide input to a database that reliably labels im-
ages for use in graphical search engines—improving the ability of image search
engines to identify images. In real time, then, people are building and partici-
pating in a collective, organic, worldwide computer to perform tasks that real
computers cannot easily do themselves.29
These kinds of grid applications produce (or at least encourage) certain
kinds of public activity by combining small, individual private actions. Benkler
calls this phenomenon “coordinate coexistence producing information.”30
Benkler points out that the same idea helps us ﬁnd what we are looking for on
the Internet, even if we do not go out of our way to play the ESP game; search
engines commonly aggregate the artifacts of individual Internet activity, such
as webmasters’ choices about where to link, to produce relevant search results.
Search engines also track which links are most often clicked on in ordered
search results in order, and then more prominently feature those links in future
searches.31 The value of this human-derived wisdom has been noted by spam-
mers, who create “link farms” of fake Web sites containing fragments of text
drawn at random from elsewhere on the Web (“word salad”) that link back to
the spammers’ sites in an attempt to boost their search engine rankings. The
most useful links are ones placed on genuinely popular Web sites, though, and
the piles of word salad do not qualify.
As a result, spammers have turned to leaving comments on popular blogs
that ignore the original entry to which they are attached and instead simply
provide links back to their own Web sites. In response, the authors of blogging
software have incorporated so-called captcha boxes that must be navigated be-
fore anyone can leave a comment on a blog. Captchas—now used on many
mainstream Web sites including Ticketmaster.com—ask users to prove that
they are human by typing in, say, a distorted nonsense word displayed in a
small graphic.32 Computers can start with a word and make a distorted image
in a heartbeat, but they cannot easily reverse engineer the distorted image back
to the word. This need for human intervention was intended to force spam-
mers to abandon automated robots to place their blog comment spam. For a
while they did, reportedly setting up captcha sweatshops that paid people to
solve captchas from blog comment prompts all day long.33 (In 2003, the going
rate was $2.50/hour for such work.)34 But spammers have continued to ex-
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plore more eﬃcient solutions. A spammer can write a program to ﬁll in all the
information but the captcha, and when it gets to the captcha it places it in front
of a real person trying to get to a piece of information—say on a page a user
might get after clicking a link that says, “You’ve just won $1000! Click
here!”35—or perhaps a pornographic photo.36 The captcha had been copied
that instant from a blog where a spammer’s robot was waiting to leave a com-
ment, and then pasted into the prompt for the human wanting to see the next
page. The human’s answer to the captcha was then instantly ported back over to
the blog site in order to solve the captcha and leave the spammed comment.37
Predictably, companies have also sprung up to meet this demand, providing
custom software to thwart captchas on a contract basis of $100 to $5,000 per
project.38 Generative indeed: the ability to remix diﬀerent pieces of the Web,
and to deploy new code without gatekeepers, is crucial to the spammers’ work.
Other uses of captchas are more benign but equally subtle: a project called 
reCAPTCHA provides an open API to substitute for regular captchas where a
Web site might want to test to see if it is a human visiting.39 reCAPTCHA cre-
ates an image that pairs a standard, automatically generated test word image
with an image of a word from an old book that a computer has been unable to
properly scan and translate. When the user solves the captcha by entering both
words, the ﬁrst word is used to validate that the user is indeed human, and the
second is used to put the human’s computing power to work to identify one
more word of one more book that otherwise would be unscannable.
* * *
What do captchas have to do with privacy? New generative uses of the Internet
have made the solutions proposed for Privacy 1.0 largely inapplicable. Fears
about “mass dataveillance”40 are not misplaced, but they recognize only part of
the problem, and one that represents an increasingly smaller slice of the pie. So-
lutions such as disclosure41 or encryption42 still work for Privacy 1.0, but new
approaches are needed to meet the challenge of Privacy 2.0, in which sensitive
data is collected and exchanged peer-to-peer in conﬁgurations as unusual as
that of the spammers’ system for bypassing captchas.
The power of centralized databases feared in 1973 is now being replicated
and ampliﬁed through generative uses of individual data and activity. For ex-
ample, cheap sensors have allowed various gunshot-detecting technologies to
operate through microphones in public spaces.43 If a shot is ﬁred, sensors asso-
ciated with the microphones triangulate the shot’s location and summon the
police. To avoid false alarms, the system can be augmented with help from the
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public at large, minimizing the need for understaﬀed police to make the initial
assessment about what is going on when a suspicious sound is heard. Interested
citizens can review camera feeds near a reported shot and press a button if they
see something strange happening on their computer monitors. Should a citizen
do so, other citizens can be asked for veriﬁcation. If the answer is yes, the police
can be sent.
In November of 2006, the state of Texas spent $210,000 to set up eight web-
cams along the Mexico border as part of a pilot program to solicit the public’s
help in reducing illegal immigration.44 Webcam feeds were sent to a public
Web site, and people were invited to alert the police if they thought they saw
suspicious activity. During the month-long trial the Web site took in just under
twenty-eight million hits. No doubt many were from the curious rather than
the helpful, but those wanting to volunteer came forward, too. The site regis-
tered over 220,000 users, and those users sent 13,000 e-mails to report suspi-
cious activity. At three o’clock in the morning one woman at her PC saw some-
one signal a pickup truck on the webcam. She alerted police, who seized over
four hundred pounds of marijuana from the truck’s occupants after a high-
speed chase. In separate incidents, a stolen car was recovered, and twelve un-
documented immigrants were stopped. To some—especially state oﬃcials—
this was a success beyond any expectation;45 to others it was a paltry result for
so much investment.46
Beyond any ﬁrst-order success of stopping crime, some observers welcome
involvement by members of the public as a check on law enforcement surveil-
lance.47 Science ﬁction author David Brin foresaw increased use of cameras
and other sensors by the government and adopted an if-you-can’t-beat-them-
join-them approach to dealing with the privacy threat. He suggested allowing
ubiquitous surveillance so long as the watchers themselves were watched: live
cameras could be installed in police cars, station houses, and jails. According to
Brin, everyone watching everywhere would lessen the likelihood of unobserved
government abuse. What the Rodney King video did for a single incident48—
one that surely would have passed without major public notice but for the am-
ateur video capturing what looked like excessive force by arresting oﬃcers—
Brin’s proposal could do for nearly all state activities. Of course, Brin’s calculus
does not adequately account for the invasions of privacy that would take place
whenever random members of the public could watch—and perhaps record—
every interaction between citizens and authorities, especially since many of
those interactions take place at sensitive moments for the citizens. And ubiqui-
tous surveillance can lead to other problems. The Sheriﬀ ’s Oﬃce of Anderson
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County, Tennessee, introduced one of the ﬁrst live “jailcams” in the country,
covering a little area in the jail where jailors sit and keep an eye on everything—
the center of the panopticon.49 The Anderson County webcam was very Web
2.0: the Web site included a chat room where visitors could meet other viewers,
there was a guestbook to sign, and a link to syndicated advertising to help fund
the webcam. However, some began using the webcam to make crank calls to
jailors at key moments and even, it is claimed, to coordinate the delivery of
contraband.50 The webcam was shut down.
This example suggests a critical diﬀerence between Privacy 1.0 and 2.0. If
the government is controlling the observation, then the government can pull
the plug on such webcams if it thinks they are not helpful, balancing whatever
policy factors it chooses.51 Many scholars have considered the privacy prob-
lems posed by cheap sensors and networks, but they focus on the situations
where the sensors serve only government or corporate masters. Daniel Solove,
for instance, has written extensively on emergent privacy concerns, but he has
focused on the danger of “digital dossiers” created by businesses and govern-
ments.52 Likewise, Jerry Kang and Dana Cuﬀ have written about how small
sensors will lead to “pervasive computing,” but they worry that the technology
will be abused by coordinated entities like shopping malls, and their prescrip-
tions thus follow the pattern established by Privacy 1.0.53 Their concerns are
not misplaced, but they represent an increasingly smaller part of the total pic-
ture. The essence of Privacy 2.0 is that government or corporations, or other 
intermediaries, need not be the source of the surveillance. Peer-to-peer tech-
nologies can eliminate points of control and gatekeeping from the transfer of
personal data and information just as they can for movies and music. The in-
tellectual property conﬂicts raised by the generative Internet, where people can
still copy large amounts of copyrighted music without fear of repercussion, are
rehearsals for the problems of Privacy 2.0.54
The Rodney King beating was ﬁlmed not by a public camera, but by a pri-
vate one, and its novel use in 1991 is now commonplace. Many private cam-
eras, including camera-equipped mobile phones, ﬁt the generative mold as de-
vices purchased for one purpose but frequently used for another. The Rodney
King video, however, required news network attention to gain salience. Videos
depicting similar events today gain attention without the prior approval of an
intermediary.55 With cheap sensors, processors, and networks, citizens can
quickly distribute to anywhere in the world what they capture in their back-
yard. Therefore, any activity is subject to recording and broadcast. Perform a
search on a video aggregation site like YouTube for “angry teacher” or “road
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rage” and hundreds of videos turn up. The presence of documentary evidence
not only makes such incidents reviewable by the public at large, but for, say, an-
gry teachers it also creates the possibility of getting ﬁred or disciplined where
there had not been one before. Perhaps this is good: teachers are on notice that
they must account for their behavior the way that police oﬃcers must take re-
sponsibility for their own actions.
If so, it is not just oﬃcers and teachers: we are all on notice. The famed “Bus
Uncle” of Hong Kong upbraided a fellow bus passenger who politely asked him
to speak more quietly on his mobile phone.56 The mobile phone user learned
an important lesson in etiquette when a third person captured the argument
and then uploaded it to the Internet, where 1.3 million people have viewed one
version of the exchange.57 (Others have since created derivative versions of the
exchange, including karaoke and a ringtone.) Weeks after the video was posted,
the Bus Uncle was beaten up in a targeted attack at the restaurant where he
worked.58 In a similar incident, a woman’s dog defecated on the ﬂoor of a
South Korean subway. She refused to clean it up, even when oﬀered a tissue—
though she cleaned the dog—and left the subway car at the next stop. The in-
cident was captured on a mobile phone camera and posted to the Internet,
where the poster issued an all points bulletin seeking information about the
dog owner and her relatives, and about where she worked. She was identiﬁed by
others who had previously seen her and the dog, and the resulting ﬁrestorm of
criticism apparently caused her to quit her job.59
The summed outrage of many unrelated people viewing a disembodied
video may be disproportionate to whatever social norm or law is violated
within that video. Lives can be ruined after momentary wrongs, even if merely
misdemeanors. Recall verkeersbordvrij theory from Chapter Six: it suggests that
too many road signs and driving rules change people into automatons, causing
them to trade in common sense and judgment for mere hewing to exactly what
the rules provide, no more and no less. In the same way, too much scrutiny can
also turn us into automatons. Teacher behavior in a classroom, for example, is
largely a matter of standards and norms rather than rules and laws, but the pres-
ence of scrutiny, should anything unusual happen, can halt desirable pedagog-
ical risks if there is a chance those risks could be taken out of context, miscon-
strued, or become the subject of pillory by those with perfect hindsight.
These phenomena aﬀect students as well as teachers, regular citizens rather
than just those in authority. And ridicule or mere celebrity can be as chilling as
outright disapprobation. In November 2002 a Canadian teenager used his high
school’s video camera to record himself swinging a golf ball retriever as though
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it were a light saber from Star Wars.60 By all accounts he was doing it for his
own amusement. The tape was not erased, and it was found the following
spring by someone else who shared it, ﬁrst with friends and then with the In-
ternet at large. Although individuals want privacy for themselves, they will line
up to see the follies of others, and by 2006 the “Star Wars Kid” was estimated to
be the most popular word-of-mouth video on the Internet, with over nine hun-
dred million cumulative views.61 It has spawned several parodies, including
ones shown on prime time television. This is a consummately generative event:
a repurposing of something made for completely diﬀerent reasons, taking oﬀ
beyond any expectation, and triggering further works, elaborations, and com-
mentaries—both by other amateurs and by Hollywood.62 It is also clearly a
privacy story. The student who made the video has been reported to have been
traumatized by its circulation, and in no way did he seek to capitalize on his
celebrity.
In this hyperscrutinized reality, people may moderate themselves instead of
expressing their true opinions. To be sure, people have always balanced be-
tween public and private expression. As Mark Twain observed: “We are discreet
sheep; we wait to see how the drove is going, and then go with the drove. We
have two opinions: one private, which we are afraid to express; and another
one—the one we use—which we force ourselves to wear to please Mrs.
Grundy, until habit makes us comfortable in it, and the custom of defending it
presently makes us love it, adore it, and forget how pitifully we came by it. Look
at it in politics.”63
Today we are all becoming politicians. People in power, whether at parlia-
mentary debates or press conferences, have learned to stick to carefully planned
talking points, accepting the drawbacks of appearing stilted and saying little of
substance in exchange for the beneﬁts of predictability and stability.64 Ubiqui-
tous sensors threaten to push everyone toward treating each public encounter
as if it were a press conference, creating fewer spaces in which citizens can ex-
press their private selves.
Even the use of “public” and “private” to describe our selves and spaces is not
subtle enough to express the kind of privacy we might want. By one deﬁnition
they mean who manages the space: a federal post oﬃce is public; a home is pri-
vate. A typical restaurant or inn is thus also private, yet it is also a place where
the public gathers and mingles: someone there is “in public.” But while activi-
ties in private establishments open to the public are technically in the public
eye,65 what transpires there is usually limited to a handful of eyewitnesses—
likely strangers—and the activity is ephemeral. No more, thanks to cheap sen-
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sors and cheap networks to disseminate what they glean. As our previously pri-
vate public spaces, like classrooms and restaurants, turn into public public
spaces, the pressure will rise for us to be on press conference behavior.
There are both signiﬁcant costs and beneﬁts inherent in expanding the use of
our public selves into more facets of daily life. Our public face may be kinder,
and the expansion may cause us to rethink our private prejudices and excesses
as we publicly profess more mainstream standards and, as Twain says, “habit
makes us comfortable in it.” On the other hand, as law professors Eric Posner
and Cass Sunstein point out, strong normative pressure can prevent outlying
behavior of any kind, and group baselines can themselves be prejudiced. Out-
lying behavior is the generative spark found at the social layer, the cultural 
innovation out of left ﬁeld that can later become mainstream. Just as our infor-
mation technology environment has beneﬁted immeasurably from experi-
mentation by a variety of people with diﬀerent aims, motives, and skills, so too
is our cultural environment bettered when commonly held—and therefore
sometimes rarely revisited—views can be challenged.66
The framers of the U.S. Constitution embraced anonymous speech in the
political sphere as a way of being able to express unpopular opinions without
having to experience personal disapprobation.67 No defense of a similar princi-
ple was needed for keeping private conversations in public spaces from becom-
ing public broadcasts—disapprobation that begins with small “test” groups
but somehow becomes society-wide—since there were no means by which to
perform that transformation. Now that the means are there, a defense is called
for lest we run the risk of letting our social system become metaphorically more
appliancized: open to change only by those few radicals so disconnected from
existing norms as to not fear their imposition at all.
Privacy 2.0 is about more than those who are famous or those who become
involuntary “welebrities.” For those who happen to be captured doing particu-
larly fascinating or embarrassing things, like Star Wars Kid or an angry teacher,
a utilitarian might say that nine hundred million views is ﬁrst-order evidence of
a public beneﬁt far exceeding the cost to the student who made the video. It
might even be pointed out that the Star Wars Kid failed to erase the tape, so he
can be said to bear some responsibility for its circulation. But the next-genera-
tion privacy problem cannot be written oﬀ as aﬀecting only a few unlucky vic-
tims. Neither can it be said to aﬀect only genuine celebrities who must now face
constant exposure not only to a handful of professional paparazzi but also to
hordes of sensor-equipped amateurs. (Celebrities must now contend with the
consequences of cell phone videos of their slightest aberrations—such as one in
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which a mildly testy exchange with a valet parker is quickly circulated and ex-
aggerated online68—or more comprehensive peer-produced sites like Gawker
Stalker,69 where people send in local sightings of celebrities as they happen.
Gawker strives to relay the sightings within ﬁfteen minutes and place them on
a Google map, so that if Jack Nicholson is at Starbucks, one can arrive in time
to stand awkwardly near him before he ﬁnishes his latte.)
Cybervisionary David Weinberger’s twist on Andy Warhol’s famous quota-
tion is the central issue for the rest of us: “On the Web, everyone will be famous
to ﬁfteen people.”70 Although Weinberger made his observation in the context
of online expression, explaining that microaudiences are worthy audiences, it
has further application. Just as cheap networks made it possible for businesses
to satisfy the “long tail,” serving the needs of obscure interests every bit as much
as popular ones71 (Amazon is able to stock a selection of books virtually far 
beyond the best sellers found in a physical bookstore), peer-produced data-
bases can be conﬁgured to track the people who are of interest only to a few
others.
How will the next-generation privacy problem aﬀect average citizens? Early
photo aggregation sites like Flickr were premised on a seemingly dubious as-
sumption that turned out to be true: not only would people want an online
repository for their photos, but they would often be pleased to share them with
the public at large. Such sites now boast hundreds of millions of photos,72
many of which are also sorted and categorized thanks to the same distributed
energy that got Mars’s craters promptly mapped. Proponents of Web 2.0 sing
the praises of “folksonomies” rather than taxonomies—bottom-up tagging
done by strangers rather than expert-designed and -applied canonical classiﬁca-
tions like the Dewey Decimal System or the Library of Congress schemes for
sorting books.73 Metadata describing the contents of pictures makes images far
more useful and searchable. Combining user-generated tags with automatically
generated data makes pictures even more accessible. Camera makers now rou-
tinely build cameras that use global positioning systems to mark exactly where
on the planet each picture it snaps was taken and, of course, to time- and date-
stamp them. Web sites like Riya, Polar Rose, and MyHeritage are perfecting 
facial recognition technologies so that once photos of a particular person are
tagged a few times with his or her name, their computers can then automati-
cally label all future photos that include the person—even if their image ap-
pears in the background. In August 2006 Google announced the acquisition of
Neven Vision, a company working on photo recognition, and in May 2007
Google added a feature to its image search so that only images of people could
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be returned (to be sure, still short of identifying which image is which).74
Massachusetts oﬃcials have used such technology to compare mug shots in
“Wanted” posters to driver’s license photos, leading to arrests.75 Mash together
these technologies and functionalities through the kind of generative mixing
allowed by their open APIs and it becomes trivial to receive answers to ques-
tions like: Where was Jonathan Zittrain last year on the fourteenth of Febru-
ary?, or, Who could be found near the entrance to the local Planned Par-
enthood clinic in the past six months? The answers need not come from
government or corporate cameras, which are at least partially secured against
abuse through well-considered privacy policies from Privacy 1.0. Instead, the
answers come from a more powerful, generative source: an army of the world’s
photographers, including tourists sharing their photos online without ﬁrm (or
legitimate) expectations of how they might next be used and reused.
As generativity would predict, those uses may be surprising or even oﬀensive
to those who create the new tools or provide the underlying data. The Christian
Gallery News Service was started by antiabortion activist Neal Horsley in the
mid 1990s. Part of its activities included the Nuremberg Files Web site, where
the public was solicited for as much information as possible about the identi-
ties, lives, and families of physicians who performed abortions, as well as about
clinic owners and workers.76 When a provider was killed, a line would be
drawn through his or her name. (The site was rarely updated with new infor-
mation, and it became entangled in a larger lawsuit lodged under the U.S. Free-
dom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act.77 The site remains accessible.) An asso-
ciated venture solicits the public to take pictures of women arriving at clinics,
including the cars in which they arrive (and corresponding license plates), and
posts the pictures in order to deter people from nearing clinics.78
With image recognition technology mash-ups, photos taken as people enter
clinics or participate in protests can be instantly cross-referenced with their
names. One can easily pair this type of data with Google Maps to provide ﬁne-
grained satellite imagery of the homes and neighborhoods of these individuals,
similar to the “subversive books” maps created by computer consultant and tin-
kerer Tom Owad, tracking wish lists on Amazon.79
This intrusion can reach places that the governments of liberal democracies
refuse to go. In early 2007, a federal court overseeing the settlement of a class
action lawsuit over New York City police surveillance of public activities held
that routine police videotaping of public events was in violation of the settle-
ment: “The authority . . . conferred upon the NYPD ‘to visit any place and at-
tend any event that is open to the public, on the same terms and conditions of
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the public generally,’ cannot be stretched to authorize police oﬃcers to video-
tape everyone at a public gathering just because a visiting little old lady from
Dubuque . . . could do so. There is a quantum diﬀerence between a police oﬃ-
cer and the little old lady (or other tourist or private citizen) videotaping or
photographing a public event.”80
The court expressed concern about a chilling of speech and political activi-
ties if authorities were videotaping public events. But police surveillance be-
comes moot when an army of little old ladies from Dubuque is naturally video-
taping and sharing nearly everything—protests, scenes inside a mall (such that
amateur video exists of a random shootout in a Salt Lake City, Utah, mall),81 or
picnics in the park. Peer-leveraging technologies are overstepping the bound-
aries that laws and norms have deﬁned as public and private, even as they are
also facilitating beneﬁcial innovation. Cheap processors, networks, and sensors
enable a new form of beneﬁcial information ﬂow as citizen reporters can pro-
vide footage and frontline analysis of newsworthy events as they happen.82 For
example, OhmyNews is a wildly popular online newspaper in South Korea
with citizen-written articles and reports. (Such writers provide editors with
their names and national identity numbers so articles are not anonymous.)
Similarly, those who might commit atrocities within war zones can now be sur-
veilled and recorded by civilians so that their actions may be watched and ulti-
mately punished, a potential sea change for the protection of human rights.83
For privacy, peer-leveraging technologies might make for a much more con-
strained world rather than the more chaotic one that they have wrought for in-
tellectual property. More precisely, a world where bits can be recorded, manip-
ulated, and transmitted without limitation means, in copyright, a free-for-all
for the public and constraint upon ﬁrms (and perhaps upstream artists) with
content to protect. For privacy, the public is variously creator, beneﬁciary, and
victim of the free-for-all. The constraints—in the form of privacy invasion that
Jeﬀrey Rosen crystallizes as an “unwanted gaze”—now come not only from the
well-organized governments or ﬁrms of Privacy 1.0, but from a few people gen-
eratively drawing upon the labors of many to greatly impact rights otherwise
guaranteed by a legal system.
Privacy and Reputation
At each layer where a generative pattern can be discerned, this book has asked
whether there is a way to sift out what we might judge to be bad generative re-
sults from the good ones without unduly damaging the system’s overall genera-
tivity. This is the question raised at the technical layer for network security, at
Solutions216
the content layer for falsehoods in Wikipedia and failures of intellectual prop-
erty protection, and now at the social layer for privacy. Can we preserve gener-
ative innovations without giving up our core privacy values? Before turning to
answers, it is helpful to explore a ﬁnal piece of the Privacy 2.0 mosaic: the im-
pact of emerging reputation systems. This is both because such systems can
greatly impact our privacy and because this book has suggested reputational
tools as a way to solve the generative sifting problem at other layers.
Search is central to a functioning Web,84 and reputation has become central
to search. If people already know exactly what they are looking for, a network
needs only a way of registering and indexing speciﬁc sites. Thus, IP addresses
are attached to computers, and domain names to IP addresses, so that we can
ask for www.drudgereport.com and go straight to Matt Drudge’s site. But
much of the time we want help in ﬁnding something without knowing the ex-
act online destination. Search engines help us navigate the petabytes of publicly
posted information online, and for them to work well they must do more than
simply identify all pages containing the search terms that we specify. They must
rank them in relevance. There are many ways to identify what sites are most rel-
evant. A handful of search engines auction oﬀ the top-ranked slots in search re-
sults on given terms and determine relevance on the basis of how much the site
operators would pay to put their sites in front of searchers.85 These search en-
gines are not widely used. Most have instead turned to some proxy for reputa-
tion. As mentioned earlier, a site popular with others—with lots of inbound
links—is considered worthier of a high rank than an unpopular one, and thus
search engines can draw upon the behavior of millions of other Web sites as
they sort their search results.86 Sites like Amazon deploy a diﬀerent form of
ranking, using the “mouse droppings” of customer purchasing and browsing
behavior to make recommendations—so they can tell customers that “people
who like the Beatles also like the Rolling Stones.” Search engines can also more
explicitly invite the public to express its views on the items it ranks, so that users
can decide what to view or buy on the basis of others’ opinions. Amazon users
can rate and review the items for sale, and subsequent users then rate the ﬁrst
users’ reviews. Sites like Digg and Reddit invite users to vote for stories and ar-
ticles they like, and tech news site Slashdot employs a rating system so complex
that it attracts much academic attention.87
eBay uses reputation to help shoppers ﬁnd trustworthy sellers. eBay users
rate each others’ transactions, and this trail of ratings then informs future buy-
ers how much to trust repeat sellers. These rating systems are crude but power-
ful. Malicious sellers can abandon poorly rated eBay accounts and sign up for
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new ones, but fresh accounts with little track record are often viewed skepti-
cally by buyers, especially for proposed transactions involving expensive items.
One study conﬁrmed that established identities fare better than new ones, with
buyers willing to pay, on average, over 8 percent more for items sold by highly
regarded, established sellers.88 Reputation systems have many pitfalls and can
be gamed, but the scholarship seems to indicate that they work reasonably
well.89 There are many ways reputation systems might be improved, but at
their core they rely on the number of people rating each other in good faith well
exceeding the number of people seeking to game the system—and a way to ex-
clude robots working for the latter. For example, eBay’s rating system has been
threatened by the rise of “1-cent eBooks” with no shipping charges; sellers can
create alter egos to bid on these nonitems and then have the phantom users
highly rate the transaction.90 One such “feedback farm” earned a seller a thou-
sand positive reviews over four days. eBay intervenes to some extent to elimi-
nate such gaming, just as Google reserves the right to exact the “Google death
penalty” by de-listing any Web site that it believes is unduly gaming its chances
of a high search engine rating.91
These reputation systems now stand to expand beyond evaluating people’s
behavior in discrete transactions or making recommendations on products or
content, into rating people more generally. This could happen as an extension
of current services—as one’s eBay rating is used to determine trustworthiness
on, say, another peer-to-peer service. Or, it could come directly from social net-
working: Cyworld is a social networking site that has twenty million sub-
scribers; it is one of the most popular Internet services in the world, largely
thanks to interest in South Korea.92 The site has its own economy, with $100
million worth of “acorns,” the world’s currency, sold in 2006.93
Not only does Cyworld have a ﬁnancial market, but it also has a market for
reputation. Cyworld includes behavior monitoring and rating systems that
make it so that users can see a constantly updated score for “sexiness,” “fame,”
“friendliness,” “karma,” and “kindness.” As people interact with each other,
they try to maximize the kinds of behaviors that augment their ratings in the
same way that many Web sites try to ﬁgure out how best to optimize their pre-
sentation for a high Google ranking.94 People’s worth is deﬁned and measured
precisely, if not accurately, by the reactions of others. That trend is increasing as
social networking takes oﬀ, partly due to the extension of online social net-
works beyond the people users already know personally as they “befriend” their
friends’ friends’ friends.
The whole-person ratings of social networks like Cyworld will eventually be
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available in the real world. Similar real-world reputation systems already exist
in embryonic form. Law professor Lior Strahilevitz has written a fascinating
monograph on the eﬀectiveness of “How’s My Driving” programs, where com-
mercial vehicles are emblazoned with bumper stickers encouraging other driv-
ers to report poor driving.95 He notes that such programs have resulted in sig-
niﬁcant accident reductions, and analyzes what might happen if the program
were extended to all drivers. A technologically sophisticated version of the
scheme dispenses with the need to note a phone number and ﬁle a report; one
could instead install transponders in every vehicle and distribute TiVo-like re-
mote controls to drivers, cyclists, and pedestrians. If someone acts politely, say
by allowing you to switch lanes, you can acknowledge it with a digital thumbs-
up that is recorded on that driver’s record. Cutting someone oﬀ in traﬃc earns
a thumbs-down from the victim and other witnesses. Strahilevitz is supportive
of such a scheme, and he surmises it could be even more eﬀective than eBay’s
ratings for online transactions since vehicles are registered by the government,
making it far more diﬃcult escape poor ratings tied to one’s vehicle. He ac-
knowledges some worries: people could give thumbs-down to each other for
reasons unrelated to their driving—racism, for example. Perhaps a bumper
sticker expressing support for Republicans would earn a thumbs-down in a
blue state. Strahilevitz counters that the reputation system could be made to
eliminate “outliers”—so presumably only well-ensconced racism across many
drivers would end up aﬀecting one’s ratings. According to Strahilevitz, this sys-
tem of peer judgment would pass constitutional muster if challenged, even if
the program is run by the state, because driving does not implicate one’s core
rights. “How’s My Driving?” systems are too minor to warrant extensive judi-
cial review. But driving is only the tip of the iceberg.
Imagine entering a café in Paris with one’s personal digital assistant or mo-
bile phone, and being able to query: “Is there anyone on my buddy list within
100 yards? Are any of the ten closest friends of my ten closest friends within
100 yards?” Although this may sound fanciful, it could quickly become main-
stream. With reputation systems already advising us on what to buy, why not
have them also help us make the ﬁrst cut on whom to meet, to date, to be-
friend? These are not diﬃcult services to oﬀer, and there are precursors today.96
These systems can indicate who has not oﬀered evidence that he or she is safe to
meet—as is currently solicited by some online dating sites—or it may use
Amazon-style matching to tell us which of the strangers who have just entered
the café is a good match for people who have the kinds of friends we do. People
can rate their interactions with each other (and change their votes later, so they
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can show their companion a thumbs-up at the time of the meeting and tell the
truth later on), and those ratings will inform future suggested acquaintances.
With enough people adopting the system, the act of entering a café can be
diﬀerent from one person to the next: for some, the patrons may shrink away,
burying their heads deeper in their books and newspapers. For others, the en-
tire café may perk up upon entrance, not knowing who it is but having a lead
that this is someone worth knowing. Those who do not participate in the
scheme at all will be as suspect as brand new buyers or sellers on eBay.
Increasingly, diﬃcult-to-shed indicators of our identity will be recorded and
captured as we go about our daily lives and enter into routine transactions—
our ﬁngerprints may be used to log in to our computers or verify our bank ac-
counts, our photo may be snapped and tagged many times a day, or our license
plate may be tracked as people judge our driving habits. The more our identity
is associated with our daily actions, the greater opportunities others will have to
oﬀer judgments about those actions. A government-run system like the one
Strahilevitz recommends for assessing driving is the easy case. If the state is the
record keeper, it is possible to structure the system so that citizens can know the
basis of their ratings—where (if not by whom) various thumbs-down clicks
came from—and the state can give a chance for drivers to oﬀer an explanation
or excuse, or to follow up. The state’s formula for meting out ﬁnes or other
penalties to poor drivers would be known (“three strikes and you’re out,” for
whatever other problems it has, is an eminently transparent scheme), and it
could be adjusted through accountable processes, just as legislatures already de-
termine what constitutes an illegal act, and what range of punishment it should
earn.
Generatively grown but comprehensively popular unregulated systems are a
much trickier case. The more that we rely upon the judgments oﬀered by these
private systems, the more harmful that mistakes can be.97 Correcting or identi-
fying mistakes can be diﬃcult if the systems are operated entirely by private
parties and their ratings formulas are closely held trade secrets. Search engines
are notoriously resistant to discussing how their rankings work, in part to avoid
gaming—a form of security through obscurity.98 The most popular engines re-
serve the right to intervene in their automatic rankings processes—to adminis-
ter the Google death penalty, for example—but otherwise suggest that they do
not centrally adjust results. Hence a search in Google for “Jew” returns an anti-
Semitic Web site as one of its top hits,99 as well as a separate sponsored adver-
tisement from Google itself explaining that its rankings are automatic.100 But
while the observance of such policies could limit worries of bias to search algo-
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rithm design rather than to the case-by-case prejudices of search engine opera-
tors, it does not address user-speciﬁc bias that may emerge from personalized
judgments.
Amazon’s automatic recommendations also make mistakes; for a period of
time the Oﬃcial Lego Creator Activity Book was paired with a “perfect partner”
suggestion: American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us Today. If such mis-
matched pairings happen when discussing people rather than products, rare
mismatches could have worse eﬀects while being less noticeable since they are
not universal. The kinds of search systems that say which people are worth get-
ting to know and which should be avoided, tailored to the users querying the
system, present a set of due process problems far more complicated than a state-
operated system or, for that matter, any system operated by a single party. The
generative capacity to share data and to create mash-ups means that ratings and
rankings can be far more emergent—and far more inscrutable.
SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF PRIVACY 2.0
Cheap sensors generatively wired to cheap networks with cheap processors
are transforming the nature of privacy. How can we respond to the notion
that nearly anything we do outside our homes can be monitored and shared?
How do we deal with systems that oﬀer judgments about what to read or
buy, and whom to meet, when they are not channeled through a public au-
thority or through something as suable, and therefore as accountable, as
Google?
The central problem is that the organizations creating, maintaining, using,
and disseminating records of identiﬁable personal data are no longer just “orga-
nizations”—they are people who take pictures and stream them online, who
blog about their reactions to a lecture or a class or a meal, and who share on so-
cial sites rich descriptions of their friends and interactions. These databases are
becoming as powerful as the ones large institutions populate and centrally de-
ﬁne. Yet the sorts of administrative burdens we can reasonably place on estab-
lished ﬁrms exceed those we can place on individuals—at some point, the 
burden of compliance becomes so great that the administrative burdens are
tantamount to an outright ban. That is one reason why so few radio stations are
operated by individuals: it need not be capital intensive to set up a radio broad-
casting tower—a low-power neighborhood system could easily ﬁt in someone’s
attic—but the administrative burdens of complying with telecommunications
law are well beyond the abilities of a regular citizen. Similarly, we could create a
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privacy regime so complicated as to frustrate generative developments by indi-
vidual users.
The 1973 U.S. government report on privacy crystallized the template for
Privacy 1.0, suggesting ﬁve elements of a code of fair information practice:
• There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence
is secret.
• There must be a way for an individual to ﬁnd out what information about
him is in a record and how it is used.
• There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that
was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other
purposes without his consent.
• There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identi-
ﬁable information about him.
• Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of
identiﬁable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their in-
tended use and must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.101
These recommendations present a tall order for distributed, generative sys-
tems. It may seem clear that the existence of personal data record-keeping sys-
tems ought not to be kept secret, but this issue was easier to address in 1973,
when such systems were typically large consumer credit databases or govern-
ment dossiers about citizens, which could more readily be disclosed and adver-
tised by the relevant parties. It is harder to apply the antisecrecy maxim to dis-
tributed personal information databases. When many of us maintain records or
record fragments on one another, and through peer-produced social network-
ing services like Facebook or MySpace share these records with thousands of
others, or allow them to be indexed to create powerful mosaics of personal data,
then exactly what the database is changes from one moment to the next—not
simply in terms of its contents, but its very structure and scope. Such databases
may be generally unknown while not truly “secret.”102
Further, these databases are ours. It is one thing to ask a corporation to dis-
close the personal data and records it maintains; it is far more intrusive to de-
mand such a thing of private citizens. Such disclosure may itself constitute an
intrusive search upon the citizen maintaining the records. Similarly, the idea of
mandating that an individual be able to ﬁnd out what an information gatherer
knows—much less to correct or amend the information—is categorically
more diﬃcult to implement when what is known is distributed across millions
of people’s technological outposts. To be sure, we can Google ourselves, but this
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does not capture those databases open only to “friends of friends”—a category
that may not include us but may include thousands of others. At the same time,
we may have minimal recourse when the information we thought we were cir-
culating within social networking sites merely for fun and, say, only among fel-
low college students, ends up leaking to the world at large.103
What to do? There is a combination of steps drawn from the solutions
sketched in the previous two chapters that might ameliorate the worst of Pri-
vacy 2.0’s problems, and even provide a framework in which to implement
some of the Privacy 1.0 solutions without rejecting the generative framework
that gives rise to Privacy 2.0 in the ﬁrst place.
The Power of Code-Backed Norms
The Web is disaggregated. Its pieces are bound together into a single virtual
database by private search engines like Google. Google and other search en-
gines assign digital robots to crawl the Web as if they were peripatetic Web
surfers, clicking on one link after another, recording the results, and placing
them into a concordance that can then be used for search.104
Early on, some wanted to be able to publish material to the Web without it
appearing in search engines. In the way a conversation at a pub is a private mat-
ter unfolding in a public (but not publicly owned) space, these people wanted
their sites to be private but not secret. The law oﬀers one approach to vindicate
this desire for privacy but not secrecy. It could establish a framework delineat-
ing the scope and nature of a right in one’s Web site being indexed, and provid-
ing for penalties for those who infringe that right. An approach of this sort has
well-known pitfalls. For example, it would be diﬃcult to harmonize such doc-
trine across various jurisdictions around the world,105 and there would be tech-
nical questions as to how a Web site owner could signal his or her choice to
would-be robot indexers visiting the site.
The Internet community, however, ﬁxed most of the problem before it could
become intractable or even noticeable to mainstream audiences. A software en-
gineer named Martijn Koster was among those discussing the issue of robot sig-
naling on a public mailing list in 1993 and 1994. Participants, including “a ma-
jority of robot authors and other people with an interest in robots,” converged
on a standard for “robots.txt,” a ﬁle that Web site authors could create that
would be inconspicuous to Web surfers but in plain sight to indexing ro-
bots.106 Through robots.txt, site owners can indicate preferences about what
parts of the site ought to be crawled and by whom. Consensus among some in-
ﬂuential Web programmers on a mailing list was the only blessing this standard
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received: “It is not an oﬃcial standard backed by a standards body, or owned by
any commercial organisation. It is not enforced by anybody, and there [sic] no
guarantee that all current and future robots will use it. Consider it a common
facility the majority of robot authors oﬀer the WWW community to protect
WWW server [sic ] against unwanted accesses by their robots.”107
Today, nearly all Web programmers know robots.txt is the way in which sites
can signal their intentions to robots, and these intentions are respected by every
major search engine across diﬀering cultures and legal jurisdictions.108 On this
potentially contentious topic—search engines might well be more valuable if
they indexed everything, especially content marked as something to avoid—
harmony was reached without any application of law. The robots.txt standard
did not address the legalities of search engines and robots; it merely provided a
way to defuse many conﬂicts before they could even begin. The apparent legal
vulnerabilities of robots.txt—its lack of ownership or backing of a large pri-
vate standards setting organization, and the absence of private enforcement de-
vices—may in fact be essential to its success.109 Law professor Jody Freeman
and others have written about the increasingly important role played by private
organizations in the formation of standards across a wide range of disciplines
and the ways in which some organizations incorporate governmental notions
of due process in their activities.110 Many Internet standards have been forged
much less legalistically but still cooperatively.111
The questions not preempted or settled by such cooperation tend to be
clashes between ﬁrms with some income stream in dispute—and where the law
has then partially weighed in. For example, eBay sued data aggregator Bidder’s
Edge for using robots to scrape its site even after eBay clearly objected both in
person and through robots.txt. eBay won in a case that has made it singularly
into most cyberlaw casebooks and even into a few general property case-
books—a testament to how rarely such disputes enter the legal system.112
Similarly, the safe harbors of the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998 give some protection to search engines that point customers to material
that infringes copyright,113 but they do not shield the actions required to cre-
ate the search database in the ﬁrst place. The act of creating a search engine, like
the act of surﬁng itself, is something so commonplace that it would be diﬃcult
to imagine deeming it illegal—but this is not to say that search engines rest on
any stronger of a legal basis than the practice of using robots.txt to determine
when it is and is not appropriate to copy and archive a Web site.114 Only re-
cently, with Google’s book scanning project, have copyright holders really be-
gun to test this kind of question.115 That challenge has arisen over the scanning
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of paper books, not Web sites, as Google prepares to make them searchable in
the same way Google has indexed the Web.116 The long-standing practice of
Web site copying, guided by robots.txt, made that kind of indexing uncontro-
versial even as it is, in theory, legally cloudy.
The lasting lesson from robots.txt is that a simple, basic standard created by
people of good faith can go a long way toward resolving or forestalling a prob-
lem containing strong ethical or legal dimensions. The founders of Creative
Commons created an analogous set of standards to allow content creators to in-
dicate how they would like their works to be used or reused. Creative Com-
mons licenses purport to have the force of law behind them—one ignores them
at the peril of infringing copyright—but the main force of Creative Commons
as a movement has not been in the courts, but in cultural mindshare: alerting
authors to basic but heretofore hidden options they have for allowing use of the
photos, songs, books, or blog entries they create, and alerting those who make
use of the materials to the general orientation of the author.
Creative Commons is robots.txt generalized. Again, the legal underpinnings
of this standard are not particularly strong. For example, one Creative Com-
mons option is “noncommercial,” which allows authors to indicate that their
material can be reused without risk of infringement so long as the use is non-
commercial. But the deﬁnition of noncommercial is a model of vagueness, the
sort of deﬁnition that could easily launch a case like eBay v. Bidder’s Edge.117 If
one aggregates others’ blogs on a page that has banner ads, is that a commercial
use? There have been only a handful of cases over Creative Commons licenses,
and none testing the meaning of noncommercial.118 Rather, people seem to
know a commercial (or derivative) use when they see it: the real power of the li-
cense may have less to do with a threat of legal enforcement and more to do
with the way it signals one’s intentions and asks that they be respected. Reliable
empirical data is absent, but the sense among many of those using Creative
Commons licenses is that their wishes have been respected.119
Applying Code-Backed Norms to Privacy: Data Genealogy
As people put data on the Internet for others to use or reuse—data that might
be about other people as well as themselves—there are no tools to allow those
who provide the data to express their preferences about how the data ought to
be indexed or used. There is no Privacy Commons license to request basic lim-
its on how one’s photographs ought to be reproduced from a social networking
site. There ought to be. Intellectual property law professor Pamela Samuelson
has proposed that in response to the technical simplicity of collecting substan-
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tial amounts of personal information in cyberspace, a person should have a pro-
tectable right to control this personal data. She notes that a property-based le-
gal framework is more diﬃcult to impose when one takes into account the mul-
tiple interests a person might have in her personal data, and suggests a move to
a contractual approach to protecting information privacy based in part on en-
forcement of Web site privacy policies.120 Before turning to law directly, we
can develop tools to register and convey authors’ privacy-related preferences
unobtrusively.
On today’s Internet, the copying and pasting of information takes place
with no sense of metadata.121 It is diﬃcult enough to make sure that a Cre-
ative Commons license follows the photograph, sound, or text to which it is
related as those items circulate on the Web. But there is no standard at all to
pass along for a given work and who recorded it, with what devices,122 and
most important, what the subject is comfortable having others do with it. If
there were, links could become two-way. Those who place information on
the Web could more readily canvas the public uses to which that information
had been put and by whom. In turn, those who wish to reuse information
would have a way of getting in touch with its original source to request per-
mission. Some Web 2.0 outposts have generated promising rudimentary
methods for this. Facebook, for example, oﬀers tools to label the photographs
one submits and to indicate what groups of people can and cannot see them.
Once a photo is copied beyond the Facebook environment, however, these
attributes are lost.123
The Web is a complex social phenomenon with information contributed
not only by institutional sources like Britannica, CNN, and others that place
large amounts of structured information on it, but also by amateurs like
Wikipedians, Flickr contributors, and bloggers. Yet a Google search intention-
ally smoothes over this complexity; each linked search result is placed into a
standard format to give the act of searching structure and order. Search engines
and other aggregators can and should do more to enrich users’ understanding
of where the information they see is coming from. This approach would
shadow the way that Theodor Nelson, coiner of the word “hypertext,” envi-
sioned “transclusion”—a means not to simply copy text, but also to reference it
to its original source.124 Nelson’s vision was drastic in its simplicity: informa-
tion would repose primarily at its source, and any quotes to it would simply
frame that source. If it were deleted from the original source, it would disappear
from its subsequent uses. If it were changed at the source, downstream uses
would change with it. This is a strong version of the genealogy idea, since the
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metadata about an item’s origin would actually be the item itself. It is data as
service, and insofar as it leaves too much control with the data’s originator, it
suﬀers from many of the drawbacks of software as service described in Chapter
Five. For the purposes of privacy, we do not need such a radical reworking of
the copy-and-paste culture of the Web. Rather, we need ways for people to sig-
nal whether they would like to remain associated with the data they place on
the Web, and to be consulted about unusual uses.
This weaker signaling-based version of Nelson’s vision does not answer the
legal question of what would happen if the originator of the data could not
come to an agreement with someone who wanted to use it. But as with robots
.txt and Creative Commons licenses, it could forestall many of the conﬂicts
that will arise in the absence of any standard at all.125 Most importantly, it
would help signal authorial intention not only to end users but also to the in-
termediaries whose indices provide the engines for invasions of privacy in the
ﬁrst place. One could indicate that photos were okay to index by tag but not by
facial recognition, for example. If search engines of today are any indication,
such restrictions could be respected even without a deﬁnitive answer as to the
extent of their legal enforceability. Indeed, by attaching online identity—if not
physical identity—to the various bits of data that are constantly mashed up as
people copy and paste what they like around the Web, it becomes possible for
people to get in touch with one another more readily to express thanks, suggest
collaboration, or otherwise interact as people in communities do. Similarly,
projects like reCAPTCHA could seek to alert people to the extra good their
solving of captchas is doing—and even let them opt out of solving the second
word in the image, the one that is not testing whether they are human but in-
stead is being used to perform work for someone else. Just as Moore v. Regents of
the University of California struggled with the issue of whether a patient whose
tumor was removed should be consulted before the tumor is used for medical
research,126 we will face the question of when people ought to be informed
when their online behaviors are used for ulterior purposes—including beneﬁ-
cial ones.
Respect for robots.txt, Creative Commons licenses, and privacy “tags,” and
an opportunity to alert people and allow them to opt in to helpful ventures
with their routine online behavior like captcha-solving, both requires and
promotes a sense of community. Harnessing some version of Nelson’s vision is
a self-reinforcing community-building exercise—bringing people closer to-
gether while engendering further respect for people’s privacy choices. It should
be no surprise that people tend to act less charitably in today’s online environ-
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ment than they would act in the physical world.127 Recall the discussion of ver-
keersbordvrij in Chapter Six, where the elimination of most traﬃc signs can
counterintuitively reduce accidents. Today’s online environment is only half of
the verkeersbordvrij system: there are few perceived rules, but there are also few
ways to receive, and therefore respect, cues from those whose content or data
someone might be using.128 Verkeersbordvrij depends not simply on eliminat-
ing most legal rules and enforcement, but also, in the view of its proponents,
crucially on motorists’ ability to roll down their windows and make eye contact
with other motorists and pedestrians, to signal each other, and to pull them-
selves away from the many distractions like mobile phones and snacking that
turn driving into a mechanical operation rather than a social act. By devising
tools and practices to connect distant individuals already building upon one
another’s data, we can promote the feedback loops found within functioning
communities and build a framework to allow the nicely part of Benkler’s “shar-
ing nicely” to blossom.129
Enabling Reputation Bankruptcy
As biometric readers become more commonplace in our endpoint machines, it
will be possible for online destinations routinely to demand unsheddable iden-
tity tokens rather than disposable pseudonyms from Internet users. Many sites
could beneﬁt from asking people to participate with real identities known at
least to the site, if not to the public at large. eBay, for one, would certainly proﬁt
by making it harder for people to shift among various ghost accounts. One
could even imagine Wikipedia establishing a “fast track” for contributions if
they were done with biometric assurance, just as South Korean citizen journal-
ist newspaper OhmyNews keeps citizen identity numbers on ﬁle for the articles
it publishes.130 These architectures protect one’s identity from the world at
large while still making it much more diﬃcult to produce multiple false “sock
puppet” identities. When we participate in other walks of life—school, work,
PTA meetings, and so on—we do so as ourselves, not wearing Groucho mus-
taches, and even if people do not know exactly who we are, they can recognize
us from one meeting to the next. The same should be possible for our online
selves.
As real identity grows in importance on the Net, the intermediaries de-
manding it ought to consider making available a form of reputation bank-
ruptcy. Like personal ﬁnancial bankruptcy, or the way in which a state often
seals a juvenile criminal record and gives a child a “fresh start” as an adult, we
ought to consider how to implement the idea of a second or third chance into
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our digital spaces. People ought to be able to express a choice to deemphasize if
not entirely delete older information that has been generated about them by
and through various systems: political preferences, activities, youthful likes and
dislikes. If every action ends up on one’s “permanent record,” the press confer-
ence eﬀect can set in. Reputation bankruptcy has the potential to facilitate de-
sirably experimental social behavior and break up the monotony of static com-
munities online and oﬄine.131 As a safety valve against excess experimentation,
perhaps the information in one’s record could not be deleted selectively; if
someone wants to declare reputation bankruptcy, we might want it to mean
throwing out the good along with the bad. The blank spot in one’s history in-
dicates a bankruptcy has been declared—this would be the price one pays for
eliminating unwanted details.
The key is to realize that we can make design choices now that work to cap-
ture the nuances of human relations far better than our current systems, and
that online intermediaries might well embrace such new designs even in the ab-
sence of a legal mandate to do so.
More, Not Less, Information
Reputation bankruptcy provides for the possibility of a clean slate. It works best
within informationally hermetic systems that generate their own data through
the activities of their participants, such as a social networking site that records
who is friends with whom, or one that accumulates the various thumbs-up and
thumbs-down array that could be part of a “How’s My Driving”–style judg-
ment.
But the use of the Internet more generally to spread real-world information
about people is not amenable to reputation bankruptcy. Once injected into the
Net, an irresistible video of an angry teacher, or a drunk and/or racist celebrity,
cannot be easily stamped out without the kinds of network or endpoint control
that are both diﬃcult to implement and, if implemented, unacceptably corro-
sive to the generative Internet. What happens if we accept this as fact, and also
assume that legal proscriptions against disseminating sensitive but popular data
will be highly ineﬀective?132 We might turn to contextualization: the idea, akin
to the tort of false light, that harm comes from information plucked out of the
rich thread of a person’s existence and expression.133 We see this in political
controversies—even the slightest misphrasing of something can be extracted
and blown out of proportion. It is the reason that oﬃcial press conferences are
not the same as bland conversation; they are even blander.
Contextualization suggests that the aim of an informational system should
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be to allow those who are characterized within it to augment the picture pro-
vided by a single snippet with whatever information, explanation, or denial
that they think helps frame what is portrayed. Civil libertarians have long sug-
gested that the solution to bad speech is more speech while realizing the diﬃ-
culties of linking the second round of speech to the ﬁrst without infringing the
rights of the ﬁrst speaker.134 Criticisms of the “more speech” approach have in-
cluded the observation that a retraction or amendment of a salacious newspa-
per story usually appears much less prominently than the original. This is par-
ticularly true for newspapers, where those seeing one piece of information may
not ever see the follow-up. There is also the worry that the fog of information
generated by a free-for-all is no way to have people discern facts from lies. Gen-
erative networks invite us to ﬁnd ways to reconcile these views. We can design
protocols to privilege those who are featured or described online so that they
can provide their own framing linked to their depictions. This may not accord
with our pre-Web expectations: it may be useful for a private newspaper to pro-
vide a right of reply to its subjects, but such an entity would quickly invoke a
First Amendment–style complaint of compelled speech if the law were to pro-
vide for routine rights of reply in any but the narrowest of circumstances.135
And many of us might wish to discuss Holocaust deniers or racists without giv-
ing them a platform to even link to a reply. The path forward is likely not a for-
mal legal right but a structure to allow those disseminating information to
build connections to the subjects of their discussions. In many cases those of us
disseminating may not object—and a properly designed system might turn
what would have otherwise been one-sided exchanges into genuine dialogues.
We already see some movement in this direction. The Harvard Kennedy
School’s Joseph Nye has suggested that a site like urban legend debunker
snopes.com be instituted for reputation, a place that people would know to
check to get the full story when they see something scandalous but decontextu-
alized online.136 The subjects of the scandalous data would similarly know to
place their answers there—perhaps somewhat mitigating the need to formally
link it to each instance of the original data. Google invites people quoted or dis-
cussed within news stories to oﬀer addenda and clariﬁcation directly to Google,
which posts these responses prominently near its link to the story when it is a
search result within Google News.137 Services like reputationdefender.com
will, for a fee, take on the task of trying to remove or, failing that, contextualize
sensitive information about people online.138 ReputationDefender uses a broad
toolkit of tactics to try to clear up perceived invasions of privacy—mostly
moral suasion rather than legal threat.
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To be sure, contextualization addresses just one slice of the privacy problem,
since it only adds information to a sensitive depiction. If the depiction is em-
barrassing or humiliating, the opportunity to express that one is indeed em-
barrassed or humiliated does not much help. It may be that values of privacy
are implacably in tension with some of the fruits of generativity. Just as the dig-
ital copyright problem could be solved if publishers could ﬁnd a way to proﬁt
from abundance rather than scarcity, the privacy problem could be solved if we
could take Sun Microsystems CEO McNealey’s advice and simply get over it.
This is not a satisfying rejoinder to someone whose privacy has been invaded,
but, amazingly, this may be precisely what is happening: people are getting
over it.
THE GENERATIONAL DIVIDE: BEYOND INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
The values animating our concern for privacy are themselves in transition.
Many have noted an age-driven gap in attitudes about privacy perhaps rivaled
only by the 1960s generation gap on rock and roll.139 Surveys bear out some of
this perception.140 Fifty-ﬁve percent of online teens have created proﬁles on
sites like MySpace, though 66 percent of those use tools that the sites oﬀer to
limit access in some way.141 Twice as many teens as adults have a blog.142 In-
terestingly, while young people appear eager to share information online, they
are more worried than older people about government surveillance.143 Some
also see that their identities may be discovered online, even with privacy con-
trols.144
A large part of the personal information available on the Web about those
born after 1985 comes from the subjects themselves. People routinely set up
pages on social networking sites—in the United States, more than 85 percent
of university students are said to have an entry on Facebook—and they impart
reams of photographs, views, and status reports about their lives, updated to
the minute. Friends who tag other friends in photographs cause those photos to
be automatically associated with everyone mentioned—a major step toward
the world in which simply showing up to an event is enough to make one’s
photo and name permanently searchable online in connection with the event.
Worries about such a willingness to place personal information online can be
split into two categories. The ﬁrst is explicitly paternalistic: children may lack
the judgment to know when they should and should not share their personal
information. As with other decisions that could bear signiﬁcantly on their
lives—signing contracts, drinking, or seeing movies with violent or sexual con-
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tent—perhaps younger people should be protected from rash decisions that fa-
cilitate infringements of their privacy. The second relies more on the generative
mosaic concern expressed earlier: people might make rational decisions about
sharing their personal information in the short term, but underestimate what
might happen to that information as it is indexed, reused, and repurposed by
strangers. Both worries have merit, and to the extent that they do we could de-
ploy the tools of intermediary gatekeeping to try to protect people below a cer-
tain age until they wise up. This is just the approach of the U.S. Children’s On-
line Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA).145 COPPA ﬁts comfortably but
ineﬀectually within a Privacy 1.0 framework, as it places restrictions on opera-
tors of Web sites and services that knowingly gather identiﬁable information
from children under the age of thirteen: they cannot do so without parental
consent. The result is discernable in most mainstream Web sites that collect
data; each now presents a checkbox for the user to aﬃrm that he or she is over
thirteen, or asks outright for a birthday or age. The result has been predictable;
kids quickly learn simply to enter an age greater than thirteen in order to get to
the services they want.146 To achieve limits on the ﬂow of information about
kids requires levels of intervention that so far exceed the willingness of any ju-
risdiction.147 The most common scheme to separate kids from adults online is
to identify individual network endpoints as used primarily or frequently by
kids and then limit what those endpoints can do: PCs in libraries and public
schools are often locked down with ﬁltering software, sometimes due to much-
litigated legal requirements.148
A shift to tethered appliances could greatly lower the costs of discerning age
online. Many appliances could be initialized at the time of acquisition with the
birthdays of their users, or sold assuming use by children until unlocked by the
vendor after receiving proof of age. This is exactly how many tethered mobile
phones with Internet access are sold,149 and because they do not allow third-
party code they can be much more securely conﬁgured to only access certain
approved Web sites. With the right standards in place, PCs could broadcast to
every Web site visited that they have not been unlocked for adult browsing, and
such Web sites could then be regulated through a template like COPPA to re-
strict the transmission of certain information that could harm the young users.
This is a variant of Lessig’s idea for a “kid enabled browser,” made much more
robust because a tethered appliance is diﬃcult to hack.150
These paternalistic interventions assume that people will be more careful
about what they put online once they grow up. And even those who are not
more careful and regret it have exercised their autonomy in ways that ought to
Solutions232
be respected. But the generational divide on privacy appears to be more than
the higher carelessness or risk tolerance of kids. Many of those growing up with
the Internet appear not only reconciled to a public dimension to their lives—
famous for at least ﬁfteen people—but eager to launch it. Their notions of pri-
vacy transcend the Privacy 1.0 plea to keep certain secrets or private facts under
control. Instead, by digitally furnishing and nesting within publicly accessible
online environments, they seek to make such environments their own. My-
Space—currently the third most popular Web site in the United States and
sixth most popular in the world151—is evocatively named: it implicitly prom-
ises its users that they can decorate and arrange their personal pages to be ex-
pressive of themselves. Nearly every feature of a MySpace home page can be 
reworked by its occupant, and that is exactly what occupants do, drawing on
tools provided by MySpace and outside developers.152 This is generativity at
work: MySpace programmers creating platforms that can in turn be directed
and reshaped by users with less technical talent but more individualized cre-
ative energy. The most salient feature of privacy for MySpace users is not se-
crecy so much as autonomy: a sense of control over their home bases, even if
what they post can later escape their conﬁnes. Privacy is about establishing a lo-
cus which we can call our own without undue intervention or interruption—a
place where we can vest our identities. That can happen most directly in a par-
ticular location—“your home is your castle”—and, as law professor Margaret
Radin explains, it can also happen with objects.153 She had in mind a ring or
other heirloom, but an iPod containing one’s carefully selected music and video
can ﬁt the bill as well. Losing such a thing hurts more than the mere pecuniary
value of obtaining a fresh one. MySpace pages, blogs, and similar online out-
posts can be repositories for our identities for which personal control, not se-
crecy, is the touchstone.
The 1973 U.S. government privacy report observed:
An agrarian, frontier society undoubtedly permitted much less personal privacy than
a modern urban society, and a small rural town today still permits less than a big city.
The poet, the novelist, and the social scientist tell us, each in his own way, that the
life of a small-town man, woman, or family is an open book compared to the more
anonymous existence of urban dwellers. Yet the individual in a small town can retain
his conﬁdence because he can be more sure of retaining control. He lives in a face-to-
face world, in a social system where irresponsible behavior can be identiﬁed and
called to account. By contrast, the impersonal data system, and faceless users of the
information it contains, tend to be accountable only in the formal sense of the word.
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In practice they are for the most part immune to whatever sanctions the individual
can invoke.154
Enduring solutions to the new generation of privacy problems brought
about by the generative Internet will have as their touchstone tools of connec-
tion and accountability among the people who produce, transform, and con-
sume personal information and expression: tools to bring about social systems
to match the power of the technical one. Today’s Internet is an uncomfortable
blend of the personal and the impersonal. It can be used to build and reﬁne
communities and to gather people around common ideas and projects.155 In
contrast, it can also be seen as an impersonal library of enormous scale: faceless
users perform searches and then click and consume what they see. Many
among the new generation of people growing up with the Internet are enthusi-
astic about its social possibilities. They are willing to put more of themselves
into the network and are more willing to meet and converse with those they
have never met in person. They may not experience the same divide that Twain
observed between our public and private selves. Photos of their drunken ex-
ploits on Facebook might indeed hurt their job prospects156—but soon those
making hiring decisions will themselves have had Facebook pages. The diﬀer-
ential between our public and private selves might be largely resolved as we de-
velop digital environments in which views can be expressed and then later re-
vised. Our missteps and mistakes will not be cause to stop the digital presses;
instead, the good along with the bad will form part of a dialogue with both the
attributes of a small town and a “world where anyone, anywhere may express
his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into si-
lence or conformity.”157 Such an environment will not be perfect: there will be
Star Wars Kids who wish to retract their private embarrassing moments and
who cannot. But it will be better than one without powerful generative instru-
mentalities, one where the tools of monitoring are held and monopolized by
the faceless institutions anticipated and feared in 1973.
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Nicholas Negroponte, former director of the MIT Media Lab, an-
nounced the One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) project at the beginning
of 2005. The project aims to give one hundred million hardy, portable
computers to children in the developing world. The laptops, called
XOs, are priced around $100, and they are to be purchased by gov-
ernments and given to children through their schools.1 As of this writ-
ing Brazil, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Rwanda, and Uruguay have
committed to a pilot run that will have the XO’s assembly lines ramp-
ing up to ﬁve million machines per month and totaling approximately
20 percent of all laptop manufacturing in the world.2
The pitch to governments footing the bill emphasizes alignment
with existing schoolhouse curricula and practices. A laptop can be a
cost-eﬀective way to distribute textbooks, because it can contain so
much data in a small space and can be updated after it has been dis-
tributed. Says Negroponte: “The hundred-dollar laptop is an educa-
tion project. It’s not a laptop project.”3
Yet OLPC is about revolution rather than evolution, and it embod-
ies both the promise and challenge of generativity. The project’s intel-
lectual pedigree and structure reveal an enterprise of breathtaking theoretical
and logistical ambition. The education Negroponte refers to is not the rote
learning represented by the typical textbook and the three R’s that form the
basis of most developing and developed country curricula. Rather, the XO is
shaped to reﬂect the theories of fellow Media Lab visionary Seymour Papert.
Alternately known as constructionism or constructivism, Papert’s vision of ed-
ucation downplays drills in hard facts and abstract skills in favor of a model that
teaches students how to learn by asking them to undertake projects that they
ﬁnd relevant to their everyday lives.4
A modest incarnation of the OLPC project would distribute PCs as elec-
tronic workbooks. The PCs would run the consumer operating systems and ap-
plications prevailing in the industrialized world—the better to groom students
for work in call centers and other outsourced IT-based industries. Microsoft,
under competition from free operating systems, has shown a willingness to
greatly reduce the prices for its products in areas where wallets are smaller, so
such a strategy is not necessarily out of reach, and in any case the XO machine
could run one of the more consumer-friendly versions of free Linux without
much modiﬁcation.5
But the XO completely redesigns today’s user interfaces from the ground up.
Current PC users who encounter an XO have a lot to unlearn. For example, the
arrow pointer serves a diﬀerent purpose: moving the XO’s arrow toward the
center of the screen indicates options that apply only to that computer; moving
the pointer toward any edge indicates interaction with nearby computers or the
community at large.
The XO envisions students who are able to hack their own machines: to re-
program them even as they are learning to read and write—and to do so largely
on their own initiative. The XO dissemination plan is remarkably light on both
student and teacher training. There are a handful of trainers to cover the thou-
sands of schools that will serve as distribution points, and the training function
is more to ensure installation and functioning of the servers rather than true
mastery of the machines. Students are expected to rely on each other and on
trial-and-error to acquire most of the skills needed to use and reprogram the
machines.
Content also seems a calculated afterthought. The XO project wiki—hap-
hazardly organized, as wikis tend to be—featured a “call for content” in late
2006, mere months before millions of machines were to be placed in children’s
hands, for “content creators, collectors, and archivists, to suggest educational
content for inclusion with the laptops, to be made available to millions of chil-
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dren in the developing the world, most of whom do not have access to learning
materials.”6 Determining exactly what would be bundled on the machines,
what would repose on servers at schools, and what would be available on the
XO Web site for remote access was very much a work in progress even as de-
ployment dates neared.
In other words, XO has embraced the procrastination principle that is wo-
ven through generative technologies. To the chagrin and discomfort of most
educational academics following the project, there is little focus on speciﬁc ed-
ucational outcomes or metrics.7 There are no ﬁrm plans to measure usage of the
laptops, or to correlate changes in test scores with their deployment and use. In-
stead, the idea is to create an infrastructure that is both simple and generative,
stand back, and see what happens, ﬁxing most major substantive problems only
as they arise, rather than anticipating them from the start.
Thus as much as Negroponte insists that the project is not a technology play,
the lion’s share of the eﬀort has gone into just that, and is calculated to promote
a very special agenda of experimentation. Central to the XO’s philosophy is
that each machine should belong to a single child, rather than being found in a
typical computer lab or children’s cyber café. That partially explains the XO’s
radical design, both in physical form and in software. It features especially small
keys so that adults cannot easily use it if they should steal it from a child, and it
has no moving parts within. There is no hard drive to suﬀer from a fall; the
screen is designed to be viewable in direct sunlight; and it consumes little
enough power that it can be recharged with a crank or other physical motion in
the absence of a source of electricity. The machines automatically form mesh
networks with one another so that children can share programs and data with
each other or connect to a school’s data repository in the absence of any ISPs. It
is a rediscovery of the principles behind FIDOnet, the ad hoc network of bul-
letin boards programmed on PCs that called each other using modems before
PC users could connect to the Internet.
One bundled application, TamTam, lets a child use the machine to generate
music and drumbeats, and nearby machines can be coordinated through their
mesh networks so that each one represents a diﬀerent instrument in a sym-
phony the group can compose and play. Just as some students might develop
and express talents at the technical layer, reprogramming the machines, others
might be inspired to develop musical talents through the rough tools of Tam-
Tam at the content layer.
Constructionism counts on curiosity and intellectual passion of self- or in-
formally taught individuals as its primary engine, exactly the wellspring tapped
Conclusion 237
by generative systems. From XO’s founders we see an attempt to reprise the
spirit that illuminated the original personal computer, Internet, and Web. They
believe that it is less important to provide content than to provide a means of
making it and passing it along, just as an Internet without any plan for content
ended up oﬀering far more than the proprietary walled gardens that had so
carefully sponsored and groomed their oﬀerings. There is a leap of faith that a
machine given entirely to a child’s custody, twenty-four hours a day, will not
promptly be lost, stolen, or broken. Instead, children are predicted to treat
these boxes as dear possessions, and some among them will learn to program,
designing and then sharing new applications that in turn support new kinds of
content and interaction that may not have been invented in the developed
world.
Yet the makers of the XO are aware that it is not the dawn of the networked
era. We have experienced market boom and wildly successful applications, but
also bust, viruses, and spam. The sheer scale and public proﬁle of the XO proj-
ect make it diﬃcult fully to embrace an experimentalist spirit, whether at the
technical, content, or social layers. The sui generis modiﬁed Linux-based oper-
ating systems within the XO machines give them an initial immunity to the
worms and viruses that plague the machines of the developed world, so that
should they choose to surf the world’s Web they will not be immediately over-
come by the malware that otherwise requires constantly updated ﬁrewalls.
They can breathe the digital air directly, without the need for the expensive
antivirus “clean suits” that other PCs must have. XO’s director of security has
further implemented a security architecture for the machines that keeps pro-
grams from being able to communicate with each other, in order to preemp-
tively quarantine any attack in one part of the machine.8 This means that a
word processor cannot talk directly to a music program, and an Internet pro-
gram cannot talk to a drawing program. This protects the machine from hy-
pothetical viruses, but it also adds a layer of inﬂexibility and complexity to
an operating system that children are supposed to be able to understand and
modify.
The XO thus combines its generative foundation with elements of a tethered
appliance. XO staﬀ have vowed never to accede to requests for content ﬁlter-
ing9—yet they have built a kill switch into the machines so that stolen models
can be selectively disabled,10 and such a switch opens the door to later remote
control. Thus, XOs are both independent as they can form mesh networks, and
tethered as they can be updated, monitored, and turned oﬀ from afar, so long as
they are connected to the Internet. They are generative in spirit and architec-
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ture, and they are also appliances, painstakingly designed to be reliable to and
usable by someone who cannot read or write. They combine the hope of the
early Internet era with the hard lessons of its second phase. They represent the
confusion of the interregnum between the unbridled explosion of cheap and
ﬂexible processors, networks, and sensors, and the tightening up that comes as
their true power is appreciated—and abused.
Perhaps the audience of schoolchildren in developing countries is remote
and uninteresting enough to those who want to control or compromise today’s
information technology that it will be helpfully overlooked during the critical
time period in which backwater status helps to foster generative development.
Just as domain names were originally ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served, and no major
companies reserved their own names or foresaw a trademark problem, poor
schoolchildren may not be deemed enough of an economic market to be worth
vying for—either in attracting their eyeballs to show them advertising, or in
preventing them from exchanging bits that could be copyrighted. There are no
preexisting CD sales among them to dent.
XO is but the most prominent and well-funded of a series of enterprises to
attempt to bridge the digital divide. Other eﬀorts, such as the Volkscomputer
in Brazil, the VillagePDA, and the Ink have fared poorly, stuck at some phase of
development or production.11 Negroponte’s impatience with tentative initial
steps, and with the kind of planning and study that ﬁrm-based ventures usually
require, has worried many in the international development community. They
fear that a prominent failure of the project could unduly tarnish other attempts
to deploy technology in the developing world. The Indian government an-
nounced in 2006 that it would not sign up to buy any XO machines, in part
due to diﬃculties encountered with the Simputer, a for-proﬁt project begun in
1998 to deliver handheld technology to India’s rural population, which is made
up mostly of farmers and laborers—many of whom are illiterate and speak re-
gional dialects. In 2001, Bruce Sterling lionized the Simputer as “computing as
it would have looked if Gandhi had invented it, then used Steve Jobs for his ad
campaign.”12 It never took oﬀ. Instead India appears to be placing its bets on
the Novantium Nova or a similar device, non-generative machines fully teth-
ered to a subscription server for both software and content.13
Will XO fail like the others? Development experts view it as skeptically as ed-
ucation experts do, seeing XO as yet another risky heaving of hardware at prob-
lems that are actually political, social, and economic in nature. Debates on the
XO wiki wonder whether teching-up an entire generation of millions of chil-
dren will be good or bad for those already online. Some worry that the already-
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formidable sources of Nigerian “419” spam soliciting business deals will grow
and diversify. There is even musing that guerrilla ﬁghters could use the laptops’
mesh networking capabilities to communicate secretly on the battleﬁeld.14
(Depending on which side one supports in that battle, that could be good, al-
though it is a far cry from the notion of laptops as educational gateways for chil-
dren.)
As computer scientist Gene Spaﬀord wrote:
We can’t defend against the threats we are facing now. If these mass computer give-
aways succeed, shortly we will have another billion users online who are being raised
in environments of poverty, with little or no education about proper IT use, and of-
ten in countries where there is little history of tolerance (and considerable history of
religious, ethnic and tribal strife). Access to eBay and YouTube isn’t going to give
them clean water and freedom from disease. But it may help breed resentment and
discontent where it hasn’t been before.
Gee, I can barely wait. The metaphor that comes to mind is that if we were in the
ramp-up to the Black Plague in the middle ages, these groups would be trying to ﬁnd
ways to subsidize the purchase of pet rats.15
Spaﬀord appears to recognize the delicate condition of today’s Net, and he
believes that a pause in expansion is needed—a bit of time to digest the prob-
lems that beset it. The easier and more risk-averse path is to distribute mobile
phones and other basic Net appliances to the developing world just as those de-
vices are becoming more central in the developed one, bridging the digital di-
vide in one sense—providing useful technology—while leaving out the gener-
ative elements most important to the digital space’s success: the integration of
people as participants in it rather than only consumers of it.
But a project like OLPC oﬀers an opportunity to demonstrate ﬁxes to the
Net’s problems among audiences that have yet to encounter it. Its XO repre-
sents a new path of continued if cautious generativity as the developed world’s
technology is beginning to ossify under the weight of its own success. It repre-
sents a faith not only that students can learn to reprogram their computers, but
that what they direct them to do will be, on balance, good if disruptive.
The story of the XO is the story of the generative pattern. The pattern begins
with the ambitious planting of a ﬂag for a new enterprise in an overlooked back-
water. The procrastination principle gives license for the idea’s technical and so-
cial blueprints to be incomplete. Contribution is welcome from outsiders, and if
the project takes oﬀ, the results may prove completely unexpected.
The XO’s skeptics have much in common with generativity’s skeptics. They
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can convincingly put forward the very real risks attendant to a project only par-
tially planned, without extensive layers of measurement, control, and account-
ability. These risks are most obviously grouped under the rubric of security, but
the label is far too narrow either to capture the problem or to point us to the
most promising solutions—just as the story of badware on PCs is not simply a
story about security worries on the Internet, narrowly deﬁned.
Rather, the limits of an open PC and Net, and the fears for the XO, are much
more general case studies of what happens within systems that are built with a
peculiar and extraordinary openness to contribution and innovation and that
succeed because of it. They challenge us to understand and meet the problems
arising from success in a way that does not neuter what made the original suc-
cess possible.
The puzzle of PC security is fundamentally the same as the puzzle of keeping
Wikipedia honest and true—and perhaps giving birth to its version 2.0 succes-
sor—now that Wikipedia has entered the prime-time glare, attracting partici-
pants who are ignorant or scornful of its ideals. It is the puzzle of empowering
people to share and trade stories, photos, and recommendations without losing
their identities as they become not only the creators of distributed scrutiny and
judgment, but also their subjects.
It is the puzzle of Herdict, the application designed to run on netizens’ PCs
to generate and share a collective map of vital signs, that can produce distrib-
uted judgments about good code and bad. One of the ﬁrst questions asked
about Herdict is whether makers of badware will simply hijack lots of PCs and
compel them to report to Herdict that they are happy, when in fact they are
not. One answer acknowledges the problem and then seeks, from day one, to
forestall it while it is still on the drawing board, with attendant complication,
investment, and elaboration. An alternative answer says: The point at which
Herdict is worth the eﬀort of bad people to game it is a milestone of success. It is
a token of movement from the primordial soup that begins the generative pat-
tern to the mainstream impact that attracts the next round of problems.
Imagine planning but not yet executing Wikipedia: “Won’t people come
along and vandalize it?” One response to that question, and to the others like it
that arise for an idea as crazy as Wikipedia, would be to abandon the idea—to
transform it so much in anticipation of the problems that it is unrecognizable
from its original generative blueprint. The response instead was to deem the
question reasonable but premature. The generativity that makes it vulnerable
also facilitates the tools and relationships through which people can meet the
problems when ﬁrst-round success causes them to materialize.
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The animating spirit: “Ready, ﬁre, aim.” This ethos is a major ingredient of
Google’s secret sauce as a company, a willingness to deploy big ideas that re-
main labeled “beta” for months even as they become wildly popular, as Google
News was. It lies behind the scanning of all the world’s books, despite the logis-
tical burdens and legal uncertainties. To the amazement of those of us who
work for universities and could not possibly persuade our general counsels to
risk their clients’ endowments on such a venture, Google simply started doing
it. The litigation continues as this book goes to press, and so does the scanning
of the books and the indexing of their contents, available to hundreds of mil-
lions of people who would otherwise never know of them, at books.google.com.
How we choose to approach generative puzzles animates the struggle be-
tween the models of the Net and of television, of the insurgent and the incum-
bent. Traditional cyberlaw frameworks tend to see the Net as an intriguing
force for chaos that might as well have popped out of nowhere. It is too easy to
then shift attention to the “issues raised” by the Net, usually by those threat-
ened by it—whether incumbent technical-layer competitors like traditional
telephony providers, or content-layer ﬁrms like record companies whose busi-
ness models (and, to be sure, legally protected interests) are disrupted by it.
Then the name of the game is seen to be coming up with the right law or policy
by a government actor to address the issues. Such approaches can lead to useful,
hard-nosed insights and suggestions, but they are structured to overlook the
fact that the Net is quite literally what we make it.
The traditional approaches lead us in the direction of intergovernmental or-
ganizations and diplomatically styled talk-shop initiatives like the World Sum-
mit on the Information Society and its successor, the Internet Governance 
Forum, where “stakeholders” gather to express their views about Internet gov-
ernance, which is now more fashionably known as “the creation of multi-stake-
holder regimes.” Such eﬀorts import from professional diplomacy the notion
of process and unanimity above all. Their solution for the diﬃculties of indi-
vidual state enforcement on the Net is a kind of negotiated intellectual har-
mony among participants at a self-conscious summit—complex regimes to be
mapped out in a dialogue taking place at an endlessly long table, with a role for
all to play. Such dialogues end either in bland consensus pronouncements or in
ﬁnal documents that are agreed upon only because the range of participants has
been narrowed.
It is no surprise that this approach rarely gets to the nuts and bolts of design-
ing new tools or grassroots initiatives to take on the problems it identiﬁes. The
Net and its issues sail blithely on regardless of the carefully worded commu-
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niqués that emerge from a parade of meetings and consultations. Stylized gath-
erings of concerned stakeholders are not inherently bad—much can come of di-
alogue among parties whose interests interconnect. Indeed, earlier in this book I
called for a latter-day Manhattan Project to take on the most pressing problems
facing the generative Internet. But the types of people that such a project re-
quires are missing from the current round of “stakeholder governance” struc-
tures. Missing are the computer scientists and geeks who would rather be coding
than attending receptions in Geneva and Tunis. Without them we too easily ne-
glect the prospect that we could code new tools and protocols to facilitate social
solutions—the way that the robots.txt of Chapter Nine has so far headed oﬀ
what otherwise would have been yet another cyberlaw issue.
To be sure, from the earliest days of the Internet the people who designed its
protocols acceded to some formality and diplomacy. Recall that they published
“RFCs,” requests for comments designed to write up their ideas, creating insti-
tutional structure and memory as the project became bigger than just a few re-
searchers in a room. The author of the ﬁrst one—RFC 1—recalls: “We
parceled out the work and wrote the initial batch of memos. In addition to par-
ticipating in the technical design, I took on the administrative function of set-
ting up a simple scheme for numbering and distributing the notes. Mindful
that our group was informal, junior and unchartered, I wanted to emphasize
these notes were the beginning of a dialog and not an assertion of control.”16
Informal, junior, and unchartered, yet collaborative and at least partially
structured: this includes people who are eager to take on a parcel of work and
build. It represents the ingredients found in the generative soil of Wikipedia,
Pledgebank, Meetup, CouchSurﬁng.com, and other countless innovations
that abound on the Net, themselves made possible because the Net’s soil is
made of the same stuﬀ. The way to secure it and the innovations built upon it
is to empower rank-and-ﬁle users to contribute, rather than to impose security
models that count on a handful of trusted people for control. We need tools
that cure the autistic nature of today’s Net experience: PC users unaware of
their digital environments and therefore unable to act on social cues, whether
of danger or of encouragement.
If history is a guide, these tools can just as likely come from one or two re-
searchers as from hackers, and the properly executed Manhattan Project to bol-
ster the Net for another round of success will not be marked by centralization
so much as by focus: the application of money and encouragement to those
who step forward to help ﬁx the most important and endemic problems that
can no longer tolerate any procrastination.
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Just as the XO’s technology platform seeks to cultivate such contributions as
routine rather than as obscure or special, by placing generative technologies
into as many children’s hands as possible, the educational systems in the devel-
oped world could be geared to encourage and reward such behavior, whether at
the technical, content, or social layers.
Unfortunately, the initial reaction by many educators to digital participatory
enterprises—ones that indeed may be subverted by their users—is fear. Many
teachers are decrying the ways in which the Net has made it easy to plagiarize
outright or to draw from dubious sources.17 Some schools and universities
have banned the citation of Wikipedia in student papers,18 while signing up
for plagiarism detection services like TurnitIn.com and automatic essay-grad-
ing tools like SAGrader.com, which “uses computational intelligence strategies
to grade students [sic ] essays in seconds and respond with detailed, topic-spe-
ciﬁc feedback.”19
Instead of being subject to technology that automates and reinforces the
worst aspects of contemporary education—emphasizing regurgitation and
summarization of content from an oracular source, followed by impersonal
grading within a conceptual echo chamber—our children ought to be encour-
aged to accept the participatory invitation of the Net and that which has recur-
sively emerged at its upper layers from its open technologies below. Wikipedia’s
conceded weakness as a source is an invitation to improve it, and the act of im-
proving it can be as meaningful to the contributor as to those who come after.
Our students can be given assignments that matter—reading with a critical eye
the sources that the rest of the online world consults, and improving them as
best they know how, using tools of research and argument and intellectual hon-
esty that our schools can teach. Instead of turning in a report for a single teacher
to read, they can put their skills into work that everyone can read. The millions
of students doing make-work around the world can come to learn instead that
what they do can have consequences—and that if they do not contribute, it is
not necessarily true that others will. In other words, we can use our generative
technologies to teach our children to take responsibility for the way the world
works rather than to be merely borne along by its currents. This will work best
if our teachers are on board. Without people to whom others can apprentice, to
learn technical skills and social practice, generative technologies can ﬂounder.
This is the XO’s vulnerability, too—if it fails, it may in large part be because the
technology was too diﬃcult to master and share, and its possibilities not hinted
at enough to entice learners to persist in their attention to it.
Like the XO, generativity itself is, at its core, not a technology project. It is an
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education project, an exercise in intellect and community, the founding con-
cepts of the university. Our universities are in a position to take a leadership
role in the Net’s future. They were the Net’s original cradle, along with the self-
taught hobbyists who advanced the PC from its earliest days. Business and
commerce followed in their wake, reﬁning and expanding the opportunities
developed through largely nonmarket process and ethos. The Internet and at-
tached generative platforms are invitations to code and to build. Universities—
and not just their computer science departments—should see those invitations
as central to their missions of teaching their students and bringing knowledge
to the world.
As countries and groups in the developing world incline to brand new gen-
erative technologies, those in the developed world must ﬁght to retain theirs.
There is not a simple pendulum swinging from generative to non-generative
and back again; we cannot count on the fact that screws tightened too far can
become stripped. Any comprehensive redesign of the Internet at this late stage
would draw the attention of regulators and other parties who will push for ways
to prevent abuse before it can even happen. Instead, we must piecemeal reﬁne
and temper the PC and the Net so that they can continue to serve as engines of
innovation and contribution while mitigating the most pressing concerns of
those harmed by them. We must appreciate the connection between generative
technology and generative content.
Today’s consumer information technology is careening at breakneck pace,
and most see no need to begin steering it. Our technologists are complacent be-
cause the ongoing success of the generative Net has taken place without central
tending—the payoﬀs of the procrastination principle. Rank-and-ﬁle Internet
users enjoy its beneﬁts while seeing its operation as a mystery, something they
could not possibly hope to aﬀect. They boot their PCs each day and expect
them more or less to work, and they access Wikipedia and expect it more or less
to be accurate.
But our Net technologies are experiencing the ﬁrst true shock waves from
their generative successes. The state of the hacking arts is advancing. Web sites
can be compromised in an instant, and many visitors will then come away with
an infected PC simply for having surfed there. Without a new cadre of good
hackers unafraid to take ownership of the challenges posed by their malicious
siblings and create the tools needed to help nonhackers keep the Net on a con-
structive trajectory, the most direct solutions will be lockdown that cuts short
the Net experiment, deprives us of its fruits, and facilitates a form of govern-
mental control that upends a balance between citizen and sovereign. These rip-
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ples can be followed recursively up the Net’s layers. Our generative technolo-
gies need technically skilled people of goodwill to keep them going, and the
ﬂedgling generative activities above—blogging, wikis, social networks—need
artistically and intellectually skilled people of goodwill to serve as true alterna-
tives to a centralized, industrialized information economy that asks us to iden-
tify only as consumers of meaning rather than as makers of it. Peer production
alone does not guarantee collaborative meaning making. Services like Inno-
Centive place ﬁve-ﬁgure bounties on diﬃcult but modular scientiﬁc problems,
and ask the public at large to oﬀer solutions.20 But the solutions tendered then
become the full property of the institutional bounty hunter.21 Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk has created a marketplace for the solving of so-called human in-
telligence tasks on the other side of the scale: trivial, repetitive tasks like tracing
lines around the faces in photographs for a ﬁrm that has some reason to need
them traced.22 If ﬁve years from now children with XOs were using them for
hours each day primarily to trace lines at half a penny per trace, it could be a
useful economic engine to some and a sweatshop to others—but either way it
would not be an activity that is generative at the content layer.
The deciding factor in whether our current infrastructure can endure will be
the sum of the perceptions and actions of its users. There are roles for tradi-
tional state sovereigns, pan-state organizations, and formal multistakeholder
regimes to play. They can help reinforce the conditions necessary for generative
blossoming, and they can also step in—with all the confusion and diﬃculty
that notoriously attends regulation of a generative space—when mere generos-
ity of spirit among people of goodwill cannot resolve conﬂict. But such gen-
erosity of spirit is a society’s powerful ﬁrst line of moderation.
Our fortuitous starting point is a generative device in tens of millions of
hands on a neutral Net. To maintain it, the users of those devices must experi-
ence the Net as something with which they identify and belong. We must use
the generativity of the Net to engage a constituency that will protect and nur-
ture it. That constituency may be drawn from the ranks of a new generation
able to see that technology is not simply a video game designed by someone
else, and that content is not simply what is provided through a TiVo or iPhone.
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CHAPTER 2. BATTLE OF THE NETWORKS
1. In October 1984, 73 percent of home computers had been purchased in the previous
two years. R K, U.S. D’  C, C  I
U   U S: 1984, at 9 tbl.1 (1988), available at http://www
.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/computer/p23–155.html. But over 50 per-
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holds, did not even use the machine; instead, their children were the primary users. Id. at
4. Among those who did brave the waters, “learning to use” was the most popular activ-
ity, followed by video games, household records, and word processing. Id. at 16 tbl.5.
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K, U.S. D’  C, C  I U   U
S: 1989, at 1 (1991), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/
socdemo/computer/p23-.html. And although children were still the proportionately
dominant users (and in many cases the reason why the machine was purchased), adults
had begun to use bulletin board services (5.7 percent) and e-mail (5.3 percent) on their
PCs. Id. at 10, 16 tbl.5.
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C. N, U.S. D’  C, C U   U St:
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65 percent connected from their homes, and most relied on the Net as an information
resource. Id. at 10. Web browsing and e-mail now trailed only word processing among
adult home users. See U.S. Census Bureau, Table 7: Purpose of Computer Use at Home
by People 18 Years and Over: October 1997, http://www.census.gov/population/
socdemo/computer/report97/tab07.pdf.
By 2003, 89 percent of home computer users browsed the Internet and used e-mail.
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C  I U   U S: 2003, at 12 tbl.F (2005), avail-
able at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p23–208.pdf. Integration of the Inter-
net into users’ daily lives occurred at an accelerated pace between 1997 and 2003. The
number of users who relied on the Net for daily news or personal communications in-
creased by a factor of four during that period, and use of the Net for retail shopping in-
creased by a factor of ﬁfteen. Id. at 13 ﬁg.8.
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